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Summary
This study is based on the archaeological investigation of
three wrecks from the Spanish Armada of 1588. As a result of these
discoveries it has been possible to assess in practical terms the
equipment and resources with which the Spaniards intended to
invade England, and to identify their strengths and weaknesses.
The ships were in general sturdy and well handled, but most of
them were merchantmen and few could stand up well to heavy gunnery.
The use of artillery at sea forms a major part of the stu~, and
the extensive collection of guns and associated equipment recovered
from the wrecks has helped to show why the Spaniards' performance
in this respect was all but ineffective. Relics of the invasion
army's weapons and mat~riel, which include parts of a dismantled
heavy siege train, indicate on the other hand that the troops
carried by the fleet were well equipped and likely to have been, if
given the chance ashore, a formidable and fast-moving force.
A fresh examination of the historical material, studied in
conjunction with the archaeological evidence, has thrown new light
on the campaign as a whole. The threat which England faced in 1588
is shown to have been a very real one. If the original plan put
forward by the Spanish commanders to mount a self-contained task
force from Lisbon had prevailed, the enterprise would almost
certainly have succeeded. But Philip II's insistence on using the
Army of Flanders as the main invasion force, with a smaller-scale
Armada to escort it across the Channel in barges, gave rise to
difficulties which proved insuperable. As an armed convoy the
Armada might indeed have proved invincible, but as a battle-fleet
it was almost inevitably bound to fail.
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Dates, weights, and measures
At the time of the Armada the Spaniards were following the
calendar as adjusted by Pope Gregor,yXIII in 1582, while the
English still adhered to the old Julian system. English dates
therefore appear to fall ten d~s earlier than their Spanish
counterparts. Gregorian dating has been followed throughout
this stu~, except when English documents are cited directly,
in which case the initials OS (for Old Style) appear in
brackets after the date.
The Castilian libra of 460 grams, and the quintal of 100
libras, were the main weight units used in the Armada prepar-
ations. Libra is abbreviated as .re. or lli (for "pounder") in
the text, quintal is ill or gtx (plural). Where the word "pound"
is employed the indication is general and non-specific, unless
it is used in an English context, in which case its value, as
tod~, is 454 grams.
Other relevant units may be defined as follows:
~(~) - one sixteenth of a libra
Azumbre - 20017 litres
Cuartillo - 0.504 litres
Arroba (as a
weight) .. 25 libras
(as a liquid
measure, oil) - 12.56 litres
(as a liquid
measure, wine) - 16.13 litres
These values are extracted from the official correspondence tables
of 1852, which convert the ancient measures of the various Spanish
provinces to the metric system. They are published in the Enciclopedia
Universal Ilustrada, vol. 34, pp. 1306 - 1314. Further information
on individual units can be found under the appropriate headings in
the same work. The volume of a cask, or~, at the time of the
Armada is uncertain, although a discover,y from La Trinidad Valencera
suggests that it was about 590 litres (pp. 350-1).
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The fieldwork recorded in these pages spans a period during
which the metric system replaced Imperial measurement as the
standard employed in British archaeology. Some of the earlier
work, notably that conducted on the Santa Maria de la Rosa site,
was recorded in feet and inches, and this standard has been
retained in the drawings prepared at the time. Otherwise, the
metric system has been used throughout.
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Captions for figures (in separate portfolio)
Unless otherwise specified, the figures are the work of the writer
Frontispiece. The amphibious landings at Terceira in July 1583.
It was to mount just such an operation against England that the
Armada was launched. Fresco in the Hall of Battles at the Escorial,
1590 (reproduced from Tenison, Elizabethan England, portfolio of
plates, no. 9).
1. The proposed formation of the Armada, as sent to the Grand Duke
of TuscanY by his ambassador to Spain on 18 May 1588. The Grand
Duke's own ship, the Florencia[8] , is shown as number 14 (reproduced
from Walker, The Armada, p. 88).
2. The theatre of operations, showing the Armada's track and the
subsequent track of ships mentioned in the text.
3. General locations of the five wreck sites.
4. Kinnagoe B~, County Donegal, where La Trinidad Valencera was
wrecked on 16 September 1588 (cf. Figure 5).
50 The Trinidad Valencera wreck site and its environs.
6. The Trinidad Valencera wreck site showing the main excavation
grid, and the results of the metal detector surveyo
7. The jet-probe surv~ on the Trinidad Valencera site, superimposed
on the main grid. The shaded areas denote a sediment depth of less
than 3 feet, while the asterisks show the soundings where organic
material was encounteredo
8. South sector of the main grid, showing the areas excavated up to
19760
9. North sector of the main grid, showing the areas excavated up to
1976. Grid references in the text, which are prefixed by "Grid",
refer to measurements in feet, first horizontally and then
vertically, from point A on the baseline.
100 The area to the north-east of the main grid, showing the extent
of the organic deposit and a series of dislocated ship's timbers.
A section through the deposit is shown belowo
11. A concretion deposit centred on Grid 40.100. The material,
which' consists largely of iron nails, is probably spill from the
barrel represented by the two iron hoops in the right-hand concretion.
12. An organic deposit, partially excavated at Grid 520166, which
includes a wooden lantern top (note the burn mark at its centre) and,
within a matrix of splintered debris, a leather bottleo
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13. Features at Grid 170147. The upper part of the large wooden sheave
block l~ within the zone of biological and mechanical degradation.
Below that level, where the sea bed is stable, the organic material
is well preservedo A corner of the block rests on the rim of a 10-
spoked limber wheel. Scale in incheso
14. Blasket Sound, photographed from the cliff above Coumeenoole
Strand, where the only survivor from the Santa Marfa de la Rosa was
probably cast ashore (cf. Figure 15). The ship sank beyond the Lure,
the hump-backed rock in the upper centre. Great Blasket Island lies
in the background.
15. The sequence of events in Blasket Sound on 21 September 1588,
based on the relacibn of Marcos de Aramburu and on finds made in
the course of the 1968 swimline searches.
16. Anchors id~ntified as belonging to the San Juan of Castile
(left) and the Santa Marfa de la Rosa (right).
17. Rim of a pewter plate showing the name of (Francisco Ruiz) Matute
of the Santa Mar!a de la Rosa.
18. General plan of the Santa Marfa wreck site at the completion of
excavations in 1969.
19. Structural elements and other finds at the forward section of
the Santa Marfa wreck.
20. The damaged mast-step complex on the Santa Marfa wreck. Thia
feature was only partially excavated.
t'210 Lower frame timbers of the Santa Mar~a, revealed during excavation.
Scale in feeto
22. Stroms Hellier, Fair Isle, where El Gran Grifon was wrecked on
28 September 1588. This photograph was obtained through the kindness
and skilful piloting of Captain Alan Whitfield of Loganairo
23. Topographical survey of Stroma Hellier, showing the area (defined
by the square labelled "Grid") within which the wreckage of El Gran
Grifon was contained.
24. El Gran Grifon's wreck site, showing the areas excavated. The
grid system, in metres, is read horizontally and then vertically,
as on La Trinidad Valencera.
25. A cast-iron gun, sectioned by abrasion, lying within the concretion
matrix in the excavated gully bottom at Grid 28017.
26. Section through the concretion deposit at Grid 30.17.
Key to depositsl
1. Regularly mobile shingle
20 Partially stable shingle, with organic staining
3. Black sand4. Concretion l~er, overlain by bronze gun
50 Black organic l~er
60 Clean shingle
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21. Impacted lead shot from the Gran Grif6n wreck, of musket and
arquebus calibre (1.3 and 1.9 cm). This is presumably English shot
fired at the ship during the engagements in the Channel or off
Gravelines, and it indicates the ver,yclose range at which some of
the fighting was conducted.
28. The San Mart{n after the battle of Sao Miguel in 1582. Detail
from the fresco in the Hall of Battles at the Escorial, 1590
(reproduced fro~ Walker, The Armada, p. 23). Cf. my reconstruction
of the San Mart1n's internal l~out on p. 189.
29. Profile of a Spanish galleon, from an original by Diego Garcia
de Palacio, 1581 (reproduced from Waters, The Elizabethan navY and
the Armada of Spain. p.\!,S).
30. A galley offloading ordnance with a block hung from her lateen
yard (reproduced from Gentilini, Instruttioni di Artiglieri, p. 64).
31. Another method of getting ~ns ashore from a galley, using a
ramp formed with its own oars lreproduced from Capo Bianco, Corona
e palma militare, p. 46).
32. The square-rigged Armada galleass from the Greenwich cartoon
(reproduced from St~nuit, Treasures of the Armada, p. 28).
33. Bartolomeo Crescentio's Mediterranean galleass of 1607 (reproduced
from his Nautica Mediterranea, p. 62).
34. A large Mediterranean merchant ship from the tomb of Alessandro
Contarini of Padua, who died in 1555 (reproduced from Braudel,
The Mediterranean, vol. 1, plate 10).
350 Structural timbers from the wreck of La Trinidad Valencerao
36. A Baltic hulk from a woodcut after Breughel, c. 1560 (reproduced
from Martin, Full Fathom Five, plate 9).
31. A flat-bottomed barge with ramps at either end, and other Rhine
river craft; detail of a woodcut by Anton Woensam, 1531 (reproduced
from Geisburg, The German single-leaf woodcut, vol. Lt, p. \SlO•
38. Medias culebrinas from Juan de Acu~a Vela's submission to Philip
II, 25 July 1581 (from a photograph supplied by the Archivo General
at Simaneas, My P, V-17, per Geoffrey Parker).
39. Different sizes of iron roundshot and their windages, from a
memorandum sent by Juan de Acuna Vela on 20 January 1590 (from a
photograph supplied by the Archivo General at Simancas, M y P,
V-20, per Geoffrey Parker).
40. One of the matched pair of canones de batir cast by Remigy de
Halut, recovered from the wreck of La Trinidad Valencera.
41. Hinged vent covers for the Remigy guns.
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42. Canones de batir from Juan de Acuna Vela's submission to Philip
II, 25 July 1581 (from a photograph supplied by the Archivo General
at Simancas, My P, V-18, per Geoff~ey Parker). The lower gun may be
the missing piece from La Trinidad Valencera (see note 34 to Chapter
Three)o
43. 20-lbr medios canones from Juan de Acuna.Vela's submission to
Philip II, 25 Ju~ 1581 (from a photograph supplied by the Archivo
General at Simancas, per Geoffrey Parker).
44. Bronze guns from non-Spanish sourcesa top, a French medio can~n
from the San Juan de Sicilia [11] J second, a Venetian media can5n
from La Trinidad Valencera; third, a Venetian sacre from La Trinidad
Valencera; bottom, a Venetian media sacre from La Trinidad Valencera.
45. A can6n pedrero (reproduced from Collado, Pl~tica.Manual, F. 35).
Note also the rammer and ladle.
46. Wrought-iron breech-block, probably belonging to a pedrero-type
gun, from La Trinidad Valencera.
41. Casting specification for a culebrina, 25 July 1581 (from a
photograph supplied by the Archivo General at Simancas, per Geoffrey
Parker).
48. Bronze media cu1ebrina (top) and media sacre (bottom) from El
Gran Grifon. The error in the alignment of the b.oreof the medi-;-
culebrina is shown projected from the broken muzzle end.
49. Histogram of iron roundshot recovered from El Gran Grifon, and
its relationship to the guns she carried.
50. Cast-iron guns from El Gran Grifon. 1, long media sacre. 2, short
sacre; 3, eroded breech end of a sacre similar to 2, showing the
location of ball, charge, and wadding (£L. Figure 51).
51. Sectioned breech of a loaded cast-iron sacre from El Gran Grif6n
(no. 3 in Figure 50). The gunpowder residues have been removed. Part
of the breech has been cut clean to reveal its void-free, true section.
52. (a) Falcon pedrero from La Trinidad Valencera, and (b) Moretti's
petriero , braga (reproduced from his Trattato del artig1ieria, p. 31).
53. Wrought-iron guns and breech-blocks from El Gran Grifon. 1,
lombardaJ 2-5, breech-blocks from similar pieces; 6, part of a falcon
pedrero; 1 and 8, swivel gun breech-blocks.
54. Bronze esmeril from the Girona, showing its own breech-block and
the breech-block of a larger but similar type.
55. Bronze esmeril from the San Juan de Sicilia, now in the School
Museum at Charterhouse.
56. A 4-truck carriage from the MarY Rose, wrecked in 1545 (reproduced
from Peter Whitlock, note in Mariner's Mirror, 66 (1980), p. 345).
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51. English naval truck carriages emplaced ashore with anchor holdfastsl
a detail from the Smerwick map of 1580 (from a photograph supplied
by the Public Record Office, MFF - 15, per Tom Glasgow, Jr.).
58. Late sixteenth-centur,y Spanish sea carriage (from a photograph
supplied by the Archivo General at Simancas, M y P, XVIII-48, per
Geoffrey Parker).
59. Another type of Spanish sea carriage (source, as above, M y P,
XVIII-49, per Geoffrey Parker).
60. Sea carriage illustrated by Pietro Sardi, 1621 (from his Artiglieria,
p. 130).
61. Guncarriage components from La Trinidad Valenceral top, 10-spoked
wheel of a type associated with carriages on the MarY Rose; bottom,
tripartite wheel and axle.
62. Top, a wooden musket stock from La Trinidad Valencera; bottom, an
incomplete arquebus stock from the same site.
63. A wheel-lock musket of c. 1600 at the moment of firing. Note the
forked rest with which it is operated. These tests, which were carried
out for the BBC by Mr A.C. Carpenter, showed that beyond 15 metres
accuracy was poor, and that it was almost impossible to hit a man-sized
target at 30 metres.
640 Wooden powder flasks from La Trinidad Valencera. The flask for the
main charge, on the right, would hold about 1£ libras, while the
smaller priming flask has a capacity of about 4 onzas.
650 Concretion cast showing the imprint of elaborate decoration on the
surface of a morion. Scale in centimetres.
66. Brass plume-holder from a morion. Scale in millimetreso
610 The remains of a leather shoe with its silk lace in situ. Scale in
centimetres.
680 The fore part of a cloth anklet, 15 em wide, with fabric-covered
buttons.
69. Leather water or wine bottles from La Trinidad Valencera, with
wooden funnels and stoppers. Scale in centimetres.
70. A 10-spoked limber wheel with its associated concretions, in situ
on the Trinidad Valencera site.
11. Reconstructions of the artiller,yundercarriage assemblies from
La Trinidad Valencera. Top, main carriage assembly; bottom, limber
assembly.
12. Drawing of a field gun's undercarriage assembly by Pietro Sard1
(from his Artiglieria, Figure 13).
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73. Reconstructed side elevation of a mounted canon de batir from
La Trinidad Valencera, based on the archaeological finds and on
information given by Pietro Sardi.
74. Heavy oak swingletree, presumably from the draught assembly of
one of La Trinidad Valencera's canones de batir. Scale in inches and
centimetres.
75. Charles V's artiller,y train exercising at Munich in 1530, from a
woodcut by Hans Sebald Beham (reproduced from Geisberg, The German
single-leaf woodcut, vol. 1, p. 275). Note the limbers to the rear
of the unhitched guns, the ammunition wagons, and the tripod hoists
for mounting and dismounting the artiller,y. The nearest limber is
fitted with the linkage between its chassis and the axle-ends, as
discussed on ppo 334-5.
76. Sponge heads'from La Trinidad Valencera, scale in centimetres.
In use these would have been cased in sheepskin envelopes, with the
wool outermost.
77. Gunner's linstock of wood from La Trinidad Valencera. Scale in
centimetreso
78. The detached head of another wooden linstock, with the fuse still
in situo Note the burn mark on the underside.
79. Carpenter's claw-hammer (left) and blacksmith's hammer (right),
from La Trinidad Valencera.
~
80. A pair of bellows from La Trinidad Valencera. Scale in inches and
centimetreso
81. Felloe and spoke from a small wheel, 85 em in diameter, from
La Trinidad Valencera. Its size and proportions suggest that it ~
have been from a light handcart.Scale in inches.
82. Remains of hurdling, perhaps part of a gabion, in situ on the
Trinidad Valencera site. Scale in 5-centimetre graduations.
83. Field artiller,y gabions, from a 1530 woodcut by Ehard Schoen
(reproduced from Geisberg, The German single-leaf woodcut, vol. ~ ,
pp. 12.10-11) 0
84(~lFir sapling for the construction of defensive obstacles, from
La Trinidad Valencera. Scale 1 metre. The two other pieces could have
s~rved either as levers or as palisade stakes. (b) A detail from
~ard Schoen's 1530 woodcut shows such defences in use (source as for
Figure 83).
85. Remains of a wooden gunpowder keg from La Trinidad Valencera. Scale
in inches and centimetres.
86. A ceramic alcanc{a, or firepot, from La Trinidad Valencera. It is
12 cm high and 10.5 cm in diameter.
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87. A firepot with its fuses attached (reproduced from Lucar,
Appendix, p. 74).
88. The remains of a bomba, or trunk, in situ on tha Trinidad Valencera
wreck sitae
89. Troops carr,ying flame-emitting bombas, a detail from Hogenburg's
woodcut of the arrest of the duke of Aarschot in 1577 (reproduced fro~
Decavele, Eenheid en Scheiding, Cat. 484). Note also the droop-curved
arquebus stocks and the powder flasks.
90. Restored ~ (left) and gunpowder keg from La Trinidad Valencera.
91. Olive jar of half-arroba capacity from La Trinidad Valencera.
92. Steelyard, steelyard weights (top centre and right) and a weight
from a nested set (top left) fro~ La Trinidad Valencera.
93. Turned wooden bowls from La Trinidad Valencera~ The large one
seems suited to a messing sub-unit, or camarada, while the two smaller
ones might have belonged to individual soldiers.
94. The four common forms of green-glazed Portuguese potter,y found on
the wrecks. It seems reasonable to link these forms with the platos,
escudillas, ollas y jarros which the marquis of Santa Cruz proposed
should be_ordered from the Lisbon potteries in his Armada blueprint
of-1586~----95. The Wan-Li bowl from La Trinidad Valencera.
96. Religious medallions from La Trinidad Valencera.
97. Elements of a wooden lantern with a pewter candle-holder from
La Trinidad Valencera. Its lights were probably of horn. QI. the
lantern shown in Figure 89.
98. Various ~nner' s rulesl
(a) Blade from a gunner's stiletto (Mann, Gunner's stiletto
plate 10)
(b) Collado's Italian rule,
reversed for convenience (Practica Manual di
Artilleria, p. 3)
(Instruttioni di
Artigileri, pQ 4)
(Dell' Arte militare)
(c) Gentilini's rule
(d) Cataneo's rule
(e) Trinidad Valencera rule (both faces shown)
99. Wooden shot gauges from La Trinidad Valencera. Scale in centimetres.
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Introduction
"Now this fleet [the Spanish Armada] is here, and must
be waited upon with all our force, which is little enough.
There should be an infinite quantity of powder and shot
provided, and continually sent abroad; without the which
great hazard may grow to our country; for this is the
greatest and strongest combination, to my understanding,
that was ever gathered in Christendom."(l) John Hawkins
wrote this anxious letter "in haste and bad weather" aboard
his ship, the Victory, on 10 August 1588 - that is, several
days after most historians consider that the Spanish Armada
had met an apparantly inevitable defeat at the hands of
Queen Elizabeth's navy. A full week later the English
commander, Lord Admiral Howard, "in haste and much occupied"
aboard his flagship ~ Royal, breathed an audible Sigh of
relief as his enemies continued to sail away northwards:
"Some made little account of the Spanish force by sea; but I
do warrant you, all the world never saw such a force as
theirs was."(2) On 20 August even the redoubtable Francis
Drake was by no means certain that the threat had passed.
From the Reyenge, he reminded his government: "The prince of
Parma, I take him to be as a bear robbed of her whelps; and
no doubt but, being so great a soldier as he is, that he
will presently, if he may, undertake some great
matter•••Truly, my poor opinion is that we should have a
great eye unto him."(3)
- 2 -
The best-informed opinion in England in 1588 was thus
not disposed to underestimate the enormity of the threat
posed by Philip II's great fleet. These three commanders
were writing from the same flagships aboard which, only a
few days earlier, they had fought the longest and fiercest
artillery action ever fought at sea. Even as they wrote the
Spanish fleet, battered but with its formidable order and
discipline still largely intact, was loose in the northern
seas. A powerful invasion army of veteran troops, under one
of the most determined and capable military commanders of
the age, remained on the coast of Flanders, poised to
embark. It had been a very close call, and the danger was
by no means past. The English fleet, supported as it was by
only the most rUdimentary and parsimonious supply
organisation, had run out of ammunition. The Spaniards, it
was widely believed, had themselves expended most if not all
of their roundshot, but Howard, Drake and Hawkins knew
better than anyone that in a battle without big guns the
Spaniards, with their companies of shipboard infantry and
superior skill in hand-to-hand fighting, would possess an
irresistable advantage. England, at the last, was almost
without defence, and her navy could only, in Lord Admiral
Howard's words, "set on a brag countenance and give chase,
as though we had wanted nothing, until we had cleared our
own coast and some part of Scotland with them."(4)
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The bluff worked, and the Armada struggled on past the
northern isles into the Atlantic in an effort to gain sea
room for a safe run southwards to the ports of Galicia and
Biscay. But fortune did not favour the Spaniards. The
autumnal gales of that portentous year - the winds of God,
as their Protestant enemies would have it - blew early and
with unusual violence, driving the returning ships towards
the iron-bound Atlantic coasts of Scotland and Ireland.
Many were wrecked. For the Spaniards it was an unmitigated
disaster, but one brought about as much by the forces of
nature as by the hand of man. In English and Dutch eyes,
however, it was both an overwhelming naval victory and a
clear demonstration of where divine sympathies lay. The
anxious realism expressed by the English commanders at the
moment of crisis was thus swamped, in the euphoria of
deliverance, by a growing tide of patriotic fervour which
saw the events as an affirmation of England's inevitable
naval and religious superiority over her enemies.
What, then, was the reality of the Spanish threat in
1588? And why, if indeed it was a substantive one, did it
fail?
It might be thought that historians have already
considered these questions from every conceivable angle, and
answered them satisfactorily. The historiography of the
Armada is immense: few episodes of naval warfare have
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received so much attention from English-speaking writers.
The conflict, in addition to its appeal as what is often
seen to be a climactic finale to the maritime struggle
between England and Spain which began in the middle years of
the sixteenth century, is in many respects exceptionally
well documented. On the Spanish side the years of planning
and preparation which preceded it involved decisions of
policy at the highest level coupled with a great mass of
administrative minutiae through which these policies were
put into effect. In consequence the ponderous Spanish
bureaucratic machine, of which Philip II was in effect both
managing director and chief clerk, generated an enormous
volume of paperwork concerning these matters, and much of it
has survived in the royal archives at Simancas and
elsewhere.
The serious study of this material began in the late
nineteenth century with the calendaring and editing of a
,
selection of the Armada documents, particularly by Fernandez
Duro in 1884 and 1885 (5), by E. Herrera Oria in 1929 (6),
and, in English translation, by Martin Hume in 1899.(7) Most
of the relevant English documents were published by Sir John
Laughton in 1894, (8) while Horatio Brown's translated
selection of Venetian state papers contains much valuable
comment from well-informed contemporary observers -
particularly the ambassador at Madrid, Hieronimo
Lippomano.(9) These great works of transcription, together
with their excellent commentaries, have formed the basis of
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most subsequent studies of the Armada campaign. But
although their value remains undiminished they are, as their
compilers were at pains to point out, no more than edited
selections of those documents which were considered to be,
in the light of contemporary historical tradition, the most
relevant. For almost a century, in consequence, Armada
studies have tended to stagnate in rich but
unreplenished pond
progenitors.
provided by their late Victorian
That this should be so invites the consideration of
another factor. Britain, in the late nineteenth century, was
at the zenith of her imperial glory; her ironclads ruled the
world's oceans, and the battle of Trafalgar, from which her
immense sea-power and popular pride in it directly stemmed,
was less than a century past. It was therefore natural for
Britons (and British historians) to follow their Elizabethan
forebears' comfortable belief, born in the afterglow of the
Armada's undoing, that their navy was predestined always to
thwart invaders before they reached the English coast.
Indeed, since then, Britain's navy had almost always won;
and its successes were often enough traced back (with
varying degrees of justification) to technical or tactical
innovations which were first manifested in 1588. In
consequence, men like Drake and Nelson were frequently
regarded as being separated in time but not in outlook; they
were super-heroes cast in the unchanging mould of British
naval tradition. But eighteenth and nineteenth century
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principles of sea-power, so admirably set into perspective
by A.T. Mahan, simply did not apply in the sixteenth
century. (10) Concepts such as long-term economic blockade,
the domination of global shipping-routes, and the physical
annihiliation of an enemy's battle-fleet were beyond the
grasp of contemporary men's minds and, more to the point,
well outside the technical and logistical capacities of
sixteenth-century naval administrations. This has tended to
obscure the fact that there was no 'right' way, in 1588, of
exercising naval power. More than one approach was
possible, and those adopted by England and Spain in their
conflict were indeed fundamentally different. That the
English approach did, in the end, succeed, does not prove
that it was bound to do so. As we shall see, it might very
easily have failed.
We should not therefore base our assessment of the
Armada campaign on the application of Mahanian principles
two centuries ahead of their time, as many modern historians
have sought to dOi nor should we allow the cloud of
patriotic dogma which sits over most English views of the
event to influence our judgement of what actually happened.
Much of history, it has shrewdly been observed, is the
propaganda of the winning sides, and this is manifestly so -
in some instances much more blatantly than in others - of
most versions of the Armada story, from the proliferation of
triumphant broadsheets issued by the victors and their
sympathisers, almost before the gunsmoke had cleared, to the
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compilations
Spanish) from
of modern writers (few of whom have been
Froude to the present day.(ll) Even Garrett
Mattingly's magisterial Defeat of the Spanish Armada, by far
the best account so far published, treats the campaign as
incidental to the broad surge of military, political and
dynastic events surrounding it, and adds little to
conventional interpretations of the fighting. (12) It is true
to say that no comprehensive and objective study of the
naval and military aspects of the 1588 campaign has yet been
written from the Spanish point of view, and that the written
sources, extensive though they are,
themselves to supply all the answers.
are not likely in
There exists, however, a primary source of evidence
which has not, until now, been considered by historians. In
the terrible aftermath of the campaign, thirty or more
Armada ships were lost off the western coasts of Scotland
and Ireland. The sites of five of these wrecks are known
and four or them have been subjected, in recent years, to
careful archaeological investigation. Physical evidence
from the wrecks can now be studied against the unusually
full documentary background, the one source complementing
and illuminating the other. But, far from simply confirming
the 'conventional' historical interpretations, this new
material has pointed to hitherto unsuspected anomalies and
gaps in the documentary evidence, and laid the foundations
for a radically new assessment of the event as a whole. It
is with this reassessment, and particularly with the
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archaeological evidence which supports it, that my thesis is
concerned.
I am aware that the task I have set myself is, in same
respects, beyond the capacity of a single researcher. It
would have been impossible for me to have consulted all of
the potentially relevant documentary material: many
distinguished scholars, working over a span of more than a
century, have so far failed to exhaust it. But the fact
that so much scholarship has already been expended on the
subject has left rich opportunities for synthesis, and this
is the course I have followed in studying the written
material, seeking always the sources upon which
interpretations are based rather than attaching undue weight
to the interpretations themselves. This I have been able to
augment with some unpublished documentary evidence from
Simancas, kindly made available by Professor Geoffrey Parker
and Dr. I.A.A. Thompson, whose generOSity I most
gratefully acknowledge. I have also found a rich source of
complementary information in the technical and military
literature of the period.
My primary evidence, however, comes from the wrecks.
Through the skills of archaeological colleagues, the
disciplined enthusiasm of fellow divers, and the dedicated
expertise of museum staff, the fruits of these exciting but
fragile discoveries have themselves become archives, as
relevant a source of information as any written document. I
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have found, as I have worked with this material and with the
written sources, that intellectual distinctions between them
become ever more blurred. Is this thesis therefore a, work
of history, or of archaeology? I do not know, and I do not
think it matters.
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Part I: The Historical Background
Chapter One: The origins of the Armada, 1580-1588
In 1492 Columbus discovered America, and in Spain the
last stronghold of the Moors at Granada fell to Ferdinand
and Isabella. Either event might be taken as the point at
which the mediaeval period in that country ended. One laid
the foundations of Spain's emergence as the world's first
truly oceanic power, while the other sowed the seeds of her
imperial destiny. In the century of meteoric development
which was to follow no change was more revolutionary than
that which took place in military organisation and
technology • From mediaeval traditions of chivalry and
crusade - though these were never entirely lost - there
sprang a new and radically different breed of fighting man:
the trained and disciplined professional foot-soldier.
Since the days of Don Gonsalvo de ,Cordoba the Spanish
infantry had shown their solid worth, and by the end of the
century Parma's veterans in the Netherlands had reached a
peak of fighting efficiency and endurance which has seldom
been surpassed.(l)
Technical and tactical developments in sea warfare over
the same period were in some respects less radical, because
for the most part they were confined to the Mediterranean
and involved, almost exclusively, the fighting galley. By
the sixteenth century this highly specialised craft had more
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than two millennia of development behind it, in the course
of which the fundamental principles governing its use had
changed little.(2) First, it was a wholly offensive fighting
machine; its only modes of defence were either to attack or
to run. Second~ its fighting capacity and radius of
operation were limited by the weight of its armament and of
the supernumeraries it carried (i.e. those whose
muscle-power was not utilised for propulsion), and of the
provisions needed to sustain them and the rowing crew. This
weight factor in turn influenced the equation between
displacement and sprint performance upon which the galley's
fighting ability depended.(3) Finally, it was extremely
expensive to build, man, and maintain.(4)
These factors imposed severe restrictions on the way in
whicp galley, fleets could be employed. They could not, for
instance, be used to sweep the seas of enemy craft; and,
even if they could, there was no way in which they might
then exploit the supremacy thus gained. Thus the Mahanian
strategy of dominating the shipping lanes could not be
applied. Neither, because of their limited endurance, could
they be used to sustain a blockade, except in the extremely
localised circumstances of a coastal siege in which they had
the co-operation of supporting land forces and some means of
re-supply. And although they could, and sometimes did,
engage in formal large-scale battles with their own kind,
victory could often, in the long run; prove disadvantageous,
for it could not bring with it the domination of an area of
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ocean, while a reduction in the strength of the victor's
force - even if the enemy's losses had beengalley
proportionally greater - might seriously reduce the
strategic influence he had exercised before the battle.
What, then, could galleys do? Their most frequent
employment was in what has euphemistically been termed
'little wars' or commerce raiding, in which profit to one's
own side resulted in loss and disruption to the enemy
(theoretically at least: in practice distinctions between
friend and foe were often blurred). In a more organised
conflict, galleys were at their best very close to their
bases, where they could fight light (and therefore fast) or
with a greater payload of troops or other armament, and with
rowing crews and soldiers in peak condition. An adversary
would be disadvantaged in these respects in direct
proportion to the distance he had had to come. The key to
galley strategy in the Mediterranean, therefore, was to
secure and hold bases; it was the anchorages, rather than
the vessels in them, which ultimately controlled the sea.(5)
Since under normal conditions the bases held advantages
which made them Virtually impregnable, the deployment of
galleys around the Mediterranean reflected a balance of
deterrence rather than of overt threat, an arrangement
curiously similar to the deployment of missiles in the
modern world: if they had to be used, their underlying
purpose had failed. Such galley actions as there were
almost always concerned attempts to sieze bases, such as
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Charles V's capture of Tunis in 1535 or Piali Pasa's
spectacular failure to win Malta in 1565. Even Lepanto, in
1571, was in the last analysis a massive defensive effort on
the part of the Holy League rather than a profitable
victory, for it brought the League no territorial gains. It
did, however, prevent the Turks from establishing new naval
bases in the western Mediterranean.
Despite these constraints, galleys were often used in
conjunction with land forces to help with the prosecution of
a siege against a coastal fortress, or to assist in its
relief. Such operations were extremely specialised, and
conducted according to rules which were (in theory at least)
as mathematically predictable as the wider art of
siegecraft.
scientific
In summary, then, galley operations were
drills,
affairs in which logistics,
and the fine balancing of
precision fleet
complex and subtle
variables were the ingredients of success. In these matters
sixteenth-century Spanish galley commanders, of whom the
most outstanding was Don Alvaro de Bazan (who, after 1578,
was Marquis of Santa Cruz), held a formidable and
well-deserved reputation.
Such specialised techniques of maritime warfare did
not, however, often extend beyond the Pillars of Hercules,
where galleys seldom ventured and where, by the late
sixteenth century, the broadside-carrying sailing warship
reigned virtually supreme. But until 1580 Spain did not
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possess an effective sailing navy in the Atlantic. As a sea
power she had faced, throughout the century, in two
directions: towards the Mediterranean and towards the
Indies. In the early years of Philip II's reign her naval
presence had also extended into the waters of north-west
Europe, with a fleet based at Veere in Zeeland, but this
facility was lost to the Dutch rebels in 1572 and by 1576 a
royal fleet no longer existed in the Low Countries.(6) Nor
did Spain exercise real control, in a naval sense, over her
convoy routes to the Americas. All trans-Atlantic traffic
~was organised by the Casa de la Contratacion at Seville, and
was monopolised by it. Although a squadron of galleons-
the Indian Guard - charged with the protection of the
Atlantic convoys was supported by the aver!a, a protection
tax imposed by the ~ on all goods carried, these ships
were fast and specialised escort vessels rather than true
warships and were, as we shall see, very lightly armed. The
lack of a secure naval base, and of shipping suitable for
oceanic warfare, therefore precluded effective maritime
operations against northern European adversaries such as the
Dutch or the English.
In the summer of 1580, however, Philip II enforced his
claim to the vacant Portuguese throne by capturing Lisbon.
The campaign which brought this about was a joint land and
sea operation in the classic Mediterranean mould.(7) An army
under the Duke of Alba, consisting of 15,000 veteran
infantry supported by cavalry and artillery, advanced to the
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south bank of the Tagus estuary. At the seaward end of the
estuary the army made contact with 62 galleys and 25
supporting ships commanded by the marquis of Santa Cruz and,
under the fleet's protection, crossed the 3-mile wide river
mouth. Alba was now poised to march on Lisbon with his
right flank supported by Santa Cruz's fleet. The
combination of a fast-moving infantry assault and the
aggressive close-range cannonading of the galley squadron
proved irresistable, and the Portuguese defences quickly
collapsed. Dom Ant6nio, the Portuguese pretender, fled into
exile.
Over the next two years Santa Cruz developed Lisbon as
a secure base.
Tagus,
heavy
safe
already
The narrow approach at the mouth of the
defended by forts, was strengthened with
artillery creating, in the wide roadstead beyond, a
and sheltered haven for the largest fleet. No other
port on the Atlantic seaboard of the Iberian peninsula could
offer this combination of almost unlimited capacity with
total security from enemies and from the weather. It would,
if the time for it came, make an excellent base from which
to mount an invasion of Holland or England.
The Spaniards had also captured from the Portuguese the
nucleus of an Atlantic battle-fleet. Eleven Portuguese
royal galleons, big, strongly built, and heavily armed, were
taken intact in 1580. To these Santa Cruz could add, as
need arose, galleys and galleasses from the Mediterranean
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fleets, and, by charter or requisition, private vessels from
the Baltic to the Adriatic. The light defensive armament
which merchant ships usually carried could be reinforced
with guns and munitions belonging to the king, and a
stockpile of artillery was established at Lisbon for this
purpose.
In 1582, Santa Cruz's Atlantic navy saw its first
action. After his flight from Lisbon, ,Dom Antonio had
secured the tacit support of the French king, Henry III, who
allowed a force of some 60 ships and 6000 troops to muster
~at Belle Ile off the Brittany coast, prior to invading the
Azores, which had refused to acknowledge the Spanish
succession. Under Filippo Strozzi, a Florentine nobleman
well connected at the French court, this fleet sailed on 16
June and reached the Azores a month later. Santa Cruz set
out from Lisbon to intercept Strozzi on 22 June but found
the French fleet waiting for him off the island of S~o
Miguel. The Spaniards had about 30 ships: the Portuguese
royal galleons San Mart{n, which carried his flag, and ~
Mateo (both of which were to serve with great distinction in
the 1588 Armada); armed merchantmen from Portugal, Castile,
the Mediterranean and the Basque ports; cargo hulks from the
Baltic; and a number of small dispatch boats. There were no
galleys or galleasses; this was to be, for the first time in
history, a major fleet action in which the deciding factors
would be sails and guns alone.(8)
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Rather than wait for the reserve fleet which Juan
Martfnez de Recalde was mustering at Cadiz, Santa Cruz and
his captains elected to risk their numerical inferiority and
attack without delay.
abreast, Santa Cruz's
The Spanish fleet drew up
flagship at the centre,
in line
in the
time-honoured formation of a galley force offering battle.
Unlike galleys, however, sailing ships could not manoeuvre
independently of the wind, and light variable breezes kept
the rival fleets fencing for favourable positions over the
next two days. On the night of 24 June Santa Cruz gained
the advantage of wind, only to lose it when a mishap forced
him to take his vice-flagship in tow. At dawn on 26 June
Strozzi held the weather gauge, though he seems to have
considered the wind too light to justity an assault on the
Spanish line, and the stalemate continued. At this point
the ~ Mateo - whether on Santa Cruz's orders, or on the
personal initiative of her commander, Don Lope de Figueroa,
is not clear - broke station and clawed her way alone
towards the French fleet. Strozzi accepted the challenge
and moved to attack in his flagship with four strong
warships in support. A furious close-range combat developed
and for two hours the ~ Mateo received, and returned,
broadside after broadside. But though the French tried
repeatedly to board they were repelled by Figueroa's 250
soldiers, who were stationed in the waist, on the
castleworks and in the fighting tops.
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It took some time for Santa Cruz's main fleet to work
its way upwind towards the action. The Spanish rearguard of
Guipuzcoan merchantmen under Miguel de Oquendo - who, it was
said, could handle his massive Basque-built flagship with
the dash of a light cavalryman - relieved the beleaguered
~ Mateo by ramming clear the remaining Frenchmen grappled
on either side of her.
remaining Spanish ships
A general melee developed as the
came up. Tactics were simple:
individual captains, having singled out an enemy ship,
delivered a short-range broadside before grappling and
boarding. Santa Cruz in the ~ Martin, as honour dictated,
sought
having
close
out Strozzi's flagship amid the smoke and chaos and,
found her, pounded her with gunfire until she was
to sinking. Strozzi died of his wounds before he
could surrender his sword, and Santa Cruz peremptorily
ordered his body to be cast overboard.
The French rearguard, for reasons which have never
satisfactorily been explained, had not become engaged, and
on the collapse of the vanguard joined in a general flight.
Strozzi's fleet lost 11 ships sunk or captured, and well
over 1000 men. Spanish casualties were lighter - 224 dead
and 553 wounded - but damage to some of their ships had been
severe. The ~ Martin had taken a particularly heavy
in towing Strozzi'sbattering, and had great difficulty
captured flagship to port.(9) ~
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From
enough.
decided
the Spanish point of view the lessons were clear
First, naval conflicts in the Atlantic would be
in future by the sailing ship and the artillery
broadside; second, the best tactic to use against nimbler
ships which held the weather gauge was to stand in a tight
formation and fight in close support, moving the most
powerfully armed units in that formation to positions from
which they could be used to best effect.
Although Santa Cruz was technically the victor at S~o
Miguel, his fleet was so shattered that he was unable to
exploit his supremacy against Dom Ant~nio's land forces,
which continued to hold the rest of the Azores, including
the key island of Terceira. But by the following summer,
after a year spent in repair and preparation at Lisbon, he
was ready to finish the job.
The victory at S~o Miguel had effectively neutralised
the threat by sea to a Spanish force invading the Azores,
and so Santa Cruz decided to send an amphibious task force
to seize Terceira. In June 1583 this fleet sailed and,
according to a summary of the muster held at Lisbon just_
before its departure, it consisted of the following
forces(10):
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Tons Oarsmen Seamen Soldiers
2 galleasses 496 188 315
12 galleys 2212 600
3 royal galleons 2200 290 524
2 galleons belonging
to Santa Cruz 1546 180 486
7 Ragusan great-ships 5092 474 2354
3 Catalan great-ships 2191 203 811
4 Venetian great-ships 2342 229 1158
2 Genoese great-ships 898 87 461
Neapolitan great-ship 498 47 274
13 great ships from
Guipuzcoa and Biscay 5450 671 2545
1 great-ship
(origin not stated)
12 pataches
15 zabras
14 fortuguese caravels
7 landing craft
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From an advance base on the Spanish-held island of S~o
Miguel this force was able to probe and reconnoitre the
enemy defences on Terceira before launching its main attack
in mid-July. The Terceirans expected the Spanish to land at
the harbours of Angra and Peggia, and had disposed their
forces accordingly, but Santa Cruz decided, on the basis of
local information and personal reconnaissance, to deliver
his main thrust at Mole, a beach 10 miles from Angra which
was defended only by light earthworks occupied by infantry
with some artillery support.(11) Santa Cruz's own account of
the action has a strikingly modern ring:
"The flag galley began to batter and dismount
the enemy artillery and the rest of the galleys
did likewise•••the landing boats ran aground and
placed soldiers at the sides of the forts, and
along the trenches, although with much difficulty
and working under the pressure of the furious
artillery, arquebus, and musket fire of the
enemy. And the soldiers mounting the trenches in
several places came under heavy musket and
arquebus fire,
trenches."(12)
but finally won the forts and
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The confidence felt by Spain's military leaders in the
aftermath of the Azores campaigns coincided with a growing
belief that open conflict with England was inevitable. Now,
surely, was the time to strike. "After the taking of the
isle of Terceira", wrote a contemporary observer, "the
Captains which accompanied the Marquis of Santa Cruz•••said
openly now that we have Portugal England is ours, and little
by little we shall gain France also."(13) By August 1583
Santa Cruz was himself impressing upon Philip II the
feasibility of a maritime expedition against Flanders and
England.(14) The marquis's personal prestige by this time
was enormous, and an aura of the invincibility of Spanish
arms under his direction touched even the cautious spirit of
the Prudent King. After 1583 the invasion of England ceased
to be a wishful dream; it had become, almost overnight, a
practical possibility.
Only one man could organise and lead such an
undertaking, and that man must be given extraordinary powers
to muster the necessary naval and military resources. On 23
June 1584 the king appointed Santa Cruz to a remarkable and
unprecedented Captain-Generalcy;(15) not that of a fleet, or
of a province, but of the entire ~ Oceano, the Ocean Sea,
encompassing all Spanish operations on, or connected with,
that vast and unpredictable element, of which Charles V had
once enjoined his son mostAparticularly to beware.(16) The
marquis was empowered to direct all naval affairs in the
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king's name, with authority to requisition whatever
shipping, Spanish or foreign, he considered necessary for
his endeavours. He was to pay especial attention to the
administrative and financial problems of arming and manning
his ships to appropriate scales. Finally, although his
commission nowhere alludes specifically to an invasion of
England it mentions, on two occasions, unspecified ftnew
enterprisesft which the king might require his
Captain-General to undertake. It was not long before these
enterprises began to take definite form.
Early in 1586 Philip instructed Santa Cruz to submit
plans for what had become known as the 'Enterprise of
England', and on 22 March the marquis sent his proposals to
the king.(17) They were couched not in the terms of a broad
strategic plan, far less as an exposition of the tactics
that were to be employed in its execution, but rather as a
detailed breakdown of all the resources which would be
needed to put it into effect. Nevertheless the figures, if
read in conjunction with Santa Cruz's experiences and
successes over a long fighting career, and most particularly
those which had taken place in the A~lantic since 1580, make
his intentions quite clear. The operation was to be built
up in the secure and capacious port and roadstead of Lisbon,
and launched from there as a single amphibious task force
under his direct command. The objective was simple: to land
an army sufficiently strong, with all the supporting
services it required, at a point on the English coast from
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which it could speedily achieve a decisive victory.
Santa Cruz's strategy, as reconstructed from his
planning document, can be divided into four elements. The
first was transport. A large fleet of big sailing vessels
would be needed to bring the projected 55,000 invasion
troops plus their equipment and supporting services to
England. A hundred and fifty ships totalling 77,250 tons
were specified for this purpose. They would include 40
large merchant vessels chartered or requisitioned from
Ragusa, Venice, Sicily, Naples and the Mediterranean coasts
of Spain; 25 Spanish royal galleons and other vessels
currently based at Lisbon and Cadiz; 20 ships, including the
powerful group of fighting galleons, which had belonged to
the Portuguese crown; 35 Basque merchantmen from Biscay and.
,Guipuzcoa; and 30 German hulks which were already under
contract to Spain for the transport of naval stores from the
Baltic.
The second element in Santa Cruz's plan concerned the
defence of this massive fleet as it advanced towards the
disembarkation point. In this respect it should be stressed
that the Armada's fighting role, At~, was from first to
last defensive. S~o Miguel had demonstrated the futility,
from the Spanish point of view, of a naval battle of
attrition which achieved a victory over an enemy fleet at
the expense of the capaCity to exploit that victory ashore.
All of the Armada's ships would be armed and, to a greater
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or lesser extent, able to defend themselves individually or
collectively. The fleet formation would have been arranged,
no doubt, to utilise the most powerful vessels to best
effect, as was to be the case in 1588. Six galleasses and
40 galleys would provide a fighting reserve which could be
deployed irrespective of wind direction. Santa Cruz
reasoned, we may presume, that strict formation discipline
coupled with vigorous self-defence would be enough to bring
him through the Channel, if not unscathed, at least
sufficiently intact to put the third phase of his operation
into effect.
This was to land and secure a beach-head for the army
in the Thames estuary. Such an operation would be, without
doubt, the most crucial and difficult part of the whole
enterprise, but it was one of which Santa Cruz and many of
those who would be under his command had recent and
successful experience. It would be, after all, little
different from the Terceira landings, though on a far larger
scale, and Santa Cruz took care to specify just those
ingredients which had brought him victory at the Mole
beach-head three years before. In this part of the
operations the 40 galleys he had called for would come into
their own. Unsuited they may have been to 9pen water combat
with armed sailing ships; fragile they certainly were in
heavy weather; but in the sheltered waters of the Thames,
screened from seaward by the main fleet, they would have
been as deadly as they had been in the Tagus in 1580. As
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swift and manouevreable destroyers they could bring down
sustained fire on shore positions, operating right up to the
beaches, while as support landing craft they could rapidly
transfer heavy loads - particularly field and siege
artillery - from the fleet to the beach-head. Finally, once
the initial landings had been consolidated, and the land
campaign launched, the galley force could support the flank
of the army as it advanced along the coast, probing up
rivers and into harbours as required, as Santa Cruz's
galleys had done for Alba's army six years before. Vital
though the galleys would be in supporting and assisting the
landings, they had not the capaCity quickly to transfer
large numbers of troops from the fleet to the shore. This
task would be carried out by 200 specially designed landing
craft - barcas chatas - which, as Santa Cruz emphaSised in
his proposals, should be of the same type as those used for
the Terceira landings.(18)
Once the troops and their equipment had been brought to
the beaches the operation would move into its fourth and
final phase. This was an advance on London, for which the
army was to be provided with everything necessary to ensure
success. Speed was of the essence: a swift blow to the
heart of Tudor power ("the root of the evil", as Philip put
it) would be the most certain solution to the English
problem, and probably, in the end, the cheapest one. It is
important to bear in mind that territorial gain was not
Philip's primary objective, and he was understandably
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anxious to avoid England becoming another Flanders, with its
interminable and profitless drain on resources.
To take the English capital and keep his fleet secure
Santa Cruz reckoned he would need 55,000 front-line
infantry, made up of 28,000 Spaniards, 15,000 Italians, and
12,000 Germans, who would be armed with pike, arquebus, or
musket. Many would be veterans. They would be supported by
a large siege train, organised into four batteries of 12
40-~ canones and one battery of 2 25-~ heavy
culebrinas. In addition there would be 16 heavy field guns
(medias canones and medias culebrinas), 24 light field
pieces (sacres), and 20 heavy swivel guns (esmeriles
largos). An appropriate number of draught and pack animals,
wheeled transport, and specialist craftsmen would be
attached to the artillery train. There would also be a
3000-strong corps of pioneers (gastadores), equipped to
construct siegeworks and clear obstacles. Santa Cruz's
General Staff would include supply and administrative
officers, a medical service, and a strong contingent of
military police. And although no mention of it is made in
the planning document (perhaps Santa Cruz felt that this was
something the king would like to attend to himself), there
would certainly have been a chaplaincy department to
maintain the crusading zeal of the troops and add spiritual
conversion to the temporal subjugation of the heretics.,
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The whole force, including seamen, oarsmen, unattached
officers and gentlemen-adventurers, would amount to 94,222
men all told. It was to be provided with the staggering
amount of food, fodder, drinking water and wine necessary to
sustain it through a voyage and campaign calculated to last
eight months, and with a commensurate supply of ammunition
and other military stores. This would involve, to take a
few examples, the provision of 379,337 ~ of hard-tack,
22,800 ~ of bacon, 21,500 ~ of cheese, 46,800 pipas of
wine, 60,000 pairs of shoes, 40,000 leather bottles, 12,000
wooden shovels, 12,000 ~ of lead, and 22,080 ~ of
gunpowder.
To assist in the mustering and preparation of this
great force Santa Cruz called for forty large supply vessels
and 320 smaller ones to act as fleet tenders. Forty similar
vessels were expected to accompany the six galleasses when
they came from Naples. These 400 support vessels were not,
as has sometimes been supposed, all expected to take part in
the operation itself, though some of them undoubtedly would
have accompanied the fleet, as they did in 1588, as scouts
and dispatch craft.
The whole prodigious undertaking would cost, by Santa
Cruz's meticulous reckoning, 1,526,425,798 maraved!s, or 4
million ducats, and it was no doubt to this colossal figure
that the king first directed his glance. Some commentators
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have accused Santa Cruz of a lack of realism, even of
megalomania, in making these proposals; and indeed Philip II
was hardly in a position, financially or militarily, to
accept them as they stood. But the marquis had been
instructed to draft a theoretical costing for the enterprise
as a basis for planning and discussion,· and it would be
natural to suppose that he added a substantial margin to
what he deemed in his own mind absolutely necessary.
Generals almost invariably over-estimate their requirements
when asked by their political masters to draw up plans of
action, so allowing for the probability that they will
receive far less than they ask for (and, incidentally,
reserving for themselves the prospective defence that,
should the venture fail, it did so because they had not been
given adequate resources). It seems reasonable to suggest,
therefore, that Santa Cruz did not expect to be given
anything like the resources listed in his 1586 proposals -
he must have appreciated the financial impracticability as
much as Philip did - and was working on the assumption that
a much smaller force could probably do the job,
perhaps with less certainty of outright success.
though
If, for the sake of argument (for we cannot now
penetrate the workings of the marquis's mind), we assume
that he had simply doubled up his minimum figures, the
result is in many respects close to the force which actually
sailed in 1588. But there is one serious discrepancy. Even
on the suggested 50 percent scale, Santa Cruz would still
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have required nearly 30,000 combat troops for his
self-contained invasion force; yet the Armada, when it
sailed, carried not much more than half that number, many of
them raw recruits. Spanish soldiers, as Alexander Farnese,
duke of Parma, was fond of remarking, would be the sinews of
the whole affair; and, even if a self-contained invasion
force could have carried them from Lisbon, it is doubtful
whether 30,000 men suitably trained and experienced for the
tasks which lay ahead could have been mustered there without
dangerously weakening the theatres from which they would
have to be drawn. Most of Spain's front-line soldiers, and
almost all of her best ones, were in Flanders under Parma,
where years of unremitting warfare under the duke's inspired
generalship had forged them into the toughest and most
professional army of early modern times.
It was the presence of these troops so close to
England, and a belief that success in England would
seriously weaken Dutch resistance and perhaps even bring
about a general collapse of the revolt, that prompted Philip
to produce an alternative plan.(19) An Armada would still
sail from Lisbon, carrying as maQY troops as could be
,mustered, together with most of the materiel needed for the
land campaign. The main invasion force, however, would be
launched from Flanders by Parma himself, who would effect
the short Channel crossing in flat-bottomed river craft.
Santa Cruz, with his Armada, would cover this crossing by
advancing in defensive formation up the Channel to
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rendezvous with Parma at some convenient (but unspecified)
point, and escort the flotilla of landing craft to a
beach-head inside the mouth of the Thames. The Armada's
role in these operations would be threefold: first, it would
deal with any direct threat presented by English and Dutch
naval forces; next, it would provide a wave of 6000 assault
troops who would back up Parma's initial landings; and
finally, it would off-load the artillery and supplies needed
by Parma to mount a rapid march on London. Then, and only
then, could the Armada operate as an independent force,
though always with Parma's approval and where possible in
his direct support; it might attack enemy shipping, capture
a port, or ferry reinforcements from Flanders.(20)
It is impossible to emphasise too strongly the
significance of this change in plan. There is every chance
that Santa Cruz's 1586 proposals, even if they had been
applied on a much reduced scale, would have worked. Events
in 1588 showed that the Spaniards experienced little
difficulty in moving 60,000 tons of shipping in a mutually
defensive formation from one end of the Channel to the
other, despite repeated assaults upon it, "and while the
English would certainly have offered fierce resistance had
the Spaniards then attempted to force the Thames estuary it
is difficult to imagine what might have been done to stop
them: "a brag countenance•••as it we had wanted tor nothing"
would, in such circumstances, have been of little avail.
The Armada's sole undoing was the Flanders rendezvous, and
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that rendezvous was, from the outset, an option which
neither of the commanders involved considered to be a
workable proposition. The responsibility for ordering its
attempt rests squarely with Philip II who, once the decision
had been taken, would countenance neither delay nor
modification in putting it into effect.
By the late summer of 1587 the plan had reached its
final form. On 4 September Philip wrote congratulating Parma
on the capture of Sluys, a deep-water port linked to its
hinterland by a network of canals.(21) It would be, the king
pointed out, an excellent mustering point for the invasion
boats. He went on:
"I have been convinced that the most advantageous
way will be to join your forces with ours at the
same time; and when the junction is effected the
affair will be simplified and the passage
assured. The whole force can then be applied to
cutting to the root of the evil•••
"We calculate that by the time you have
invested Ostend you will have over 30,000 men
ready for the main business, whilst 6000 Spanish
infantry. a part of them veterans. will go in the
Armada from here. the whole force of soldiers and
seamen in the fleet reaching 22,000 men. I have
decided that when the Marquis of Santa Cruz
arrives with the fiotas at Cape St. Vincent, he
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shall leave them there in charge of the Spanish
galleys, and go direct to Lisbon. He will then at
once take charge of the fleet which will be
awaiting him and with God's blessing sail straight
to the English Channel•••you, in the meantime,
will be quite ready, and•••You will, if the
weather permits, immediately cross with the whole
army in the boats which you will have prepared•••"
The king's reasoning sounds, on the face of it,
plausible enough, but his plan presented difficulties which,
to experienced commanders like Parma and Santa Cruz,
appeared insurmountable. First, how were two large
independant forces, whose operational bases were separated
by more than a thousand miles of ocean, to achieve the
necessary precision· of time and place in effecting their
link-up? Second, how could Parma's vulnerable flotilla of
landing craft, which would amount to no more than open and
unarmed river barges packed with wet and seasick soldiery,
cross the Flemish shoals in the face of the almost
continuous presence of the Dutch Republic aggressive and
well-gunned flyboats and of the less frequent but
unpredictable presence of English offshore squadrons? On top
of these difficulties, moreover, Philip was now ordering the
campaign to start at the approach of the autumnal equinox,
when weather both for the crossing and the following
campaign was likely to be at its very worst. In his zeal,
aggravated no doubt by a growing sense of frustration,
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Philip's legendary caution seems to have been replaced by
the optimistic certainty that divine patronage would ensure
success if somehow the whole unwieldy business could be
steamrollered through. That he should seriously have
considered, at such a time, launching both the Armada and
the cream of Parma's army calls into question not only his
military competence - there can be little doubt of his
shortcomings in that respect - but also his general
sanity.(22) "We are quite aware", he concluded his orders to
Parma, "of the risk which is incurred by sending a heavy
fleet in the winter through the Channel without a safe
harbour, but•••as it is all for His cause, God will send
good weather." Philip's two generals, stalwart Catholics
though they were, can hardly have been impressed by such
reasoning. Two years earlier, Parma had warned the king,
with his customary directness, that God would "grow weary of
working miracles for us."(23) Events were to show that he
pinned little faith on one manifesting itself now.
But such a miracle could not be worked without a fleet
to work it with. Even before a firm decision to send the
mammoth task of
at the beginning of February 1587 the
assembling its component parts had
Armada was taken
begun.(21) Long-term stockpiling of the fleet's provisions
was of crucial importance, for sixteenth-century Europe
enjoyed few food surpluses and supplies of the magnitude
required might be difficult to obtain, at any price, if the
notice given was too short (this consideration was balanced,
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unfortunately, by the immutable fact that, in an age without
tin-cans or freezers, no footstuffs lasted indefinitely).
Orders for biscuit and salt meat were sent to Alicante,
Cartagena , ,and Malaga - at Malaga alone 40 new biscuit ovens,
had to be built.(25) Milan was requested to supply a large
consignment of rice, while a merchant was dispatched with
letters of credit to purchase meat, cheese and fish in
Genoa, along the Riviera, and in Sardin1a.(26) Twenty
Hamburg hulks brought nearly half a million pounds of cheese
to Lisbon,(27) while grain purchases in Spain, where there
was already a shortage, had an inflationary effect on the
market price.(28)
Other agents, meanwhile, were setting in hand bulk
contracts for the supply of military equipment. In Seville
the duke of Medina Sidonia ordered a large number of
campaign tents, and 12,000 sets of shoes, leather canteens,
and knapsacks for the invasion troops; later, in the same
town, picks, shovels and gabions were ordered for the
pioneers.(29) A courier was dispatched in early February to
summon veteran troops from Italy, and recruits to take over
their garrison duties were later sent by galley from
Spain.(30) There was no way in which all this activity could
be kept secret. By 10 February the Venetian ambassador at
Madrid, Hieronimo Lippomano, reported that the 'business'
was growing warmer every day.(31) Little doubt existed in
anyone's mind as to the purpose for which the business was
intended: ten days earlier, on 31 January, the Venetian
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ambassador at Rome, Giovanni Gritti, had informed his
government that "people think an attack on England is
settled", although he added, with diplomatic caution, "the
general opinion is that it will be a very difficult
affair."(32)
Preparations for the fleet itself also proceeded apace,
and shipping began to muster at Cartagena, the Basque ports,
Lisbon and Cadiz. New ships were built in Biscay.(33)
Although Lisbon was to be the base from which the Armada
would ultimately sail, activity at first centred on Cadiz,
which possessed extensive facilities for fitting out and
victualling the Indies fleets. Vessels began to crowd the
anchorage between the seaward peninsula, upon which the town
stood, and the mouth of the Guadalquivir, whence supplies
could be brought down from Seville. The port, with its wide
entrance, was less secure than Lisbon, but it was well
defended with forts and artillery, and by a squadron of
galleys.(34) By the end of April nearly Sixty vessels were
in harbour; hulks and coasters loading for Lisbon, fishing
craft, and merchantmen of all types from small caravels to a
700-ton 40-gun Genoese great-ship about to depart for Italy
with a cargo of cochineal, leather and wool.
On the evening of 29 April there suddenly appeared, in
the midst of this apparently secure roadstead, a fleet of
more than 20 English ships led by Sir Francis Drake.
Neither the Spanish shore defences nor the galleys proved
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effectual, and only the prompt arrival of land forces under
the duke of Medina Sidonia prevented the city itself from
being taken and sacked. Nothing, however, could save the
shipping, and the English embarked on an orgy of
prize-taking and destruction.(35) When it was over, 24
vessels had been captured, sunk or destroyed, and a reported
392 pipas of wine, 3443 ~ of biscuit, 3288 fanegas of
wheat, and a large quantity of sailcloth, cordage and
ironwork, all bound for Lisbon, had been lost. The cost of
the disaster was estimated at 172,000 ducats.(36)
The magnitude of the blow was not to be reckoned only
in cash terms. Drake followed his success at Cadiz by
landing on Cape St. Vincent, where he took the castle of
Sagres and destroyed its artillery.(37) During the following
weeks his ships dominated the seas from the Cape to the
Straits of Gibralter, bottling up movement from the
Mediterranean and devastating the plodding stream of small
coasting craft ferrying stores from Cadiz to Lisbon. Many
were sunk, including a number of the tuna fishing fleet and
several vessels carrying seasoned barrel hoops and
of the ships captured were laden with oarsstaves.(38) Two
for the galleys. These losses,
were a major setback to the
commissariat difficulties. As
on top of those at Cadiz,
Enterprise's already acute
a final insult Drake
approached Lisbon itself and, within sight of Santa Cruz's
headquarters at the castle of St. Julian, defied the
marquis to come out and "exchange certain bullets" with
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him. The unfortunate Captain-General of the Ocean Sea,
though goaded almost beyond endurance, was forced to ignore
the challenge, for his ships were not ready to fight. Drake
therefore headed for the Azores, intent on intercepting the
returning Portuguese and Spanish treasure fleets.(39)
These humiliating reverses, however, in no way lessened
the likelihood that the Armada would eventually sail; on the
contrary, they made its sailing even more certain. All
Europe knew that Spain was preparing a fleet to conquer
England and so, whatever the cost, the Enterprise had to go
ahead. To abandon it now would be an unacceptable admission
of defeat, and each fresh ducat invested in it 'reinforced
the inevitability of the whole ponderous affair. As the
Venetian ambassador shrewdly observed, the king had reached
a point at which he "could not endure the idea of throwing
away such vast treasure•••as has been spent this year".(40)
But when would the Armada actually put to sea? Expert
opinion advocated a departure in the settled weather of the
early spring: the ships would have been careened during the
winter months, and fresh stores and troops brought aboard in
February and March, so that the fleet might catch the
favourable winds which normally blew in early May.(41) The
whole summer would then lie ahead for the prosecution of the
campaign. Cautionary precedents which demonstrated the
inadvisability of embarking upon naval enterprises late in
the season were numerous, and the most commonly cited was
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that of Charles V's disastrous expedition to Algiers in the
autumn of 1541.(42) Even without Drake's intervention,
however, there was no way in which such a timetable could
have been adhered to in 1587; preparation for it had begun
too late. Nevertheless the king insisted that the fleet
must sail at the earliest possible opportunity. The
problems and costs of the Enterprise, it seemed to him,
Iwould only escalate while the Armada remained in port.
There were, moreover, political factors to consider. The
execution of Mary Queen of Scots on 18 February 1587
provided Philip with a cast-iron justification for launching
his crusade, and at the same time absolved him of the
embarrassing necessity, had she lived, of placing her on the
English throne, so opening the way to an inevitable
Franco-English alliance. Events were moving in France, too,
in ways which indicated there would be no interference from
that quarter if a Spanish fleet were to arrive in the
Channel bent on an invasion of England.(43) And, of course,
the sooner Francis Drake's costly impudence was punished,
and his countrymen prevented from acting similarly again,
the better. Another consideration also influenced the
king. From the very beginning the Armada had been conceived
as a force so powerful as to be invincible, and so there was
always the chance that its mere appearance in the Channel
would force Elizabeth to come to terms.(44) But whether it
had to fight or whether it might achieve its objectives
simply by a show of strength, the Armada had to be
physically capable of putting to sea.
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In the early summer of 1587 Santa Cruz did not believe
that it yet possessed that capability, and in any case there
could be no question of its setting sail, even in the two
separate waves of an advance force and back-up fleet that
had been projected, while Drake was loose among the Azores.
On 11 July the marquis set out from Lisbon with 40 ships,
including the Portuguese galleons, to protect the Indies
fleet, which was expected daily, and, if possible, to
intercept the English 'corsairs': "If God should allow him
[Santa Cruz] to encounter Drake," wrote the king to
Bernardino de Mendoza, "I trust he will give him what he
deserves".(45) Santa Cruz, in fact, missed Drake, who had
rounded off his beard-singeing expedition by capturing the
fabulously rich Portuguese Indiaman ~ Felipe before
heading back to England. Little wonder the Spaniards
suspected 'El Draque' of keeping a magic mirror in his
cabin, through which he could observe his enemies' every
move.
The presence of Santa Cruz's squadron off the southern
coast of Portugal had, however, allowed the shipping which
had been building up for the Armada in the Mediterranean
ports and at Seville to move safely to Lisbon. A fleet of
70 vessels, including the squadrons of Levant, Andalusia and
Castile, together with 28 Baltic hulks and 4 Neapolitan
galleasses, entered the Tagus on 4 August under the command
of Don Alonso Mart!nez de Leyva.(46) As soon as a contingent
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of Guipuzcoan ships under Miguel de Oquendo came down from
the north, and the Portuguese and Biscayan squadrons of
Santa Cruz and his vice-admiral Juan Mart!nez de Recalde
returned from the Azores, the Armada would be at its full
projected strength.
But, by then, autumn would be well advanced.
At the beginning of September the first troops were
embarked on the ships at Lisbon, and forbidden to go ashore
on pain of death.(47) But there was little chance of their
sailing for some time, since the squadrons which had been on
the Azores station, and which had still not returned, would
be in no condition to undertake a voyage to England until
they had undergone extensive maintenance. Santa Cruz did
not bring them into Lisbon until the end of the month, only
to find that the king expected him to proceed to Flanders
without delay. According to the Venetian ambassador,
Hieronimo Lippomano, the marquis replied that he would be
ready to sail on 20 Ootober.(48) A few days later, however,
after the shipwrights had inspected the Portuguese galleons
and Recalde's Biscayan ships, Santa Cruz reported that they
could not possibly sail that month, and requested a delay.
Philip was furious: it was, Lippomano reported him as
saying, a cunning plot on the part of the owners whose ships
had been siezed for the Enterprise, in the hope that they
might recover their vessels. The ambassador went on: "Those
who understand naval matters declare that if his Majesty
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continues in this resolve he will only succeed in losing the
Armada and all his forces. The marquis cannot be ready even
for the date he himself has named; but as he sees the king
so determined he is afraid to write his own opinion, or to
urge the lateness of the season, but he does what he can to
put off, as he knows that this is of real service to the
king."(49)
On 18 October Lippomano reported that the king had sent
a special courier to Lisbon with express orders for Santa
Cruz to sail. All the same, he continued, "it becomes
clearer every day that the marquis does not wish to take to
the sea." The four Neapolitan galleasses were laid up for
the winter, and Santa Cruz despatched to Madrid "an expert
in naval affairs to pOint out to his Majesty how great is
the danger this season, and to inform him of the bad
condition of the fleet, of the large number of soldiers who
are dead or have fled, and the great want of sailors, and to
assure him that if they.sail in this state they will be
going to destruction •••"(50) Philip sent Santa Cruz's expert
back without an audience, with a messenger hard on his heels
bearing the king's "will and command" that they fleet was to
sail without further delay or excuse. Even if only part of
it was servicable, he ordered, that part should put to sea
immediately under Don Alonso de Leyva, and Santa Cruz should
follow with the rest as soon as they were ready.(51)
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The same grisly charade was repeated in November. On
the one hand Santa Cruz claimed that he had 600 shipwrights
working day and night to prepare the fleet for sea: in
another fifteen days all would be ready. On the other, he
reiterated his warning about putting to sea in mid-winter,
and claimed strong support in this view from the duke of
Medina Sidonia who, though neither of them knew it, was to
succeed him as the fleet's commander.(52) Lippomano
supported his report to the Doge and Senate by referring to
a letter, of which he had a copy, which Santa Cruz had sent
to the king on 4 November:
WI should be deeply culpable [wrote Santa
Cruz] if I did not set forth the considerations of
seamanship, of war, and of state which I hold to
be of service or disservice to your
Majesty••• Your majesty's Singular intelligence
will perceive the difference between sending out
the Armada in December or sending it out in March
is the difference of a couple of months, or little
more, lost, whereas the gain would be the peace of
mind and the certainty of a successful issue, for
at the later season the open sea would serve as a
port for the Armada•••
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"•••in winter in England there is little more
than six hours of daylight, and up to two o'clock
the sky is usually clouded with a thick and dense
mist; if the wind is from the south, which is
favourable to our fleet, the atmosphere is
obscured for the whole day, so day might justly be
called night, and navigation in unknown waters is
rendered highly dangerous; on the other hand, if
the sky is clear the wind will be absolutely in
our teeth••• the objection of all others which
weighs with me is this, that during the winter
certain winds blow which are deadly to foreigners,
and so without fighting there is a great danger of
losing soldiers and sailors.
"If it really be decided to go to England
itself I would only observe that this Armada, even
when united with the troops of the Duke of Parma,
which would at this season be embarked and carried
over the straits with no small difficulty, does
not seem to me sufficient to attempt his
enterprise in the very heart of the winter. We
have no harbours at hand in case of need, and the
tide is extremely strong, the sea open to the
south winds. Nor, in my opinion, would it be such
an easy matter to take the Isle of Wight, or any
other harbour, for the shelter of our fleet, as is
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represented to your Majesty by those who stake
nothing on the risk, and have not been taught the
difference between victory and defeat.
"If, after all, your Majesty should insist
on my sailing, be assured that you will not have
either officer or private who will risk his life
with greater alacrity, courage, and ardour. But,
as I have humbly expressed it, my opinion is that
the sailing of the Armada should be delayed, if
not till March, at least till the middle of
AndFebruary to allow the weather to grow milder.
your Majesty must remember that should any
misfortune befall the fleet, which God forbid, it
would be impossible to put together another such
Armada for a long time to come."(53)
Paradoxically the duke of Parma, whose views on the
weaknesses of Philip's plan for the Armada coincided with
those
delay.
of Santa Cruz,
In his
was meanwhile urging expedition,
view secrecy should have been
not
the
Enterprise's main protection, and surprise its recipe for
success. But with every day that passed, Spanish intentions
were becoming more clearly known. He also pointed out that,
while it had not been insuperably difficult to get his army
and the invasion craft into position, it was virtually
impossible to keep them there, at a high state of readiness,
for an indefinite period, a difficulty made more acute by
the widespread failure of the Flemish grain harvest.(54)
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Confident that the Armada was about to depart the king had
ordered him, on 4 September 1587, to stand by for the
link-up with Santa Cruz. "Pray send me word at once,"
Philip had written, "that there shall be no shortcoming in
these respects."(55) Parma and his men had thereafter waited
along the Channel coast, with growing frustration, for the
fleet to arrive. The winter wore on, and nothing happened.
In December two extraordinary letters arrived from the king
which, unfortunately, do not appear to have survived, but
Parma's reply to them on 31 January 1588 makes their content
clear; Philip was now asking the duke whether he was in
England, and if not, why not?(56) In the face of such an
inexplicable lack of logic Parma's impatience exploded: the
king's letters, he wrote, "seem to infer that I may have
done what you Majesty emphatically ordered me not to do
until the arrival of the marquis of Santa Cruz with the
Armada to ensure the passage across." He went on:
"I wrote by your Majesty's orders my own
opinion, that in the interests of the facility,
success, and efficacy of the expedition, it was
necessary that secrecy should be maintained, the
French kept busy, and these States assured. I
said also that the passage across from here was
convenient, in consequence of its shortness and
the facility of obtaining boats. The latter,
however, obviously are not fit for anything but
the passage itself, as they are too small for
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fighting, and so low that four skiffs of the fleet
could send to the bottom as many as they might
meet. They could hardly live through a freshet,
much less a tempest, so that they can only be used
in settled weather. As your Majesty ordered me to
undertake this business and make all necessary
preparations, although the time given to me was
very short, and the supply of money very limited,
I have done my best to attempt the impossible.
Things have been drawn out longer than I like or
than is deSirable; both men and money having been
delayed beyond the time your Majesty indicated,
and particularly the Spanish troops, who are the
sinew of the whole bUSiness, the numbers,
moreover, being less than those agreed upon... In
order to keep them near the points of embarkation
they are so badly housed that very many of them
are missing••• I made every effort to get them to
the ports in accordance with your Majesty's
orders, and went personally to expedite them, on
the understanding that there would be no delay in
the arrival of the marquis of Santa Cruz with your
Majesty's Armada, as your Majesty assured me in
your own letters. I now see that everything has
turned out the reverse of what I expected and
hoped.
Secrecy, which was of the utmost importance,
has not been maintained; and from Spain, Italy,
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a~ ~l
expedition,
parts come, not only news of the
but full details of it••• the English
themselves have promptly and energetically set
about their preparations for defence. Your
Majesty is perfectly well aware that, without the
support of the fleet, I could not cross over to
England with these boats, and you very prudently
ordered me in your letter of 4 September not to
attempt to do so until the marquis arrived. I
thought that his coming would be so soon that,
notwithstanding my utmost haste, I should not be
in time; and I hurried all my men into the port
[Dunkirk]. If the marquis had come then, the
crossing would easily have been effected with
God's help, because, what with the Dunkirk and
other coast boats, as well as those I had
prepared, I could have taken the men over without
the Antwerp boats, neither the English, the
Hollanders, nor the Zeelanders being then in a
position to offer resistance to your Majesty's
fleet•••
"Your Majesty has the right to give absolute
orders, whilst I can only receive them as speci~
favours, and fulfil them; and for you to write to
me now with a presumption diametric~ly opposite
to the orders sent, natur~ly gives me great.
pain. I therefore humbly beg your Majesty to do
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me the great favour of instructing me how I am to
act•••"
On 22 February Parma and his men were still anxiously
awaiting the arrival of the Armada. His own preparations,
he reported to the king, were complete.(57) Munitions were
on board the transports, the landing craft were assembled at
Dunkirk and Sluys, and the men were concentrated near the
ports ready for embarkation. Owing to "exposure and evil
lodging" the troops available for the crossing had dwindled
to 18,000 but their morale, said the duke, was high (that he
had been able to keep it so since the previous September
says much for Parma's qualities as a general). His letter
ends with a reminder that "the Armada [must] come strong
enough to assure the victory, and the marquis must remember
that the English and the rebels are now strong and fully
prepared with their fleets."
But the marquis would never now see the coast of
Flanders. Two weeks before Parma wrote this letter the great
Santa Cruz had died amidst the chaos of the preparations at
Lisbon, broken, it was said, by the demands of the Armada
and the lack of understanding shown by his king. Just
before his death Philip had sent a special investigator to
Lisbon, who found Santa Cruz in a state of deep despair,
trying to direct the fleet's preparations from his
sick-bed.(58) The confusion was indescribable. Even when he
was in possession of all his faculties the marquis had been
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a fighting admiral rather than a staff-officer; now, as he
lay dying, feebly trying to cope with an impossible
situation, the whole Enterprise was on the verge of
collapse. The difficulties and uncertainties of
previous winter had reduced the fleet to a shambles of
unseaworthy ships and rotting supplies and, more critically,
for it is infectious and less easily cured, of dispirited
and disillusioned men. Santa Cruz must have found in death
a welcome release.
The king now took what was probably the only wholly
sensible decision he was to make in the course of the entire
unhappy affair. What the Armada urgently needed, if it was
to sail at all, was not another fighting admiral but a
determined and practical man with outstanding administrative
abilities. Such a man was Don Alonso P&rez de Guzm'n, duke
of Medina Sidonia, whose qualifications to succeed Santa
Cruz were impeccable. First, he had taken part in the
Armada's planning from the outset. Second, his
administrative talents were among the best available in
Spain. He virtually ruled the rich southern province of
Andalusia, where he was widely respected for his efficiency,
humanity, and fair-dealing. Nor was he lacking in military
and naval experience, particularly on the all-important
logistical side. In 1580 he led the army which received the
submission of the Portuguese Algarve, and in the following
year he was given the task of organising a naval expedition
to North Africa (which did not, in the event, take place).
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He commanded the relief force sent to Cadiz at the time of
Drake's raid in 1581, and his prompt arrival undoubtedly
saved the town from capture: the king himself commended him
for it. And from the early 1580s until the end of his life
(he died in 1615) he was much involved in the complex
administrative business of fitting out and arming the ships
of the trans-Atlantic flotas, and in the even more demanding
task of procuring supplies and trained crews for them.
Finally, and in some respects most important of all, he was
the head of one of Spain's most aristocratic and ancient
families.(59)
Whatever other failings Santa Cruz may have had in the
tragic final months of his life, he had been a commander
whose formidable prestige and authority inspired the
unquestioning respect and obedience of his subordinates. In
an age when social position was all-important, he was
difficult to replace. If one of the abler squadron
commanders - Recalde, perhaps, or Oquendo - had been
appointed over the heads of his brother officers, sensitive
veins of pride would have been deeply touched, and
dissention would inevitably have followed. Medina Sidonia
so outranked them all that none could feel - nor did they
feel - any resentment at serving under him.
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For all this, the duke was most reluctant to take
command, and the reasons he advanced for being excused the
appointment have been used, by some historians, to discredit
him. "I have not the health for the sea," he wrote to the
king's secretary, Juan de 1diaquez, on 16 February, "for I
know by the small experience I have had afloat that I soon
become sea-sick, and have many humours••• the force is so
great, and the undertaking so important, that it would not
be right for a person like myself, possessing no experience
of seafaring or war, to take charge of it. I have no doubt
that his Majesty will do me the favour which I humbly beg,
and will not entrust me to do a task of which, certainly, I
shall not give a good account; for I do not understand it,
know nothing about it, have no health for the sea, and have
no money to spend upon it."(60)
Was Medina Sidonia really the ignorant, faint-hearted
coward his own words seek to imply? Or were there deeper,
unstated reasons behind his self-professed unsuitability for
the appointment? When it came to the fighting in the
Channel, and particularly during the bloody battles off the
Flemish coast, nothing whatever was found wanting in the
duke's abilities as a commander or in his personal courage
under fire. We must therefore seek another explanation for
his unwillingness to accept the appointment. Might it
perhaps be that he knew he was the only man in Spain who
could actually get the Enterprise under way and that, in
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consequence, the best service he could do his king was to
hold back and so ensure the Armada would not sail at all? If
this were the case, history has vindicated his judgement.
But Philip's authority prevailed and Medina Sidonia, his
gesture made, hurried to Lisbon.
In the three months which elapsed between the duke's
arrival and the sailing of the fleet at the end of May
something of a miracle took place. Under his firm but
courteous direction, aided by a willingness to seek the
opinion of his more experienced subordinates and his own
prodigious capacity for work, the fleet was made seaworthy.
Guns and 'ammunition were distributed (shot and powder quotas
\went up to the unprecedented minimum of 50 rounds per gun),
the dismantled siege train and other military stores were
packed into the holds, provisions and water were stowed
according to a carefully planned turnover system, and the
abysmal morale of the men was replaced by a pious fervour to
sail.(61) Even the duke, it seems, had become cautiously
optimistic about the outcome of the campaign.(62)
On 9 May 1588 a muster was held at Lisbon in which all
the ships of the fleet were listed, squadron by squadron,
with their tonnages, the number of guns each carried, their
crew strengths, and the number of troops on board. The
amount of roundshot, gunpowder, lead and match issued to
each ship was also recorded. The list of ships was followed
with a general break-down of the senior officers, specialist
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troops, and infantry units attached to the Armada.
Ayentureros (gentlemen-adventurers) and entretenidos
(unattached officers) were included separately. The muster
closes with a summary of the artillery, weapons, munitions,
general equipment and provisions carried by the fleet.
This list was published at Lisbon before the Armada
sailed, and various editions of it appeared throughout
Europe within a matter of weeks.(63) The list is
'"supplemented by a summary relacion issued by the duke of
Medina Sidonia on 14 May.(64) Although it is unlikely that
these lists are accurate in every respect they
unquestionably provide a broadly reliable picture of the
Armada's Order of Battle, which, in modern warfare, would
have been a highly secret document. It must be supposed
that the Spaniards publicised it in order to underline the
reality of the fleet which was about to sail.
The 9 May muster and the 14 May summary have been
combined to provide the Order of Battle table presented in
Appendix 4. Each ship in the table has been given a serial
number to which reference is made, where appropriate, within
square brackets in the following text.
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Chapter Two: The Armada Campaign, May-August 1588
Advance to contact, 30 May - 30 July
Only the weather could now delay the Armada's
departure. After the muster on 9 May Medina Sidonia began
moving his ships down-river past Belem, where they anchored
to await a favourable wind. But the Atlantic weather, the
duke reported on 14 May, was "as boisterous and bad as if it
were December", and the fleet was still at anchor on 28 May,
with a north-westerly gale blowing down the estuary.(1) Two
days later the Armada was at sea, though its progress
northward was tortuously slow because of the contrary winds
and the poor performance of the hulks.(2) Another more
serious problem was beginning to manifest itself. Despite
Medina Sidonia's careful precautions at Lisbon the
provisions were already beginning to go bad, and some were
so rotten that they had to be jettisoned.(3). It took the
fleet two weeks to struggle the 250 miles to Cape
Finisterre, at which point the ships were ordered to clear
their decks for the coming action.(4) But there was to be no
fighting yet. The contrary winds persisted, and little
further progress had been made when, on 19 June, Medina
Sidonia held a Council of War at which it was decided that
the whole fleet should put into Corunna for fresh stores and
water.(5) By that evening the ~ Martfn[1] and about fifty
other ships had reached the harbour but the remainder, which
included the galleasses, the clumsy hulks and Levanters, and
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Recalde's squadron of Biscayans, stood off beyond the
headland in the failing light intending to make their
entrance at daybreak.(6)
During the night a violent south-westerly gale blew up,
and the ships outside Corunna had to run north-eastwards
with it. By the time these scattered ships had been
gathered in from as far afield as the Scillies, and their
damage repaired, fresh provisions and water stowed, and the
fleet once again put in fighting order, a full month had
elapsed.(7) Again Medina Sidonia's administrative skills and
tireless attention to detail brought the Armada through
another crisis, and again he felt constrained to write to
the king, even more strongly than before, urging him not to
continue with the Enterprise.(8) But Philip remained
unpersuaded. The Armada was to sail from Corunna at the
first opportunity, even if some of the missing ships had not
yet returned.(9)
In fact, when the fleet did sail on 21 July almost all
of the stragglers had rejoined and, at last, the weather had
turned in the Spaniards' favour.(10) Five days of brisk
southerly breezes brought the Armada across the Bay of
Biscay to the latitude of Ushant, beyond which lay the
entrance to the English Channel.
some early casualties. Diego de
Unfortunately there were
Medrano's four galleys
failed to weather the rolling Atlantio swells, and had to
run for French ports; one, the Diana[129l, was wrecked at
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the entrance to Bayonne. More unexpectedly, the 768-ton
Biscayan capitana Santa Ana[13] also came to grief, and
eventually sought shelter at La Hogue, on the eastern side
of the Cherbourg peninsula, where she was to remain
throughout the campaign.
On Saturday 30 July the Armada sighted the Lizard, and
the fleet hove-to. The Aan Martin hoisted her crusading
standard on the maintop, and fired a three-gun Signal to
summon a Council of War. A suggestion by Don Alonso de
Leyva that an attack should be mounted on Plymouth was
turned down by the Council; such a move would not help the
fleet to achieve its main objective, and the entrance to the
Sound was reported to be well guarded. In any case the
attempt would be in direct contradiction to the king's
orders. It was however decided that the Armada should
proceed no further eastward than the Isle of Wight until
firm communication had been established with Parma.(11) In
spite of repeated requests for information which Medina
Sidonia had sent to Flanders by fast pinnace there was still
no up-to-date indication of the invasion army's state of
readiness. The duke knew nothing of how Parma intended to
link up with the Armada, nor of the extent of Dutch and
English naval activity off the Flemish coast. Although the
option of forcing the Solent was one which the king's
instructions countenanced only i! and after the Flanders
rendezvous had failed, Medina Sidonia clearly felt that the
rendezvous should be held to have failed if, for some
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reason, Parma was unable to keep it, and that if so it would
be better to go for the Isle of Wight without first risking,
to no good purpose, the shoals and other hazards of the
Flemish coast. As events were to show, this reasoning was
entirely sound, and Medina Sidonia took the precaution of
communicating it to the king.(12}
The advance up-Channel began the following morning.
"Our Armada placed itself in combat formation," runs the
duke's entry in his diario of the proceedings, "and the
flagship put abroad the royal standard at the foremast."(13}
No first-hand plan of this formation has survived, although
one undoubtedly existed. But a number of second-hand
versions of the Armada's proposed battle array, evidently
compiled some time before the fleet sailed, have been
preserved.(14) They were included with intelligence reports
sent to their governments by several Italian ambassadors and
were based, presumably, on an official version issued to
each ship along with a mass of other administrative
instructions.(15) It was probably not even considered to be
a confidential document (~. the publicity given to the
fleet's administrative order of battle). One of these
copies - that sent to the Grand Duke of Tuscany by his
ambassador at Lisbon on 18 May 1588 - is reproduced in
Figure 1. This information can be augmented, and in many
respects supported, by a short pamphlet published by Filippo
Pigafetta at Rome some months later.(16} While these sources
do not necessarily indicate the precise combat order which
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the fleet actually adopted on 31 July they represent the
most detailed contemporary information we possess, and for
that reason alone they deserve close study. At the very
least we may glean from them pointers to the tactical
intentions of the Armada's commanders, however much these
intentions may have been modified by the situation which was
actually faced on the eve of battle.
Pigafetta's description placed a screen of light craft
two miles ahead of the main fleet to probe for the enemy.
Their duty was to act as early-warning pickets, and if
hostile forces were sighted they would fall back into the
main body. The fleet itself was arranged in four
divisions. First came a vanguard of twelve powerful vessels
set in three ranks. The leading rank comprised the
strongest ships of the Levant squadron, with Don Alonso de
Leyva'S ~ Encoronada[70] on the right and Mart!n de
Bertendona's Regazona[68] on the left. The other two would
be, in all probability, La Trinidad ya1encera[72] and the
~ ~~ S1c111a[71], which were the next most senior
units in the squadron.
galleasses, led by Hugo
Behind them sailed
de Moncada's flagsh1p
the four
the ~
Loreozo[123]. The rear rank of the vanguard consisted of
four Portuguese galleons, with the fleet capitana general,
Medina S1donia's ~ Mart!n[1], placed second on the right.
A space of fifty paces separated the ranks, and a gap
equivalent to the width of two ships divided each vessel
from its neighbour. The advantage of this arrangement,
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according to Pigafetta, was that it left several tactical
options open: the front rank could attack on its own,
supported by the other two; or the second could move up into
the gaps and attack in line with the first, supported by the
third; or, indeed, all three ranks could form line abreast.
Half a mile astern of the vanguard came the second
division, or main battle. Its first rank was an 18-strong
line of warships, set two ship-widths apart. On the right
(though Pigafetta also places this ship in the vanguard) was
Bertendona's Regazona[68], and on the left the Portuguese
~ ~[5]. Four galleys under Diego de Medrano came
next. Bringing up the main battle's rear were eight members
of the Andalusian squadron under Pedro de Valdes in the
Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario[43], supported by twenty armed
caravels.
From each flank of the main battle, and set 300 paces
(540m) from it, extended the last two divisions, which
formed what Pigafetta called the "horns" of the formation.
Each horn consisted of a front line of 15 fighting ships,
set the regulation two widths apart, although unlike the
vanguard and main battle they did not sail in line abreast
but in forward echelon, the bows of each being in line with
the mainmast of its outer neighbour. The flagships occupied
the seaward stations at either end; on the right horn, Juan
Martinez de Recalde's ~ ~ ~ Portugal[2], and on the
left Diego Pimentel's ~ Mateo[6]. A hundred paces (180m)
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behind each horn's front line lay its supports of pinnaces
and hulks arrayed in three ranks; in the first, seven
pinnaces twenty paces apart, in the second six hulks, and in
the third four more pinnaces.
Pigafetta makes it clear that this fleet arrangement
was based on the well-tried ordering of a galley force in
battle array, and indeed likened it to the famous "eagle"
formation with which the Ottoman navy had out-manoeuvred the
Holy League's fleet at Prevesa in 1538.(17) The vanguard was
the head, the main battle the body, and the two flanking
divisions the wings. He also stressed that the supposed
crescent-shape of the formation, so frequently portrayed by
writers and illustrators from his day to ours, derives from
the ignorant imagination of landsmen. A fleet of ships
cannot, he pointed out,
order based on right
maintained.
maintain a curved formation: an
lines is the only kind that can be
After describing the Armada's formation, Pigafetta went
on to analyse its tactical strengths. Its wide front would
make it almost impossible, he thought, for an enemy to
out-manoeuvre it and so attack its rear or flanks, while its
elasticity would give it the capacity to encircle a foe who
attempted to approach it from the front. The powerful
vanguard, which incorporated the four galleasses, was he
believed a sensible development of an idea which had proved
successful at Lepanto, when a forward screen of galleasses,
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set ahead of the main battle, had disrupted the enemy's
attack formation before it had become seriously engaged.(18)
Pigafetta's descriptive analysis of the formation, and
the Tuscan ambassador's sketch, clearly demonstrated the
underlying purpose for which the fleet was designed. Its
sole function was to advance towards its objective in such a
way as to deny an enemy the opportunity of preventing it
from doing so. It was not, in a purely naval sense, an
aggressive
to think
formation, but it would be a gross misjudgement
of it as fundamentally defensive. The military
strategy which underlay it was clear-cut, single minded, and
wholly offensive.
While it seems almost certain that Pigafetta's
description and the ambassador's sketches were based on an
official formation plan, we have no means of knowing the
date of the original, or to what extent it may subsequently
have been modified. Some further information can, however,
be extracted from a document published by Duro, for which he
gives no date or provenence but which can be assigned, on
internal evidence, to a date later than 7 January 1588.(19)
The document contains a detailed allocation of forty
front-line ships to the right and left horns (cuernos) of
the formation. That it does not refer to the fleet as it
actually sailed is clear from the inclusion of three ships
which did not participate in the final muster,
that the rest did merits its transcription in
but the fact
full. The
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serial numbers of those ships which are listed in the Lisbon
muster are added in brackets.
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CUERNO IZQUIERDO
San Francisco P [8]
Bertendona L [68]
Anunciada L [73]Prodoneli L [74]
La Viscn L [76]
Santistena B [?57]Salvador B [56]Santandres LZabra Julia P [12]Irun Grande H [?~ Grifoo]San Pefro Mayor H [85]Perro Marino H [80]Ventura H [94]
Santa Barbara H [95]
Santa B~rbara B [59]
San Buenaventura B [60]
N.S. de Begona C [37]
San Juan de Fernandomo C [40]
San Medel!n Celid6n C [35]
N.S. de Barrio C [34]
BATALLA
CUERNO DERECHO
Juan Martfnez P [2]
San Mateo P [6]
Santiago G [15]
Belen G
La Caridad, Inglesa Pat [102]
La Magdalena G [18]
San Juan G [19]
Mar!a Juan G [61]
La Manuela G [21]
Santa Marfa G [58]
El Gato H [98]
San Gabriel H [100]
FalcOn Blanco H [81 or 89]
Santandres U [90]
Sanson H [86]
La Trinidad C [38]
San Pedro C [29]
Capitana vieja de Oquendo B [155]
Zabra Agusta P [11]~San Pedro Amaras A
G ,A = Andalusia; B = Biscay; C = Castile; = Guipuzcoa; H = Hulks;
L = Levant; P = Portugal; Pat = Pataches.
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Some of the ships, .notablythe Biscayans and Guipuzcoans,
are not assigned to the squadrons with which they ultimately
sailed. Not all of the attributions are certain, but they
are not worth individual discussion; where the doubt is
considerable I have inserted a question mark.
On the face of it, then, this document appears to be
part of a written formation plan drawn up not long before
the fleet sailed. There must also have been a complementary
list setting out the stations of the main battle (batalla),
as the heading itself indicates. But even without this
additional information we can draw a number of Significant
conclusions. First, in one fundamental respect, the Spanish
version differs from the Italian ones. Instead of four
divisions there were only three: a main battle and two
horns. That this arrangement was the one in which the
Armada actually went into battle is confirmed by the Spanish
accounts of the fighting. The most positive assertion comes
from an unsigned relaciOn which states that "our fleet was
divided into three bodies: the vanguard, commanded by Don
Alonso de Leyva; the main battle, under the cap1tana [Medina
Sidonia]; and the rearguard, under the alm1ranta
[Recalde]."(20) Medina Sidonia himself, writing to the king
just after the fleet had left Lisbon, confirms this
arrangement: "I have taken every precaution," he writes, "as
will be seen from the formation I have caused to be
adopted. Either of the two horns of our battle formation,
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with their supports, and two of the galleasses which
accompany the tirst four ships, would be able to cope with
one ot the enemy's fleets; I, with the rest of our vessels
leading, could deal with the fleet in front of us, my centre
being supported by the vessels I have appointed for the
purpose, and the other two galleasses which are attached to
my flagship."(21)
Modern historians of the Armada have based their
interpretations of the fleet's formation, as far as I know
without exception, on the assumption that the territorial
squadrons listed in the Lisbon muster were discrete tactical
units which sailed in regular sub-formations under their
respective commanders. The Italian sources and the Spanish
list, however, demonstrate no such regular groupings. On
the contrary, individual members of the various squadrons
are scattered apparently at random throughout the fleet.
This must surely indicate that the squadrons were-
administrative units rather than tactical ones. Other
evidence supports this conclusion. Diego Flores de
Valdes, for example, was the administrative commander of the
Castilian squadron, although helnever set foot during the
,campaign on board his capitana ~ Cristobal[27]. This was
because his tactical function was as chief-of-staff to the
duke of Medina Sidonia, a post which demanded his personal
presence on board the capitana general, the ~ Martin[1].
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This apparent mobility of command, and the divorcing of
administrative from tactical responsibilities, also explains
why several ships, not necessarily flagships or
vice-flagships, are consistently named by the Italian
sources and given precise locations within the formation,
while the rest are simply lumped together without any
attempt to identify them beyond a very broad definition of
ship-type: great-ship, hulk or pinnace. Possibly this was
intended simply to underline the presence of the most
illustrious officers, and certainly the named ships are
those of senior or notably dashing commanders. A m~e
satisfactory explanation for their special mention may,
however, be advanced. As we shall see when we come to
.
consider the battles, this relatively small group of named
vessels crops up again and again in accounts of the
fighting, particularly in Medina Sidonia's own diario.
These ships seem to have borne the brunt of the engagements
throughout the campaign, and they apparently moved freely to
any threatened part of the formation.
We may, perhaps, see these ships as units specially
authorised, no doubt within clearly defined limits, to break
station on their own initiative in response to any attack on
the formation as a whole. This, if so, would be in marked
contrast to the clear responsibility of the rest of the
fleet, which was to hold formation at all cost: indeed, one
erring captain was to hang for failing to do so, .while
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several others narrowly escaped the same fate.(22)
The argument can be carried further. If we accept the
division of the fleet into these two categories, the
formation-keepers and the free-lance troubleshooters, we can
begin to understand something of the Armada's command
structure, an aspect of the campaign which has consistently
puzzled modern students of the event. How did Medina
Sidonia actually control his great fleet during the battles?
His General Orders, which were issued at Lisbon before the
Armada sailed, make no mention of a chain of command, and
contain o~y the most rudimentary signalling
instructions.(23) Naval signalling in the sixteenth century
in any case played little or no part in the actual conduct
of fleet engagements.(24) What the duke did lay down,
however, was that each day before nightfall it was the duty
of all the fleet's principal officers to communicate with
the flagship, by sending a patache or ship's boat to receive
orders. He also arranged for most of Hurtado de Mendoza's
twenty-two pataches or zabras, which made up the Armada's
communications squadron, to be stationed close by the
flagship. They would thus always be available to convey, if
necessary to several quarters at once, any further orders
that were required.(25)
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So, it would seem, every ship in the fleet had an
overriding duty to keep to its apPointed station on the
flagship unless the flagship directed otherwise. There
were, in effect, no subordinate commands. In this way the
duke could direct the defence of the formation, without
setting its overall order at risk, simply by moving powerful
and well-officered ships to any position he f~t
appropriate, and by giving them whatever freedom to act he
judged fit. Thus, for example, when Don Alonso de Leyva was
put in charge of an augmented rearguard in the
reorganisation of 1 August, we do not later hear of him
actually controlling the rearguard as a coherent force under
his personal command. Most of the ships simply plodded on,
keeping station, as before. But, thereafter, Don Alonso's
great carrack, the]ala Encoronada[70], was to be found
wherever the fighting around the rearguard was hottest,
blasting away in concert with, but not commanding or
commanded by, half-a-dozen or more of his fellow free-lance
troubleshooters who had evidently moved from elsewhere in
the fleet to support him.
,
Whatever tactical advantages this system may have had -
and in the circumstances they were probably considerable-
it also neatly solved a less obvious but no less crucial
problem of command. As we have seen, Medina Sidonia owed
his appointment, in part at least, to his social position.
He far outranked, in terms of nobility, every other officer
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in the fleet, and no one could object on social grounds to
serving under him. But to have placed subordinates in
positions of direct authority over their brother officers
would have created insuperable problems of precedence, and
this factor alone ruled out a hierarchal command structure.
Indeed, in his relationship with one senior officer, the
fiery Don Hugo de Moncada of the galleasses, even Medina
Sidonia was to experience difficulties of this kind.
Another question we must consider is that of the
technical terms used by the Spaniards themselves in
describing the Armada's formation. In what was to follow,
Medina Sidonia's diario makes frequent mention of both
vanguard and rearguard, but in a way which best makes sense
if we understand the terms as referring not to the front and
rear of the formation but to the flanking horns, the one on
the left being Leyva's vanguard and that on the right
Recalde's rearguard. Corbett first made the ingenious
suggestion that this apparent contradiction can be resolved
by the application of contemporary military nomenclature to
distinguish between the marching- and battle-orders of the
fleet.(26) On the march, an army's main battle was preceded
by its vanguard and followed by its rearguard. In order to
form line of battle the vanguard would normally fall back on
the main battle's right flank (the post of honour) while the
rearguard would take up pOSition on the left. If the threat
came from the flank, however, the same disposition only
required each man to turn half left or right. A right turn
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would, of course, place the vanguard on the left of the
line, which though technically incorrect was presumably
acceptable on the grounds of simplicity. If we imagine the
Armada sailing north from Ushant in its order-of-march,
Leyva leading, Medina Sidonia next, and Recalde bringing up
the rear, w~ can easily see how, on 31 July, Medina Sidonia
brought it smoothly into battle-formation for the advance
up-Channel. All the ships simply swung 90 degrees to
starboard, facing east, so that Leyva's ships formed the
left horn, Recalde's the right, and Medina Sidonia's the
main battle. In diagramatic form we can represent the moves
thus:
Axis of advance
VANGUARD (Leyva)
MAIN BATTLE
(Medina Sidonia) REARGUARD (Recalde)
Line of March
and we may further deduce that the following tactical
responses were made according to the position held by the
enemy:
i
aster$:)enemy ahead «enemy
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The
defend
strength of this formation lay in its
itself without halting its advance.
ability to
A force
attacking from the rear could be flanked and ultimately
surrounded by the horns, while any attempt to impede its
progress from the front could be countered by swinging the
horns forward. Several related points deserve
consideration. The first is the very considerable degree of
seamanship and discipline with which the Spaniards adopted
and held this large and complex arrangement of ships whose
sailing qualities varied but were generally poor. Next we
should note that the formation was, to some extent,
flexible, particularly with regard to the movement within it
of the twenty or so specially assigned troubleshooters.
Such movements normally took place, as the accounts of the
fighting demonstrate, within the formation and not outside
it. When, for example, we hear of Medina Sidonia'S ~
Martin[1], whose station was near the front of the main
battle, coming to the aid of ships at the rear of the
formation, we need not suppose (as many writers have done)
that she had ponderously worked her way round the outside of
the fleet; all she would have had to do was to shorten sail
and fall back through it. In this connection we should note
that as a group the troubleshooters tended to be ships with
a superior margin of performance over the progress of the
fleet as a whole, which was naturally restricted to that of
its slowest member. They could therefore regain station
from a rearward position without slowing down the general
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advance.
Finally, we should consider the fleet's density. This
clearly
little
varied according to circumstances, and we have
hard evidence to help us. Pigafetta's two
ship-widths of lateral separation gives the formation as he
described it an overall front of four miles, while Camden,
who was probably working from eye-witness accounts, tells us
that the Armada in battle-array covered seven miles from
flank to flank.(27) Camden may of course have been
exaggerating, and in any case the figure cannot have been
more than an educated guess on the part of his informant,
but nonetheless his estimation seems entirely reasonable.
Pigafetta's spacing should not, I think, be taken literally,
since he makes it clear that the spacing is intended to
allow two ships actually to take station in each gap, for
which a greater provision than the minimum required by their
combined beams would obviously be necessary. If we
postulate a flank-to-flank front of fifty ships with an
average beam of thirty-five feet, and allow room between
each two ships for two more to be interposed with a full
beam's clearance on either side (which is still
uncomfortably close) the formation would span almost exactly
six miles. It was certainly much more open than the crowded
near-contemporary representations of it, no doubt for good
artistic reasons, often suggest.
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The fleets in contact, 31 July - 8 August
We are handicapped in understanding much of the action
in the Channel by the paucity and partiality of our
sources. A large-scale naval engagement is, both for those
who undertake it and those who seek to interpret it
afterwards, a confusing business at the best of times. Each
participant only sees glimpses of what is happening in his
immediate vicinity, a vicinity which itself represents a
tiny moving fragment of the battle as a whole. Nor is he
consciously trying to observe those matters whch will most
interest subsequent historians. His attention is absorbed
by compelling and often dangerous duties; his senses may be
dulled by shock, noise, smoke, discomfort and fatigue; and
his recollection of events will almost inevitably be
coloured by the excitement, fear, prejudice and uncertainty
which surrounded them. The historian of a modern battle can
generally draw on an abundance of complementary sources,
but, even so, he will rarely find it easy to extract a
clear-cut and incontrovertible analysis of the event from
the matrix of confusion and complexity which surrounds it.
The Armada historian is on even shakier ground. His battle
was spread over a wide expanse of sea, and no one had a
bird's eye view of it; few of the participants left accounts
of their actual experiences in the fighting; and both sides
were fighting a kind of action which was without precedent
in naval warfare, and for which no guidelines had been
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formulated or fighting instructions laid down.
In general the Spanish sources are fuller and more
reliable than the English ones. Medina Sidonia's diario is,
as far as it goes, a straightforward account of the
proceedings written by a dutiful and honest man. The duke's
account is supported and augmented by several other
relaciones from the Spanish side, notably those of Alonso
Vanegas, who sailed with the duke aboard the ~ Martln, or
,
Pedro Coco Calderon of the hulk ~ Salvador[79], and of an
anonymous officer on board the galleass Zuniga[124]. To
these may be added a number of other sources, of varying
degrees of consequence and reliability.(28) The only English
account of substance is an unsigned Relation ~ Proceedings
which is probably Lord Admiral Howard's "more particular
relation" with which he proposed to supplement the "brief
abstract of accidents" sent to Walsingham on 7 August
(0.S.).(29) This account formed the basis of two Italian
manuscripts, dedicated to Howard and Drake respectively,
which are now in the British Library.(30) The report is
certainly based on official sources, and its general value
is considerable, although it is lacking in detailed
descriptions of the fighting and, in particular, of the
tactics employed.
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In attempting to describe the fighting which took place
in the Channel and off the Flemish coast I have not
therefore attempted to produce a complete narrative; nor
have I considered, except in the most general way, the
movements and actions of the English fleet. My aim has been
to seek information which relates most directly to the
achievements and failures of the Spanish side, for it is
upon these matters that the archaeological evidence will
most directly bear.
Although the fleets were in almost continuous contact
from 31 July to 8 August the fighting can be divided, for
descriptive convenience, into five distinct phases.
Phase I: the action off Plymouth, 31 July
On the evening of 30 July, as the Armada proceeded
eastwards within distant sight of the coast, elements of the
English fleet were observed working their way to windward
out of Plymouth. A solitary English pinnace, sent to
reconnoitre Medina Sidonia's disposition, approached the
Spanish fleet and there was some ineffectual cannonading.
The following morning it became clear that the English fleet
under Lord Admiral Howard had skilfully cut across the front
of the Armada under cover of darkness and beaten its way
westward to gain the tactical advantage to windward and
seaward of the Armada'S right horn - the rearguard under
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Recalde. This would have been the occasion for the Armada
to adopt, if it had not already done so, the trailing horns
posture appropriate to an enemy threat from the rear. Such
a formation would doubtless have appeared, to an observer
close to sea level, as the great crescent which Camden
described and the Adams charts depict.(31)
The first formal shot of the campaign was delivered as
an old-fashioned gesture of etiquette on the part of the
Lord Admiral. He sent an 80-ton bark, appropriately named
Disdain, to within hailing distance of the Armada's main
battle to deliver his 'defiance' - a single token shot
discharged into the towering midst of the Spanish fleet.
Then, the formalities of warfare observed, Howard launched
his preliminary attack.
No Englishman has described the formation in which this
attack was delivered, and the English sources offer not the
slightest circumstantial clue. But, whatever they were,
Howard's tactics surprised and perturbed the Spaniards.
Both , ,Calderon and the anonymous author of another relacion
describe the English fleet as being arrayed ~~, while
Medina Sidonia commented upon its good order. The duke
added that the enemy ships were "extremely well armed,
rigged, and handled". Now ~ ~ is a Spanish military term
which means 'in file; in a line', and what the Spaniards
were witnessing was, in all probability, the first true
line-astern attack in the history of naval warfare.
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This tactic brilliantly exploited the mobility and
firepower of the broadside-armed sailing ship, and presaged
the end of rigid line-abreast fleet formations of which the
Armada itself was one of the last examples. Its
effectiveness lay in its simplicity and adaptability. One
ship (usually the flagship) led the attack, and the rest
followed in a line with the vice-flagship at the rear, thus
bringing each broadside to bear in succession. No rigid
formation-keeping was required, and the leader could move as
he willed with the rest of his force snaking behind him. As
long as each ship kept station on the stern of the vessel to
its front the line's coheSion could not be lost, however
erratic the flagship's path might be. The whole line,
moreover, could be turned about on the flagship's command,
to recross the enemy led by the vice-flagship and so present
its second broadside. These movements could be carried out
as many times as were necessary to keep the enemy, as Sir
Walter Raleigh described in his General Orders of 1617,
"under a perpetual shot. This you must do," he added, "upon
the windermost ship'or ships•••"(32)
The windermost ships of the Armada were those which lay
at the outer ends of its trailing horns. Howard's galleons
stormed across the Spanish rear, engaging first Leyva's
vanguard and then, on the far wing, Recalde's rearguard.
Some ships of the rearguard broke station in the face of
this assault, and sought shelter among the main body, but
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Recalde himself, supported by his Biscayan alm1ranta ~
~[14], stood firm, and for some time most of the English
firepower was directed against these two ships.
In their subsequent reports, however, neither side made
much of this action. Drake merely commented: "The 21st
[O.S.] we had them in chase, and so coming up unto them,
there passed some cannon shot between some of our fleet and
some of them." Hawkins described the same incident as "some
small fight".(33) During the whole engagement Recalde's ~
1YAn[2] suffered only twenty casualties, two shots lodged in
the foremast, and some stays parted; small enough penalty,
it would seem, for two hours of sustained gunfire by the
most powerful ships in Elizabeth's navy. But it was
long-range gunfire. Pedro de Valdes, commander of the
Andalusian capitana Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario[43], tells us
that little harm was done "because the fight was far
off".(34) Clearly the disciplined formation of the Armada,
and its evident strength, was having the effect for which it
had been designed: the English were not prepared to close,
and beyond point-blank range their guns could do little
damage. "We durst not adventure to put in amongst them,"
wrote Lord Admiral Howard in his report on the first day's
fighting, "their fleet being so strong."(35) Henry Whyte, a
volunteer aboard the ~~, put the matter more
the good orderbluntly. "The majesty of the enemy's fleet,
they held,
did cause,
and the private consideration of our own wants
in mine opinion, our first onset to be more
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coldly done than became the value of our nation and the
credit of the English navy•••"(36)
Recalde and his loyal supporter ~ ~[14] were
finally extricated by the ~ Mart{n[1] and ~ Mateo[6],
which had fallen back through the fleet to support their
beleagured rearguard. By mid-day the Armada, its formation
regained, was able to proceed on its way. There followed,
in quick succession, two serious mishaps. At 4 p.m. the
Guipuzcoan ~ Salyador[S6], one of the most heavily armed
ships in the fleet, was suddenly rent apart by a tremendous
explosion in her powder magazine, which blew out two decks
and the sterncastle.(37) The duke halted the Armada in its
tracks, went himself to her aid, and had the fire
extinguished. The wounded were taken off, and the damaged
ship brought into the safety of the fleet. In the course of
these triCky manoeuvres the Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario[43],
capitana of Pedro de Valdes, collided with her Andalusian
sister Santa Catalina[49], breaking her bowsprit and
foremast. Crippled, she lay to. Two of the galleasses
attempted to get a hawser to her, but failed because of the
heavy seas. Medina Sidonia then offered to take off her
crew but Don Pedro, who believed he could repair the ship,
refused to leave. The duke, torn between the Castilian code
which demanded that he should.stand by a comrade in distress
and his clear duty to continue the Armada's advance, quite
properly chose the latter. Don Pedro and the Rosario were
abandoned to the enemy. Both were later captured by Drake,
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who deserted his post as the leading English ship the
following night to pick up this tempting prize.(3B) Even Sir
Francis's most fervent apologists concede that his sole
motive was to acquire booty, with which the Rosario was
amply provided. The outspoken Martin Frobisher later
declared that Drake had thought to ·cozen us of our shares
of 15,000 ducats·, and threatened to make him ·spend the
best blood in his belly·.(39) Don Pedro, who had surrendered
without firing a shot, later became something of a celebrity
in London. He was eventually ransomed. The RosariO, minus
her treasure but with most of her guns still aboard, was
brought to Torbay.(40)
Phase II: Ibe action off Portland, 2 August
In the face of a strong English fleet to windward, and
in spite of two unexpected and serious accidents, Medina
Sidonia had demonstrated during his first day of action the
tactical and strategio strengths of the Armada, and his own
skill in commanding it. The fleet remained more or less
intact, and the delay to its progress had been slight. The
rendezvous with the Army of Flanders was drawing closer.
With that crucial meeting in mind the duke dispatched, on
the afternoon of 1 August, yet another patache informing
Parma of his situation, urgently requesting information
about the proposed link-up.(41) Medina Sidonia still had no
confirmation that the invasion force was ready, and he had
no idea at all as to how Parma intended to bring it out.
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No fighting occurred that day as the two fleets, in
wary visual'contact with one another, progressed eastwards
towards Portland Bill. The duke made use of this respite to
reorganise the Armada's formation in the light of the
previous day's experiences. Against more nimble ships which
clearly did not intend to close to boarding range, the
extended horns of the vanguard and rearguard had offered
little tactical advantage, yet had proved vulnerable to
isolation and attack. Accordingly he joined the two horns
into a single body, reinforced by the galleasses and four
Portuguese galleons. He also created a new tactical
formation. To each of the heavily armed Levanters ~
Encoronada[70] and Trinidad Valencera[72] were attached a
pair of galleasses, so establishing two very heavily-gunned
reserve units which could be deployed, by using the towing
abilities of the galleasses, irrespective of the wind.(42)
These changes were observed by the English, who from
now on describe the formation as a 'plump' or 'roundel'. We
may reconstruct its composition thus:
VANa'UARD
(Medina Sidonia)
NON-COMBATANTS
REARGUARD
Leyva to 3 Aug
Rec alde after 3 Aug
GALLEONS' ••• "4= =F ~:f: GALLEAS SES
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With this change of formation came, apparently, a
change of nomenclature. The fleet, in a sense, had reverted
from line-of-battle to line-of-march, and so, as Medina
Sidonia himself made clear, Leyva's old vanguard and
Recalde's rearguard now formed a single coherent rearguard
whose duty, as laid down by the duke, was to "withstand the
enemy and prevent him from standing in the way of our
junction with the duke of Parma." Medina Sidonia's old main
battle, at the head of the line of march towards Flanders,
now became the vanguard. The hulks and other
non-combatants, as before, occupied a relatively safe
position at the centre of the formation.
On
another
serious
this day of re-grouping,
necessary task. The
breach of formation
Medina Sidonia performed
day before there had been a
discipline when some of
Recalde's right horn had deserted their posts in the face of
the English assault. Six pataches, each with a
sergeant-major, a provost marshal, and a hangman aboard, now
delivered to every ship in the fleet clear written
instructions which defined its exact station in the
reorganised formation. Henceforward any captain who left
his assigned position without authority would be liable to
summary execution.(43)
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During the night of 1/2 August the wind fell away, and
both fleets were becalmed some miles west of Portland Bill.
But as dawn broke on the Tuesday a fresh breeze sprang up
from the east to give the Spaniards the weather gauge.
Howard saw the danger and led his line of galleons,
close-hauled, towards the north-north-east in an attempt to
place himself between the Armada and the land. With his
advantage of wind Medina Sidonia was easily able to block
this attempt, and force the English ships to come about in a
reach towards the south-south-west. This gave the
troubleshooters of the strengthened Spanish rearguard their
chance to intercept. For the first time since the fighting
began some of the larger ships now came to close quarters _
to half musket shot or less - and a heavy artillery fight
developed. Bertendona's Regazona[68] pressed the English
flagship (or, at least, the ship Medina Sidonia took to be
the flagship), clearly intent on boarding, but his adversary
turned seaward and opened the range. This general fight
continued for more than two hours and was conducted, in
Camden's descriptive phrase, "with confusion enough."(44)
Certainly the surviving accounts hint at no definite tactics
on either side beyond a strong Spanish desire to grapple and
board and an equally strong English one to avoid it.
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While this action was taking place well to seaward of
Portland Bill a separate battle had developed under its
lee. When, at dawn, the English fleet had abandoned its
attempt to weather the Armada, the seven leading ships found
themselves too far inshore to close-haul seawards. Six were
medium-sized armed merchantmen of the London squadron, and
the seventh was Martin Frobisher's heavily gunned TriumPh,
the largest ship in the English fleet. To the Spaniards,
Frobisher was an irresistable target. Medina Sidonia, whose
primary concern was with the engagement developing around
his rearguard, sent Don Hugo de Moncada with his four
galleasses to deal with Frobisher's isolated force.
The attack was not a success. Earlier in the day
Moncada had, according to some accounts, sought permission
to engage Howard's Ark Royal but, it was alleged, Medina
Sidonia had declined to give it on the grounds that only the
commander-in-chief could in honour challenge the English
flagship. Whether or not this was so, it is clear that
there was ill-feeling between the two and when, same time
later, the duke thought the galleasses tardy in pressing
home their attack he sent an officer to the flag galleass to
"say aloud to Don Hugo de Moncada certain words•••which were
not to his honour".(45) Moncada had, in all probability,
experienced difficulties with the tide race which runs
between
which,
Portland Bill and the Shambles
no doubt, the wily Frobisher had
reef and toward
purposely lured
- 86 -
him. At any event thegalleasses' attack, when it came, was
disappointingly ineffectual. Their oar-given mobility,
formidable enough in theory, was itself highly vulnerable.
A well directed concentration of English fire on the rowing
banks - upon which even a light shot at long range could
wreak dreadful carnage and even greater confusion - forced
the galleasses to revert to sail power, under which they
proved markedly inferior to Frobisher's galleons.
At this point Howard and a number of his more powerful
ships disengaged from their combat with the Spanish
rearguard and took advantage of a southerly breeze to move
in support of Frobisher. Medina Sidonia responded by
bringing down his vanguard and a general melee developed.
In the course of it the ~ Mart!n discharged, according to
,Calderon, eighty shots from one side alone, while in return,
he estimated 500 English rounds were fired at her, some of
them striking her hull and rigging, carrying away the
flagstaff and one of the mainmast stays. Lord Admiral
Howard confirmed that in this action a "terrible value" of
great shot was expended.
This being so, it is remarkable how little damage was
inflicted by either side upon the other, even though at
times the range appears to have been 100 yards or less. The
injury caused to the heavily engaged ~ Martin was, by any
reckoning, minimal. Both commanders must have been
surprised at the disappointing equation between the amount
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of precious roundshot expended and the damage it was able to
cause. For Howard, the moment was one of acute crisis. The
fight, as Sir John Hawkins reported to Walsingham, had been
"sharp and long", and in it had been spent "a good part of
our powder and shot." It was not, he considered, "good to
deal with them [the Spaniards] any more till that was
relieved."(47) More worrying still must have been the fact
that the English artillery, having expended all that shot at
moderately close range, had proved incapable of inflicting
serious damage on the Spanish ships. But it was also clear
to Howard that if his ships came too close they would run
the risk of being boarded by the Spanish troops, leading to
almost certain defeat. Yet again, in strategic terms, the
Armada had proved itself the superior force. As soon as the
battle was over, and the English fleet at least temporarily
neutralised by its ammunition crisis, it Simply shook itself
back into formation, its· component parts virtually
undamaged, and continued the eastward advance.
Phase III: The action off the Isle of Wight, 3/4 August
The Spanish strategy did not depend, however, solely on
the continuing progress of the Armada. To succeed, the
link-up with Parma had to be effected. It will be recalled
that the Council of War aboard the ~ Mart!n on 30 July had
decided that until arrangements for the rendezvous were
clear, and Parma's readiness assured, the Armada should
proceed no further than the Isle of Wight. Once east of
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this point the fleet would effectively be committed to the
Flanders rendezvous: to beat back westwards in the teeth of
the prevailing weather, with the English fleet to leeward,
was unthinkable (except, of course, to Philip II). There
can be little doubt that by the evening of 2 August, with
the Isle of Wight looming on his port quarter, Medina
Sidonia was seriously considering a move into the Solent.
Unfortunately we have no record of the duke's thoughts or
intentions at this pOint, though he clearly recognised the
choice open to him. So, evidently, did his adversaries.
But what could Howard do to prevent such a move? His
strategy, insofar as he had one, was to cut out and surround
individual members of the Spanish fleet, to "pluck their
feathers little by little", as he put it.(48) On the morning
of 3 August, having obtained some meagre replenishment to
his ammunition stocks, an opportunity for him to do just
this presented itself.
As dawn broke a large ship was observed trailing behind
the seaward flank of the Armada, a few miles off the
dangerous western entrance to the Solent. The straggler was
~ ~ Grlfon[78], capltana of Gomez de Medina's
supply-hulks, and although the majority of these clumsy
ships were non-combatants their nobly-officered flagship
seems to have been one of the fleet's mobile
troubleshooters. Those English ships closest to her crowded
on sail to catch the light morning airs and cut her off. A
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nimble and powertul galleon, which is nowhere specifically
named but which the balance ot probability suggests was
Drake's Reyenge, glided swittly abeam the wallowing Grifon
and gave her a broadside at close range, swiftly came about
and discharged another, and tinally crossed her stern to
rake her at halt-musket shot. It was a devastating example
ot the mobile tactics which individual English captains were
learning by instinct and experience and which, in
combination with the line astern tormation, toreshadow the
fleet tactics which two centuries later would win
Trafalgar. In 1588, however, such innovative action and
skillful seamanship could not in themselves deteat a
determined enemy. ,Grimly the Grifan hung on, struck by at
least torty roundshot, her decks crowded with soldiers who,
although taking serious casualties themselves, remained
capable of boarding and carrying any English vessel which
came too close.(49) The incident neatly illustrates the
strength of the Armada as a whole: it might be battered but
it could not be destroyed; and yet, unless it was destroyed,
its essentially military potential remained as strong as
ever.
As the tight developed, the whole Spanish right rear
became engaged, and Medina Sidonia sent in the galleasses to
extricate ,the damaged Grifan. Having done so, he gave the
signal tor a general engagement, at which the English drew
otr, clearly intent on delaying the Spaniards rather than on
preCipitating an all-out battle. The duke therefore turned
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his ships about, and continued on his way.
The next stage of the campaign was a crucial one,
although unfortunately neither side has left a full or
entirely comprehensible account of it. But the key to
understanding what subsequently happened is the Armada's
position close to the eastern entrance to the Solent; now,
if at all, Medina Sidonia had to put his alternative plan
into effect. His dilemma was not an easy one to resolve.
Although the king's instructions on the matter had been
explicit, that an attempt.on the Isle of Wight could only be
made if for some reason the rendezvous with Parma had
failed, in a sense that meeting had already failed, inasmuch
as no practical arrangements for putting it into effect were
yet known to the duke. Since, in the event, the Isle ot
Wight option was not successfully prosecuted, we shall never
know tor sure whether the Spaniards seriously meant to try
it, for Medina Sidonia's diariQ is understandably silent on
the point: if he had made the attempt, and failed, it is
expecting tQQ much even of his honest nature that he should
have admitted it. But it we assume that the Spaniards did
intend to bring the Armada into the Solent on 4 August, much
of what followed makes sense.
There are signs, too, that the English recognised the
danger. On the evening of 3 August, after the tleets had
disengaged,
torces.(50)
Howard ordered a major reorganisation of his
Until then his tleet had been divided into no
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discernable groupings, and indeed gave the impression of
having been little more than an ~~ agglomeration whose
members, apart from a general obligation to support their
admiral's flag, were expected to act as their individual
circumstances best dictated. This apparently haphazard
arrangement might have served well enough in the confusion
of a general fleet action, but it could hardly have been
employed to secure a wider strategic aim - in this case, to
deny the Spaniards entry to the Solent.
Accordingly, Howard held an urgent Council of War
aboard the ~ Royal, at which it was decided to organise
the fleet into four quasi-independent squadrons under the
respective commands of the Lord Admiral, Drake, Hawkins and
Frobisher. These squadrons, we may suppose from subsequent
events, were each given specific tasks which, taken in
conjunction, amounted to a co-ordinated plan to drive the
Armada safely eastward of Selsey Bill.
At dawn on 4 August, as the Adams charts clearly
depict, the new squadron formations were in being and poised
against the Armada's rear. During the night two Spanish
ships, the Portuguese ~~(5] and the Andalusian Santa
Ana[48], had lagged behind, and, like El~ GrifCn the day
before, presented the English with an obvious target. But
this time there was no wind. Hawkins, whose squadron was
closest to the Spanish stragglers, lowered his ships' boats
and moved to the attack under tow. Medina Sidonia responded
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by sending in three of the galleasses, one of them towing
Leyva's ~ Encoronada[70] for additional fire support.
Slowly the ranges closed, and the guns began to fire. The
galleasses were now the main object of the English attack,
and a number of hits were scored. One was seen to list,
another lost her lantern, and a third received damage to her
prow. But these modest claims, which came from the English
side and are therefore likely to be over- rather than
under-estimates, indicate that the damage inflicted by the
English artillery was again slight. In any case it failed
to prevent the galleasses from completing their task, for
they were able to take the ~LY!a and Santa Ana in tow and
withdraw from the action. At this 'point a south-west wind
sprang up, and the sailing ships on both sides were again
able to manoeuvre.
While the fleets had been becalmed Frobisher's
squadron, which was stationed inshore, was carried by tidal
drift north of the Armada's left wing, so imposing itself
between the Spaniards and the Solent. This move, whether or
not intentional, was dangerous: as had happened off
Portland, when the wind came Frobisher found himself cut off
and to leeward of the Spanish vanguard. The Victory now
became the centre of the action as Medina Sidonia and his
powerful supports moved to attack her while Howard bore down
from windward to her aid. Frobisher launched his ship's
boats in an attempt to tow himself clear of the danger but
then the wind freshened and the Victory was able to escape
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,under sail. "She got out so swiftly," wrote Purser Calderon
in despairing admiration, "that the galleon~ ~ and
another quick sailing ship - the speediest vessels in the
Armada - although they gave chase, seemed in comparison with
her to be standing still."
These moves on the part of the English did nothing to
deny the Spaniards entry to the Solent; if anything, they
left it more open than before. And here our main sources
all but desert us. All we know for sure is that by the end
of the day the Armada was well clear of the Solent and
heading east. ,Medina Sidonia and Calderon both imply that
some further action had taken place, but beyond stating that
the Armada's good order remained unimpaired they do not
elaborate. A clue to what had happened, however, comes from
,the relacion of an un-named captain of a Sevillian ship
which had been stationed on the seaward side of the Armada,
who had seen events from a very different viewpoint.
"Victory was all but won," he wrote, "when the enemy charged
upon the seaward wing in such wise that we who were there
were cornered, so that, if the duke had not gone about with
his flagship•••we should have come out vanquished that
day."(5t)
Who launched this sudden and decisive attack, which
came at precisely the right time and from just the right
direction to crowd the Armada to leeward, pressing it
towards Selsey Bill and the Ower Banks, from which the only
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escape was to make all sail east? Long ago Corbett astutely
pointed to the fact that Drake is not mentioned in any
account of the morning actions, and in consequence the
flagship which the Seville captain saw leading the enemy
attack in the afternoon can only have been the missing
Reyenge.(52) If so, Drake's move was a brilliant one. While
the Lord Admiral, Hawkins and Frobisher had been engaged in
the mouth of the Solent, he had worked his squadron
unobtrusively seawards, antiCipating the change of wind in
the afternoon which would enable him to launch his attack.
Medina Sidonia's attempt to force the Solent, if that is
what he had intended, was foiled forever. He was now east
of Selsey Bill with the English fleet at his rear, and
before him lay the coast of Flanders.
Phase IV: Calais and the fireships, 6-8 August
There can be few sets of military correspondence so
one-sided as that which passed between the dukes of Medina
Sidonia and Parma as the Armada made its was from Lisbon to
Flanders. On 10 June, when Medina Sidonia might reasonably
have expected to reach the rendezvous within a fortnight, he
sent a zabra ahead informing Parma of his progress, pointing
out that because of the Flemish banks and the lack of a
deepwater port the
clear of the coast.
link-up would have to take place well
His next letter is dated 25 July, and
is simply a confirmation that, after the delay at Corunna,
he was again on his way. From then on the letters became
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increasingly frequent and urgent but, like the first two,
they remained unacknowledged. On 1 August he asked Parma to
supply more pilots who knew the coast of Flanders. Three
days later, after the first bouts of fighting in the
Channel, he was asking for two shiploads of powder and shot,
and confirming his imminent arrival off Flanders. Still
there was no reply.(53)
No fighting took place in the three days required for
the Armada to sail from Selsey Bill to the Dover Strait.
Both sides were husbanding their precious ammunition for the
decisive battle to come. In the late afternoon of Saturday
6 August the Armada reached Calais Roads, where it
anchored. A long culverin shot to windward, the English
fleet followed suit. To the east lay the Flemish Banks; the
Armada could sail no further in that direction. Still there
was no word from Parma. "I have constantly writterito your
Excellency," wrote Medina Sidonia in desperation, "and not
only have I received no reply to my letters, but no
acknowledgement of their receipt•••lf you cannot at once
bring out all your fleet, send me the 40 or 50 flyboats I
asked for yesterday so I shall be able to resist the enemy's
fleet until your Excellency can come out with the
rest•••"(54)
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That Medina Sidonia seriously thought Parma could send
out fifty flyboats to cover the rendezvous underlines the
inadequacy of the information with which he had been
provided. Flyboats were shallow-draught coastal gunboats of
which Parma possessed none, although the Dutch fleet under
Justin of Nassau had twenty-five or thirty of them
patrolling the shoal waters between Flushing and Gravelines
from bases in the Western Scheldt. Since his flyboats could
operate among the shallows close inshore, where the
deep-draught ships of the Armada could not venture, Nassau
was able to bottle up the Army of Flanders indefinitely in
its ports and so prevent a junction with the fleet.
On the morning of 7 August Rodrigo Tellez de Guzman,
the messenger sent to Flanders by Medina Sidonia on 25 July,
returned to the anchored ~ Mart!n with devastating news.
When he had left Dunkirk the evening before Parma was still
at Bruges, forty miles away, and the embarkation of troops
at Dunkirk had not yet begun. He had seen, moreover, little
evidence of any serious preparations for the invasion.(55)
On Sunday 8 August Parma at last wrote to explain his army's
apparant lack of readiness, but his letter was not addressed
to the anxious and now abandoned Captain-General of the
Ocean Sea, waiting perilously at anchor only a few miles
distant. It was to Philip II, whose geographical remoteness
was as nothing compared with his remoteness from the
situation into which he had driven his two commanders.(56)
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Parma could not come out without exposing his army to an
inevitable and entirely pointless disaster among the Flemish
shoals, while the Armada, on its own, could neither mount an
invasion nor destroy the English and Dutch fleets.
Parma's letter is a masterpiece of veiled cynicism
(which, we must hope, was not lost on its recipient). In it
he blames the whole debacle on Medina Sidonia - for doing
exactly what the king had ordered. The duke, he said,
"still wishes me to go out and join him with these boats of
ours•••but it is obviously impossible without incurring
great danger of losing our army. If the duke were fully
informed on the matter [my italics] he would be of the same
opinion•••What grieves me most," Parma concluded, his
cynicism giving way to genuine concern, "is to learn that
the duke is in his present position, without a place of
shelter in case of necessity•••"
Parma was right in supposing Medina Sidonia's position
to be a dangerous one. Early on the same Sunday morning
Lord Admiral Howard had called a Council of War, at which it
was decided to launch a fireship attack on the Armada that
night.(57) The conditions were ideal. The Armada was
crowded together at anchor,
(through no fault of his
Spanish lee lay the Flemish
and its commander was uncertain
own) of his next move. To the
shoals. Best of all, the
conjunction of spring tides (the very tides which, Medina
Sidonia had hoped, should have enabled Parma to get his
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flotilla to sea) and a freshening south-south-east wind
would carry the fireships swiftly into the Armada's heart.
Eight ships were prepared for the attack. They were
packed with combustibles, and their guns were left loaded so
that they would discharge spontaneously when the heat
reached them, so adding a Psychological element to the
strategem. No one on the Spanish side was unaware of the
terrible explosion ships, maQuinas ~ minas, designed by the
Italian engineer Giambelli, one of which had smashed the
Antwerp boom in 1585.(58) The object of the English attack
was not so much to destroy ships as to create confusion and
panic throughout the Armada. If that could be done the
forces of nature, aided by the English fleet, would do the
rest.
Medina Sidonia was well aware that such an attack was
likely.
ships'
grapple
midnight
Before night fell he set a screen of pinnaces and
boats to windward of the Armada, with orders to
and tow clear any fireships that approached. At
the attack came. Two fireships were intercepted
and dragged into the shallows (an act of herOism on the part
of the nameless pinnace crews) but the remaining six
careered into the midst of the anchored Armada, their
red-hot guns exploding as they went. Medina Sidonia at once
ordered all ships to cut their cables and move from the path
of the fireships, with instructions that as soon as the
danger was past the fleet should re-anchor as close to its
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original position as possible.(59) But the combination of
terror and uncertainty was too much for the majority of the
Spanish crews, who fled blindly with the wind. The Armada's
discipline and tight defensive formation had at last been
broken.
Phase V: The battle off Grayel1nes. 8 August
Panic, however, did not grip the flagship or its loyal
group of close supporters. The ~ MartIn[l] immediately
anchored, as did Recalde's·..sa.n.Jlla.n[2],Pefiafiel's San
Marcos[3], and two other Portuguese galleons, perhaps the
~ Hateo[6] and ~ FeI1pe[4]. At dawn on 8 August these
five found themselves quite alone, facing the entire English
fleet (which, by now, probably numbered 150 ships, including
all the Queen's galleons), the rest of the Armada being
scattered many miles to leeward. Now there was no
impossible choice for Medina Sidonia. He could at last
stand as honour demanded, shoulder to shoulder with his
comrades, and defy the enemy to his last breath. Even so,
he did not neglect his duties as a commander, and the ships'
boats were sent away to leeward to rally the rest of the
fleet. As they left, the first English ships came within
range, and heavy firing began.
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At this point Lord Armiral Howard's attention was
distracted from the lion-hearted quintet of Portuguese
galleons which stood between him and the dispersed Armada.
During the confusion which followed the fireship attack Don
Hugo de Moncada's capitana galleass, the ~ Lorenzo[1231,
had damaged her rudder and mainmast, and in seeking to avoid
capture she had grounded at the entrance to Calais. Stuck
fast on a falling tide, with her seaward broadside pOinting
impotently to the sky as she heeled over, she could offer
little defence. The prize was one which Howard could not
ignore (or, at any rate, resist). He dispatched an assault
party in boats to take her and, after a fierce struggle
which only ended when Moncada was killed, the galleass was
boarded and sacked.(60) Because of this incident the main
attack on the Armada was delayed for more than two hours.
Medina Sidonia put this unexpected respite to good use
by falling back, fighting all the way, to mobilise the
defence of his now rapidly re-forming Armada. The
troubleshooters began to gather on either side of the
flagship, forming a ragged but determined protective
screen. William Wynter, a member of Lord Henry Seymour's
eastern squadron which had reinforced the English fleet off
Calais, observed this re-grouping with detached professional
interest: "They went into the proportion of a half moon.
Their admiral and vice-admiral, they went in the midst•••and
there went on each Side, in the wings, their galleasses,
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armados of Portugal, and other good ships, in the whole to
the number of sixteen to a wing, which did seem to be of
their principal shipping."(61) It was the old trailing-horns
defensive posture, this time composed exclusively of the
troubleshooters, doggedly prepared for whatever the English
might yet throw against them.
The battle which followed lasted nine hours. It was
fierce and very confused, but it may be summarised as a
running fight in which the Spaniards strove to maintain
defence in a close and compact formation, and so work
northwards into the open sea, while the English endeavoured
to cut off the weathermost ships and force the rest to
leeward towards the Flemish banks. A vital factor was the
wind, which veered steadily throughout the day from
south-south-west to north-west, setting the Spanish fleet at
an increasingly greater disadvantage as it did so. The
weather too had deteriorated; the sea was now rough and the
visibility poor.(62)
Through the confusion, we can detect features which
mark this battle as radically different from anything that
had gone before. First, much of it was fought at very close
range. "Out of my ship the Vanguard," wrote William Wynter
afterwards, "there was shot 500 rounds of demi-cannon,
culverin, and demi-culverin: and when I was farthest off in
discharging any of the pieces, I was not out of Shot of the
harquebus, and most time within speech of one another."(63)
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The fact that the protagonists were at times within hailing
distance (which, amid the noice and chaos of battle, must
have been very close indeed), is graphically borne out by
~what Purser Calderon saw of the fighting from the Spanish
side:
"The enemy inflicted great damage on the
galleons ~ Mateo and ~ Felipe, the latter
having five of her starboard guns dismounted•••In
view of this, and that his upper deck was
destroyed, both his pumps broken, his rigging in
shreds, and his ship almost a wreck, Don Francisco
de Toledo [of the ~ Felipe] ordered the
grappling hooks to be got out, and shouted to the
enemy to come to close quarters. They replied,
summoning him to surrender in fair fight; and one
Englishman, standing in the maintop with his sword
and buckler, called out 'Good soldiers that you
are, surrender to the fair terms we offer you'.
But the only answer he got was a gunshot, which
brought him down in sight of everyone, and [Don
Francisco] then ordered the muskets and arquebuses
to be brought into action. The enemy thereupon
retired, whilst our men shouted out to them that
they were cowards, and with opprobrious words
reproached them for their want of spirit, calling
them Lutheran hens, and daring them to return to
the fight."(64)
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Some time earlier the ~ Felipe's sister, the ~
Mateo, had experienced, ,according to Calderon, an even
closer encounter with one of the English ships. As the two
vessels passed one another their sides scraped so close that
a single foolhardy Englishman was able to leap onto the
Spaniard's deck. No one followed him, and he was instantly
cut down.
The English were now, for the first time, pressing
their attacks to a range at which real damage could be
inflicted on the Spanish hulls. We have already seen· the
shambles to which the San Felipe had been reduced, and she
was one of many. The aggressive and persistent
troubleshooters, now fighting to save the Armada from total
annihilation, naturally suffered most. The .San Martin
received over 200 hits, several of which penetrated her hull
close to the waterline. (65) Only the heroic efforts of two
naked divers with oakum and lead patches kept the leakage
under control. The San Mateo, cut off by "13 or 14" English
galleons, fought till she was "a thing of pity to see,
riddled with shot like a sieve."(66) For all this
punishment, surprisingly, only one Spanish ship actually
She was the Biscayan Mariasank during the battles•
.sI.l.1a.n [ 20](67), which foundered suddenly at sunset in rising
heavy weather. Only a single boatload of her people were
saved. Human casualties aboard many other ships were high.
Over 200 of the San Felipe's oomplement of about 500 were
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reported killed, while there were forty dead aboard the San
Martin. In all, calculated Alonso Vanegas, the fleet's
total casualties that day were over 600 killed and 800
wounded.(68) But the fighting spirit of the survivors
remained strong. At one stage in the battle a great Italian
ship, perhaps Bertendona's Regazona[68], was observed to be
"all full of blood", though she was still maintaining her
position in the defensive rearguard three hours later.
Seen by later standards of sea warfare the damage and
casualties suffered by the Armada were not, in fact,
particularly severe. Some serious hull damage had certainly
been inflicted. Masts, sails and rigging had been shot
about. A moderately large number of men had been killed or
wounded. But the outcome of the battle was not total
defeat. Although they subjected the Armada to a severe
battering the English did not achieve their objective of
breaking its formation and forcing it onto the sandbanks.
Spanish discipline, the English shortage of ammunition, and
a providential change of wind to the south-south-west on the
Tuesday morning combined to prevent that. And, at the end
of it all, the Spaniards were by no means a spent force.
They still had, as van Meteren expressed it shortly
afterwards, "many great vantages of the English, namely for
the extraordinary bigness of their ships, and also that they
were so nearly conjoined, and kept together in so good
array, that they could by no means be fought withall one to
one."(69) The Armada remained undefeated in naval terms; its
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general order and cohesion remained intact. If
circumstances had been different, and if somehow that final
battle had been fought with Parma's army shepherded safely
in the Armada's midst, who can say what the eventual outcome
might have been?
A final point concerning the Gravelines battle must now
be considered. If the range at which it was fought was close
enough for the English to inflict serious damage on the
Spanish hulls, what punishment had the Armada been able to
mete out in return? Apocryphal stories of the Spanish
bombardment's ferocity abound;
come from sources close to
the best known, predictably,
Drake. In one version a
gentleman, "lying weary" in the Reyenge's great cabin, had
the bed shot from under him by a saker ball; shortly
afterwards (the bed having been miraculously restored), a
demi-culverin ball discommoded two more gentlemen, one of
whom was the duke of Northumberland, in precisely the same
place.(70) But whatever superficial if dramatic damage of
this kind may have been done to the upper works of
Elizabeth's galleons, it is clear that they had suffered no
serious hurt. No doubt many minor repairs were carried out
by the ships' carpenters without need for comment. As to
major repairs, we have the objective evidence of a full
dockyard survey carried out on the Queen's ships shortly
after the emergency had ended. In it, as we should expect,
a number of unservicable components are noted for
replacement, being variously described as "worn", "cracked"
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or "decayed". On occasion these may perhaps be euphemisms
for battle damage, though the frequency with which they
occur is little greater than might be expected in any
routine survey. Some minor damage to spars and ships' boats
is indeed directly attributed to enemy action. But of
substantial damage to hulls - the kind of damage sustained
by so many of the Armada's ships - there is not a Single
mention.(65)
Why was this so? All the evidence suggests that, at
close range, the Spanish armament should have been at its
most effective - more effective, indeed, than that of the
English. "The enemy's object will be to fight at long
distance," Philip II had warned Medina Sidonia, "but the aim
of our men must be to bring him to close quarters."(72) To
explain the failure at Gravelines it is generally assumed
that the Armada had by then almost completely run out of
ammunition, particularly in the heavier 'ship-smashing'
calibres. Medina Sidonia himself said as much. The most
powerful ships, he noted in his diario, were finally
rendered ineffective "on account of the cannon fire to which
they had been exposed, and their own lack of
projectiles."(73) We cannot, of course, ever know the final
ammunition state of principal ships like the ~ Mart!n, ~
Mateo and ~ Felipe, which undoubtedly bore the brunt of
the final action. But we do now know that at least five
Armada vessels, all of which undoubtedly belonged to the
heavily engaged 'troubleshooting' category, ended the fight
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with substantial stocks of roundshot still on board,
especially
above}•
shot of 'ship-smashing' calibre (9-~ and
Evidence to support this contention is
archaeological, and irrefutable; it comes from the large
quantity of ammunition which has actually been recovered
from their wrecks off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland.
To seek an explanation of why this shot was not discharged,
and why, despite its availability, no damage was inflicted
on the English hulls, it is to these wrecks that we must now
turn.
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Part II: The Wrecks
Introduction
After Gravelines the duke of Medina Sidonia had yet
another unpalatable decision before him. On 9 August, with
a south-westerly wind blowing the Armada clear of the
Flemish shoals and into the North Sea, a Council of War was
held aboard the ~ Mart!n to determine what strategy the
fleet should now adopt.(1) Should it, without hope of
replenishment or reinforcement, in the face of the
prevailing winds and against an enemy who had proved his
superiority over the Armada in battle and who was operating
close to his home bases, attempt the rendezvous with Parma
once again? Should it perhaps mount some kind of offensive
operation on its own initiative? Or should it Simply nurse
itself back to Spain as best it could, via the north of
Britain, and so keep losses to a minimum? The Council's
unanimous decision was that, unless the wind changed to a
direction which would enable the fleet to regain the
Channel, a north-about return should be made to Spain. But
this was to be no flight in blind panic. The English fleet
was still to leeward, and discipline had to be maintained in
case of further attack and to ensure mutual support against
the perils which undoubtedly lay ahead. There had been a
serious lapse of formation discipline after the fireship
attack at Calais and now, with the fleet committed to what
might be called a strategic retreat, stern measures were
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adopted to make sure that there would not be another. On
11 August captains were tried by summary
court-martial for breaches of discipline during and after
I ,the Gravelines battle, and one of them - Cristobal de Avila,
of the hulk Santa Barbara[95] - was hanged, and his corpse
paraded round the fleet to drive the lesson home.(2)
Two days later, off the Firth of Forth, the English
broke off pursuit.(3) That same day, 13 August, the ~
Martin issued orders for the homeward voyage. A copy of
these orders later fell into English hands on the west coast
of Ireland. "The course that is first to be held," the
instructions are reported to have read, "is to the
north-north-east, until you be found under 61 1/2 degrees;
and to take great heed lest you fall upon the Island of
Ireland, for fear of the harm that may happen to you upon
that coast." After "doubling the Cape" (i.e. reaching a
longitude beyond the most westerly part of Ireland), the
fleet was to head west-south-west to a latitude of
58 degrees (somewhere to the west of Rockall), and thence
south-west to 53 degrees, from where a final south-easterly
run might be made to the ports of northern Spain.(4)
There is nothing remarkable about this route since,
even in times of peace, ships rarely attempted the
notoriously difficult Channel passage from east to west,
pa~ticularly in autumn or winter.(5) The prevailing
south-westerlies made the passage to tne Northern Isles
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relatively easy, and the islands themselves could usually be
rounded without difficulty, often with the help of the
north-easterlY Helm wind which springs up from the high
pressure zone frequently found over Arctic Norway. Once
sufficient sea room into the north Atlantic was gained
progress could be made southwards, even against the
prevailing wind, by employing a series of long tacks.
Many ships held to the course given out by the ~
Mart!n, including the flagship herself, and most of these,
in spite of the appalling weather of September and
October 1588, eventually reached home port.(6) It was those
which were forced towards the coasts of Scotland and Ireland
because of poor sailing qualities, battle-damage, or lack of
water - or a combination of all three - that were the most
prone to disaster. We do not know exactly how' many were
lost, but two documents drawn up by the Spaniards in
October 1588 are of considerable help. One lists the ships
which had safely returned to Spain, while the other records
those presumed to have been lost.(7) These documents, which
were probably compiled at slightly different dates, are not
entirely reliable and do not always agree: some ships are on
both lists, whtle others appear on neither. The information
contained in them is included in the order-of-battle tables
set out in Appendix 4.
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It should be noted that the appearance of a ship on the
'missing' column does not necessarily mean that it was
lost. The list was compiled after most of the survivors had
returned, but a few had yet to reach port. It is almost
certain, moreover, that at least some of the hulks listed as
missing had made straight for their home ports in the
Baltic, while many smaller craft may have sought shelter on
other coasts. Because of this doubt, which can never fully
be resolved, it is impossible to reach an accurate estimate
of the Armada's total losses; though great, they were
probably not as high as is sometimes supposed. Thirty-four
percent, or about forty-four ships of all classes, is a
likely approximation.(8) Many of the ships which did return,
however, were unfit for further service, and human attrition
on all of them was high - often in excess of 50 percent. Of
the 30,000 or so men who set out in 1588 barely one in three
lived to see the following spring.
The most devastating harvest of wrecks and lives was
reaped on the coast of Ireland. The first victim, La
Trinidad yalencera[72], came to grief on the north coast of
Donegal on 16 September 1588. On 25 September three more
members of the Levant squadron, the Lavia[69], the
Juliana[75] and the Santa Maria ~ Yison[76] were driven
onto the sweeping beach of Streedagh, in Sligo, and beaten
to pieces in the shallows.(9) 1,100 bodies were subsequently
counted along the sands, together with wreckage "•••more
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than would have built four of the greatest ships•••and such
masts, for bigness and length, as in my knowledge I never
saw any two that would make the like": so the Lord Deputy of
Ireland, Sir William Fitzwilliam, reported some days later,
after riding along the strand to view the scene.(10) Four
days earlier, on 21 September, the worst storm of that whole
dismal autumn had wrecked the Biscayan and Guipuzcoan
almirantas .n !i.I:an !lr..1n[14]and Santa Marfa ~.a ~[55]
on Clare Island and in Blasket Sound, the Levanter
Aounciada[73] in the Shannon estuary, and Don Alonso de
Leyva's ~ Encoronada[70], also of Levant, in Blacksod
Bay, Mayo. Don Alonso and most of his men survived the
Rata's wreck and transferred to the hulk DUQuesa Santa
Ana[48] but this ship, in making her way north, was herself
wrecked in Loughros Mor Bay, Donegal. Again Don Alonso
escaped and, although injured, led his men across nineteen
miles of bog and mountain to Killibegs, where the galleass
Girona[125] had put in to make repairs to her hull and
rudder. At length the galleass, now carrying the combined
complements of three ships, set sail in an attempt to reach
Scotland. Off the north coast of Antrim her jury rudder
broke, and she was driven onto a reef close to the Giant's
Causeway. Of the 1,300 or so on board there were fewer than
twenty survivors.(11)
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Other ships, not all of them identified with certainty,~
were wrecked among the Blaskets, at Tralee, Doonbeg, Mutton
Island, Galway Bay, Inishboffin, on the north Mayo coast, in
Donegal Bay and along the north-west coast of Donegal.
Elsewhere, the hospital hulk ~ Pedro Mayor[8S], after
clearing the Irish coast, was wrecked on Bolt Tail in
Devon (12), while Scotland claimed two certain victims, the
~ luan~ Sicilia[711 and Ll~ Grifon[781, and two or
more possible ones.(13) There were wrecks on the coast of
Norway.(14) Many of these events, and the circumstances
surrounding them, are well chronicled, but there may also
have been ships, large and small, which foundered
unwitnessed in the open sea, or were smashed on reefs or
shores so desolate that no one ever knew of them.(lS)
Five of the wreck sites are known with certainty today,
in the sense that remains have been located and positively
identified on the sea bed. These five ships provide an
excellent sample of the fleet as a whole, and emphasise the
variety of ship-types and geographical origins involved in
its formation. The locations of the wrecks are shown in
Figure 3. The Tobermory wreck, whose remains have been
picked over for nearly four centuries by generations of
hopeful salvors seeking an elusive and almost certainly
I
illusory treasure, was the ~~~ Sicilia[71], which
came originally from Ragusa.(16} The galleass Girona[1251,
whose scattered remains were found off Lacada Point in
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Antrim by Dr. Robert Stenuit in 1967, had been based at
Naples.(17) The Guipuzcoan almiranta Santa Marfa ~la
~[55), whose wreck was identified by Sydney Wignall and
the writer in 1968 at the bottom of Blasket Sound, County
Kerry, was built at San Sebastian the year before the Armada
sailed. ~ ~ GrifOn[78], capitana of the supply hulks,
whose remains were located by the writer off Fair Isle in
1970, was a Hanseatic merchantman from Rostock. Relics from
La Trinidad yalencera[72], a Venetian grain-ship which was
the fourth largest vessel in the fleet, were found buried
and wonderfully well preserved in the sandy sea-floor of
Kinnagoe Bay, County Donegal, by members of the City of
Derry Sub-Aqua Club in 1971, and the site was subsequently
excavated under the writer's direction.
It is with the evidence provided by the last three
wrecks that my thesis is predominantly concerned. This
section includes a chapter on each of them, in which both
the historical background and the nature of the
archaeological remains are examined.
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Chapter Three: La Trinidad Valencera
The Venetian merchant ship La Trinidad Valencera (a
Spanish corruption of her Italian name BaJanzara), of 1100
tons and 32 guns, was requisitioned on 18 January 1587 by
the Spanish authorities in Sicily to convey troops and war
materials to Spain, where they were required for the
projected Armada.(1) Her great size, and the fact that she
appears to have plied between Venice and Sicily, combine to
suggest that she was a bulk grain carrier.(2) Together with
four other merchantmen from the Adriatic and western Italy
she arrived at Cartagena in May 1587, and by 18 July she was
~at San Lucar, where she was credited with a complement of
180 soldiers and 80 seamen, and an armament of 28 bronze
guns of unspecified type and size.(3) We do, however,
possess a list of the guns carried by the five Levantine
ships as a whole, and so the Valencera's 28 pieces are to be
found among the following: (4)
9 bronze medios canones, 16-19-~
7 bronze medias culebrinas, 12-14-~
31 bronze medios canones pedreros, 10-16-~
29 bronze sacres, 7-12-~
31 bronze falconetes pedreros, 3-4-~ (stone)
13 bronze falconetes, 2-3-~
6 bronze versos, 3-~
116 cast iron pieces, 3-12-~
14 iron pedreros, 12-14-~
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'3iron falcones, 3-~
'12 iron versos, 2-~
'These iron pieces can, presumably, be discounted from
the yalencera's exclusively bronze armament.
Although the yalencera had been impressed only to
transport men and stores to Lisbon, when she reached that
port in August 1587 she was embargoed to take part in the
Armada itself as a member of Bertendona's Levant squadron,
an act against which her master, Horatio Danai, protested
vigorously but in vain.(5) As will be considered more fully
in a later chapter, one of this squadron's tasks was to
transport a dismantled siege train for the campaign which
was to follow the landing in England. This role is
reflected in a list of artillery equipment and stores issued
to the ship in May 1588, which included: (6)
3 canones ~ batir mounted on sea carriages, with six
dismantled sets of field carriages
6 limbers (armones) with their fittings
190 Atx of powder, of which 100 were for the siege artillery
1171 lbA of match
400 40-~ iron balls
80 planks and baulks for platforms
15 hemp cables for gun-hoists (cabr1as)
1 gun-hoist with accessories
64 levers, 80 spokes (rayos), 20 felloes (p1nas) and
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4 naves (macas) for.canan wheels, all of wood
20 woodchoppers' axes
3 rollers (polines) [in the inventory of a sister ship,
the ~1Yan Bautista[71], these are described
as ,~ embarcar artiller{a']
6 wooden sledgehammers [the ~1Yan Bautista's inventory
describes these as '~ enrayar' - for
spoking wheels]
8 solid wheels (ruedas enteridas)
1000 nails for platforms
1 ladle (cargador) and 3 rammers (atacadores)
24 wooden wedges
Some months earlier the Valencera had been issued with
a Turkish gun for which no weight or calibre was recorded,
although it is probable that it, too, was a battery
cannon.(7) In a deposition after his capture the ship's
senior officer, Don Alonso ,de Luzon, referred to "four
cannons of brass" distinct from the 28 pieces belonging to
the ship,(8) while his second-in-command, Baltasar L~pez del
Arbol, was even more specific, saying that the vessel
carried "32 pieces of brass whereof 4 were cannons of the
king, the rest belonging to the ship being of divers
kinds •••"(9)
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An addition of four battery cannons to the Valencera's
original armament would make up the total of 32 which both
de Luzon and del Arbol attest. This is ten short of the 42
guns with which the ship is credited in the muster of
9 May 1588, which may either have been a clerical error or,
perhaps, an unrea1ised intention. Even so, and in spite of
the contention of an Armada deserter that "the ships of
Italy, nominally the largest, were badly provided with
arti11ery",(10) La Trinidad Valencera was, in comparison
with the rest of the fleet, very heavily armed. Her
gunpowder quota of 125~, listed in the 9 May muster, was
only 15 ~ below that of the ~ Mart!O, which carried the
largest supply in the Armada. She was also credited with
2100 rounds of shot (since this figure is based on a
50-per-gun average for 42 guns, it should be treated with
caution), 19 ~ of lead, and 16 ~ of match. In all the
ship carried 79 seamen and 281 soldiers, while her rated
tonnage of 1100 made her the fourth largest unit in the
fleet.
Her commander, ,Don Alonso de Luzon, was Maestre ~
Campo of the tercio of Naples, three of whose 26 companies
sailed with the ship.(11) These belonged to Don Alonso
himself, and to Captains Hieronimo de Aybar and Garc!a
Manrique de Lara. Among other attached personnel four
aventureros are listed in the muster: they were'Francisco de
Rivadeneira (with 8 retainers), Rodrigo Lasso (5 retainers),
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Sebasti~n Zapata (3 retainers) and Diego Fernandez de Mesa
(1 retainer).[12]
In the storm which forced some of the Armada to shelter
in Corunna, and others to ride out the tempest at sea, many
of the clumsy Levanters and Baltic hulks were driven towards
the Scillies. Among them were ~ Trinidad yalencera and Ll
,~ Grifon, flagship of the hulks.(13) By 11 July the
yalencera had reached V{vero, and was present at the muster
held at Corunna on 13 July, where she was listed with a
complement of 415 men - and increase of 53 over the Lisbon
figure.(14)
As the most heavily armed ship in her squadron, the
Yalencera was engaged in most of the running fights which
took place between Plymouth and Gravelines.
involved in the long-range exchanges with Lord Admiral
Howard and others at the start of the battle, and she became
more closely engaged during the actions off Portland Bill
and the Isle of Wight.(15) Early in the fighting the
Yalencera and Don Alonso de Leyva's ~ Encoronada, also of
the Levant squadron, were detached as independent
battle-groups with two galleasses attached to each
great-ship, though evidently these powerfully armed units
were never effectively deployed in the fighting.(16) In the
final rearguard action off Gravelines the Yalencera was one
of the twenty or so ships which fought in Medina Sidonia's
close support and so saved the retreating Spanish fleet from
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destruction.(17)
On 20 August the Armada passed between North Ronaldsay
and Fair Isle, where Scottish fishermen reported "a very
great fleet of monsterous great ships, being about 100 in
number", running westward before the wind.(18) On the same
~day Don Balthasar de Zuniga, a staff-officer aboard Medina
Sidonia's ~ Mart!n, landed at Scalloway to take a fast
pinnace to Spain with despatches for the king.(19) About
this time, or perhaps slightly before, La Tr1n1dad Valencera
with three other ships lost contact with the main body.(20)
The Valencera's companions were hulks which, like her, had
found themselves unable to keep as well to windward as the
rest of the fleet. /They were El~ Gr1fon and two members
of her squadron, the Barca Aa Amburg[83] and the Castillo
Negro[82]. Together the four ships struggled south-west for
twelve days, making little progress. Then, on 1 September,
the Barca ~ Amburg, her seams open and her pumps choked,
signalled that she was foundering. Her company of 250 was
transferred to the Valencera and the GrifOn just before she
sank. Three nights later, somewhere off the north-west
coast of Ireland, the remaining ships lost contact with one
another. The Castillo Negro vanished without a trace, and
was never heard of again. The ,Grifon was driven
northwards, eventually to be wrecked on Fair Isle. The
Valencera, which had now sprung a severe leak, headed for
the northern coast of Ireland, where, in Kinnagoe Bay, just
west of the entrance to Lough Foyle, she grounded on
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14 September.(21)
Three witnesses recorded details of the shipwreck, and
the significant parts of their statements follow:
,~ Alonso ~ Luzon: "•••they landed by shipwreck as many of
them as they could in a broken boat of their own, some swam
to shore, and the rest were landed in a boat of O'Doherty's
country, for the use of which they gave in money and apparel
200 ducats ••• They were about two days in landing all their
men •••" (13/23 October 1588).(22)
Baltasar LOpez ~ Arbol: "•••the ship wherein they were
tQOk a great leak forty leagues from the coast of Ireland,
whereupon they made for Ireland as the next land they knew,
and coming on the shore in O'Doherty's country they took to
land in an old boat of their own and some did swim to land,
and their own boat being broken they gave 100 ducats in
money and above 100 ducats in apparel, rings and jewels to a
boat of the country to help them to land, which being also
broken there came a third boat which they offered to have
for their help, but the owners of the boat would not yield
thereto, but went for spoil to the ship, and on the sinking
of the ship, being entered into her, sank with her. He
saith that as they came near the land, he saw some 20 of the
savage people standing on a rock and in their landing about
4 or 5 of them came and did help them out of the boat and
used them courteously until the rest of the wild people that
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stood on the rock, and more with them to the number of 40,
came together at which time they took from them in money,
gold buttons, rapiers and apparel to the value of 7,300
ducats or thereabouts." (13/23 October 1588) [23]
~ ~ ~ and Francisco ~ Borja (two soldiers from the
ship who eventually escaped from Ireland and who made
statements on their homecoming): "They lost sight of the
Armada on the night of 12 September, during a tempest. The
same night their ship sprang a great leak forward, and for
the next two days and nights they were at the pumps. On the
14th they brought up on the coast of Ireland, towards
Blasket [sic], and all the soldiers, except 40 who remained
in the ship and were afterwards drowned when she foundered,
were put on shore, with their arms, in a little boat." (21
January 1589) [24]
To the above first-hand accounts may be added a
second-hand one, in which the numbers of the survivors and
victims are patently exaggerated, which was sent to the Lord
Deputy of Ireland by Richard and Henry Hoveden, commanders
of the local English garrison, in a letter dated 12
September (O.S.): "These 700 Spaniards were driven by force
of weather into a creek named Glanganvey, where their ship
is drowned with 200 or 300 men in her, and so would all the
rest have been, were it not that O'Doherty's men went unto
them with boats and did bring them to shore."(25)
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From these testimonies, of which del Arbol's is the
fullest and probably the most reliable, we can deduce that
the ship, close to sinking after springing a leak some 40
leagues (about 120 nautical miles, or 220 kilometres) from
the coast, ran aground "in a creek named Glanganvey" on
14 September. By implication the sea conditions were rough,
since the Yalencera's own boat and then a boat hired from
the locals appear to have been wrecked during the transfer
of men and equipment to shore. In spite of these
difficulties most of the Spaniards were able to disembark,
with the evident exception of a few, possibly non-swimmers
or the immovably sick.
The ship broke up and sank, evidently without warning,
on 16 September, drowning a number of local people who were
attempting to salvage her contents. Whether or not this was
associated with rough weather is not clear, but there is
evidence from other sources to suggest that the weather
pattern at this time was unusually unsettled and severe, and
on the follOWing day"~ srande tormenta" of unspecified
direction was recorded by a Spaniard on board Ll ~
Grifon, which had parted company with La Trinidad Valencera
only a few days before.(26)
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No record of subsequent salvage has been found,
although details of the ship's bronze ordnance were known to
the English authorities from the interrogation of survivors,
and the site was within the working depth of contemporary
salvors. Sir George Carew raised guns, some very large,
from an Armada wreck off Dunbeg, County Clare, in four and a
half fathoms (8 m) of water in June 1589,(27) and later (1
August) was ordered to "repair to that part of Ulster upon
the sea where some part of the Spanish fleet perished, and
where there are certain pieces of ordnance meet to be
recovered."(28) As far as can be ascertained, however, Sir
George's Ulster salvage operations only involved the site of
the wrecked galleass Girona, near the Giant's Causeway, many
of whose guns had already been recovered by Sorley Boy
McDonnell of Dunluce, aided by his Scottish kinsmen.(29}
It is however possible that some of the Valencera's
guns were recovered in the early seventeenth century. In
1610-11 Sir James Stewart of Glasgow raised 12,000 pounds
weight (5443 kg) of assorted brass ordnance from an
unspecified Armada wreck off Ireland, under the authority
and protection of Sir Arthur Chichester.(30} In 1609, as
part of the Plantation of Ulster, Sir Arthur had ousted the
O'Doherty clan from the Barony of Inishowen, on the north
coast of which the wreck of the Valencera lies, and it is
therefore quite probable that this was the source of James
Stewart's guns. But, if so, he did not recover them all.
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The guns which were to be found by the City of Derry
Sub-Aqua Club in 1971 eluded discovery for nearly four
centuries, even though at least two of them would have been
easily visible from the surface when the water was clear and
a busy salmon fishing station later stood within 300 m of
the spot.
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ji. Location ~~ wreck
Kinnagoe Bay is situated close to the north-eastern
corner of the Inishowen Peninsula, County Donegal, in the
Irish Republic (Figure 4). The bay lies between headlands
some 2 km apart, and although much of its length is exposed
to Atlantic swells its extreme north-western end is well
sheltered from all directions except the east and
north-east. A long strand fringes the bay almost from
headland. to headland, with a steep hinterland rising some
120 m above sea level. Thickly tangled vegetation makes
this hinterland virtually impassible even today, save where
two riverlets debouch through deep gullies at Glenagivney,
half way across the bay, and at Port Kinnagoe close to its
western end. Clustered at the foot of the Glenagivney gully
an O'Doherty hamlet once stood.(31) Traces of foundations
and some stone-lined hollows for boats can still be seen,
while the almost ploughed-out remains of a small stronghold
overlook the village from higher ground. Though many of
these remains may be of much later date it was probably from
this village, which is less than a kilometre from the wreck
site, that the "savage people" came to greet the Spaniards,
first to succour them and then to relieve them of their
possessions. No doubt it was a Glenagivney boat which "went
for spoil to the ship" shortly before she broke up, drowning
those who had gone aboard.
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Richard and Henry Hoveden, writing two days after the
sinking, stated that "the ship is drowned•••in a creek named
Glanganvey". Today, as the Ordnance maps show, the small
rock-girt cove into which the Glenagivney stream now flows
is called Glenagivney Bay, and in here fruitless searches
were made by several diving teams prior to 1971.(32) In
retrospect, however, it seems that because in the sixteenth
century Glenagivney was the only place of any consequence
within several miles, the whole of the larger bay - and not
just the small central cove - was referred to by that name
also. But by the 1830s, when data for the Ordnance maps was
being gathered, Glenagivney hamlet was deserted and
forgotten, and the focus had shifted to the fishing station
and coastguard post at Port Kinnagoe, close to the western
end of the main bay. It was from Kinnagoe, therefore, and
not from the abandoned Glenagivney, that the surveyors took
a general name for the whole bay.
In 1969 the City of Derry Sub-Aqua Club began a
systematic search for the wreck, coupled with a local
enquiry to see whether any tradition of it had survived. No
evidence either of oral legend or of place names connected
with the event was (or has since been) brought to light, and
when underwater explorations of the modern Glenagivney Bay,
proved inconclusive the search was switched to the eastern
end of Kinnagoe Bay with similarly negative results. Not
until early 1971 was the western end of the bay tackled, and
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on 20 February two Club members, Archie Jack and Paddy
Stewart, who were part of a 13-man training group led by the
Diving Officer, Charles Perkinson, found a bronze gun laying
on a shallow rock outcrop.(33) Searches by the rest of the
team quickly revealed three more bronze guns, an anchor, the
remains of three heavily concreted spoked wooden wheels, and
a number of small finds which suggested a late sixteenth
century date and an Armada connection. Later investigation
revealed that the two largest guns, a pair of full canones,
bore the arms of Philip II and the date 1556. These guns
can be identified through their weight marks as two of the
canones ~ batir carried by La Trinidad Valencera, and prove
the identity of the wreck beyond any doubt.(34)
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.111: .lha wreck ~
From the outset the City of Derry Sub-Aqua Club has
insisted that work carried out on the site, whether by its
members or by anyone else, should be conducted as a
controlled
standards,
archaeological
and that the
operation, to appropriate
recoveries should be recorded,
conserved, studied and eventually retained as an intact
collection. The Club, as a corporate body, remains the
legal salvor of the wreck, and is entirely responsible for
all work done on it. At the Club's invitation, however,
archaeological control of the work has throughout been
vested in the St. Andrews Institute of Maritime
Archaeology, under the writer's direction. On this basis
work was conducted in 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980,
amounting in all to some 18 months of active field work on
the site. Conservation support has been provided from the
outset by the Ulster Museum, Belfast. In February 1982,
with the agreement of the City of Derry Sub-Aqua Club and
the government of the Republic of Ireland, the whole
collection passed into the ownership of the Ulster Museum,
where it is now stored and ~isplayed.
The initial finds were made on, around, and to the
north of a reef which extends in a north-easterly direction
for some 200 metres underwater from an exposed rock stratum
on shore, and rises several feet above a stable and very
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flat sandy seabed ten metres below Mean Low Water (Figures
4, 5 and 6). Some wreckage, notably a large bronze gun and
a concreted wooden guncarriage wheel, has found its way into
the broad gully to the south of the reef, while in the
narrow gullies among the reef itslef a few groups of small
finds, and some organic matter, have been noted. The bulk
of the remains, however, lie almost wholly buried in the
flat bottom of mixed sand and shingle which stretches
northwards from the edge of the reef. Surface indications
suggested the existence of three main clusters of wreckage:
one, just north of the reef, which included three guns, two
guncarriage wheels, and an anchor; another, thirty metres
north of the first, represented by two more wheels, two
wooden axletrees, and a swivel gun; and a third, fifteen
metres north-east of the second, indicated by an anchor and
an axletree.
Later· searches revealed a number of scattered finds
extending south-westwards from the main site towards the
shore. A total of 43 surf-abraded potsherds with fabrics
and glazes similar to those identified on the wreck-site
proper have, over the course of the investigations, been
picked up from the shingle of the north-western end of the
beach, and other pottery finds have been made in the reef
gullies between the shore and the site. During a
,particularly low Spring tide in 1980 a stone falcon pedrero
ball was picked up from a tidal pool close to the water's
edge. Heavier objects are less widely dispersed, and the
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most inshore one so far noted, a brass candlestick base, lay
about half way between the main site and the beach. Several
abraded timbers, apparently from the ship's hull, have been
noted in reef gullies to the west and south-west of the main
site.
These indications suggest that ka Trinidad Valencera,
in seeking to run ashore at this sheltered spot, grounded
firmly on the reef. Her normal draught would have been in
the order of four metres (see Appendix I), and she was no
doubt considerably deeper in the water when, in serious
distress, she reached Kinnagoe Bay on 12 September 1588.
With her bow lodged on the reef and her partially sunk stern
sitting on the sand she would have been immobile but
relatively secure, although she would have been liable to
break amidships in the first appreciable north-easterly
swell. In this precarious position she apparently remained
for two days, allowing most of her people and some of her
portable contents to be brought ashore. The end evidently
came with little warning, and was no doubt caused by the
pile-driving effect which a swell' in the bay would have
caused the mainmast to exert on the unsupported keel, so
breaking the ship into the two halves which the extent and
patterning of the observed wreckage now seem to suggest.
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The site is little affected by tidal movement, although
seas from the north to north-east direction cause a marked
surge on the bottom. During such surges the ridged surface
sand moves freely, levelling out any hump or depression
remarkably quickly; beneath the immediate surface, however,
the sediments are extremely stable, as later observations
were to confirm. Nonetheless a complex pattern of sand
movement within the bay as a whole is indicated by massive
sequences of drifting and erosion at the western end of the
beach, obvious during the nine years in which investigations
have taken place and confirmed over a much longer period by
Mr. Hugh McConway of Kinnagoe, who has known the bay
intimately for nearly eighty years.
A heavy growth of Lamlnarla dlgltata covers the reef.
Though mature plants are confined to the rocks, juveniles of
this and other species have been observed dragging small
pebbles, to which their holdfasts were attached, across the
sand, their fronds acting as 'sails' in the to-and-fro
surges. Since they are able to climb the shallow forward
slopes of the sand ripples, but stick on their steep reverse
ones, they tend to move in one direction only, and often
cover considerable linear distances. The distinctive trails
left by such pebbles are common on the site, which suggests
that this factor may account for some of the shingle
transport within the bay.
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The water is generally clear, with visibility ranging
from three metres
exceptional days.
to as much as fifteen metres on
Peaty water deposited in the bay by the
Long Glen River after heavy rains can, on occasion, cut
visibility almost to zero for several days. These fine peat
sediments may, it is thought, contribute to the preservation
of organic materials on the site, although this factor is
not, as yet, fully understood.
Before excavation began, extensive physical, metal
detector and probe surveys were carried out. Two base
points 100 feet apart were established on the reef, and from
these a grid was constructed by tape triangulation.(35) The
primary
marked
steel
grid was extended 200 feet from the base line, and
at ten foot intervals along the outer sides with
rods driven firmly into the sea bed. Tapes were then
stretched between complementary pairs of rods to provide
datum lines wherever required, from which rigid surveying
equipment was positioned as appropriate. During excavation
the primary grid was extended a further twenty feet
northwards.
The metal detector survey was conducted by Jeremy
Green, then of the Oxford Laboratory for Archaeology, and
the writer, in 1971. The area enclosed by the grid was.
·subjected to total and intensive coverage, while a general
reconnaissance was made of the surrounding areas, and of the
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main gully which runs between the wreck site and the shore,
to check whether any major deposits lay outside the grid.
Targets fell into two categories:
where high readings were obtained,
single point of high intensity.
indicated in Figure 6.
those having a large area
and those which showed a
These two categories are
Following the metal detector survey the site was probed
in order to assess the nature and depth of its sediments. A
jet-probe was to make sub-bottom soundings to a depth of up
to 9 feet (2.74 m). The soudings were taken at 5 feet
(1.52 m) intervals along a series of datum lines beginning
at the baseline and progressing in 10 foot (3.05 m)
parallels to the north end of the grid. The information so
derived is presented, in simplified form, in Figure 7.
Contacts within 3 feet (0.91 m) of the sea bed surface
are shown as shaded areas. The shallow contours at the
bottom corners of the grid, close to A and B, represent rock
strata sloping gradually down from the exposed part of the
reef. The large zones of shallow contact in the north-east
sector of the grid, on the other hand, consist of a massive
crust of concreted wreck debris, which in places almost
breaks the surface. The more scattered contacts west of
this deposit also represent shallow wreck debris as do,
apparently, the smaller shallow contacts scattered over the
rest of the grid. Little information has been derived about
the nature of the deeper strata.
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It was noted that each jet probe sounding left a small
crater in the sand, and that if any organic material had
been encountered during the probe a small sample of it would
gather at the bottom of the crater after the turbulence had
died down. Soundings which yielded organic indications are
noted in Figure 7. From the pre-disturbance survey it was
concluded that the grid system as laid out enclosed the
probable nucleus of the wreck, and on the basis of this
information systematic excavation has progressed. As a
result of discoveries in the north-east corner the grid was
later extended a further 20 feet (6.1 m) northwards.
Excavation was carried out by the progressive stripping
of selected grid units, either down to bedrock or to what
appeared to be the lowest level of wreck deposit. A 15 cm
diameter airlift was used to remove overburden where the
archaeological deposits were scattered or lay at an
appreciable depth; most excavation, however, was carried out
by hand, with a 10 em diameter water dredge used to carry
away spoil. Spoil was dumped on previously excavated areas
to maintain the equilibrium of the site.
The present extent of the excavation, which is not yet
completed, is shown in Figures 8 and 9. It appears that the
wreck is a well scattered one, without coherent structural
remains,
have been
although some dislocated components of the hull
identified. The flat and extremely stable sea
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bed, however, has been found to contain a number of discrete
pockets of wreck material, sealed within lens-shaped
depressions, which include a wide range of objects from the
wreck, ma~y of them extremely well preserved. All classes
of material are represented: wood, leather, plant and animal
remains, textiles, ceramics, stone and metal. One such
concentration is located at the south-east corner of the
grid,
50.160,
one is centred on Grid square 10.150, another at
and a fourth at 80.200 (Figure 10). Elsewhere on
the site there are widely scattered areas of concretion,
most of which is derived from hull bolts and other ship's
fittings,
(Figure
where little or no organic matter is present
11) • The latter will have been deposited,
and durable objects like guns, anchors,
along
andwith heavy
guncarriage components, as the vessel disintegrated. 'It,
seems likely that while the ship was breaking up on the
reef, with the main part of her hull resting on the sand;
she formed a massive anomaly which temporarily disturbed the
equilibrium of the sea bed and created shallow scour pits
around it. In these pits waterlogged material, carried
along the sea bed by the bottom surge, would have gathered
and become trapped. Loose seaweed also found its way into
the scour pits to cap the deposits with a black protective
sludge of decayed plant matter. After the hull
disintegrated the natural stability of the sea bed
reasserted itself, and the pits filled with sand to seal and
protect the jumbled archaeological deposits within them.
Below a depth of 15 to 20 cm from the present day sea bed
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the organic deposits are stable and well preserved (Figure
12). The line which divides the surface layer from the
stabilised zone is very distinct, as is demonstrated when an
object lies partly in one and partly in the other. An
example is provided by the large pulley block at Grid
18.149, a corner of which lay on the edge of the guncarriage
wheel centred on Grid 17.147 (Figure 13).
The peculiar circumstances of this wreck's environment
has ensured the survival of a sample of material which,
although it represents only a very small proportion of the
ship's original contents, is remarkably comprehensive and
well preserved. Since La Trinidad Valencera was one of the
largest units in the Spanish fleet, and carried a wide range
of stores and equipment connected with the projected
landings in England, her wreck is therefore a fundamental
source of evidence for understanding the Armada as a
whole. (36)
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Chapter Four: Santa Marfa ~La~
The Santa Marfa ~ ~ ~ was built as a large
merchant vessel at San Sebasti~n in 1586/7 by Martin de
Villafranca, vecino of that town.(1) By the second half of
sixteenth century Basque shipbuilding was a
well-developed industry, the technical competence of which
is currently being revealed by the excavation of the
remarkably well preserved hull of a 400-ton Guipuzcoan
whaling ship, the ~~, which was lost in 1560 at Red
Bay, Labrador.(2) By the summer of 1587 the Santa Marfa had
been fitted out and was preparing to sail on her maiden
voyage when she was embargoed to act as capitana of Miguel
de Oquendo's Guipuzcoan squadron, which was on the point of
sailing to join the Armada at Lisbon. There, on 31 October,
the armament of the ship was inventoried thus: (3)
40 bronze 18-~ medias canones from Gregorio Loefer's
foundry, all mounted on field carriages
6 bronze medias culebrinas 9-, 10-, and 11-~; 2
of Remigy de Halut, and 2 from the Ragusan
foundry, all mounted on field carriages
480 balls for the above guns, plus 2000 for the esmeriles
2 bronze 1 1/2-~ falcones mounted on old swivels
1 6-oz esmeril with an iron swivel
All the above belonged to the king. The following belonged
to the ship:
9 iron falconetes of 1 1/2-2-~
2 iron 19mbardas of 4 1/2- and 7-~ stone shot
1 iron passamuro of 2-~ iron shot
700 iron balls
On 7 January 1588 the Santa Marfa was credited with a
crew of 138, of which 14 were officers, 85 seamen, and 39
ships' boys.(4) At this date she is still described as the
squadron's capitana. By 19 March, however, she had lost her
flag status to the Santa Jna[54], in which Oquendo
ultimately sailed, and had become the squadron's aJm1ranta
or vice-flagship.(5)
A statement of additional artillery required by
Oquendo's squadron, remitted with a letter dated 5 March,
lists the Santa Marfa as needing an extra nineteen guns.(6)
According to an inventory of 14 May, however, she actually
received only two of these additional pieces, together with
other ordnance stores: (7)
canan pedrero
{
both of ~ nueva fundiciOn,
and both on sea carriages1 media culebrina
4 sets of field carriages and limbers for the media canones
2 wooden beds for esmeriles, and 2 rammers
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1 wheel for a media canOn field carriage
300 pikes
90 arquebuses
4 rammers with handles
4729 libras of powder
22 wooden wedges and 18 hands pikes
30 iron balls
30 stone balls
6575 libras of match
A report of 19 March shows that no structural
alterations had been made to prepare to Santa Marfa for the
campaign, though other members of the squadron received
considerable modifications to convert them from merchantmen
into auxillary warships.(8) From this we may infer that the
Santa Marfa was from the start considered to be a strongly
built ship.
At the final muster on 9 May the ship was listed with a
burden of 945 tons, an armament of 26 guns (one less than
the total indicated in the documents cited above), and a
complement of 297 men, of whom 225 were soldiers. She
carried 80 ~ of powder, 20 ~ of lead, 16 ~ of match,
and 1300 rounds of shot. Martin de Villafranca, the
vessel's unfortunate owner, remained in command, while two
captains from the tercio of Sicily, Lope Ochoa de la Vega
and Francisco Ruiz Matute, and one officer from Don
Francisco de Toledo's tercio, Cristobal Rivero, sailed with
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elements of their companies. The five adyentureros aboard
included the brother of the marquis of Villena, Don Diego
Pacheco, who took with him 19 retainers. The other four,
Jusepe Justen, Juan de Alba, Juan Cler and Pedro Dere, were
apparently less well connected: they had no followers at
all.(9)
In the storm which scattered the Armada off Corunna the
Santa Marfa was severely damaged, losing her mainmast with
all its associated rigging. Several men were injured, and
most of the provisions were spoiled.(10) On 10 July the ship
was remasted at Corunna, under the.supervision of the duke
of Medina Sidonia, who wrote to the king the following day
to report the fitting of the new mast. The operation had
been a major one, taking more than six hours to complete:
when it was over, the duke observed with some satisfaction,
"I thought we had not done badly•••"(ll)
While the Santa Marfa was out of commission because of
these repairs the vice-flag evidently passed to her
Guipuzcoan sister-ship ~ Salyador[56l, though when a
muster was held before the Armada left Corunna the Santa
Marfa is once again listed as almiranta.(12) As such, too,
is she rated with her loss off Ireland was finally recorded
in Spain.(13)
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Though we are nowhere directly told of the ship's part
in the battles, that she was heavily engaged is implicit in
her only survivor's statement that "this ship was shot
through four times, and one of the shots was between the
wind and the water, whereof they thought she would have
sunk, and most of her tackle was spoiled with shot". In
all, the survivor reported, the ship suffered 200 casualties
"by fight and sickness". (14)
According to his testimony the Santa Marfa stayed with
the main body of the fleet in its north-about course until
early in September. Then a storm dispersed them. "Where he
left the duke [of Medina Sidonia] he knoweth not •••he saw no
land and can therefore name no place but they feared by
tempest, the duke kept his course to the sea; we drew
towards the land to find Cape Clear, so did divers other
ships, which he thinks to amount to the number of forty
shlps •••"(15)
Only one other vessel reported having seen the Santa
Marfa as she struggled through the north Atlantic. She was
the almiranta of the hulks, the ~ Salyador[56], commanded
by Pedro Coco Calderon. "From the 24th [of August]," wrote
,Calderon, "we sailed without knowing whither, through
constant storms, fogs and squalls. As this hulk could not
beat to windward it was necessary to keep out to sea, and we
were unable to discover the main body of the Armada until 4
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September, when we joined it. On this day, as we were
sailing to leeward of the body of the Armada, we saw the
ship Villafranca of Oquendo [i.e. the Santa Mar!a ~~
~] and another Levantine ship fall away towards the
Faroes and Iceland. These ships were far to leeward of
us."(16)
Seventeen days later the Santa Marfa was off the
south-westerly tip of Ireland, in sight of the Blaskets, and
in acute distress. Sea and weather conditions were
appalling: this was the day of the "great gale" which Edward
\
Whyte, Clerk to the Council of Connaught, described as "a
most extreme and cruel storm the like whereof hath not been
heard a long time, which put us in good hope that many of
the Armada ships should be beaten up and cast upon the
rocks."(17) The Blasket Islands, separated from the mainland
shore by a narrow sound, offered the Santa Marfa a slim
hope of refuge. When, at noon, she entered the Sound from
the north she found three other Armada ships already
sheltering off Great Blasket Island, though their situation
was scarcely less perilous than her own. These ships were
Juan Mart!nez de Recalde's ~Jyan of Portugal[2], the ~
1Yan of Castile[28], and a patache. They had arrived a week
earlier, gaining the lee of the Great Blasket by passing
through a narrow passage in the western reefs, a superb
piece of seamanship on the part of Recalde, who knew this
coast well. There they had remained at anchor, making
repairs, taking on water, and awaiting a fair wind for
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Spain.(17) Marcos de Aramburu, commander of the Castilian
~~, who was both an eye-witness and a direct
participant, recorded the dramatic and terrible events which
took place on 21 September in Blasket Sound as follows:
"On the 21st, in the morning, the west wind
came with some terrible fury, but cloudless and
with little rain. The ship of Juan Martfnez
drifted down on ours, cast anchor and another
cable, and having smashed our lantern and our
mizzen tackle and rigging, the flagship secured
herself. At mid-day the ship Santa Marfa ~ ~
~, of Martfn de Villafranca, came in by another
entrance nearer land on the north-west side. She
fired a shot on entering, as if seeking help, and
another further on. All her sails were in pieces
except the foresail. She cast her single anchor,
for she was not carrying more, and with the tide
coming in from the south-east side and beating
against her stern she stayed there until two
o'clock. Then the tide waned, and as it turned
the ship began dragging on our two cables, . and we
with her, and in an instant we could see that she
was going down, trying to hoist the foresail.
Then she sank with all on board, not a person
being saved, a most extraordinary and terrifying
thing. We were dragging on her still, to our own
perdition. But our Lord had willed us, in case of
- 144 -
such nec~ssity, to put a new stock to an anchor
which had only half a stock, which Juan Martfnez
had given us, with a cable. We cast this anchor,
the ship turned her prow; and we hauled in the
other anchor, finding the stock with half the
shank, for the rest was broken, and the cable
chaffed by the rocks over which we were
lying."(19)
The sudden sinking of the Santa Marfa was also observed
f~om the mainland cliffs at Coumeenoole by James Traunte,
who reported: "•••as soon as ever they cast anchor they
drove upon a rock, and there, was cast away into the middle
of the sea, with five hundred tall men and the Prince [of
Ascoli], and no man saved but one, that brought us this
news, who came naked upon a board".(20)
The survivor was Giovanni de Manona, a Genoese, son of
the ship's pilot. Of the moment of wrecking, he had this to
say: "This ship broke against the rocks in the Sound of
Bleskies a league and a half from land upon the Tuesday last
at noon, and all in the ship perished saving this examinate,
who saved himself upon two or three planks; the gentlemen
thinking to save themselves by the boat, it was so fast tied
as they could not get her loose, thereby they were
drowned... He saith that as soon as the ship broke against
the rock, one of the captains slew this examinate's father,
saying he did it by treason•••"(21)
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On being pressed for details of "ordnance, wines, and
other matters of moment", Giovanni stated that "on the ship
here cast away•••were fifty great brass pieces, all cannons
for the field, twenty-five pieces of brass and cast iron
belonging to the ship, there is also in her fifty tuns of
sack. In silver there are in her fifteen thousand ducats,
in gold as much more, much rich apparel and plate and cups
of gold". In a later statement the survivor added that
"this ship that is drowned hath in her three chests full of
money".
If we discount the fifty great brass pieces, which are
surely
downright
a misunderstanding, a mistranscription, or a
lie, the number of guns given by Giovanni is
remarkably close to what we know to have been aboard the
ship from Spanish sources. His figures for the treasure and
wine on board are probably equally close to the mark.
No mention of the Armada wreckings in BlasketSound is
made in the remarkable native literature of the Blasket
Island community, (22) although there is a strong tradition
on the mainland at Dunquin that the stone-capped mound which
stands close to the village is "the grave of the son of the
king of Spain". Spotswood Green records that in the
mid-nineteenth century Blasket fishermen brought up in their
trammel nets a small bronze gun, emblazoned with a
coat-of-arms, which balanced muzzle-down.(23) The piece
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evidently disappeared during the troubles of 1916.
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ii. The location of the wreck
The above evidence prompted Sydney Wignall, in 1968, to
attempt a search of Blasket Sound for the Santa Maria's
remains. Since the area within which the wreck might be
supposed to lie covered some four million square metres, the
task was a formidable one (Figure 14). That it was
accomplished was due to the skill of Commander John Grattan
of the Royal Navy, who directed a three-month programme of
swim-line searches which, on 6 July 1968, located the site
of the wreck.(24) Archaeological survey and a limited
programme of excavation began under the writer's direction
in the late summer of 1968, and continued for a six-month
season in 1969.(25)
The remains lie on a flat shingle bottom at a mean High
Water depth of 35 m, a position which represents the
south-eastern terminus of a north-west/south-east line
across the Sound from the anchorage off Great Blasket Island
(Figure 15) This line is indicated first by a sequence of
iron anchors, discovered during the searches, and then by
the main pinnacle of an underwater reef close to the centre
of the Sound's narrowest part. This line reflects the mean
influence of wind and tide on 21 September 1588, and the
events which these forces precipitated, exactly as described
in Marcos
Stromboli
de Aramburu's account. The reef pinnacle,
Rock {it was hit during the nineteenth century by
a vessel of that name), is still not adequately marked on
Admiralty Chart 2790, published in 1966. It is, in fact,
some distance west of its plotted position, and it rises to
within 2 m of the surface instead of the 5 m suggested by
the chart. On this pinnacle the Santa Marfa struck, having
been dragged towards it by a combination of the westerly
gale and the two-knot run of the ebbing tide. So quickly
did she sink that she hit the bottom only 200 m down-tide of
the rock.
Taking the position of the Santa Marfa's wreck as a
starting point, we can with some confidence identify the
anchors found to the north-west of Stromboli Rock. TWo of
them, which lie in the sheltered area between Great Blasket
and Beginish Island where Recalde and Aramburu first
anchored, are almost certainly those lost by the two ~
~s when they collided and broke free of their moorings on
the morning of 21 September. We can, without serious doubt,
ascribe to Aramburu himself the anchor which possesses only
its arms and half its shank, and which is surely the missing
part of the the "stock with half the shank" which he was
able to recover when the crisis had passed (Figure 16). At
the northern base of Stromboli Reef, just a cable's length
(about 200 m) from the main pinnacle, what must be the Santa
Marfa's sole anchor ("for she was not carrying more") still
lies hooked foul on a ledge of rock, its shank pointing
towards the wreck (Figure 16). Between this anchor and the
two lying in the anchorage a fourth was located: this may,
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perhaps,-indicate the spot at which Recalde and Aramburu
managed to. re-anchor just before the Santa Maria came into
the Sound.
Two hours after the Santa Maria went down a second
ship, the ~1Yan Bautista[40], a converted merchantman of
the Castilian squadron, entered the Sound without a mainmast
and with her sails in shreds. Some days later this ship
also appears to have sunk in or near to Blasket Sound,
although her men and some of her guns were taken off by
Recalde before she foundered. (26) Unfortunately on
24 September we lose our key witness, Aramburu, who sailed
for Spain (which he reached safely on 14 October, followed a
few days later by the dying Recalde). We have no means of
knowing, therefore, where the ~~ Bautista's wreck
might lie, and the possibility must be considered that it,
and not the Santa Mar!a, is the ship now at the base of
Stromboli Reef. Fortunately, two finds made during the 1969
excavations resolve this doubt. They are a matching pair of
pewter plates, and each is inscribed on its lower rim with
the name 'MATUTE' (Figure 17). Since we know from Spanish
sources that a man of this name embarked with the Santa
Marfa ~~~, and from English sources that he perished
with it, this find establishes beyond any doubt the identity
of the Stromboli Reef wreck.(27)
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iii. Tbe wreck site
The visible remains of the wreck comprise a mound of
packed limestone ballast which is merged at its edges with
the natural seabed of loose shingle. The feature is 30 m
long and 12 m broad at its widest part. Excavation was to
show that the average depth of the ballast was about 0.75 m,
suggesting a mass in air of about 90 tonnes. The central
ridge of the mound runs in a north-south direction although,
as will be seen, this does not represent the main axis of
the wreck (Figure 18).
Towards the south of the mound the eastern and western
edges
which
draw together to form a marked 'tail',
trails away into the natural shingle. On
the tip of
the north
and north-western edges of the mound massive concretions of
piled iron shot form a solid, larva-like crust, while seven
lead 'ingots were found lying on top of the ballast at its
highest point.
Thought was given to the question of identifying bow
and stern ends. There exists a description of the well known
Tobermory wreck, that of the Levanter ~ ~ ~
Sicilia[71], as it appeared to a salvor working on it in the
late seventeenth century. The salvor, Archibald Miller of
Greenock, had this to say of the ship's remains: "There is
no deck upon her except in the hinder part•••in the fore
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part of the ship lie many great ballast stones, with some
shot amongst them".(28) The latter part of this description
implies a configuration remarkably similar to that observed
at the northern end of the Blasket Sound wreck. Miller
speaks of a concentration of ballast in the fore part of his
ship, just as occurs in the broad head and narrowing tail of
the Blasket mound. A consideration of the factors involved
in ballasting a ship of this type suggests an explanation.
The massive castle-work of the stern, with its associated
armament and fortification, must have exerted considerable
stern-down component in the trim of such a vessel. Ballast
concentrated forward, tapering gradually aft with the run of
the hull, would correct this imbalance and would leave on a
wreck site a spread of ballast like that noted by Miller at
Tobermory and now evident in the Blasket mound. Miller also
noted the presence of shot in the fore part of the Tobermory
ship, and this is paralleled by the shot concretions at the
broad northern end of the Santa Marfa wreck.
The visible features of the wreck on discovery offered
no obvious indication of how the ship had broken up. Since
the disposition of large metal objects, particularly the
ship's guns, seemed a likely indicator of the way in which
the hull had collapsed, arrangements were made with the
Research Laboratory for Archaeology at Oxford to carry out a
metal detector survey on the ballast mound and over the
surrounding sea bed. This operation was carried out by
Jeremy Green (then of the Laboratory), with the assistance
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of the writer, and although later excavation confirmed the
detector's ability to locate small metal objects, ferrous
and non-ferrous, up to a buried depth of at least 0.6 m, no
large contacts such as might be expected of a gun were
recorded.(29) The metal detector survey, though leading to
the discovery of a number of scattered artifacts, thus added
little to what was already known about the lie of the wreck,
and it was felt that selective excavation of the structural
remains which were evidently pinned beneath the ballast
mound should proceed (Figure 19).
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iY. Excayation
Excavation was first directed along a structural line
of axis running north-west/south-east which proved to be the
keelson of the forward part of the ship. This feature had
been constructed in scarf-jointed lengths, 25 cm broad by
20 cm deep, with rib slots cut into the underside. At 2 m
intervals the stanchions which carried the orlop beams were
tenoned into the keelson, and some of these posts had
survived up to the level of the ballast. Others could be
identified by the mortices cut into the keelson to receive
them.
Hard against the port side of the forward stanchions
and running along the axis of the keelson were two 6 m
planks, each 30 cm broad and 5 cm thick, set on edge one
atop the other. They were not fastened in any way, being
held in place against the uprights solely by the pressure of
the ballast. They can thus be recognised as shifting
boards, used when the ballast was moved from one side of the
ship to the other during careening, or for the routine
trenching which was necessary to check the floor timbers for
leaks. They will also have helped to prevent the ballast
from shooting sideways in heavy seas, or when the ship was
sailing on a tack. Mainwaring, writing in the early
seventeenth century, describes the use of such boarding,
which he calls "pouching".(30)
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10.5 m from the bow end of the ballast, on the keelson
axis, a complex structural arrangement was uncovered (Figure
20). Here a series of uprights and boards had formed a
rectangular box, now partially collapsed, set lengthwise
directly above the keelson. The box had been constructed to
withstand pressure from without, which suggests that its
function had been to hold an open space within the ballast.
Where it passed beneath this space, and for some distance
fore and aft, the keelson was 40 cm deep - double its normal
thickness. Under the forward part of the box the keelson
was massively torn and splintered, as though by the ripping
out of a heavY structure once bolted to it. On either side
the keelson had been supported by a 10 cm square
longitudinal sleeper, the starboard one of which is now
displaced sideways. The floor of the box was packed flush
with the level of the keelson and sleepers with two runs of
planking, evidently in order to secure a flat, firm base for
seating and supporting a solid structural unit now no longer
in place.
Three heavy
athwartships above
timbers were then uncovered, riding
the main hull frames on the starboard
side of the box. Their inboard ends, which were squared off
and slightly tapered, layover the displaced starboard
sleeper. Clearly these ends had mated with recesses in a
now vanished component, which analogy and structural
considerations clearly identity as the mainmast step. The
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box arrangement around the mast step is paralleled in the
remains of a large ship excavated at Woolwich in 1912,
variously identified but certainly belonging to the first
half of the sixteenth century.(31) The thickening of the
keelson at this point of heavy stress is prescribed in an
English shipbuilding treatise of 1620. Finally, the
supporting riders, intended to buttress the mast step
athwartships, are closely paralleled in the arrangement
noted on the remains of a vessel discovered at Rye and
believed by its excavator to date not later than the end of
the sixteenth century.(32)
Structural distortion in the area surrounding the Santa
Maria's mast step, and the ripping out of the long iron
bolts which had bound the step itself to the keelson fore
and aft, suggest that the mast toppled towards the south,
the direction in which a strong ebb tide, reaching a surface
velocity of nearly three knots, was running when the
wrecking occurred. The collapse of the mast in this
direction may also explain the absence of corresponding
riders in position on the port side.
It is of interest to compare the makeshift appearance
of the shoring around the mast step with the solid
shipwrightry of the other components, for it will be
recalled that the Santa Marfa underwent a remasting
operation not long before she sank. It is not unreasonable
to see in this shoring a temporary arrangement intended to
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clear the stepping area of ballast in preparation for the
new mast that was fitted at Corunna.
After the keelson sequence and mast step had been
examined, a transverse trench was begun on the port bow
mound in order to locate framequarter
timbers.
uncovered,
of the ballast
Fifteen closely spaced ground timbers
although unfortunately time did not permit
were
completion of the trench up to the keelson, as had been
intended (Figure 21). Every second timber was found to be
20 em wide and 30 em deep, and these main members were
spaced on average 15 cm apart. Between each pair of main
timbers lay a secondary timber, fitting tightly into the gap
between its neighbours with its top just below the level of
theirs. The lower hull thus appears to have been
solid-framed throughout, without internal strengthening
other than the mast-step riders.
The outer planking, in the several places where it
could be examined, was 10 em thick. Exce~t in the region of
the mast step, there appeared to be no ceiling planking
inside the hull. The outer planks were pinned to the frames
with oak treenails 2.5 em in diameter, studded in groups of
twos and threes. The plank ends, or butts, where springing
stresses were strongest, were bolted with iron, just as
Mainwaring prescribes.(33) These bolts were clenched on
oakum washers as a protection against salt-water corrosion
("iron-sickness", as Mainwaring called it). Evidence was
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found of lead patching over leaky treenails.
Just aft of the mast step the structural sequence along
the keelson ended abruptly while the last part of the
structure showed evidence of distortion and fracture. At
this point the ballast mound sharply changed direction,
trailing off some 50 degrees to port of the wreck's forward
axis. From this it was concluded that the hull had broken
just aft of the mainmast, and that the forward section had
pivoted to match the run of the ebbing tide. Whether this
part of the ship actually broke free, spilling its ballast
and drifting down tide, is not yet known; only further
excavation will tell. It is more than possible, however,
that the starboard side of the hull was extensively damaged
when the ship hit Stromboli Reef, and that this break was
continued to port with the subsequent ripping out of the
mainmast. If so, the stern will have gone completely,
perhaps taking with it much of the upper decks with their
contents and guns. Relieved of its ballast, the main part
of the ship might well have drifted down-tide into very deep
water before eventually breaking up. The tapering nature of
the tail of the ballast mound, and its close alignment with
the run of the tide, supports such a hypothesis. But all
that can be said with certainty at present is that the
entire lower forward hull and the bulk of the ship's ballast
are still on the site.
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Small finds made in the course of these excavations
were not numerous. To the north of the ballast mound a
concreted deposit, which lay beneath a shallow covering of
shingle, was excavated. This contained a number of
concreted musket and arquebus barrels, a pike butt, the
'Matute' plates, a pewter medallion, and two glass beads.
Shot ot various calibres was sampled, though the bulk of it
was lett on the site. The sizes were found to agree broadly
with the calibres of guns associated with the ship in
documentary sources. A group of 13.2 cm calibre iron balls
is appropriate to the four 18-~ medioa canones, while
another group, averaging 10.7 em in diameter but showing
variations extending from 10.2 em to 11 em would neatly
straddle the three calibres (9-, 10-, and 11-~) of the six
medias eulebrinas aboard. A group of smaller iron
roundshot, ranging from 2.5 em to 6 em in diameter, can be
ascribed to the various small calibre guns from the single
6-~ esmeril to the nine 1 1/2- to 2-~ faleonetes. Stone
shot of 16.5 em diameter (about 14-~) identifies the
otherwise unrecorded calibre of the single bronze pedrero of
the 14 May increment, while smaller stone balls of 9 em and
11 em confirm the presence of the 4 1/2- and 7-~ iron
lombargas. There is, however, some shot for which guns
cannot be found in the documentary sources. Two rounds of
8.5 em iron shot, suitable for a 5-~ piece, may represent
no more than an administrative error, but it is less easy to
dismiss a group of 17.8 em iron balls, appropriate to full
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40-~ canones ~ batir, together with a single 15.3 cm
(30-~) shot. Either the ship did, in fact, carry canones
~ batir which have eluded mention in the documents (and
Giovanni. de Manona's confused "50 great brass pieces, all
cannons for the field", might be taken to support this
possibility) or, perhaps more probably, ammunition for the
siege train was in some cases carried by ships which did not
themselves have any canones ~ batir aboard.(34)
Excavation in the area of the mast step yielded a small
but varied collection of pottery, part of a pewter goblet, a
brass balance pan, fragments of barrel-ends and staves and a
brazil nut. Investigation of a metal detector contact at
the southern "tail" of the ballast mound revealed part of a
human skeleton associated with a pewter plate and two
coins - a gold 2-escudo of Philip II, minted at Seville, and
a silver 4-~, also of Philip II, bearing the Mexico City
mark. Lead shot of musket and arquebus calibre was
scattered widely over the site.
Further excavation of this wreck would certainly yield
much structural data, and perhaps a considerable number of
finds. Unfortunately its depth and exposed position
severely restrict the amount of effective work that can be
done with limited resources, since without decompression
facilities it is only possible to dive for a maximum bottom
period of twelve minutes during each of the two daily
periods of slack water.
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"Chapter Five: .El .G.un Orifon
".El .G.un Orifon, rated at 650 tons and carrying
thirty-eight guns, was capitana of Juan Oomez de Medina's
squadron of supply-hulks (urcas). Her port of origin was
Rostock, a Hanseatic Free City which bore as its crest a
golden griffin from which, no doubt, the ship took her
name.(1) ,She was embargoed at San Lucar on 1 March 1587,(2)
and was again listed among a group of ships "assembling in
Andalusia" on 18 July 1587, at which date she had on board
40 seamen, 50 soldiers, and 27 iron guns.(3) The latter
presumably represented her original armament as a Hanseatic
merchantman, before any additions were made. The ship was
present at the muster held at Lisbon on 7 January 1588 and
by 19 March she was reported operational.(4) By 14 May she
had been issued with an increment to bring her armament up
to strength.(5) This included:
4 bronze medias culebrinas, on sea carriages
4 bronze medias sacres, on sea carriages
(these guns are listed in the final squadron
,summary as being of la nueva fundicion)
140 varas of linen for cartridges, to be distributed
among the squadron
3 ~ of stitching thread
150 bombas, to be distributed among the squadron
200 alcanc!as to be distributed among the squadron
1 sack of roundshot
20 pe10tas ~ cadena and enramadas
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1420 pieces of iron shot of all calibres
20 muskets
100 arquebuses
253 ~ of musket bullets
425 ~ of arquebus bullets
4165 lQa of arquebus powder
1424 ~ of match
26 cradles and levers of wood
2 rammers
1225 lha of lead
At the final muster on 9 May 1588 ~~ GrifCn had a
complement of 43 mariners and 243 soldiers.(6) Most of the
seamen were probably her original Rostock crew under their
captain, Burgat Querquerman, who was later to die on Fair
Isle.(7) The soldiers were from the tercio of Nicolas de
Isla, and three of their company officers - Patricio de
Antolinez, Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera,
/and Esteban de
Legorreta _ sailed with them. Also on board was the
squadron commander, Juan G6mez de Medina; a minor aventurero
called VascO de Lago; and three expatriate Irish
catholics.(8)
The muster of 9 May also records totals for the ship's
quotas of roundshot, powder, lead and match: 1900 pieces of
shot, 48 ~ of fine-grained powder, 19 ~ of lead, and 15
~ of match. Apart for the eight bronze pieces added at
Lisbon we know nothing from documentary sources of her
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armament, except that the 27 guns with which she arrived at
,San Lucar were all of iron, and ranged in calibre from 4-~
to 6-~. The nature of the additional three guns which
brought her final total to thirty-eight is not known.
Thus the ship's armament, while not particularly heavy
(we ,may hazard a total firepower of a little over 100
libras), was nonetheless appropriate to her status as a
non-combatant flagship. It puts her in the same category,
for example, as most of the Castilian galleons.
As things turned out, however, ~~ GrifCo was to
see a good deal of action. She was involved in some
desultory prize-chasing off the Scillies when the main body
of the Armada was stuck at the Corunna rendezvous,(9) and
during the action off Portland on 2 August her name again
crops up.(10) On the following morning, off the Isle' of
Wight, she was attacked and all but cut off as she straggled
behind the Armada's exposed windward wing by a strong
English force almost'certainly led by Francis Drake. After
sustaining severe damage and casualties in this action El
~ GrifOn was towed out of the melee by one of the
galleasses, and brought to the comparative safety of the
fleet's centre to make emergency repairs.(11) Six days later
she seems once again to have been in fighting trim, for she
~is mentioned by a witness aboard the galleass Zuniga among
the fifteen or so ships which, led by Medina Sidonia's ~
MartIn, fought the dogged rearguard action which saved the
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Armada from rout off Gravelines.(12)
Perhaps because of battle damage sustained during these
engagements - an account by an anonymous survivor, possibly
,
Juan Gomez himself - tells us that one of her seams gaped a
hand's breadth apart - and no doubt also because of her
~inherently poor sailing qualities - the Grifon lagged behind
the main body of the fleet during the north-about
voyage.(13) After a harrowing series of misadventures in the
north Atlantic and off the Irish coast she was driven back
to the north, eventually fetching up into the lee of Fair
Isle stricken and close to foundering. There, on
28 September, she was wrecked, although allan board came
safely ashore. Fifty of the castaways, among them the
master and mate, died of privation'during their six week
stay on the island although most of the rest, including
Gomez de Medina, returned at length to the Netherlands and
Spain via Shetland, Anstruther and Edinburgh.(14)
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ii. Location of the wreck
,The whereabouts of the Grifon's wreck, handed down in a
Fair Isle folk memory through four centuries which is now
confirmed by archaeology to be entirely accurate, is the
narrow cave-ended ~ of Stroms Hellier, close to the
south-eastern corner of the island (Figure 22).(15) The ~
is relatively sheltered from the prevailing south-westerly
winds, and salvage operations were evidently contemplated in
1595 (if not before), when a contract was signed between
Earl Patrick of Orkney and William Irvine of Sebay to raise
the ship's guns.(16) It is not known whether these
operations were carried out with any success, but in 1728
two noted "wrackmen", Captain Jacob Rowe and William Evans,
working with Rowe's patented diving equipment, recovered two
bronze guns "of a large size" from the wreck, which they
were exploring in the mistaken belief that the vessel was
the flagship of the whole Armada which, as well as mounting
"130 ,brass guns or thereabouts" (even the real ~ Mart!n
had only carried 48), contained a fortune in treasure.(17)
,The confusion doubtless sprang from Gomez de Medina's name,
,and as for the treasure, although the Grifcn had undoubtedly
carried some, it was saved by the survivors and brought
"unspoiled" to Edinburgh.(18) Rowe's fruitless work on the
site was abandoned after only two months in favour of a much
more productive wreck, that of the Dutch east Indiaman
Adelaar, which sank in March 1728 off Barra with a large
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quantity of coined and bar silver on board.(19) Thereafter,
so far as is known, no further diving operations were
,carried out on the Grifon site until 1970.
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iii. The wreck site and its interpretation
In June 1970 the writer, in conjunction with Sydney
Wignall, Christopher Oldfield and Simon Martin, located the
remains ,of El Gran Grifon on the south-eastern side of
Stroms Hellier. Three months of survey and limited
excavation under the writer's direction followed. A brief
visit to the site was made in 1973, and in 1977 a team from
the Institute of Marine Archaeology, led by the writer,
carried out a four-month programme of excavation. The finds
are now lodged in the Shetland County Museum, Lerwick, and
no further work on the site is planned.
The strata of Old Red Sandstone on the eastern side of
Fair Isle incline towards the north-west at an angle of some
60 degrees. Stroms Hellier itself has been formed by the
collapse of two caves which ran at right angles to the trend
of the strata and whose inshore ends now penetrate deep into
the cliff base (Figure 23). The tilting plate which once
divided these caves survives as a spine of rock running
northeast-southwest through the centre of the~, rising
above sea level at its inshore end and terminating to
seaward where the shore line existed prior to the
penetration and collapse of the caves. This geology gives
the north-west facing rock slopes, above and below the
water, a tendency to overhang. The central spine divides
the &e2 into two deep gully systems which narrow
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progressively as they run inshore towards the caves. At
their inshore ends both gullies slope upwards, and their
U-shaped bottoms are well scoured by small quantities of
mobile sediment. Only in isolated pockets does relatively
stable detritus occur, and even this tends to move in
moderate sea conditions. As the gullies widen to seaward
the shingle becomes deeper, more stable, and composed of
sand, shell, and rounded boulders up to 40 cm in size. In
several places large rocks lie jumbled up in the gullies.
Some have the jagged edges and rough faces indicative of
recent breakage, and have clearly fallen from the
overhanging cliff above in the not too distant past.
Although the rate of erosion seems fairly slow (no major
fall was noted between 1970 and 1977), it is likely that
many of these rocks have intruded upon the site since 1588.
Seaward of the ~ the bottom is relatively flat and
open, with large scattered boulders. Water depth increases
progressively and rapidly, reaching the 20 fathom (37 m)
contour within 80 m. Surface heights and spot depths are
indicated on the general site plan.
The shallow parts of the site, especially the top of
the spine and the flat platform surrounding Point 0'
Ska1rharis, supports a vigorous growth of Laminaria digitata
and, within the tidal zone, Laminaria hyperborea. The gully
sides and bottoms, however, carry only a sparse and stunted
population of diiltata. Since this species is adapted to
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survive in exposed tidal shallows, its poor condition
indicates that within this environment extreme conditions of
water movement and abrasion prevail. Such conditions are
not apparent when diving on the site, since operations are
naturally conducted in periods of relative calm. It is
possible, however, to assess in general terms the behaviour
of the gully environment from surface observation in bad
weather.
The ~ faces towards the east and north-east, and
while these are not the directions of the prevailing wind
they are exposed to a sUbstantial proportion of each year's
rough weather, particularly during winter. Indeed the worst
r
storms of all - the so-called 'storms of the century' such
as the great gale of 1900 - invariably come from this
direction. It is still told on Fair Isle how, in 1900,
60-foot seas broke over the south-east end of the island and
covered the fields and crofts in white water.(20) A wave of
such height, having expended its momentum against the
overhanging and narrowing wedge presented by the~, would
collapse downwards and impose its full weight directly on
the ~ bottom. This would force violently seawards, by
displacement, the water already in the gullies. Because of
the great volume of water involved the resulting velocity in
the gully bottoms would be extremely high. It would
certainly be capable of displacing and mixing the relatively
stable deposits of deep shingle, and of moving large
boulders. Clear archaeological evidence of shingle movement
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up to a depth of 1.6 m was indeed observed (below, p. ),
while the horizontal displacement of one large boulder by
1.5 m occurred at some time between 1970 and 1977, on which
two occasions its precise location was plotted.
It was into such an environment that the wreck of Ll
,Grifon was deposited. Little archaeological cohesion
can therefore be expected in the remains, for the observed
distribution of artifacts has clearly resulted from a total
break-up of the ship against the cliff, with subsequent
deposition into the deep gully bottoms. No hull structure
appears to have survived. However, it may be supposed that
the larger and heavier objects have not moved far from the
locations of their initial deposition (though they may first
have dropped and rolled some distance in getting there) and
so their positions probably relate, in some measure at
least, to their original positions within the ship.
The wreckage observed lies entirely within the gully
system to the south-east of the central spine (Figure 24).
A long cast-iron gun, identified as a media sacre, was
wedged into the narrow gully bottom close to the foot of the
cliff, where it is fully exposed to the abrasive effect of
the moving sediments which have worn it down so that it is
now, in effect, sectioned longitudinally. This gun
represents the most inshore wreckage so far noted. Some 5 m
seaward of it a group of four lead ingots was found, while
two more ingots and a broken cast-iron gun lay 12 m further
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on, at a point at which the gully begins to broaden and fill
with deep shingle. Removal of this shingle - a task which
took the most of the 1977 visit to accomplish - exposed a
solid mass of iron concretion filling the gully bottom. The
concretion was composed almost entirely of iron roundshot,
clearly visible in the abraded top surface as a pattern of
disc-shaped sections. The smooth top of the concretion, and
the bright unoxidised surfaces of the sectional shot, showed
that the abrasive effect of moving shingle was regularly
active up to at least 1.6 m below its normal surface, which
was the maximum depth removed.
Lying directly on the top surface of the concretion
were two more guns. One was a bronze media culebrina in
relatively sound condition, though its dolphins and muzzle
end were missing. A single dolphin was found close to its
breech, within the concretion, while the muzzle was located
ten metres away in a neighbouring gully. The second loose
gun, of which only the abraded breech end survived, was ot
cast iron.
Within the concretion layer one cast iron gun and three
wrought iron breech blocks were discovered (Figure 25).
Abrasion had removed most of the cast gun's top part, but
the concretion had protected its lower metal so that an
excellent longitudinal section of the weapon was preserved.
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The main concretion terminated where the gully rises
towards its seaward end, and a metal detector survey
suggested that, apart for a small deposit of iron shot in a
nearby fissure, no further wreckage lies in this direction.
Beyond this point the gully is effectively blocked off by
the rising bedrock, so creating a natural trap for the
wreckage contained within it.
Ten meters or so south-east of the gully just
described, and running parallel to it, is a second gully.
At its seaward end, which is 19 m below the surface, this
gully reaches a width of 12 m, and is here blocked off by
rising bedrock. The gully runs close inshore under the
shallows around Point 0' Skairharis at a depth of 16 m, at
which point it lies beneath a considerable rock overhang,
and then climbs towards the base of the cliff where it
terminates in a rising and narrowing fissure filled with
large boulders. In the central part of this gully, at a
depth of 16 m, seven guns lay partially exposed. These
included a--bronze media sacre, three cast iron guns, and
three wrought iron gun barrels. Excavation revealed, in
addition, four wrought iron breech blocks, a breech fragment
from a cast iron gun, and the miSSing muzzle end of the
bronze media culebrina noted in the adjacent gully. This
area also yielded lead and iron shot, a curved iron blade
which may be
pewter utensils,
a sheer hook, some fragments of copper and
and a silver 4-real coin of Philip II from
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the Toledo mint. At the seaward end of this deposit a
wrought iron rudder pintle was located, which together with
eight fragmentary iron bolts, a brass sheave, and two brass
sheave bushes, constitute all that can now be recognised of
the ship and its fittings.
In all, 370 pieces of iron shot were found on the site,
together with six socketed lead hemispheres from bar shot
and four lead balls of greater than hand-gun calibre (Figure
49). A total of 4,594 lead balls suitable for musket and
arquebus were also recovered.
Seventy m north-east of Point Saider a wrought iron
anchor was located at a depth of 23 m. Its proportions and
appearance are entirely compatible with its belonging to a
large ship of sixteenth century date, and there can be
,little doubt that it belonged to El~ Grifoo.
An attempt can now be made to interpret, from the
observed remains and information gleaned from documentary
sources, the circumstances of the wrecking and the nature of
the subsequent deposition of artifacts. The ship, according
to the anonymous survivor, approached- the island on
27 September 1588 from the direction of North Ronaldsay,
driven by a south-westerlY gale: "The sea kept giving us
such dreadful blows, that truly our one thought was that our
lives were ended•••" Anyone with experience of these waters,
where the conflicting tidal streams of the North Sea and the
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Atlantic meet, will appreciate the hulk's predicament. It
was at this point that the morale of those on board finally
collapsed. "Each one of us reconciled himself to God•••and
prepared for the long long journey that seemed inevitable.
As to force the hulk anymore would only have ended it and
our lives the sooner, we determined to cease our efforts.
The poor soldiers, too, lost all spirit to work at the
pumps. The two companies - 230 men in all and 40 we had
taken from the other ship the Barca ~ Amburs, another hulk,
which ,had foundered while in the Grifon's company off the
north-west coast of Ireland, had pumped incessantly and
worked with buckets, but the water still increased, till
there were thirteen spans of water over the mast step
[carlinga] and all efforts failed to reduce it an inch. So
we gave way to despair•••"(21)
Assuming a span to be nine inches, the depth of water
in the hold was thus almost 3 m, which must have brought the
ship very close to sinking. But at this crucial point, at
two o'clock in the afternoon, Fair Isle (Faril) was
Sighted. The survivor's account continues: "We arrived at
sunset, much consoled, though we saw we should still have to
suffer. But anything was better than drinking salt water.
We anchored in a sheltered spot we found, this day of our
great peril, 27 September 1588."
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There can be little doubt that the anchor located 70 m
north-east of Point Saider identifies the 'sheltered spot'
,at which the Grifon anchored at last light on 27 September.
This, indeed, represents the first sheltered water which a
ship approaching from the south in a south-westerly gale
would encounter. The spot lies quite close inshore, and so
gains the protection of Stroms Hellier's overhanging cliff.
Provided that the wind did not back into the south-east, it
was as safe an anchorage as could have been found.
The ship evidently rode out the night here, for the
survivor tells us that he and his comrades did not land
until the following day. It would have been out of the
question to attempt a landing on a strange and hazardous
coast in darkness. No doubt, with salvation so close, the
ship's company found fresh spirit to work the pumps. What
happened at daybreak is not entirely clear, for the account
makes no mention of the wrecking itself. But, to someone
viewing the shoreline from the Griton's anchorage, only one
reasonable course of action presents itself. Just north of
Stroms Hellier a long broad inlet, Swartz Geo, penetrates
200 m into the island, terminating in a sloping shingle
beach at the foot of the cliff. The approach to this beach,
as the Spaniards could easily have ascertained with a small
boat and sounding lead, is deep enough at High Water for a
vessel of the GritOn's draught (about 4.5 m) to run well
into the ~ before grounding. In this way those on board
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would not only have stood a reasonable chance of getting off
alive, but also of recovering from the ship, at Low Water,
whatever they required to face the perils that lay ahead.
But if this was their plan, it failed. As we now know,
the ship was wrecked not in Swartz Geo but against the
overhanging cliff of Stroms Hellier. A more forbidding
place is hard to imagine, and it cannot have been chosen
deliberately. Perhaps the tidal set to the south which runs
across the mouths of both~, though it reaches at full
flood no more than half a knot, was enough to upset what
must have been a tricky operation, performed as it was with
a waterlogged ship manned by exhausted men. At any event,
the ship became wedged fast in the south-eastern corner of
Stroms Hellier where, in due course, she was to break up and
sink.
Luck, however, did not desert the Spaniards. As the
survivor relates, all of them managed to escape. Fair Isle
tradition adds that they were able to climb up the masts and
step directly onto the cliff top, a story which the
topography of the site renders entirely feasible. Juan
G6mez and his men were, moreover, able to recover their
valuables, though the survivor's statement that they were
able to save none of their provisions might be taken to
imply that little further salvage of the ship's contents was
carried out. This need not, however, be the case. Since
the ship had arrived at Fair Isle with 3 m of water in her
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hold it is likely that all of the provisions stowed there,
whether in cask, sack or jar, had already been spoiled
beyond recovery.
The main features of the wreck as observed in the
course of the excavations may now be summarised. Its
seaward end is represented by the deposit at the base of the
overhanging cliff which drops from the shallows surrounding
Point 0' Skairharis. Common sense dictates that this is
most likely to have been the stern area, a presumption
greatly strengthened by the find here of a rudder pintle.
The guns found in this area are relatively light, and
include parts of small swivel-mounted pieces (a barrel and
four breech chambers), which are likely to have been
situated in the stern or on its upper castleworks.
Most of the objects recorded in this gully, especially
the iron shot and the few small finds, lie close into the
cliff base, which suggests a deposition such as would result
from sliding across a sloping deck.(22) It is probable,
therefore, that the ship broke up into the cliff rather than
away from it.
At the inshore end of the site, the most landward
wreckage so far noted is the abraded iron media sacra in the
narrow gully immediately south-east of the central spine, at
the point where it rises above the water to form an exposed
narrow reef Ca Fair Isle tradition relates that these rocks
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are themselves the fossilised remains of the ship}. This
long iron gun would be a suitable piece for one of the bow
chasers. Its muzzle is 39 m from the rudder pintle at the
other end of the wreck which, allowing for an outspill each
way of 4.5 m, suggests 30 m as
dimension of the hull. The group of
an approximate overall
lead ingots 5 m to
seaward of this gun thus corresponds well with the location
of ingots in the fore part of the Santa Marfa wreck.
These postulated bow and stern termini therefore leave
the midships section, which would have held the main part of
the ship's armament and other contents, lying awkwardly
across the high ridge which separates the two main gullies
and the south-east sector of the.&e.Q.. Here, almost .
certainly, the ship would have broken her back, in a manner
closely paralleled by the Dartmouth wreck in the Sound of
Mull.(23} Since no wreckage has been discovered in the gully
on the south side of this ridge, while that to the north is
filled with it, it follows that this part of the ship (the
midships 'and forward section if my hypothesis is correct)
broke up away from the cliff and against the central spine.
As noted above, this gully was filled with concreted
wreckage, mainly iron shot, among and on top of which four
guns and three breech blocks were found. Many rounds of
musket and arquebus calibre lead shot occurred within the
concretion and on top of it, but the bulk of the lead shot
came from several sandy pockets in the narrow shoreward part
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of the gully, together with two small sounding leads. In
this area no iron shot was found, except for a piece loaded
into the iron media sacre's breech.
Within the estimated 200 tonnes of shingle overburden
which covered the main concretion deposit in the wide part
of the gully no metallic, ceramic, or organic artifact was
found, despite careful screening. The only objects which
may have been associated with the wreck to be found within
the shingle level were two worn spherical stones of~. 12 cm
diameter, which are probably though not certainly stone shot
for ,a gun of the falcon Dedrero class (Figure 26). It was
also noted, in 1977, that two objects lost in the gully
during the 1970 operations, a lead belt-weight and a
photographic light meter of slight negative buoyancy, had
worked their way through the shingle layer and had come to
rest directly on top of the concretion.
These observations demonstrate that the site's
environment exercises sorting mechanisms of two distinct
kinds. Apart from the inshore gun, which is large enough
and sufficiently well wedged in the gully bottom to resist
water movement, only lead ingots and small lead objects -
and even then only those which became trapped in shallow
rock pockets - remained at the inshore end of the wreck. It
is unreasonable to suppose that only lead objects were
present at this end of the ship, and therefore the lighter
materials must in some way have been removed elsewhere. We
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have already seen how severe easterly storms are likely to
set up considerable water movement to seaward in the gully
bottoms, particularly at their narrow inshore ends, and we
may therefore presume that this movement is at times
sufficiently strong to drive all materials lighter than lead
towards the seaward end of the gully. It is in here,
therefore, that the main deposit of iron occurs, prevented
from further seaward movement by the rising rock
formations.
A second sorting effect here becomes apparent. All of
the iron, lead, and bronze objects in the wide seaward end
of the gully lie within or just above a matrix of concretion
stabilised beneath a layer of drifted shingle up to 1.6 m
deep.
shows
As noted above, the top surface of
evidence of continuing if slow
~e concretion
abrasion,
indicates that the shingle on occasion moves down
which
to its
lowest observed level.
Objects which were deposited upon such a shingle bed,
as they must have been immediately after the ship had broken
up, would therefore react in one of two ways. Those of
greater mass than the surrounding shingle - the metal
objects - would tend to move downwards whenever the shingle
below them was displaced. They would thus in time either
find a level beyond which the shingle was consistently
stable, or reach the gully bottom in a solid mass and
stabilise there. At this point, as they have done, the
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individual objects would begin, through the natural
processes of corrosion in sea water, to build up around them
a matrix within which they would be securely protected,
subject only to a slow process of grinding attrition from
the shingle above.
Heavy objects, including guns and lead shot, which
arrived in the gully bottom as a result of sea bed movement
after this process of stabilisation had been completed,
would themselves stabilise as soon as they reached the main
concretion layer but would lie on its top surface without
further penetration. An iron object deposited in this way
would then build up its own covering of concretion although,
because it was isolated, the concretion would be less
resistant to vigorous shingle movement than the consolidated
layer. This effect is evident on the two loose iron guns
above the concretion deposit which, although themselves
heavily concreted at the time of discovery, showed the
effects of severe abrasion when the shell of concretion was
removed. The explanation must be that from time to time,
presumably in those rare 'super-storms' which may occur less
than once in a generation, movement within the shingle
becomes sufficiently strong to strip the surfaces of
concreted iron objects, thus exposing them to abrasion until
a new covering develops.
- 181 -
Objects of similar specific gravity to that of the
shingle would tend to move up and down freely as the shingle
itself moved. As we have seen, two stone balls may have
survived in this way. Ceramics, too, might be expected to
survive in a similar manner, although not a single scrap of
pottery has been identified on the site. Since a
considerable amount of pottery was certainly on board the
ship, and not all of this is likely to have been salvaged,
it must be concluded that four centuries of movement within
the shingle layer has effectively ground it to nothing.
Any material lighter than the shingle, such as wood,
bone, or leather, would neither penetrate its surface nor
stand any chance of surviving above it. No such material,
apart from a cork tampion in the broken muzzle of the bronze
media culebrina, and same fragments of wadding in the bores
and breechblocks of the iron guns, has therefore survived on
the site.
Although a careful search was made of the areas
surrounding the identified wreck features, no further
deposits, or single items which might have been associated
with the wreck, were identified. In particular, the deep
gully to the north-west of the central spine was scrutinised
carefully, both visually and with a metal detector, without
result.
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A final point must now be considered. In terms of guns
and munitions, a considerable proportion of what we know to
have been on board the ship when she left Lisbon has now
been identified on the site. If we count the two bronze
pieces raised in the eighteenth century, fourteen individual
ship guns can now be recognised, together with seven breech
blocks. This amounts to about 37 percent of the ship's full
complement of thirty-eight pieces. Of her quota of 1900
roundshot we have recovered 370, or nearly 20 percent _ and
this takes no account of unknown but doubtless considerable
expenditure of shot during the fighting, and whatever may
yet lie undiscovered in the sea bed or have been ground into
oblivion by the abrasive processes of the site. We have
also recovered 11 1/2 Castilian ~ of lead, in shot and
ingot form, out of the 19 ~ listed before the ship
sailed - a full 60 percent, which again makes no allowance
for whatever may have been discharged in battle. These
percentages suggest that our examination of the site has
revealed, at the very least, four-tenths of the heavy
weaponry and ammunition of all kinds which were present on
the ship when she sank.
In contrast, the recovery of every other class of
material has been negligible. Certainly, as we have seen,
much will have been destroyed by the site's harsh
environment.
coins, pieces
But what of such items as buckles,
of military equipment, parts
buttons,
of metal
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utensils, even ship's fittings and hull bolts? Had items of
this kind been present in any quantity when the hull went
down they would surely have behaved in the same way as the
iron and lead shot; we should have expected such finds
within and on top of the concretion, and perhaps elsewhere
on the site. But they are almost entirely absent. The
explanation can only be that the ship, before she broke up
and sank, was systematically stripped not only of her
contents but also of her fittings, perhaps by the Spaniards
themselves but much more probably by the islanders, to whom
such a wreck would have been an unprecedented economic
windfall. Their modern descendants would have done the
same, and quite properly so; the vigorous salvage of wrecked
property is no more than sound common sense. The efforts
displayed by present-day Fair Islanders to recover a cargo
of timbers washed into the heads of almost inaccessible
and the determined ingenuity which tempered their at
times reckless courage, which I observed during the winter
of 1972, leaves me in little doubt that had the opportunity
presented itself Ln .1588 ,the Grifon would have been
dismantled to the waterline with considerable speed and
efficiency. According to recent researches into weather
patterns during the Armada and its aftermath, the wind
continued to blow from west and south-west until well into
October, ,and so the Griton's remains, wedged into Stroms
Hellier and supported by the rising sides of the central
spine, in all probability remained sheltered, largely above
water, and relatively intact for several days.
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Only the contents of the waterlogged hold - mainly
munitions and perishable goods - and the ship's guns, which
would have been difficult to remove and in any case of
little use to the islanders, appear to have escaped this
determined salvage. For the purposes of our study,
therefore, ,the Grifon wreck site has provided significant
information about the ship's armament, but almost nothing
else. This evidence, however, is crucial in two respects.
First, it has yielded a sufficiently high sample of
ammunition to show that not only had the ship not run out of
round shot at the close of the fighting, but had expended
relatively few - perhaps very few - of the heaviest balls
she carried (Figure 49). Second, the find of several
impacted lead bullets of musket and arquebus calibre, which
can only be English bullets ,fired at the GrifQn's hull,
provide conclusive evidence of the very short range at which
she had been engaged. The Spanish claim that much of the
fighting had been conducted "at half musket-shot" was no
mere figure of speech (Figure 27).
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Part III: The Equipment of the Spanish Armada
Chapter Six: .The. Ships
Introduction
It must be stated at the outset that evidence of ship
construction and hull form recovered from the Armada
excavations is relatively limited. Only on the Santa Marfa
~ la ~ wreck were substantial remains encountered, and
the physical difficulties presented by that site allowed
detailed examination only of selected areas. The Trinidad
Valencera wreck has yielded no coherent remains, although
several diSjointed components from her hull show something
of the ship's structural characteristics. Further data can
be extracted about the construction of the Ragusan ~~
~ Sicilia from reports of early salvors who saw her
partially intact wreck at the bottom of Tobermory Bay. Not
surprisingly, in view of their harsh environments, the wreck
sites of the Girona and ~ ~ GrifOn have shown no
indication whatever of surviving structure.
A good deal of information, however, can be gleaned
from documentary sources. Although, so far as is known, no
drawings or technical descriptions of any ships involved in
the Armada exist, oblique references concerning the
construction and internal arrangement both of individual
vessels and of general type-groups are numerous. Taken in
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conjunction with the archaeological evidence, and with other
contemporary or near-contemporary written and pictoral
material, these sources allow the fleet's major ship-types
to be reconstructed and analysed in some detail.
The relationship between hull dimensions and tonnage at
the time of the Armada, and the methods of calculation
employed, are disoussed in Appendix 1.
~ types
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Since the fleet, with its 130 ships drawn from sources
which covered the length and breadth of Europe, was an~
~ and bewilderingly cosmopolitan creation, we are unlikely
ever to know precisely how many different ship-types and
regional varieties of construction were contained within
it. Nevertheless we can recognise several broad classes of
vessel,
characteristics,
each of which presents a common set of general
however much its individual members may
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4
Class 5
Class 6
Class 7
Class 8
Class 9
have varied in detail. They are:
Portuguese royal warships
Flota galleons
Galleys
Galleasses
Mediterranean-built merchantmen
Atlantic-built merchantmen
Bal t1c hulks
Light craft
Landing craft and ships' boats
1. portuguese royal warships
These ships, which had formed the core of the
Portuguese fleet, were captured at Lisbon when Spain annexed
Portugal in 1580. The largest of them, the San Mart{n[l],
which was destined to become the Armada's capitana general,
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was Santa Cruz's flagship in the Azores campaigns of
1582-3. One of the murals in the Escorial's Hall of Battles
depicts her at the climax of S~o Miguel, towing Filippo
Strozzi's defeated galleon through the wreckage of the
French fleet (Figure 28). These murals were painted in 1590
and their technical accuracy appears generally sound.(1) The
~ Mart!n is shown as a three masted vessel of carrack
bUild, high hulled and broad beamed, with two continuous gun
decks equipped with lidded ports. She has well defined
fighting castles at bow and stern.
The general impression given by this picture is
confirmed, and much detail added to it, by the orders which
Medina Sidonia issued to the ~ Martin's company on 7 June
1588, while the fleet was regrouping at Corunna.(2) His
allocation of battle-stations to the 100 mosqueteros and 202
arguebuzeros make the ship's internal arrangements quite
clear.
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Battl e-stations mosqueteros arcabuzeros criados
First deck, with the
main battery
Second deck
Duke's cabin gallery
Beneath the stern castle
from the mizzen mast to
the fore mast (i.e. the
waist deck and its
extensions fore and aft)
On the forecastle (the
duke notes that the
galley fires (fogones)
were located immediately
below the forecastle)
In the main top
In the fore top
On the aftercastle
36 10
50 30
5 6
28 52
12 20
8
4
43
4
4
30
On the lower deck (i.e. the orlop): friars, barbers, ship's
boys and all the 'unserviceable attendants' (criados~inuti1e§) who, with 8 or 10 seamen, were responsible for
tending the wounded and repa1.ring..shot..damage.. '. " '.. '. " . '.
I=IRsr GUN "'DEC.K.
ORLOP DECK.
BA LLAST
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From the above information, and with the Hall of
Battles picture as a guide, we can reconstruct the ~
Martin's general layout as shown above.
What has emeraged is a powerful two-decker capable of
bearing heavy ordnance, fitted with dominating castleworks
which give roam and height for a large complement of troops
whose small-arms add considerably to her close-range
firepower. The vessel is typical of mid-sixteenth century
royal warships throughout Europe. MUch the same kind of
troop-carrying battleships were to be found in Henry VIII's
navy, and the wreck of one of them, the ~~, is
currently being investigated•. It promises to provide much
new evidence about the construction, internal arrangement,
and armament of such a vessel.(3)
We may note that the short mizzen-mast depicted in the
Escorial representation carries a small lateen sail and has
no fighting top, a fact confirmed by Medina Sidonia's
battle-orders, which place no men here although substantial
contingents
mdn a~
bowsprit
are stationed in the fore and main tops. The
fore masts carry two square sails apiece. A
is shown in the picture and, though it carries no
spritsail, we may presume that one existed. Without it such
a ship would have been difficult to manage.
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This simple rig, coupled with the windage presented by
the high sides and castleworks of the hull, particularly at
the stern, would not have given her good sailing or handling
qualities. Nonetheless these Atlantic-built warships, even
if they were somewhat behind the times in 1588, were strong,
well-found, and potentially formidable fighting machines.
They were evidently seaworthy too. Of the nine which
sailed, two (the ~ Mateo and ~ Felipe) grounded on the
Flemish Banks after the Battle of Gravelines; but of the
remainder, even though they had borne the brunt of the
fighting throughout the campaign, all save one (the ~
Marcos) returned safely to Spain.
2. Castilian ialleons
These ten ships formed the most homogenous group of
vessels within the fleet. Apart from the two largest (the
capitana ~ CristObal[27] and almiranta ~ ~
Bautista[28], of 700 and 750 tons) and the smallest (Santa
~[36], of 250 tons), all were rated at an identical 530
tons and all of them, except the flagship, carried the same
complement of 24 guns, although there is some variation in
the types of guns carried aboard individual ships.(4)
Nonetheless, a general impression of homogeneity remains.
This can be explained by the fact that all these vessels
were members of the Indian Guard, the Seville-based fleet of
escort warships responsible for the safe trans-Atlantic
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passage of the treasure-carrying flotas, which was
maintained by the ~ ~ .la. CootrataciOn out of the aver!a,
a special levy added to the normal duty on goods carried.
By rights, these galleons should not have taken part in the
Armada at all, but the crisis of 1588 resulted in the
cancellation of that year's flotas and these ten galleons,
along with four Indian Guard merchantmen of apparently
similar deSign and two light craft, were mustered as the
squadron of Castile under Diego Flores de Valdes.
Little is known about the evolutionary process by which
the late sixteenth century galleon came into being, but
D.W. Waters has suggested that its genesis was connected
with the raids which the French frequently made on Spain's
Caribbean possessions and trade routes from the 1520s into
the 1550s.(5) The ability to strike at these rich but
distant targets required ships capable of sustained voyages
which yet remained fast and weatherly enough to catch
stragglers or cut ships out of convoys, and were well enough
armed to capture them. These requirements were entirely
different from those of a merchantman, particularly
merchantmen operating, like the Spanish ones, within a
monopoly. The result was a new and highly specialised ship
type, the Atlantic-built, oceanic galleon. Such ships were
longer in relation to their beam and much lower in the water
than merchantmen of comparable tonnage. Their underwater
lines were finer, and top-hamper was drastically reduced.
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Although the French appear to have produced the first
galleons, other countries were not slow to follow their
example. From the 1570s the English navy, under the guiding
genius of John Hawkins, was revolutionised by it.(6) Spain
herself responded to the threat presented by the French
galleons, and later by English and Dutch ones, by building
her own. In the 1550s Don Alvaro de Baz~n (later marquis of
Santa Cruz) made strenuous efforts to develop this type of
vessel, and in the' 1560s a regular route for the
trans-Atlantic convoys, in which escorting galleons played a
major role, / ,was introduced by Pedro Menendez de Aviles.(7)
The general appearance of a late sixteenth century Spanish
galleon is indicated by the sheer plan published by Diego
Garcfa de Palacio in 1587 (Figure 29).
We may presume that the features indicated above were
characteristic of the Castilian squadron's galleons in 1588,
although unfortunately we have little documentary and no
archaeological evidence to help us. Some statistical
material can, however, be cited. The most obvious is that
only one of the ten galleons in the squadron, the ~~
of Diego Enrfquez(30], was lost on the voyage, giving this
group of ships by far the highest survival rate in the
fleet. Its 10 percent loss factor contrasts strikingly with
the 80 percent losses of the least successful group, the ten
Mediterranean-built merchantmen of the Levant squadron, and
with the 34 percent ship losses (an approximate figure,
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this, since we do not know the fates of all the ships)
sustained by the fleet as a whole. There is nothing to
suggest that the Castilian ships were laggardly in battle,
and so their sea-worthiness and general handling qualities
both in action and on the north-about voyage must have been
much better than average.
Another feature presented by this group deserves
comment. Documentary sources, which are complete in this
respect, show that the Castilian squadron was not well
armed. Even the flagship boasted nothing larger than 9-~
Quartos canones and 12-~ Dedreros among her 36 guns, while
her sister ships were even less well provided for. Since
much additional heavy armament was placed aboard the
front-line ships of the other squadrons - canoneG, medios
canones, and heavy Dedreros in particular - we must seek an
explanation for the Castilian squadron's evident weakness in
fire-power.
The weakness is, in fact, a comparative one. The
galleons' armament would have been quite sufficient for
their normal escort duties, and indeed it would have
appeared, if set beside a typical merchantman's complement
of guns, a formidable one.(8) Only the unusual Circumstances
of the Armada called for the arming of ships far beyond
their normal scales. That these galleons were not supplied
with heavy guns to bring their armament to that standard
suggests that, for some reason, they were incapable of
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carrying them. This in turn implies that either gun-deck
space, or the facilities for mounting heavy pieces, or both,
were more restricted on the Castilian ships than they were
aboard the fleet's other classes of front-line vessel.
Such restrictions are best explained if we assume that
these galleons had only one gun-deck, which was placed well
above the waterline so that the ports could be opened safely
in most weather conditions. The number of guns which could
be carried, and their collective weight (because of their
height above the ships's centre of buoyancy), would thus be
severely restricted. Such an arrangement fits well with
what we know of the duties and capabilities of these ships.
It would provide enough space in the narrow hold to contain
the provisions required for long oceanic voyages, while
still retaining sufficient armament, placed so that it could
be used in all weathers and by limited manpower, to fight
off any likely attack. The single gun-deck and the cut-down
castles would provide adequate accommodation for the
relatively small complement of officers and men which the
operation of such ships required. This compromise between
sailing characteristics, manning, endurance and armament is
remarkably similar to that adopted by the highly successful
frigate class in the eighteenth century.(9)
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That the Indian Guard galleons of 1588, like the later
frigates, were based on the concept of a single gun-deck is
supported by some further statistical evidence gleaned from
the Armada documents. Ton for ton they carried fewer
soldiers than did the Portuguese warships whose flagship ~
Martin, as we have seen, was certainly a two decker. How
many of the rest had two decks we do not know, but seven of
the ten are rated at upwards of 700 tons and it is a fair
guess that most if not all of these were constructed in much
the same way as the.s.anMart!n. We can calculate from the
figures given in the Lisbon muster that each 2.3 tons of
shipping in this squadron of two-deckers supported one
soldier, while each soldier in the Castilian squadron
required 3.5 tons to carry him. This difference suggests
that the Castilian ships offered markedly less ac~ommodation
than the Portuguese ones did - a difference best explained
by assuming that the flota galleons possessed only one
gun-deck, and were fitted with lower castleworks. They were
certainly of above average performance, at least in
comparison with the other classes of vessel on the Spanish
side. ,Purser Calderon, describing an incident in the
fighting of August 4th, singles out the "galleon.san ..Il1an
and another quick-sailing ship" as being the speediest
vessels in the Armada. Unfortunately for the Spaniards,
however, the point of his story is that in comparison with
the English galleon they were chasing they "appeared to be
standing still".(10)
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3. Galleys
Four galleys from the squadron based at Lisbon sailed
with the fleet, under the command of Diego Medrano. No
tonnages are given for them in the documents, but we can
assess their relative sizes from the number of oarsmen and
other crew members allocated to each one. The figures are:
Oarsmen Other crew
Capitaoa 303 106
Princesa 200 90
Diana 192 90
aazana 193 72
From these figures it appears that the Capitana was
some fifty percent larger than the other three. She was
presumably a true galera ~ lanterna - a lantern galley - so
called because of the increased number (usually three) and
magnificence of the stern lanterns, which provided a
rallying point at night and allowed a simple code of signals
to be transmitted during formation manoeuvres.(11) The three
smaller craft seem to have been entirely typical of late
sixteenth century Spanish war galleys, which were based and
generally deployed in the Mediterranean, and about which
much is known.(12) Such a vessel normally measured some 135
feet overall, with a waterline breadth of about 20 feet.
Its chusma,
exclusively,
or rowing gang (made up largely, though not
of convicts), was organised into 24 banks of
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oars, each sweep weighing about 125 pounds. Each of the 48
rowing benches accommodated three oarsmen, demanding a
144-strong chusma to man the sweeps at full power. The
Princesa, Diana, and Bazana had chusmas of between 48 and 56
men over this minimum figure, so maintaining a reserve of
about twenty-five percent. On this basis we may guess that
the Capitana had perhaps 26 or 27 banks, with four oarsmen
to a bench, so allowing a similar reserve in her chusma of
303. These estimates gain support from the observations of
two Dutch sailors who served with the Armada, who stated
that the ordinary galleys had 23 or 24 banks, while the flag
galley had 26.(13)
Each galley was armed, according to the Lisbon muster,
with five guns whose size is not specified. This number is
entirely typical of Mediterranean practice. We may presume
,
a heavy gun - a medio oanon, perhaps - mounted at the
centerline of the bow on a sliding carriage. This would be
flanked by two smaller guns, probably sacres, which might
also have been mounted on slides. Two light pieces, on
fixed mounting, would be positioned on the flanks.(14) An
armament on this sort of scale agrees well with the
ammunition figures provided by the Lisbon muster. Fifteen
Atx of gunpowder were allocated to each of the four galleys,
and each gun was provided with 60 rounds of shot. About
thirteen percent of the gunpowder allocation was needed for
the small arms and so, if we deduct this amount, 13 ~
remain for each set of five guns.(15) Assuming that the
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charge was approximately half the projectile weight the
powder available would be sufficient to service 60 rounds
apiece Ifrom one 25-~ medio canon, two 6-~ sacres, and
two 3-~ media sacres.
All the guns pointed directly forwards so that the
galley was, like a modern fighter aircraft, a weapons system
which operated as a single entity to bring her firepower to
bear. In battle a galley's artillery was normally
discharged at very close range- 'clothing-burning'
distance, as it has been described - just before ramming the
enemy. To exploit this moment of carnage and confusion
troops were stationed on a light platform set immediately
above the guns, the arrumbada, from which they could direct
small-arms fire or launch a boarding assault. A more
substantial platform at the stern, usually covered with a
canopy, provided the commander with an elevated post from
which to direct operations, and from which reinforcements
.might be sent to the arrymbada by way of the cors!a, a
narrow gangway which ran the length of the galley between
the rowing benches.(16)
Galleys were equipped with two masts, each of which
carried a long diagonal yard with a single lateen sail.
Their sailing characteristics were extremely poor. The
narrow beam and shallow draught deprived them of effective
keel area and made them leewardly, while their low freeboard
and lack of lateral stiffness rendered them especially
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vulnerable to high winds and heavy seas. For steering they
relied almost exclusively on their large rudders, and they
shared with the galleasses a serious weakness in the design
of this vital component. Their low-set bows, weighted down
with ordnance, were prone to driving under in all but the
lightest swells. Hardly surprisingly, in view of the bad
weather which dogged the 1588 operations from the start, all
four of the galleys failed to weather the Bay of Biscay:
three managed to make port but the fourth, the Diana, was
wrecked while attempting to enter Bayonne. (17)
Historians have been inclined to see the inclusion of
galleys in the Armada as a gesture of nostalgic pride
towards a fighting machine whose past achievements had been
glorious, however unsuited such craft undoubtedly were to
artillery-based sea warfare outside the Mediterranean. (18)
But few fighting men go to war with equipment they do not
require, and there is no reason to suppose that Medina
Sidonia was one of them. Indeed, he considered galleys to
be one of the Armada's most essential ingredients, and he
indicated as much in a letter to the king on 16 February
1588:
WIt is of the utmost importance that galleys
should go with the Armada; and it will be well, as
you say, to take four of the Spanish galleys for
that purpose, or even eight, which, joined with
those at Lisbon [i.e. the four which actually
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sailed with the fleet] would be twelve. They
would be of the greatest use and value •••"(19)
This was not the ill-informed suggestion of a landsman.
Juan Martinez de Recalde, who was unquestionably the most
experienced sea-officer in the fleet, also thought that the
Armada should include a strong contingent of galleys, and
suggested so in a carefully worded but unequivocal letter to
the king from Corunna on 11 July 1588 in which he stressed
the fleet's most pressing defects. Twelve more galleys,
thought Recalde, were urgently needed to reinforce Medrano's
small squadron of four.(20)
Galleys ,had, in fact, been earmarked for the Enterprise
from its inception in 1586. In his proposals of that year
Santa Cruz had specified forty, and how he intended to use
them is clear from his own account of the landings on
Terceira in 1583. when twelve galleys were attached to his
amphibious invasion fleet.(21) In that action, which was
carried out against a well entrenched opposition, the
galleys were used as close-support gunboats to cover an
infantry assault on the beaches from landing craft. There
is no doubt that a similar scenario was envisaged for the
Kent beaches, and perhaps the Banks of Flanders, in 1588.
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This in itself would provide reason enough for bringing
galleys, in spite of all the difficulties, to the shores of
England. But it is evident that they were expected to
perform another and even more important task." Since their
design made them independent of the wind, manoeuvreable in
confined waters, capable of beaching, and able to carry and
handle items of heavy eqUipment, they made ideal fleet
tenders and harbour tugs. At Lisbon, before the Armada
sailed, they had been extensively employed in such duties,
not least in assisting with the delivery of heavy siege
artillery and its associated equipment to the Levantine
ships.(22) The stowage of this siege train was to be,
moreover, only one part of the story; at the fleet's
destination the same artillery would have to be brought
ashore, probably under fire. How this might have been
achieved is illustrated by Gentilioi, who shows a galley using
a tackle suspended from its main lateen yard (which has been
firmly secured fore and aft) to swing a piece of heavy
ordnance aboard a raft moored alongside. Capo Bianco
illustrates a different technique, in which a galley has
grounded broadside on to a sloping beach so that her oars
can be used to form a ramp down which a gun is being lowered
directly ashore (Figures 30 and 31).
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The Armada galleys should not therefore be seen as
failed oceanic warships, a function for which they were
neither intended nor designed. They were, rather,
specialised close-support craft whose role lay in the vital
operations involved in securing a beach-head and bringing
artillery ashore. The wonder is not that galleys were
present in the fleet, but that there were only four.
4. Gal1easses
The four Neapolitan galleasses which sailed under the
command of Hugo de Moncada were front-line fighting ships.
They were very heavily armed,
,
carrying between them 21
canQnes, 14 mediQs canones, 14 medias culebrlnas, 31
Dedreros, 27 sacres, 15 medias sacres, and 80 esmerl1es.(23)
Their gunpowder allocations, which averaged 125 ~ per
galleass, was exceeded by only four other vessels in the
fleet. During the Channel battles their involvement in the
fighting was considerable, though it had surprisingly little
effect.
Galleasses were, in essence, armed versions of the big
merchant galleys which several mercantile powers in the
Mediterranean, notably the Venetians, had developed during
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Longer and broader
than war galleys, and with much more capacious hulls, such
vessels were capable of operating economic and reliable
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long-distance services provided the cargoes involved were of
high value and modest bulk. In comparison with true galleys
their performance under oars was poor, but rowing was an
auxiliary rather than the primary source of motive power,
intended to provide manoeuvreability in harbours and port
approaches, and to allow some headway to be made in
unfavourable winds.(24)
By 1550 the Venetian battle-fleet contained a number of
merchant galleys which had been adapted for fighting and
which carried a formidable complement of artillery.
Although they were exceedingly slow under oars, having a
displacement roughly four times greater than that of a
comparable galley, they could be deployed within a carefully
handled formation to bring devastating firepower to bear at
points which a conventional sailing warship might not easily
reach. At Lepanto the six Venetian galleasses, operating in
support of a classically arrayed galley fleet, were able to
play a decisive role in the battle.(25) The Armada
galleasses, however, placed against a fleet of sailing
warships whose members disobligingly refused to follow the
set-piece rules of a Lepanto-type engagement, proved to be
clumsy hybrids which suffered most of the failings and none
of the virtues of their uneasy parentage.
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No structural elements of the galleass Girona have
survived on her exposed wreck site, and we must turn again
to pictorial and documentary sources. Two of the galleasses
which sailed with the Armada had probably taken part in the
Terceira operation, and one of these is clearly depicted in
the Hall of Battles fresco.(26) It is an awkward looking
vessel, in which the rowing frame of a conventional galley
has been superimposed over what appears to be little more
than an elongated galleon hull. Twenty-one oars are shown
on each side. The high freeboard dictates that the oars
must have been longer, and consequently heavier, than normal
galley sweeps. It would have been structurally impractical
and operationally pointless to have mounted guns below the
oars, and none are shown in this location on the Terceira
galleass, although four gun-ports are visible in the sloping
roof of the covered gallery above the side of the apostis.
The main armament seems to be concentrated in the fore part
of the ship, mounted within a massive circular turret
reminiscent of the round artillery forts common in the
earlier part of the sixteenth century.(27) A heavy ram,
apparently shod with iron, juts forward of the bow at the
level of the apostis.
No stern armament is evident in the Terceira ga1leass,
although Medina Sidonia clearly indicates in his d1ario that
the Armada galleasses carried heavy ordnance aft.(28) John
Montgomery, writing in 1588, states that each galleass
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mounted four great pieces in her stern, firing directly aft,
and six firing forwards from the bow. There were also, he
says, twelve guns on each broadside in one tier, one between
each set of tw~ oars.(29) This suggests 26 banks of oars
rather than the 21 visible on the Terciera gal1eass, and
perhaps there may have been two more, as reported by Emanua1
Fremoso, a Portuguese seaman from Recalde's ~~ who was
captured during a foray ashore at the Blaskets. Twenty days
before their landfall, he says, they had been in the company
of a ga1leass "of 28 oars of a side".(30)
Guns mounted in this way would have been spaced less
than 2 m apart, and are therefore almost certain to have
been light swivel-mounted pieces, since there would have
been no deck space for carriages. It cannot be coincidence
that each gal1eass was provided, in the 9 July 1587
inventory, with 20 bronze esmeriles, of which the wreck of
the Girona has provided a fine example (Figure 54). If
Montgomery's sources are accurate, each of the tour ships
must have received four more such weapons before the fleet
sailed to make up a total of twelve per side. That this may
well be the case is suggested by a detailed representation
of one of the Armada ga11easses in an anonymous cartoon of
the battle now at Greenwich, which is thought to be closely
contemporary (Figure 32).(31) It has a regular line of small
guns, evidently SWivels, set above the apostis, with a
gaudily painted shield between each pair. Thirteen are
shown, eleven on the broadside and one pointing sideways at
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each end - not a bad count if, as we must suppose, this
English representation is based on recollected information.
The galleass in the Greenwich cartoon bears a full
three-masted rig, with square sails set on the main and fore
masts. Her mizzen carries a lateen sail, and she has a
large spritsail rigged. The Pine engravings also show the
Armada galleasses square-rigged.(32) But this is not so with
the Terciera galleass in the Escorial fresco, each of whose
three masts carries a single furled lateen sail. There can
be little doubt, however, that the Neapolitan galleasses
which sailed in 1588 were rigged as the English pictures
suggest. One of them, ,the Zunige[124] lay for many months
after the campaign at Havre de Grace in a state of disrepair
and, in a report on the storm damage she sustained shortly
after clearing that harbour in April 1589, purser Pedro de
Igueldo mentions damage to her mizzenmast, jib boom, main
topmast and main yard - components which show her to have
been rigged as the ship in the Greenwich cartoon.(33)
It is likely that the Neapolitan galleasses which
sailed with the Armada had at same intervening time been
converted from the Mediterranean-style lateen rig with which
they had been equipped for the Terceira operation to a
square galleon-type rig more suited to work in Atlantic
waters. Indeed Bartolomo Crescentio, in his Nautica
Mediterrenea of 1607, explicitly stated that "in Spain they
have given them [the galleasses] a square rig".(34)
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Crescentio also illustrated a Mediterranean galleass of
his period (Figure 33) and noted some of its particulars.
In general, it looks very much like the ships shown in the
Escorial fresco. Some years ago R.C. Anderson analysed
Crescentio's somewhat ambiguous specifications and suggeS~ed
a length for the vessel of~. 160 feet and a beam of
26 feet.(35) Although Crescentio made no mention of the
rowing arrangements of his galleass Joseph Furttenbach, a
few years later, allows a 'super' galleass 172 feet long and
28 1/2 feet wide 28 oars per side, with six men at each.(36)
But six men to an oar, if we accept Fremoso's statement that
the Armada galleasses had 28 oars per side, would have
demanded chusmas of 38 men more than the 300 rowers with
which each was provided. We may therefore postulate rowing
benches of either five men (total 280) or, more probably,
four (total 224). The latter would allow a reserve of
twenty-five percent, which is the figure we have already
arrived at for the galleys.
Van Meteren was no doubt exaggerating when he wrote
that the Armada galleasses were "of such bignesse, that they
contained within them chambers, chapels, turrets, pulpits,
and other commodities of great houses"; but it is clear that
their size greatly impressed him.(37) A Spanish source,
however, rates them at only 500 toneladas.(38)
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The Armada galleasses, it would appear, represent a
carefully considered attempt to produce a new kind of
warship adapted for operations in northern waters. Of their
heavy bow and stern batteries, coupled with the mobility
provided by a galleon rig reinforced by auxiliary oar power,
the Spaniards clearly expected great things. In the event,
they were to be disapPointed.
5. Mediterranean-built merchantmen
Sir John Hawkins, who as the energetic reformer of
Queen Elizabeth's navy can be relied upon to recognise ship
types accurately, saw for himself no less than "twenty great
Venetians and argosies [i.e. Ragusans] of the seas within
the Strait" amongst the Armada when he viewed it off the
Channel coasts.(39) His figure agrees closely with what we
know from Spanish sources. Ten ships from Italy and
Dalmatia were grouped together as the Levant squadron, while
a further ten from ports between Barcelona and Cadiz made up
the squadron of Andalusia. To these we should add the Grand
Duke of Tuscany's new spice carrier Florencia[8], which was
originally assigned to Levant but later transferred to
Portugal when the rotting ~ Raphael was scrapped.(40)
Together these 21 ships accounted for some 28 percent of the
Armada's gross tonnage, a fact which itself underlines the
importance with which they were regarded.
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Big Mediterranean hulls had, indeed, been earmarked for
the Enterprise from its inception. In his proposals of 1586
the marquis of Santa Cruz had called for 40 great-ships from
Ragusa, Venice, Sicily, Naples, and the Mediterranean coast
of Spain, with an average rating of 600 tons.(41) Such ships
did not, of course, belong to the Spanish crown, and
forceful steps were often necessary to secure them. In
February 1588, for example, the masters of the Venetian
merchantmen Regazona and Layia, which had inadvisedly docked
at Lisbon, were informed that "the king required those
vessels... the commissioners reported that these ships were
the finest, the best armed and manned of all that lay in
Lisbon, and on no account should his Majesty let them
go".(42) Vigorous diplomatic protest by Venice was of no
avail, and although Philip's commissioners expressed their
deep regrets to the Venetian ambassador Lippomano, they
stressed that "because of the great need for big ships of
the build of those two Venetians lying at Lisbon, he [the
king] could not release them... the Venetian ships are so
powerful that they can give battle to ten or twelve
Englishmen".(43) The Levant squadron's commander, Mart!n de
Bertendona, explained in a letter to Philip lIon
27 February why he thought these massive ships would be
valuable in the campaign to come. Although he admitted that
their grandeza (a word which implied overbearing
magnificence as well as sheer size) may carry same risks-
presumably in coping with the Atlantic weather - it would
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give them, thought Bertendona, an overwhelming tactical
advantage when it came to close quarter battle.(44) His
observation underlines the 'floating fortress' concept with
which most Spaniards viewed naval warfare, and explains why
they went to considerable lengths to acquire such ships.
But within a tew days of the Armada's departure from Lisbon
Medina Sidonia had cause to complain about their poor
sailing performance.(45) "I see plainly the truth of what
you say," replied the king on 5 July, "that the Levant ships
are less staunch in heavy seas than the vessels built
here... but it still is the fact that they constantly sail
to England. It is true that if we could have things exactly
as we wished, we would rather have other vessels •••" (46)
But, concluded the king, the Enterprise should not be
abandoned on account of this difficulty, "which is not such
a great one after all". He no doubt thought otherwise when,
some months later, he reviewed the fleet's casualty
figures. Of Bertendona's ten great Levanters only two had
returned, a rate of loss almost three times greater than the
Armada's overall thirty percent. Why, he may well have
asked,
badly?
had these Mediterranean great-ships fared so very
Big cargo vessels had been built in the Mediterranean
from Roman imperial times, when Lucian described the grain
ships which plied between Alexandria and Rome in terms which
suggest that their carrying capacity may have been as high
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as 1200 tons.(47) Ships of comparable size were common in
the fifteenth century, though they became less'so in the
sixteenth as it became recognised that smaller craft were
more adaptable and represented a smaller individual
risk.(48) Only in the movement of bulky commodities such as
grain along well established routes did the larger hulls
continue to predominate. In requisitioning shipping for the
Armada the Spaniards made particular efforts to obtain these
comparatively rare bulk carriers because, they believed,
such vessels would combine the strong fighting capacity
which srandeza imparted with an ability to carry much of the
fleet's heavy and space-consuming cargo of invasion stores.
Ships of this kind were extremely broad in relation to
their length. Maximum beam might be as much as half the keel
length and this, coupled with the deep hull, provided them
with great capacity but exacted a corresponding penalty in
hydrodynamic efficiency - in other words, they were very
slow and clumsy. The Venetian shipwright Pre Theodoro de
Nicolo, in a treatise written about 1550, provides
specifications fram which the hull of a merchant ship of
this type may be reconstructed (49), while a bas-relief on
the tomb of Alessandro Contarini (d. 1555) in the Cathedral
of St. Anthony at Padua shows such a vessel under full sail
(Figure 34). The characteristic features included a high
and broad hull reinforced with wales and riders; substantial
castleworks fore and aft; a three-masted rig with bowsprit
(this has been omitted in the Contarin1 relief, presumably
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for reasons of space and composition); and an armament
designed to ward off all but the most sustained and powerful
attack.
Of the five Armada wrecks examined, La Trinidad
Valencera and the ~~~ Sicilia, both of the Levant
squadron, were undoubtedly vessels of this kind. On the
Trinidad site a considerable number of dislocated timbers,
all apparently from the hull, have been identified. The
greatest concentration of them occurred in the northern part
of the site (Figure 10), where ten substantial pieces were
found within an organic deposit. Botanical samples were
taken of all the timbers found, and four of them - AAC, AAI,
AAE, and AAH - were raised for detailed examination.
All the samples proved to be of oak. The raised pieces
were photographed and then both faces were traced at full
scale on polythene sheet. Figure 35 was prepared from these
traces.
AAC appears to be a hull plank. It is 36 cm wide, 10 cm
thick, and has a surviving length of 3.81 cm. One end 1s
intact, showing a simple squared butt. 1.3 cm diameter iron
fastenings have been used throughout, though in all cases
these have completely corroded away, leaving only the
concretion casts. On what is presumably the outer side of
the plank the bolt heads, which were 2.5 cm in diameter,
were countersunk flush with timber surface, no doubt to
- 214 -
ensure a smooth underwater skin. The fastening holes are
set in pairs positioned on average 20 cm apart. Except for
the holes next to the butt, which are squarely opposite one
another, the pairs are set obliquely, so that they would
clamp the frame behind fore and aft.
The pattern of the fastenings is extremely regular in
appearance, in contrast to the apparently haphazard
patterning of fastenings more normal on hulls of the early
modern period in northern Europe. As demonstrated by the
mid-seventeenth century Dartmouth, such irregularity was
clearly intentional, so as to avoid as far as possible
setting up weaknesses along the line of the grain.(51) No
such attempt has been made in placing the Valencera's
fastenings, and the weakness thus occasioned is evident in
the lines of split and breakage which have in fact
occurred. The impression is one of routine mass-production
rather than the intuitive work of a skilled shipwright.
AAH carries much the same pattern of fastenings as AAC,
although· it is considerably narrower and thicker (18 cm and
14 cm). The countersunk bolt heads suggest an outside
surface, and the piece may well be part of a strengthening
wale. One squared end is evident.
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AAE and AAI appear to be sections of frames. Both are
some 20 cm wide, which accords with the spacings indicated
by the plank fastenings and suggests that the hull was solid
framed (~. the Santa Mar!a~~~). On both these
frame sections the inner (i.e. concave) faces show traces
of pitch apparently brushed on before an inner skin of
ceiling planking was placed. AAI has a butt end and three
lateral fixing holes.
We may deduce from these finds that the Trinidad
Yalencera's hull was built entirely of oak. It was solid
framed (that is, there were no gaps between the ribs), with
10 cm planking outside and ceiling planking of
indeterminite thickness inside. Not much is yet known about
the detailed construction of Venetian merchant ships of this
period, and the exclusive use of iron in her fastenings is
of particular interest.
only used in northern
By the sixteenth century iron was
European ships at points where
particular strength was required, notably on keel/frame
jOints and at the butt-ends of planks.(52) The remaining
fastenings were made with treenails, long oak dowels whose
heads were cross-wedged to ensure a tight fit. Rotten
treenails could be drilled out and replaced without
difficulty, but it was almost impossible to remove and
replace iron bolts. A ship fastened entirely with iron,
though initially stronger and tighter, therefore had a more
limited life: once the bolts began to corrode the entire
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vessel would have to be scrapped.
Iron fastenings began to replace wood and copper ones
in the Mediterranean during the late Roman period, and the
change can be linked to underlying economic factors. As
artisan slavery declined the cost of labour escalated, and
time-consuming craft skills were abandoned in favour of
quick and Simple procedures which could be undertaken by
unskilled workers.(53) It thus became cheaper to replace
than to repair, and the widespread use of easily fitted iron
fastenings ensured a strong hull which required minimal
maintenance over a short but intensive working life.
There is reason to suppose that very similar
considerations applied in sixteenth century Venice. F.C.
Lane has shown that the life of a Venetian cargo vessel
rarely exceeded ten years, (54) while Romano has pOinted out
that the highly organised industrial processes of Venetian
commercial enterprise relied on surprisingly modern concepts
of assembly-line operation.(55) It may be Significant, in
the context under discussion, that by the end of the
sixteenth century economic recession and poor industrial
relations had brought the system into decline, with work
often unnecessarily spun out and sloppily done. In such
circumstances iron fastenings would have offered substantial
advantages over wooden ones.
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It seems that Ragusan ships of the Armada period were
fastened in the same way. The ~1Yan~ Sicilia, wrecked
in Tobermory Bay, was a Ragusan argos. Though her remains
are elusive today, her hull was substantially intact in the
seventeenth century, apart from the damage caused by the
explosion which wrecked her. In 1677 the Ninth Earl of
Argyle, in a memorandum about the wreck, pointed out that
the hull was "fastened together with iron bolts, which are
so rusted and worn that if any attempt were made to raise
the hull, it would fall all to pieces".(56) Six years later
Archibald Miller of Greenock, who had dived on the wreck and
recovered, amongst other things, the ship's rudder, noted
that this component was 28 feet long, an observation which
suggests
feet.
that her waterline draught was in the region of 20
Clearly the ~ 1Yan was another capacious
iron-fastened Mediterranean hull.(57)
But such hulls, although capacious, were not
particularly strong. For a ship rated at 1,100 toneladas La
Trinidad Valencera was of remarkably light construction.
Her frames are less substantial, for example, than those
noted on the hull of the Dartmouth, a mid-seventeenth
century English warship only a quarter her size, and her
planking is only marginally thicker.(58) This distinction
between Atlantic and Mediterranean forms of construction is
strikingly paralleled, at a much later date, in the
proceedings of a court-martial about the loss of H.M.S.
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Daedalus, a 40-gun frigate wrecked on the Little Basses, S.
Ceylon, in 1813. She had been captured from the French and
had been, according to her captain, "built at Venice, and
perhaps never intended by the Enemy to go out of that Narrow
Guelph; for when taken into dock at Deptford she was found
to possess the Timbers, and the Scantlings, of an 18-gun
ship... the weight of her upper works and guns, when she
touched [the reef], crushed her slender Frame to
pieces".(59) Such, indeed, was to be the fate of the La
Trinidad Yalencera shortly after she grounded in Kinnagoe
Bay.
6. Atlantic-built merchantmen
Shipping provided by the maritime provinces of Biscay
and Guipuzcoa accounted for almost a quarter of the Armada's
total tonnage. These big merchant vessels had been
constructed for the trade routes of the AtlantiC, which no
doubt helps to explain their relatively low casualty rate in
the campaign; 30 percent against the Levant squadron's
80 percent. Little is known about the design and
construction of contemporary Basque ships, although current
excavations in Red Bay, Labrador, on the hull of a 400-ton
Guipuzcoan whaling ship wrecked in 1560 will in due course
yield a great deal of detailed technical information.(60)
Some structural evidence has also been obtained fram the
wreck of the Guipuzcoan almiranta Santa Marfa ~ .la. .R.c.wl in
Blasket Sound, and since this ship was built at San
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Sebastian the year before the Armada sailed it is probable
that her remains are generally representative of Basque
shipbuilding techniques during the later past of the
sixteenth century.(61)
The nature of this evidence has already been described.
It indicates an oak-built ship with a broad and flattish
bottom contructed of closely spaced frames. Unlike the
Mediterranean-built Trinidad Valencera and ~ 1Yan ~
Sicilia the hull was fastened with treenails,
been used only at points of particular stress.
iron having
But in at
least one respect the Santa Marfa was very similar in
construction to her Mediterranean Sisters. Her individual
component parts were relatively slight, and indeed her
frames and planking were of much the same thicknesses as
those noted on the wreck of 1£ Trinidad Yalencera. There
are therefore no grounds for supposing that great-ships
constructed on Atlantic seaboards were necessarily more
solidly built than their Mediterranean counterparts,
although the treenail fastenings may have made them somewhat
more resilient.
Our excavations have confirmed that merchant ships of
this kind had little in common with Atlantic-built
galleons. On the Santa Harfa wreck site the mainmast step
lay, by the line of the keelson, 11.43 m from the forward
edge of the ballast, which in turn must be on or very close
to the bow end of the keel. If, however, the mast step is
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presumed to have lain mid way between stem and sternpost, as
it did on the galleon, an overall keel length of only
22.86 m is obtained. This figure is patently too short to
have accommodated the Santa Marfa's listed 945 tons. Such a
presumption must therefore be wrong, and we are justified in
supposing that the mainmast of this particular ship was
stepped some distance forward of the central position.
This characteristic was typical of Mediterranean
merchant ships. In a~out 1445 Giorgio Timbotta, a Venetian
merchant, wrote a treatise on shipbuilding which includes
the following passage: "To fix the mast step... divide the
keel into five parts and leave three (less one foot)
aft."(62) If this formula is applied to what we know of the
Santa Marfa, assuming the 11.43 m between the mast step
and the estimated location of the stem to be two parts plus
one foot (0.305 m) forward, the following calculation
emerges:
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If the Santa Marfa was a broad-beamed merchant vessel,
then a keel length of 27.8 m would easily have accommodated
her tonnage. We can indeed extrapolate this estimated
dimension with her known burden and the formula used by the
Spaniards to make such calculations (see Appendix 1) to
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suggest a likely beam for the ship of~. 11.6 m and a depth
in hold of ~. 6.4 m. These figures obtain support from
the character of the surviving ballast pile, which has a
width at midships which co-incides with the estimated
maximum beam, and a length aft of the mast step, where the
ballast spilled as the stern section broke away down tide,
very close to the length I have postulated for the after
part of the ship (Figure 19).
In conclusion we can describe the Santa Harfa (and, by
implication, the other ships of the Biscayan and Guipuzcoan
squadrons) as a ship built on lines similar to the big
merchant vessels of the Mediterranean, though the method by
which her hull was fastened doubtless gave it more
resilience in the long Atlantic swells. The forward-placed
mainmast reflected a continuation of earlier Mediterranean
practice, occasioned by the need to concentrate the thrust
of the sails towards the bow in order to give the beamy hull
directional stability. We may fairly rate the Basque
vessels which sailed with the Armada as excellent load
carriers, but poor warships.
7. Baltic hulks
The Armada's supply-hulks (urcas) were distinctive
craft of Baltic
Hanseatic ports.
long one. Its
origin and most, if not all, came from
The pedigree of this type of ship is a
capacious hull is distinguished by the
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peculiar arrangement of the plank ends, which finish on a
level plane above the waterline so avoiding the use of a
transom at the stern or the conventional rebating of the
ends into a stem post. Its name, which is derived fram an
old word for the husk of fruit or grain, reflects the
characteristic pod-like shape of the vessel.(63) Elements of
this form of construction have been identified in the eighth
century Utrecht ship, and in the later mediaeval period it
may frequently be recognised in heraldic form on seals. By
the fifteenth century carvel planking on a pre-erected frame
had replaced clinker (or reversed clinker) building in
hulks, and the type had begun to supersede (or, perhaps more
accurately, to merge with), its one-time rival as an
economic cargo carrier, the cog.(64)
The sixteenth-century hulk generally carried a full 3-
or 4-masted rig, with or without spritsail. A
mid-sixteenth-century woodcut after Breughel (Figure 36)
gives a general impression of the type's appearance. It
shows a tubby cargo vessel designed for coastal trading
which, although seaworthy, was not particularly weatherly or
manoeuvreable. As a highly specialised instrument of
maritime economy it was slow but reliable, and cheap to
operate.
warship.
It possessed few attributes desirable in a
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In the two years preceding the Armada, Baltic hulks had
been extremely active, ferrying supplies and war materials
to Spain. The importance of Hanseatic exports and shipping
to the Spanish war effort can be gauged from the Elizabethan
government's reaction to it in the year following the
Armada, when it was stated in an Act of Privy Council that
"the late great Navy of the King of Spain... could not have
been prepared and furnished fit for such an exploit with
ships, munition and victuals unless the.1had been supplied
(as the.1 certainly were) of the greatest part of their
provisions, yea, of many great warlike ships furnished with
men and ordnance by certain Esterlings, members of the Hanse
towns•••" The Act goes on to specify those classes of
material of which carriage to Spain in Hanseatic ships was
deemed to be a hostile act, and which would be confiscated
if intercepted. This list therefore reflects the range of
Baltic exports involved in the 1587-8 preparations:
munition victual
cables tallow brimstone wheat
masts pikestaves saltpeter rye
anchors calivers bullets barley
cordage muskets copper meal
pitch armour lead beans, peason
tar powder match and the like
ordnance not belonging to the ships, canvas, and
Danske Poldavyes (Danzig sailcloth)
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In the muster held at Lisbon before the fleet sailed
,/twenty-three hulks are listed, making the supply squadron,
with a total burden of more than 10,000 tons, by far the
largest command in the fleet. The Armada hulks were
evidently hired, on a strictly commercial basis, with the
full agreement of their owners. The Enterprise had an
obvious appeal to the Hanse merchants both as a means of
curbing the growth of Anglo-Dutch maritime power (which had
already eclipsed their own) and of ending the isolation in
which, as Catholic enolaves in a largely Protestant northern
Europe, they now found themselves. Trade with Spain had,
moreover, become a mainstay of their economio survival. In
June 1586 twenty-five Baltio hulks laden with pitoh, sails,
and cordage, sailed from Hanseatio ports tor Spain taking,
for security reasons, the 'north about' route around
Scotland which, two years later, the retreating Armada was
to follow with such disastrous consequences.(66) A few days
later nine other German hulks, out from Hamburg and
similarly laden, were intercepted and captured by English
ships.(67) In retaliation the city of Hamburg offered
Philip II the use of its port, "which is capable of
sheltering a large fleet".(68) It is clear therefore that
the Hanse towns had a strong political and economic stake in
the Armada, and so Philip II's edict of December 1586, under
whch all foreign ships entering Spanish-controlled ports
were subject to embargo, in no way deterred the Baltic
hulks: within a month of its publication twenty more had
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docked at Lisbon and discharged cargo.(69)
These ships were not intended to be combat vessels, as
the lightness of their armament indicates, and Medina
Sidonia's instruction that they should be herded together in
the middle of the battle formation confirms.(70) It is also
noteworthy that no hulks are included in the list of
merchant ships which were fitted at Lisbon with fighting
superstructures to convert them into temporary warships.
The twenty-three hulks sailed with the Armada solely to
provide logistical support, and as well as acting.as
auxiliary troop transports and hospital ships they carried
some of the invasion army's draught and pack animals.
Although from a strategic point of view the hulks were
indispensib1e, from a tactical standpoint they proved a
considerable liability. Shortly after the fleet lett Lisbon
Medina Sidonia first had cause to complain of their
laggardly progress: they were slow, he said, and could not
sail to windward.(71) Philip II characteristically waved
these objections aside; hulks hardly went anywhere but up
the Channel, he pointed out, and indeed rarely lett the
northern seas.(72) True - but they did not normally sail in
company with a great battle fleet whose already ponderous
progress they substantially reduced. On 30 July off the
Lizard, the duke again vented his exasperation: "•••1, in
this galleon [the ~ Martin] could only sail as fast as the
scurviest ship in the fleet, as I have to wait for the
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slowest of them - and some of them are dreadfully slow - so
I was obliged, anxious as I was to get forward, thus to
tarry on the way."(73)
The wreck site of Ll ~ Grif6n, capitana of the
hulks, has yielded little evidence of the ship herself. A
single wrought-iron pintle shows that her rudder was 15 cm
thick, while the general absence on the site of iron hull
bolts suggests, on negative evidence, that her structure was
fastened with wooden treenails in the northern tradition.
8. Light craft
The Lisbon muster records 34 zabras, pataches, and
pinazas in the Armada, though the nature of their duties
meant that such craft were often detached from the parent
fleet, and new ones added to it. Twe9ty-one were allotted
to Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza's communications squadron,
while the remainder were attached to the squadrons of
,Portugal, Biscay, Castile, Andalusia and Guipuzcoa. Their
job was to provide fast communication within the fleet
formation and beyond it.
Zabras were two-masted smacks, and the burden of the
only two craft specifically named as such in the muster -
the Augusta[11] and Julia[12] of the Portuguese squadron-
was 166 tons apiece.(74) We may presume that the only three
ships of comparable tonnage in the communications squadron
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itself were also zabras[102, 103, 104]. Two of these were
particularly interesting vessels, for one was of English
origin (the 180-ton Caridad Inglesa[102]), while the other
S
' ,was cottish (the 150-ton~ Andres Escoces[103]).
The largest patache of the twenty-seven in the fleet
was the 96-ton vessel belonging to Miguel de Suso [25],
while the smallest for which a burden is given, the .s.an
JerOnimo[109], was 55 tons. The nineteen pataches from the
.san. JerOnimo upwards carried small contingents of soldiers
in addition to their crews (twenty troops was the usual
figure) , while the eight which have no recorded tonnage
contained only seamen. From this it may be presumed that
the smaller pataches were well below the 50 ton mark.
Only two pinazas are recorded, both of them attached to
the GUipuzcoan squadron [66, 67J. No tonnage for them is
given, but their 14- and 15-man crews, and the single small
esrner1l each sported, shows that they were very small
vessels indeed.
Hurtado de Mendoza's gapitana, the Nuestra SAnora~
i11ar ~ Zaragoza[101J, presumably fell into none of the
categories described above: her 300-tons suggests that she
functioned as the squadron's command headquarters and was
not a dispatch craft in her own right.
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Most of these small communications craft were almost
certainly lateen rigged, and owed more to Mediterranean and
Arab influence (with the exception,
English and Scottish strays)
of course, of the
than to the Atlantic
environment in which they ultimately proved so successful.
It was in ships such as these that Columbus discovered
America, and both their speed and seakeeping abilities were
outstanding.(75) A dispatch craft sent by Medina Sidonia
from Corunna to seek out units dispersed by the storm of
19 June was off the Devon coast within three days,(76) and
made the return journey in even better time. During the
voyage she endured very severe weather, and used auxiliary
oar-power to manoeuvre close inshore. She carried a
two-masted rig, and her mainmast could be lowered to the
deck to increase stability in heavy seas.
An example of the way in which such craft operated
within the fleet is provided in a letter from the Prince of
Ascoli to Philip II from Dunkirk on 12 August 1588. During
the fireship crisis on 7 August, he writes, Medina Sidonia
sent out emergency orders to the fleet, and "directed some
of us who were most in his confidence to go in zabras and
carry instructions to the other squadrons." Small fast boats
were also used to convey dispatches back to Spain, and to
establish contact with the Army of Flanders.(77)
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The support these small vessels gave the Armada in the
Channel was one of the few unqualified successes of the
campaign, and it was in a fast patache that Don Baltazar de
ZGniga brought Medina Sidonia's final gloomy dispatches
from Shetland to Spain.
9. Landing craft
Galleys alone could not land an army on the beaches:
complementary to them,
conjunction with them, were
and generally operating in
flat-bottomed landing craft
designed to carry troops from the fleet to a point at which
they might safely wade ashore. Seven large flat-bottomed
boats (barcas grandes chatas) were used at Terceira and the
Marquis of Santa Cruz, in proposing a self-contained Armada
in 1586, had these very boats in mind when he called for
"200 barcas chatas like those used in the Terceira
campaign••• to disembark the army for the assault on land."
These boats were to be built at Seville, at a cost of 120
ducats apiece.(78)
If we accept the evidence of the Hall of Battles fresco
the barcas chatas used at Terceira were wide carvel-built
open boats with transom sterns, propelled by three sweeps on
either side (Frontispiece). An assessment of their size can
be little more than a guess, but they seem to be around
10 metres long and probably carried about firty standing
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men. This implies a payload, if we assume a soldier with
his equipment and weapons to weigh something like 200
pounds, of about four tons.
No such landing craft were included in the 1588 Armada,
although some of the individual ship's boats appear to have
reached a comparable size. The barcas belonging to the
Levantine ships were described by Juan de Acu~a Vela, in a
letter to the king on 30 January 1588, as "the most suitable
for loading the heavy artillery", which shows that they were
at least capable of carrying a three-ton Siege ,canon
together with the crew and equipment necessary to handle
it.(79) These large ship's boats appear, moreover, to have
been strong and seaworthy vessels. /Marcos de Aramburu
recounts how, in Blasket Sound, the bajel grande of
Recalde's .san J.wln...s1.e. Portugal[2] carried a party of fifty
arquebusiers to attempt, in rough seas, a landing on the
mainland at Dunquin.(80) The galleass ZUniga[124] possessed
at least two large boats, one of which came adrift and was
washed ashore as she lay at anchor in Linscannor Bay, County
Clare. Boetius Clancy, the Sheriff of Clare, found the boat
unusual enough to include a brief description of it in his
report on the incident to Sir Richard Bingham. It was, he
wrote, "not like our English cockboats; it would carry
twenty men at the least." He added that it, and its anchor,
were painted red, and that it carried "an earthen vessel,
like an oil prock".(8l)
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If we assume that all of the Armada's ships carried
boats of roughly the same capacity proportional to their
size as the 1050-ton~ Juan's fifty-man craft, or the A.
,800-ton Zuniga's two twenty-man cockboats, we can estimate
for the fleet as a whole a boat capacity of about 3,000 men,
less than a third of the troops which the Armada itself was
supposed to land. Thus, even if all of these boats had been
available when the landings commenced, three round trips
would have been necessary to ferry the men ashore, plus
several more to bring heavy equipment, munitions, and
provisions to the beach-head.
The primary responsibility of the Armad n ta was 0,
however, to land the initial wave of assault troops. This
was the task allocated to the duke of Parma's waterborne
army, which was to cross the Channel under the Armada's
protection. Once Parma's men were ashore, and thrusting
i~a~, the fleet wou~d dispatch a back-up force of troops
and land equipment and supplies on the beaches. For this
task the ships' boats might, at a pinch, have proved
adequate.
But from what kind of vessels were Parma's veterans
expected to storm ashore? A report on his invasion fleet's
state of readiness on 30 May 1588 shows that he had, at
Gravelines, Dunkirk, Niewport and Sluys, sixty small
warships, thirty or forty transport hoys, three hundred
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flat-bottomed barges, and a 'great number' of small
craft.(82) Hoys were small shallow-draft coastal craft of a
kind whose workmanlike form, usually associated with a
single masted rig and leeboards, underwent little change
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.(83) Given an
appropriate escort and a fair wind they would probably have
made the crOSSing safely enough. But the same confidence
cannot be extended to the barges, and Parma himself was
under no illusions about them. They were, he said, "built
for the rivers and not for the seas"; they would "not stand
a freshet, much less a tempest"; and they were "not fit for
anything but the passage itself, as they are too small for
fighting, and so low that four skiffs might send to the
bottom as many as they might meet".(84)
Van Meteren's account of Parma's preparations states
that seventy of the flat-bottomed boats were horse
transports, each equipped with a loading ramp and able to
carry thirty animals.(85) The two hundred smaller ones he
mentions were, presumably, troop landing craft. A cargo of
thirty horses would weigh about ten tons, and so in a
troop-carrying role they would be able to accommodate some
120 armed men. Even if the smaller boats were only half
this size, Parma's troop landing craft capacity would still
be about 12,000 soldiers and so, if we take into account the
hoys and the horse transports, he probably had on paper just
sufficient capaCity to bring his 17- or 18,OOO-strong army
across the Channel.
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But what of the boats themselves? Van Meteren's
statement that the vessels were equipped with integral
loading-ramps makes it clear that they were no more than
flat-bottomed river barges, of a kind widely used as ferries
and lighters along the Rhine and in its delta. These simple
and functional craft were certainly in use by the Roman
period, as has recently been demonstrated by the discovery
of a group of massive flat-bottomed and double-ended barges
of second-third· century date at Zwammerdam, on the old
course of the Rhine between Leiden and Utrecht.(86) Just the
same kind of craft can be seen, some 1,300 years later, in
Anton Woensam's composite woodcut of the Cologne waterfront
in 1531 (Figure 37). Similar craft continue to ply the
river today.
Excellent though they undoubtedly were for river
transport, such craft were entirely unsuited to open water
use. A remarkable instance of an attempt to use Rhine
barges as troop transports in the North Sea is recorded by
Tactitus, in his account of Germanicus's campaigns of
A.D. 16. It ended in total disaster. Parma, as an educated
man, doubtless knew the passage well.(87)
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Chapter Seven: Shipboard artillery
Introduction
There exists, in a variety of sources, a bewildering
volume of information about sixteenth century artillery in
general, and on the guns carried by the Armada fleet in
particular. Works by contemporary authors, mainly in
Italian, Spanish, German and English, are legion.(1)
Administrative documents concerning guns actually issued to
Armada ships, together with eqUipment associated with them,
are in some cases remarkably complete. Finally, many guns
of the period survive to this day in various parts of the
world.(2)
On the face of it, therefore, there would appear to be
no great difficulty in computing, in reasonably specific
terms, the nature and strength of the Armada's armament, and
its probable performance in battle. This has indeed been
attempted by the late Professor Michael Lewis (3) and, more
recently by Dr. I.A.A. Thompson, whose discoveries at
Simancas enabled him to produce a statistical estimate of
the Armada's entire gun strength to which only a few points
of detail can now be added (see Appendix 4).(4) Raw
statistics do not, however, constitute the whole story. The
design and quality of the weapons must be considered too,
together with the question of how, and with what skill, they
were operated. It is in these vital areas that the
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historical sources JUU:. R are the least revealing. Much of
the technical material on artillery which was published in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is couched in highly
theoretical terms, and much of the theory expounded can now
be shown to be based on false ·premises. Caution must
therefore be exercised when making use of such material,
invaluable though it undoubtedly is. In particular,
virtually all the figures relating to range (and, by
implication, muzzle velocity) do not stand up to scientific
scrutiny; while the critical relationship between calibre,
shot diameter, and weight, involving as it does concepts of
spherical geometry which were not generally understood in
the early modern period, invariably threw the writers (and,
apparently, the practicioners) into a good deal of
confusion. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
authors, even those who were themselves practising gunners,
tended to write about their art not as it actually was, but
how in ideal terms they felt it ought to be.
Less bias is to be expected from the administrative
records which are, in the main, bald statements of fact
presented by accountants. Here the problem lies not in the
unreliability of the statements, but in their lack of
detail. At best, an individual gun may be recorded by
type-name, weight (but almost never dimensions), and the
material and weight of the projectile it was designed to
throw. At worst, a whole group of guns (the entire
complement of a ship, for example), may be given as a
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straight total, without any indication of the types and
sizes of the individual pieces which made it up.
Surviving examples of guns are, of course, useful in
illustrating the physical form of the weapons described by
the artillery theorists and the documents. But it should be
remembered that unless these are the actual weapons involved
in the campaign we are studying they may well display
characteristics which were not, for good or ill, identical
to those of the guns with which the Armada was equipped.
A final point must be taken into account. Gun barrels
are only one element in a fairly complex assemblage of
eqUipment, tools and instruments which together make up a
working artillery system. Any study of the effectiveness of
Armada weaponry must therefore take this ancillary material
into account. Very little of it has survived in modern
artillery collections, and although published works and
manuscripts are again helpful, they cannot be relied upon to
give full or unbiased descriptions of such eqUipment,
particularly. with regard to its use and performance under
operational conditions. Almost nothing is therefore known
of the way in which shipboard guns were mounted and worked
on both the Spanish and English sides during the Armada
campaign.
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It is against this background that the relevance of the
Armada wrecks can now be considered. Between them, the
sites have yielded a number of the guns actually used by the
Spanish side during the battles. Although numerically quite
small (almost exactly
grand total of 2431),
types known to have
one percent, with 24 guns out of a
the sample includes most of the basic
been carried by the fleet. Even
accepting, as we must, the dangers inherent in drawing
conclusions from a small sample, these 24 guns give us, for
the first time, a working base from which to assess the
Armada'S armament in entirely practical terms.
This chapter is arranged in four sections. First the
question of gun performance is reviewed, with
attention to the effects of barrel length.
particular
Next the
problems of gun-weight and calibre are considered. This
leads to a general classification and description of types,
based wherever possible on evidence, both documentary and
archaeological, derived from the Armada itself. Finally,
the way in which the guns were mounted aboard ship is
considered.
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1. The performance of smooth-bore muzzle-loading artillery
Many artillerists of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries believed - and most modern historians have
followed them - that the greater the length of the gun
barrel in relation to its calibre, the greater was the
muzzle velOCity, range, and accuracy of the weapon. This
belief was typically expressed by Robert Norton in the early
seventeenth century when he wrote:
"The longer the chase of the piece the
stronger the stroke••• whereby it cometh to pass
that long Culverings carry further than great
Cannons although with less powder: yet the force
is better entertained by their greater length and
better fortification to endure the full charge of
powder."(S)
The second part of Norton's statement is undoubtedly
true: as any plumber knows, a long small-bore tube will
withstand greater pressure than a short large-bore one. But
his first proposition is erroneous, and it will be as well
to consider its implications before we begin our detailed
examination of the guns themselves.
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The ~~~
exhaustive study
has recently been the
by J.F. GUilmartin,
subject of an
and it is only
necessary to summarise his findings here.(6) There is, he
points out, no valid ballistic explanation for the supposed
range advantage of culverins (which we may define broadly as
guns with barrels 30 times or more as long as the diameter
of their bore) over cannons (25 diameters or less) which the
range data contained in most published sixteenth and early
seventeenth century works on artillery invariably shows.
Colonel Guilmartin goes on:
"The unreliability of sixteenth century range
data was demonstrated by an analysis of the values
given by Collado and by Diego Prado y Tovar,
undertaken by Mr. J.W. Kochenderfer and his
co-workers in the Firing Tables Branch, U.S. Army
Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland••• who determined that the
maximum ranges given by Collado and all the ranges
given by Prado y Tovar which were subjected to
analysis would have been attainable only with
muzzle velocities in the neighbourhood of 6,000
feet per second, nearly five times the speed of
sound and almost three times the muzzle velocities
of modern small arms.
"Experimentally derived mid-nineteenth century
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data, most authoritatively given in the published
work of Captain Thomas Jefferson Rodman, makes it
plain that any muzzle velocity for black powder
artillery
be held
in excess of 2,000 feet per second must
suspect, particularly for the larger
pieces••• It seems clear that to the sixteenth
century gunner, long ranges in general and maximum
ranges in particular were a highly theoretical
proposition. We should not therefore expect too
much accuracy in what he tells us about them•••
Most of the so-called range figures which he left
us are therefore little more than educated guesses
which reflect his prejudices concerning the types
of gun which he felt should have been able to
shoot farthest and which he himself preferred when
long-range fire was called for."(7)
Guilmartin next considers the question of barrel
length. He pOints out that most modern authors have made the
~ priori assumption that the internal ballistics of black
powder cannon are the same as modern guns burning
nitrocellulose-based propellants. They are not. With
modern propellants, the increase of temperature and pressure
within the chamber serves to increase the burning rate and
hence the rate of evolution of propellant gases as the
projectile moves along the barrel. Careful shaping of the
propellant grains further enhances this desirable effect.
Black powder, on the other hand, burns in an entirely
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different manner. The rate of decomposition is essentially
independent of temperature and, above a quickly reached
threshold of about 350 pounds per square inch, of pressure.
Thereafter the rate of evolution of propellant gases within
a black powder cannon is in all practical respects
constant. As the ball accellerates down the barrel a point
will therefore be reached beyond which the projectile will
expand the volume behind it faster than the decomposition of
the propellant can keep it pressurised. Extending the
barrel beyond this point will thus result in a reduction of
the muzzle velocity and range of the gun.CB)
In the mid-nineteenth century J.G. Benton determined
experimentally that an absolute threshold of velocity was
reached for a 12-pounder black powder field gun at a barrel
length of about 25 calibres. His data further showed that
extending the barrel length beyond 16 calibres resulted in
an increase of muzzle velocity of only 5 1/2 percent while
extending it beyond 12 calibres yielded only a 12 percent
gain.(9) Due moreover to the effects of aerodynamic. drag,~
which increases as a function of the velocity squared, these
small variations in muzzle velocity would have had an even
smaller effect on the maximum range which could be
obtained.(10)
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Captain Benton's figures cannot, of course, be applied
without reserve to all types and sizes of sixteenth-century
artillery. Powder charges used in the sixteenth century
were generally larger than those used in Benton's
experiments, though higher gas losses will to same extent
have compensated for this. The considerable space taken up
/
within the bore by charge, wadding, and ball must also be
taken into account, nor should it be forgotten that we will
be following the sixteenth century practice of relating
calibre to length as measured from muzzle to base ring and
not, as Benton's calculation demands, from the breech end of
the bore itself. Nevertheless it is clear that the muzzle
velocities of sixteenth-century guns were ~ direct
functions of the barrel lengths, in spite of the widely held
belief to the contrary. Indeed, many sixteenth-century guns
had barrels considerably longer than the threshold length
beyond which velocity actually declined, a length which we
may compute in round terms as 30 calibres, so allowing 5
calibres over a postulated maximum of 25 to accommodate
charge space and the distance between the base ring and the
true breech.(11)
In fairness it should be pointed out that same
contemporary gunners had come to suspect, on empirical
grounds, that shorter bores did not reduce a gun's
efficiency. There was in any case good reason for
attempting to shorten guns intended for shipboard use, a
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point to which we will return in due course. William
Bourne,
,
writing in England shortly before the Armada
campaign, touches the heart of the matter when he noted that
"•••for divers causes, and especially for the Queen's Navie,
they have decided to make their ordnance shorter than the
accustomed manner, and so by that means they are lighter
than the pieces before time made, and yet as servicable as
the longer•••"(12) Exactly the same reasoning is reflected
on the Spanish side in a scale drawing sent by Don Juan de
Acuna Vela to Philip lIon 25 July 1587 (Figure 38). The
drawing shows three different types of 12-.lk medias
culebrinas, one of which is a 'standard' 33-calibre model
cut down to a much more manageable 25-calibres. This
version is described, significantly enough, as"~ buena
We have already seen that the maximum range obtained by
smooth-bored black powder guns was a highly theoretical
proposition. Contemporary artillery writers frequently
mention, however, another more relevant concept, that of
"point-blank" range (from the Spanish punto .sle. blanco,
pointed at the target; i.e. without elevation). In
practical terms this distance was determined by two factors,
namely hitting-power and accuracy.
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A solid mass of metal leaving a gun barrel at upwards
of 1,000 feet per second obviously possesses considerable
destructive energy. The practical effects of this were
graphically demonstrated by John Greaves, Professor of
Geometry at Gresham College, with a series of test firings
which he carried out at Woolwich in 1651.(14) Iron balls
ranging in weight from 9 to 32 pounds were fired from
several types of gun at point-blank range (the exact
distance, unfortunately, is not given) into composite butts
of oak
thick.
42 feet,
and elm. Three butts were set up, each 19 inches
The distance between the front and middle butts was
and between the middle and rear 24 feet. All the
guns pierced the front and middle butts, while most of the
"cannon" types (i.e. the shorter pieces) struck the rear
one, though none penetrated it. It is noteworthy that the
longer-barreled "culverin" types consistently failed to
strike the third butt, although the difference in
performance was admittedly slight: the important point is
that all of the guns were capable, at very close range, of
smashing their way through 38 inches of solid woodwork.
This formidable destructive power, however, diminished
rapidly as the range was increased. Aerodynamic efficiency
of a spherical body is very low. Its drag amounts to nearly
60 percent of that offered by a flat plate ot the same
frontal area, whereas a modern rifled shell is penalised by
a drag coefficient of only about 5 percent.(15) The
- 245 -
relatively high velocity with which a spherical projectile
left its barrel was thus quickly lost to drag, and most of
its effective hitting power - its capacity to batter a wall
or inflict structural damage to a ship's hull - died with
it. In practice, therefore, point-blank range in terms of
destructive effect was very short. For battery work - the
breaching of walls by sustained gunfire - a contemporary
authority, Luis Collado, recommended 80 paces (about 55 m)
as the optimum distance.(16} We are not likely to be far
wrong if we regard the same figure as the maximum range at
which really effective damage could be done to a
great-ship's hull.
Roundshot fired at much greater ranges was still, of
course, capable of inflicting damage: a solid mass of iron
weighing up to 50 pounds, even in the dying moments of its
flight, is obviously a force to be reckoned with. It will
damage spars and tackle, and kill men if it hits them. On
this basis a roundshot's range is to be reckoned in
thousands rather than hundreds of yards. But long-range
capability is only effective if, as with modern rifled
weapons, the projectile can be despatched with sufficient
accuracy to find its target, .at least upon occasion.
Roundshot fired from a smooth bore gun, however, followed an
entirely unpredictable trajetory. There are two reasons for
this. First, the ball was made to fit very loosely in the
barrel in order to compensate for variations in projectile
shape, for bores which were bumpy or out of true, and for
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the layer of chemical residue which built up on the inside
of the bore during firing. This allowance, or "windage" as
it is called, usually amoun~ed to some 5 percent of the bore
diameter. In its progress along the bore the loosely
fitting projectile rattled from one side of the barrel to
the other, and so left the muzzle at a haphazard angle to
the centreline, dependent upon its last point of contact.
This erratic progress from breech to muzzle induced a second
source of inaccuracy. As it dragged against the walls of
the barrel the ball acquired an indeterminite degree and
direction of spin, which in flight manifested itself
aerodynamically as the so-called Magnus effect (well known,
in its consequences at least, to golfers) whereby the
advancing side of the spinning ball generated more boundary
layer drag than the retreating side, causing the projectile
to slice.
It is thus apparent that the concept of "random" range
in terms of how far a ball would actually fly has little or
no validity, especialy when applied to warfare at sea. What
matters is the range within which there is at least same
chance of hitting the target. While the number of variables
posed by the individual gunner, gun, and target, and
operational circumstances on any particular occasion, render
it impossible to lay down hard and fast figures, it is
probably true to say that in sixteenth-century sea fighting
very little damage was ever caused by gunfire at ranges
beyond 500 yards, and that the chances of regularly hitting
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even a large target such as a ship beyond 200 yards were
fairly remote.
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2. Gun weights and calibres
Most gun weights in the sixteenth century were cut as
figures on the gun itself, and such figures are also
encountered in the documentary sources. These marks were
placed on the piece concerned when it was officially weighed
after casting; and, while they would clearly have been of
value to anyone who subsequently had to operate, identity,
or otherwise assess the weapon, their primary function was
one of accountancy. A balance had to be struck between the
metal issued to the guntounder and the weight of the
finished product, since the high value of tin and copper _
the main constituents of gun metal - made fraud an
attractive proposition. Benvenuto Cellini suspected that he
had been so cheated on one famous occaSion, thereby
incurring considerable technical difficulties in casting his
reknowned Perseus.(17) The weighing was therefore carried
out as precisely as possible - the results were normally
expressed to the nearest digit - and since a well calibrated
beam balance is capable of fine adjustment we may be
reasonably confident that the recorded weights are accurate,
particularly in respect of guns which come from big
state-controlled foundries such as those of Venice or
Malines.
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The bore or calibre of sixteenth-century guns was
always expressed as the weight of a ball, of the appropriate
material, which would exactly fit it. The word calibre,
indeed, is probably derived fram the latin ~ libre. There
is, of course, a distinction between the "calibre" weight of
a gun's bore and the weight of shot it actually fired, since
allowance had to be made for windage, but in most practical
instances calibre is given as the weight of the projectile
actually fired, the necessary adjustment being assumed. As
we shall see,
gravity, by
however, variables introduced by specific
the bewildering diversity of weight units
involved, and by the general muddle of sixteenth-century
arithmetic, reduced this essentially simple concept to a
morass of confusion.
Some years ago Professor Lewis demonstrated that the
master unit of weight used in the Armada preparations was
the Castilian libra of 460 grams, and most of the
documentary evidence which has been studied since he wrote
supports this conclusion.(18) Where a different unit was
involved, this was specified. Lewis himself cites the use
of the Neapolitan rotolo (of~. 891 grams) in respect of
commodities which were to come from Naples, while a listing
of the guns on board five ships of the Levant squadron in
1581 notes that their shot weights, which are not expressed
individually but as a range for each group of types, are in
pesos ~ Ita11a.(19)
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In seeking to establish the value of the sixteenth-
century Castilian libra Lewis was able to show that the 460
gram unit was in use by the mid-eighteenth century, and he
assumed (with some circumstantial supporting evidence) that
it had not materially changed in the course of the preceding
200 years.(20) We can now confirm his assumption by
practical experiment. The value of weight unit out as a
figure of 5316 on the better preserved of the two Spanish
canones ~ batir from 1a Trinidad Valencera oan be
calculated with reference to the gun's present weight, for
it is evident that loss from wear and chemical action since
its manufacture is negligible. The piece actually weighs
5429 pounds (2463 kgs), from which we may deduce that the
figure marked on the gun is in units of 463 grams, plus or
minus three. From this it appears that the unit involved is
for all practical purposes identical to the modern Castilian
libra.(21)
The long Venetian sacre from 1a Trinidad Valencera,
which carries a weight mark of 2529 and is also little
affected by wear or corrosion, was also weighed. It gave a
reading of 2632 pounds (1194 kgs), from which the unit
emerged with a value of 472 grams. This, to within 0.25
gram, is the "gross" Venetian pound of 471.75 grams,
although an error factor of up to plus or minus 7 grams
should, admittedly, be taken into account.(22) But it seems
unlikely to be coincidence that our physical calculation
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should produce, with such a remarkable degree of precision,
so suitable a weight unit for this particular gun. The
implication is, surely, that both the Londonderry Port and
Harbour Commissioners and the sixteenth-century Venetian
weighing authorities are to be credited with a much higher
standard of accuracy than we have assumed.
Most of the contemporary artillery theorists who wrote
in English (Bourne, Lucar, and Norton are the best known)
specify a Quarter of an inch as a standard windage for all
bores, and this simple formula has been accepted by most
modern authorities - who themselves have mainly been
English. From a practical point of view this is illogical:
common sense dictates that windage should be proportional,
increasing with the size of shot. Most of the Continental
authorities confirm that this indeed was so. Collado
recommended that one-tenth should be deducted from the ~
(the bore calibre expressed in libras) to determine the
appropriate weight of shot for the piece.(23) Converted into
linear measurement, this involves a reduction of about
one-twentieth, or 5 percent. This figure is confirmed, in
the later seventeenth century, by Thomas Binning who, after
sane extremely complex (and largely spurious) geanetry,,
concluded that the ideal windage was lO~ •(24) This
100
proportion remained constant until the end of the
smooth-bore era, 5 percent being the figure recommended in
an early ninteenth century gunnery manual. (25)
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A manuscript diagram prepared in the ordnance office of
Philip II's Captain-General of Artillery, Don Juan de Acuna
Vela, in January 1590, shows at full scale four sizes of
iron roundshot each sitting inside its appropriate bore
(Figure 39).(26) Bores and shot-weights are expressed in
Castilian libras, and physical measurement of the windage
shows, in every case, that (subject to the limitations of
accuracy imposed by the Spanish clerk's drawing instruments
and my ruler) it is almost exactly 5 percent.
Acuaa Vela's windage diagram is invaluable in another
connection. The specific gravities of modern grades of cast
iron range from 7.0 to 7.4 (pure iron being 7.86), the lower
values being due to an increasing presence of low density
impurities, particularly graphite: the lower the specific
gravity, the lower the grade of iron.(27) Although it has
been impossible to calculate original specific gravities for
the large number of iron balls recovered from the wrecks
because of the chemical reduction which cast iron undergoes
in sea water, exact values can be worked out from the
information contained in Acuna Vela's drawing. His data may
be tabulated as shown in the table overleaf.
The fact that the calculated specific gravities fall
within the known range for cast iron but vary from shot to
shot suggests that the figures were derived not from some
theoretical formula but from the weighing of samples. The
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steady decrease in specific gravity as the shot sizes
increase is of particular note, since large-volume castings
tend to contain a greater proportion of impurities than
small ones. It therefore seems likely that shot of larger
diameters than those tabulated had even lower densities than
that of the 16-~ ball, with its specifio gravity of 7.11 -
the lowest
metallurgy.
grade of cast iron recogo1sed
This observation lends support
by modern
to Sydney
Wignall's contention that Spao1sh iron shot, partioularly in
the larger calibres, was cast from extremely poor metal.(2B)
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3. Classification and Description of gun types.
Classification
Any attempt to classifY Sixteenth-century gun types
carries with it the danger of implying that sane kind of
general specification for each type was widely accepted. It
was not. In spite of various attempts to impose local
standards - that by Charles V in 1549 is the best known-
Sixteenth-century guns are in the main remarkable for their
individuality and profusion of forms.(29) This can be
attributed to several causes. First, the craftsmen who
created them were technical innovators, usually of forceful
and opinionated character,
(sometimes outstandingly
individualistic. As masters
who were generally competent
so) but always intensely
of an art which was (and to
some extent still is) empirical rather than sCientific, each
held his own views on how to approach gun design and
manufacture, and jealously guarded his technical secrets.
Guns therefore tended to reflect the individuality, and
sometimes the prejudice, of their creators. This lack of a
common standard was compounded by the immensely confusing
range of weights and measures Europe had inherited from the
mediaeval period, some of the manifestations of which we
have already discussed. Finally, each gun was individual in
the sense that a fresh pattern and mould had to be made up
for each casting, since both pattern and mould were
destroyed in the manufacturing process.(30) This, in an age
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before mass-production and the concepts of conformity
engenders, further militated against standardisation.
it
All
that can be said of gun design is that it was largely a
matter of trial, error, and personal idiosyncrasy in which a
range of successful forms emerged, and less successful ones
were abandoned,
evolution.
in an almost Darwinian process of
Even contemporaries were dismayed by the lack of
ordered classification which resulted. "Through an
intolerable fault," wrote Cyprian Lucar in 1587, "all our
great pieces of one name are not of one length, nor of one
weight, nor of one height in their mouths: and therefore the
gunners' books which do show that all of our pieces of one
name are of an equal length, and of an equal weight and of
an equal height, are erroneous."(31) This difficulty was
echoed by Luis Collado (1592) who noted that in the Castle
of Milan more than two hundred different sizes of charging
implements were needed when eleven would have served had the
guns been properly standardised. The problem created by
unstandardised shot, he added, was just as serious.(32)
In spite of the almost limitless variety of detailed
specification which was thus possible, sixteenth-century
gunners usually applied quite specific names to particular
types of gun. These names should not, however, be regarded
as implying sanething definitive, for as we have seen no
such definition existed. The important factors are the
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weight and type of metal of which the gun was composed; the
material and weight of the projectile it fired; and the
length of the weapon expressed in relation to its calibre.
Since, in our assessment of the Armada's artillery, we are
able in same cases to examine at first hand the weapons
themselves, we can often consider these practical factors
without becoming lost in the confusing and often
irresolvable byways of renaissance artillery nomenclature.
As one of the wisest of the sixteenth-century technical
authors, himself a gunfounder, put it: "It does not matter
what their names may be, except to know their sorts and
kinds."(33)
An attempt must nevertheless be made, for descriptive
convenience if nothing else, to group the various sorts and
kinds into named families. Fortunately we can, from the
Armada documents themselves, extract enough information to
be tolerably certain of the general parameters of
classification for each named type as they were understood
at the time by those responsible for planning the Armada.
It should be stressed that these parameters do not
necessarily apply in other contexts,
translating gun names into another language
3).
especially when
(see Appendix
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The groupings are set out in the table below as a
preliminary to more detailed consideration of the guns. The
range of shot-weights in each group is taken from maximum
and minimum figures specified for the guns allotted to that
group within the fleet. Corroborative evidence, from the
classification set out by Diego Prado y Tovar (1603), is
included in the right hand column.(34) The groups are
themselves allocated to particular families, which follow
sixteenth-century practice and are self-explanatory.
FAMny
Canones
Pedreros
Culebrinas
Swivel guns
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TYPE NAME
,Canon de batir
Canon
Medio canon
Tercio canon
Quarto canon
Canoncete
- ,Canon pedrero
Medio canon pedrero
\other pedreros
Culebrina
Media culebrina
Sacre
Media sacre
Falconete
Media falconete
Falcones
Falcones pedreros
Esmeriles dobles
Esmeriles
Versos
Obsolescent {pasamuros
Lombardas
SHOT-WEIGHT
Armada documents Prado y Tovar
SHOT-WEIGHT
40-50 lbr
28-35 lbr
15-27 lbr
10-14 lbr
9-12 lbr
10 lbr
12-20 lbr
10-12 lbr
4-12 lbr
16-21 lbr
7 1/2-14 lbr
5-8 lbr
3-4 lbr
2-4 lbr
1-1 1/2 lbr
1 1/2-3 lbr
3-6 lbr
12 oza
6-8 oza
1-3 lbr
1-2 Ibr
4 1/2-7 lbr
30-50 lbr
12-25 lbr
12 lbr
not
classified
15-22 lbr
8-12 Ibr
6 lbr
not
classified
not
classified
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Descriptiye catalogue
i) Canones ~ batir (Figure 40)
The heaviest shotted gun carried on either side in the
campaign was the 40-50 ~ full canan, or canQn~ batir as
the Spaniards almost invariably called it. Two fine
examples of this weapon have been recovered from the wreck
of La Trinidad Valencera, and these are described below
along with a discussion of their historical background.
The Valencera canones ~batir are a matching pair,
cast in bronze. They bear the Spanish royal escutcheon, and
without doubt they are two of the three canones ~ batir
loaded aboard the ship at Lisbon in May 1588. Documentary
descriptions tally precisely with the two guns recovered,
while Baltasar Lopez. del Arbol confirms that the canones
aboard the ship belonged to the king.(35) The guns are in
all practical respects identical, and have been cast in the
traditional way. A simple four-pinned iron chaplet had been
used to secure the barrel core to the mould. (36)
Specifications for both pieces are as follows:
Bore
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation)
Overall length
Muzzle to breech ring
18.4 cm
17.5
44 libras
2.92 m
2.68 m
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Calibre/length
Weight mark
1/14.5
5316 (No.1);
5260 (No.2)
Weight by weighbridge (No.1) 2463 kg
Shot/gun-weight 1/121
The guns are well cast, with little indication of the
common fault of aeration in the metal. Their barrels are
smooth and true. Decoration is finely and tastefully
executed, with additional detail chased on after casting•.
The lifting and breech dolphins are ornate and display
considerable artistic feeling, combining strength with a
fluid sense of movement. When slung by the lifting
dolphins, with a restraining strop at the breech, the guns
hang level.
The triple-moulded base-ring bears this incription:
IOANES • MA[N]RICUS • A • LARA • FIERI • CURAVIT
OPUS. REMIGY • DE • HALUT
ANNO 1556
The first reinforce bears a crowned shield in relief,
encircled with a chain of firestones and rays from which is
suspended the insignia of the Golden Fleece. The escutcheon
shows the arms of Spain impaling those of England,
reflecting Philip's consortship with Mary Tudor. Below it
the words PHILIPPUS REX are contained within a rectangular
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cartouche. On the reinforce mounding the weight figures
5316 (No.1) and 5260 (No.2) have been cut subsequent to
casting.
The vent pan is set in a transverse oblong block, at
each end of which is an upstanding lug. The left hand lug
(as viewed from the breech) is the shorter, and is set over
a curving recess so that it can act as a hinge pivot. A
plain bronze vent cover found close to No. 2 clearly
belongs to this gun; it fits snugly over the hinge lug, and
the drillings line up, while a slot at its other end mates
with the taller lug so that the hole stands proud to take a
locking pin. A decorated but otherwise similar cover was
found within a few feet of No. 1 (Figure 41). A concavity
on the underside of both covers fits over the rimmed vent
pans of the guns, so that the arrangement provides a secure
but easily opened apron which would have allowed the guns to
be kept primed under wet or windy conditions. The locking
pins were evidently secured to the vent covers with a length
of fine chain, the dovetailed attachment for which can be
seen on No. 1's vent cover.
On No. 1 a flaw in the face of the muzzle, perhaps
caused when the gun-head was sawn off, has been repaired
with a rectangular insert, filed flush.(37) Muzzle wear
suggests that No. 2 had been fired fairly frequently, and
No. 1 scarcely at all. Chafing at the sides of the
breeches, particularly on No.2, indicates the use of a
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breeching rope. Neither gun was loaded when found, although
a quantity of black powder sludge was noted in the barrel of
No.1.
These guns are complemented by a set of drawings which
have survived at Simancas. The drawings originated from the
office of the Captain-General of Artillery, Don Juan de
Acuna Vela, and are accurate, detailed, and to scale (Figure
42).(38) They represent an unusually fine example of early
technical draughtsmanship. Three canones ~ batir are
shown, and the lower example is in all practical respects
identical to the Valencera pair; indeed there are grounds
for supposing that the very gun depicted in the drawing is
the third and as yet undiscovered Remigy canan ~ batir
carried by the ship.(39) The drawing is captioned: "This
,canon is one from the foundry of Remigy, weighing 5286
libras and throwing a 40-~ shot. It is fifteen diameters
of its calibre in length."
The middle canon illustrated bears the arms of
Charles V and was cast by Gregorio Loefer of Augsburg. It
too is a 40-~, and is rather more thinly metalled than the
Remigy piece, being somewhat longer (17 3/4 calibres) and
weighing slightly less (5230 libraa).· It seems likely that
the Remigy and Loefer canones were the standard heavy siege
weapons then in the service of the Spanish crown. Both,
however, were rather old, and Aouna Vela's third drawing
shows a design specification for a replacement model. It
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would, so its caption informs us, have "the same
reinforcement and ball as that of Remigy, and be
three-quarters of its mouth shorter than that of Gregorio
Loefer." Its weight was to be 5500 libras.
The two Valencera guns were cast in the Malines foundry
of Remigy de Halut, in the first year of Philip II's reign.
Along with the rather earlier Augsburg canones of Gregorio,
they are to be associated with the Hispano-French wars which
,ended with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559, and they
will undoubtedly have been part of the great siege train
which was built up in the Low Countries during the second
and early third quarters of the sixteenth century by
Charles V and his son. Such weapons demonstrate the growing
need of field armies for mobile battery artillery to counter
the development of scientific fortification. Don Juan
Manrique de Lara, whose name appears on the yalencera guns
as the man under whose auspices they were cast (and who,
presumably, was responsible for laying down their
specifications), was Captain-General of Artillery from 1551
to 1574. The main artillery base in the Low Countries was
at Malines, where in 1551 Charles V established an arsenal.
Garrison troops and associated specialists were stationed
there under the command of a Grand Master, who between 1550
and 1564 was Philippe de Stavele, lord of Glajon and knight
of the Golden Fleece.(40)
- 264 -
Malines had been a noted bell foundry since the early
fifteenth century and in the 1480s Hans Poppenruyter, the
most famous of the city's master-founders, began producing
high quality bronze ordnance. During the first two decades
of the sixteenth century Poppenruyter cast more than 144
guns for Henry VIII of England. Work for England was
suspended in 1526 because of difficulties over payment, but
production in no way declined for in 1520 Charles V had
established Malines as his own gunfoundry, with Poppenruyter
assuming the title of f0ndeur xoyale. In 1526 Poppenruyter
married Hedwige van den Nieuwenhuisen, and when he died in
1534, leaving no heir, Hedwige - who appears to have been an
enterprising lady - sought a mate who could fill the dual
role of husband and foundry-master. She chose Remigy de
Halut, who had served as an artilleryman under Philippe de
Montmorency, and married him in 1536. Shortly afterwards
Charles V confirmed Remigy's appointment as fondeur rOYale
in succession to Hans Poppenruyter.
Hedwige died in 1562, Remigy in 1568, by which time the
foundry had fallen into a decline occasioned both by the
effects of the Dutch Revolt (Malines was sacked in 1566,
1572, and 1580) and by a shift in the strategic positioning
of the king's heavy artillery following Cateau-Cambresis.
Most of the guns were shipped to garrisons in Spain and
Italy, where they were still stationed in 1586 when the
marquis of Santa Cruz noted their availability for the
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projected Armada. His breakdown of the whereabouts of these
guns, all described as 40-~ c.a.nonesrefozados weighing on
average 5500 libras apiece, shows that twelve were in
Sic11y, seventeen at Naples, and twenty-five dispersed
,between Cartagena,· Malaga, and Lisbon.(41) The marquis
earmarked these guns specifically for land service in
support of the invading army, and they were to be organised
into four batteries of twelve guns apiece, with six held in
reserve.
The Lisbon muster of 9 May 1588 records that only
twelve such guns - a single battery, presumably - were
actually shipped. The probability is that all or most of
them were from the foundries of Augsburg and Malines, and
that all or most of them had been cast before 1559. The
Malines guns, at 15 calibres, were rather stubbier than the
Augsburg pieces, at 17 3/4; both, however, appear to have
been highly standardised weapons with a virtually identical
weight and a common bore.
This impression is confirmed by a summary of the
technical evidence. First, there are the two Yalencera guns
with their respective weights of 5316 and 5260 libras and
their bore diameters of 18.4 cm. To these we may add the
other six (presumably similar) canones ~ batir throwing
40-~ shot known to have been issued to the Levant
squadron.(42) Next we have the two guns captured aboard the
~ Salvador of GuipUzcoa, described by the English
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inventorist in 1588 as cannons weighing "by the Spanish
mark" 5222 and 5329 libras respectively.(43) These must be
the 50-~ canones listed among the ship's armament in
Spanish sources.(44) The 10-~ increase in shot size does
not necessarily imply a larger calibre, since most of the
artillery theorists allocate a 50-pound ball to a battery
cannon, although in practice Spanish canones threw a rather
lighter projectile.
Yet more evidence can be gleaned from the wrecks. At
"Borreis", a place in County Mayo which cannot now be
identified, a great ship (perhaps ~ ~ ~[14], of
Biscay) was wrecked with "50 great pieces of brass, besides
four great cannon" aboard her.(45) From a wreck off Clare,
which may have been that of the Guipuzcoan ~ Esteban[57],
Sir George Carew attempted in the summer of 1589 to raise "a
cannon· of battery or basalyke, as we Suppose by the
length... which was so huge that it break our cables". He
added: "Our diver was nearly drowned, but Irish~ vitae
hath such virtues as I hope of his recovery."(46) Sir George
doubtless knew his artillery as well as he knew his whisky,
and since he described in precise terms the types and sizes
of the guns he successfuly raised, he is unlikely to have
been mistaken about the lost piece.
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Confirmation of the two canones ~ batir recorded in
Spanish sources aboard the Levanter ~1uan~ S1c111a[71]
comes from her wreck in Tobermory Bay, which yielded to
seventeenth-century salvors "one great gun••• which would
carry a 48-pound ball" and another which was "eleven feet in
length, and seven inches and one fourth part of measure in
the bore."(47)
Finally, we should take into account the specifications
of similar pieces which appear in documentary sources not
directly connected with the Armada. As we have seen, the
Remigy and Loefer guns illustrated by Acu~a Vela bear marks
of 5186 and 5230 respectively, while four "canone§ de metal
,
de los de la fundicion de flande~", which were on the walls
of ~aga in 1587 (and which therefore almost certainly
sailed with the Armada in 1588) carried weight marks of 5260
(twice), 5170 and 5185.(48) Between them, all of these
presumed' Remigy and Gregorio canones ~ batir have an
average weight of 5252 libras, which is within 82 libras of
the lightest and 77 l1bras of the heaviest. By any
reckoning these figures are close for big bronze castings:
by sixteenth-century standards they are little short of
miraculous.(49) Beyond question, then, the Spanish crown's
Siege train, dispersed after 1559, and partially brought
together at Lisbon for the 1588 Armada, was equipped with
good quality weapons of a highly standardised type and
Calibre.
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ii) Other canones
In addition to the standardised canones ~ batlr a
number of guns described Simply as canone~ were present in
the fleet. These were evidently much more of a mixed bag.
The four galleasses carried eight canones of 30 to 35-~
calibre, while the Andalusian squadron was credited with
nine canQnes of 34 to 45-~ calibre.(50) The two aboard the
squadron capltana Nuestra SePQra ~ Rosario[43] threw a
28-~ and 35-~ shot.(51) These figures agree broadly with
Prado y Tovar's classification at Qanone~ as guns firing 30
to 50-,lk iron shot.
Although 50 libras generally speaking represents the
upper limit of Armada shot weights, there may have been a
few "super-canQnes" aboard the fleet. Such may have been
the two "piezas grandes" on the Andalusian almiranta ~
Francisco[44], whose shot sizes are not specified but whose
gun weights were 65 and 75 ~.(52)
iii) Medias canQnes
The documents show a considerable weight range for this
type of gun, from a 15-~ aboard the Nuestra Senora~
Rosario[43] to the 19-, 25- to 27-~ medias canones
distributed among the four galleasses.(53) Prado y Tovar is
in fairly close agreement, allocating a weight range of 12-
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,to 25-libras for medios canon shot. A pair of "typical"
Spanish guns in this category are illustrated in a
contemporary document from Simancas. Both are 20-~,
weighing between 3500 and 3600 libras: one is nineteen
calibres long, the other twenty (Figure 43).(54)
Two guns from the wrecks can be included in this
category. The first, which is said to have been raised from
the Tobermory ship in 1740, is now at Inverary Castle, and I
am indebted to his Grace the Duke of Argyll for allowing me
to examine it (Figure 44). The piece is an extremely fine
bronze gun of French origin, and it bears the attributes of
Francis I. Its specifications are:
Bore 14.8 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage) 14.1 cm
Shot weight (by estimation) 23 libras
Overall length 3.11 m
Muzzle to base ring 2.86 m
Calibre/length 1/19
3253Weight mark
Weight (by estimation) 3154 libras (1451 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/137
The gun has mid-set trunnions and no dolphins. Its
cascabel terminates in a stylised pomegranate, while its
breech carries the salamander device of Francis I set within
a decorative oval. The chase is covered with an alternating
pattern of fleurs ~~ and the king's monogram. A letter
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B with a hooked stroke above it surrounds the touch hole.
The claim that this is the mark of Benvenuto Cellini has
little to commend it, though the actual founder remains
unknown.(55)
A simple four-armed chaplet has been used to hold the
mould core in the breech, while two iron-filled holes 2 cm
square (the metal has all but disappeared) are located on
top of the base ring, set symmetricallyon either side of the
centre line and 9.6 cm apart. These holes may perhaps have
been connected with the mounting of some kind of sighting
instrument.
Why a French royal gun should have been carried aboard
an Armada ship is a question of some interest. A possible
explanation is that the gun fell into Spanish hands during
the Hispano-French wars prior to 1559, perhaps in the
aftermath of the battle of Pavia, when Francis himself was
captured. Several trophies taken after this action,
including the French king's armour and campaign tent, are
still in the Armer!a~ of the Royal Palace at Madrid.(S6)
Another possible source for such a gun would be Strozzi's
defeat by Santa Cruz off the Azores in 1582. Other French
guns aboard Spanish ships are known from documentary
sources.(57)
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,
The second medio canon comes from La Trinidad yalencera
(Figure 44). Its specifications are:
Bore 12.4 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation)
11.8 cm
13.6 l1bras
Overall length 3.25 m
Muzzle to base ring
Calibre/length
3.10 m
1/25
2950
3025 libras (1392 kg)
1/222
Weight mark
Estimated weight
Shot/gun-weight
With a shot weight of ·13 1/2 libra§ this gun is, by the
criteria of the Armada documents, too light by 1 1/2 libras
.;to classify as a medio canon. But there is evidence to show
that this very gun was classed as such by the Spanish
inventorist who listed the guns aboard the five Levantine
ships, since he was working, as we have seen, in
rough-and-ready pe§o§ ~ Italia with a value of about 340
grams.(58) On this basis our piece would have been an
18 1/2-pounder, taking it into the upper bracket of medias
canones as they were defined aboard these five ships (16 to
19-pounders). These observations should remind us of the
general muddle which pervaded gun nomenclature and
classification at this period, particularly where the types,
names, and weights of different countries were involved.
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The gun itself is well cast, although the bore at the
muzzle appears to be slightly out of true (cf. the much
~worse case of the media culebrioa from Ll ~ Grifon).
There are no dolphins. The trunnions are low set, and the
piece has a plain cylindrical cascabel. A small notch has
been filed at the top of the muzzle, doubtless for fixing a
dispart sight. The iron chaplet which held the barrel core
in place during casting is of the type described by
Biringuccio as "castillatedft: that is, it consists of two
arched irons to which was welded a supPorting "castle" to
hold the end of the core.(59)
The piece is unmistakably Italian, the rosetted
founder's initials N D C and the decoration on the chase
being particularly characteristic features. So far the
maker has not been identified although he may have been one
of the Conti family which, like the Alberghettis, practised
gunfounding in Venice for many generations.(60) The gun's
crest consists of crossed olive and palm branches with the
(presumably mis-spelt) motto SENPER set in a scrolled
cartouche. Traces of a similar crest, apparently in
association with the same founder's in1tials, were noted on
a badly abraded media Sagre from the same wreck).
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In calculating the weight of the gun it has been
assumed that the figure on the breech refers, like the mark
on the Venetian sacre by Zuanne Alberghetti, to its weight
in Venetian gross pounds of 471.75 grams. The resultant
figure agrees closely with an estimate based on Brigadier
Hogg's formula.(61)
iv) Minor canones
A number of small canan-types are mentioned in the
inventories. These include the tercio canOn, throwing an
iron shot of 10-12 libras, the Quarto qanOn of 9-12 libras,
and the caftonceteof 10 libras. There seems to be little to
distinguish these guns from medja~ culebrinas except,
presumably, their shorter length.
v) Canones Dedreros
Canones pedrero§, as their name implies, were
stone-shotted guns, for which the Armada lists show a
calibre range of 8- 14-~. Most of them were bronze
pieces, although ten pedreros of wrought iron (hierro ~
martillo) are recorded aboard two Guipuzcoan ships, the
Santa Marta[58] and the ~ Esteban[57].(62).
- 274 -
The pedrerQ was a short muzzle-loading gun with a
restricted chamber to carry the smaller charge demanded by
its less dense projectile. These guns were, in consequence,
much more lightly metalled than iron-shotted pieces ot
similar calibres. The Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario's six
pedreros ranged in weight trom 2566 to 3032 libras, while
the English inventorist who listed the captured ~
Salvador's guns recorded the marks on her tour pedreros
(which he called "cannons pedro") as lying between 2019 and
2~2 (see Appendix 3).(63) The bore ot ,a 14-~ canon
pedrero would have been about the same as that ot a 40-~
iron-throwing canQn~ batir. Though no example ot such a
gun has been recovered trom the wrecks, an illustration ot
,
one trom Luis Collado's Platica Manual is shown in Figure
45.
Some canones pedreros may have been breech-loaders. A
large wrought-iron breech-block was tound on the wreck ot 1£
Trinidad Yalencera (Figure 46) and, since we have reason to
believe that allot this ships's guns were bronze, its
missing barrel was probably ot that metal too. The
breech-block is 61 cm long with a chamber bore ot 7.5 cm, so
in its original state it would have weighed some 100 kg.
The bore ot the gun it served, indicated by the diameter ot
its shouldering, was about 15 cm, which suggests a stone
projectile ot about 8 Castilian libras. This would place it
at the lower end ot ,the canon pedrerQ scale. It may be
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significant that a number of bronze guns described by an
English inventorist as "great bases" - by which he certainly
meant breech-loaders - aboard the Nuestra Senora ~]Qsario
were itemised in a list which included ten otherwise
unspecified "iron chambers".(64) The Spanish gun inventory
of the same ship included three bronze falcones pedreros
which fired stone balls·of 5 and 6 libras, and it is
reasonable to suppose that these are the great bases of the
English list, each recorded as weighing "by the Spanish
mark" between 700 and 800 libra~.(65) We may suppose that an
8-~ in the same category would have been proportionally
heavier - say somewhere in the region of 1000 libras.
At the time of the Armada, ,the canon pedrero was much
favoured by the Spaniards, and to a lesser extent by the
English, as a short-range battery piece for shipboard use.
At close range the hitting power and fragmentation effect
produced by its large diameter stone ball was considerable.
That it was soon afterwards to fallout of use was due not
to its shortcomings as a naval gun - in many respects it
foreshadowed the highly successful carronade of the late
eighteenth century - but because stone projectiles took a
great deal of time and skill to produce, which at a time of
escalating labour costs rendered them prohibitatively
expensive.(66)
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vi) Culebrinas
Relatively
the Armada,
few culebrinas appear to have been carried
and no example has been recovered fram theby
wrecks. The five Levantine ships mounted between them seven
18- to 21-pounder culebrinas (rated at Italian weights),
which if translated into Castilian become, approximately,
13 1/2- to 15 1/2-~, while the Andalusian squadron also
carried seven culebrinas throwing 18 to 21-1ibra shot.(67}
In the 1591 listing of her 1588 armament the ~ Jl.ua.n ~
Portugal[2] is credited with a number of 16 to 20-~
espheras, a name which appears to have been synonYmous with
culebrioa, while the Nuestra Senora~ Rosario in the same
list is given two culebrioas of 19 and 20-~.(68) Prado y
Tovar gives his culebrinas a shot-weight range of 15 to 22
libras.
A true culebrina at the upper end of the shot-weight
scale was a gun of very considerable length and weight. In
Simancas there is a casting specification for a set of four
matching culebrioas, which includes a scale drawing (Figure
47).(69) The document is dated 25 July 1587, and the casting
was to be carried out at Seville. These guns were clearly
intended for fortress use, since they were destined for the
Canary Islands. The specification calls for a shot-weight
of 18 libras, a length of thirty calibres, and a gun-weight
of 6000 l1bras.
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Santa Cruz's planning document of 1586 includes 16
culebrinas of 6000 libras apiece, firing 25-~ shot.(70)
These "super" culebrinas were intended to neutralise enemy
strongpoints on land ("deshacer lQa traverses"), and here
Santa Cruz is clearly envisaging them in a classic
counter-battery role on land, in which their (supposed)
advantage of range and accuracy would be used to prevent an
enemy from bringing his own heavy batteries into effective
range. There is no evidence to suggest that counter-battery
culebrinas of this kind were actually included among the
field artillery which sailed in 1588.
vii) Medias culebrinas
The Armada documents give a shot-weight bracket for
this class of gun of 7 1/2 to 14 libras, which is reasonably
close to Prado y Tovar's 8 to 12 libras, especially since at
least some of the Armada's 14-pounders - those aboard the
five Levantine ships - were rated in 'pesos ~ Italia',
which would reduce their value in libras to about 10 1/2.
A particularly informative example of a media culebrina
has been recovered from the wreck of Ll~ GrifOn. The
gun was found in two pieces: its broken-off muzzle end,
66 cm long, was discovered in 1970, while the remainder of
the weapon was located, together with one of its slab-sided
dolphins, in 1977 (Figure 48). The piece has a simple
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button cascabel, and its specifications are:
Bore
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation)
Overall length
Muzzle to base ring
Calibre/length
Weight (by estimation)
Shot/gun-weight
10.8 cm
10.25 cm
8.9 lihras
3.71 m
3.54 m
1/33
2426 libras
1/273
This gun must be one of the four bronze medias
culehrinas of"la nueva fundiciOn" with which the ship was
credited in a document of 14 May 1588.(71) The "new
founding" refers to a crash programme of gun manufacture at
the Lisbon foundry, oarried out under the supervision of Don
Juan de Acuna Vela, Captain-General of Artillery, which was
~ intended to boost the Armada's armament strength right up to
the moment of departure. The piece under discussion is
remarkable in several respects. First, it bears no
escutcheon or inscription, an omission which, for the
product of a sixteenth-century royal gunfoundry, is
virtually without parallel. This in itself suggests hurried
production since, although the work involved in setting
decoration on a basic gun pattern required time and skill,
the placing of arms was regarded as an indispensible symbol
of the authority and power which such weapons
represented.(72) So radical a departure from tradition
evidently required the express permission of the king and
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indeed we find, on 10 April 1588, the harassed Acuna Vela
writing to Philip II upon this very matter.(73) The king
evidently acquiesced, and so these last-minute products of
the Lisbon foundry, by extraordinary royal assent, carried
no arms or decoration whatsoever.
Such an omission would, of course, in no way affect a
gun's performance. But the ,ariton's media culebrina
demonstrated practical disabilities which must have rendered
it all but unserviceable. When its broken end was found it
was observed that the barrel was bubbled with numerous gas
voids throughout the metal. Apart from making the gun weak
and brittle such VOids, where they touched the bore itself,
might easily trap hot debris which could prematurely _ and
perhaps disastrously - ignite the succeeding charge during
loading.(74) Worse still, the bore at the break, a clean
fracture 66 cm from the muzzle, is woefully Off-centre. Its
thick wall measures 7.1 cm, while the thin one is only
3.5 cm. In this short length, therefore, the bore has
diverged 1.8 cm from the centreline. Because it would
entail the damaging process of drilling into the breech it
has not been possible to determine the degree of error
there, but by projecting the angle of divergence indicated
by the broken muzzle segment (about 1 degree) and by
assuming that the bore is straight (if it is not, matters
are even worse) we find that the opposing walls would
measure, at their pOints of extreme difference, 14.7 cm and
6 cm. This represents an appalling weakness. Even a small
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error of this kind would have a significant effect on the
bursting pressure of the gun: one of such magnitude would
have rendered it, in all probability, quite unserviceable.
The possibility that the muzzle had actually blown off
during firing was considered but discounted, since a cork
tampion was found in position 45 cm from the end of the
bore. For it to have been pushed so far down the barrel
would have required pressure exerted from outside the gun,
and such a pressure differential could only have been set up
had the gun been an intact cylinder when it sank to the
bottom. Possibly it broke when it hit the sea bed, or
perhaps it was damaged by the eighteenth-century salvors in
an attempt to recover it.
The fault in the bore was due, no doubt, to incorrect
positioning of the central core during casting. Robert
Norton may have been exaggerating the incompetence of
continental gun manufacture in order to stress the
excellence of English foundries when he wrote the following,
but even so his comments are significant:
"If we shall examine the most used foundings
in Europe: namely that of Lisbon, ,Malaga,
Barcelona, Naples, Sicily, Cremona, Milan, Genoa,
Venice, Halines and Utrecht: in which by reason of
their continual practice they might easily become
excellent and expert, yet whether it be by
ignorance, negligence, or else by too much haste
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of those that have charge and command of those
foundings, it is apparent that they commit great
and absurd faults therein. Some of their pieces
(and not a few) are bored awry, their soule not
lying in the width of the body of the metal; some
are crooked in their chase, other of unequal
bores; same too light in the breech turn their
mouths downwards, and so endanger their own
vamures and defences... others are too heavy also
in their breech... same and a great many are come
forth of the furnace spoongy, or full of
honeycombs and flaws, by reason that the metal
runneth not fine, or that their moulds are not
throughly dried, or well nealed••• when such
gunners load them, as are either ignorant or
negligent in examining their defects, they will
either break, split, or blowingly spring their
metals and (besides that mischief they do) they
will be utterly unserviceable ever after... yet
this much I dare say to the due commendations of
our English gunfounders, that the ordnance which
they of late years hath cast, as well for
neatness, as also for reasonable bestowing and
disposing of the metal, they have excelled all the
former or foreigners•••"(75)
These observations might have been applied specifically to
,the Grifan's media culebrina.
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In fairness, it should be pointed out that even English
guns were not above suspicion in these respects. William
Bourne writing in the late sixteenth century recognised the
existence of the problem of off-centre bores and prescribed
some remedies: "•••for though at the mouth of the piece the
metal may be one like thickness, yet at the breech of the
piece the metal may be thicker on the one side, and the
piece will never shoot right upon the mark: and also, this
piece is very dangerous to shoot in for fear of
breaking."(76) He goes on to demonstrate practical tests for
testing the trueness of the bore, pOinting out that each
gunner must determine the allowance necessary to correct any
off-centre throw shown by his particular piece, and the
maximum charge he may safely put in it.
~But even had it been bored clean and true, the GritQn's
media culebrina would still be open to criticism. It is,
for its length, a very lightly metalled piece. With a
length of 33 calibres and a shot to gun-weight ratio of
1:273 it is remarkably similar to the weakest of three
12-~ medias culebrinas illustrated in a Spanish dQcument
which just pre-dates the Armada (Figure ).(77) This gun
is 33 calibres long and, with a weight of 34~, has a shot
to gun-weight ration of 1:283 - marginally better than the
GrifOn's. It is included in the drawings for the purpose of
demonstrating its unsatisfactory design, which is considered
too lightly metalled to be servicable, and, very
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significantly, it is painted out that this design is one
approved by the marquis of Santa Cruz. Since the marquis
was in charge of the Armada's preparations up to his death
in February 1588 it seems likely that this discredited
specification was the very one to which "the Grifon media
culebrina was cast.
The suggested improvements are of considerable
interest. The lower gun in the drawing is basically a
"beefed-up" version of the "Santa Cruz" type: it is another
33-calibre 12-.l.b.l:.,in which the weigh t of metal has been
increased fram 34 to 44~, giving a shot to gun-weight
ratio of 1:367. These proportions, according to the
caption, are based on the medias culebrinaa of Gregorio
Lefer, cast at Augsburg earlier in the century. But while
the result was clearly a strong and servicable weapon it
was, so its caption-writer tells us, "too big for use at
sea".
The problem presented by the other two are resolved by
the middle gun in the drawing, which is presented as an
ideal form of media culebrina for the future. Though it is
still as light as the discredited "Santa Cruz" type - 34
~ - it is as thickly metalled as the strong but over-long
"Gregorio" type. This is achieved by the simple expedient
of shortening the piece from 33 to 25 calibres and
thickening the metal accordingly, to make it, as the caption
says, "~ buena .l2w:a..la.lll.a.l:.". In every respect this is
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indeed the best gun of the three: not only is it strong, and
short enough for good management afloat, but it is very
close to the calibre:length ratio which would give it the
best possible muzzle velocity.
This workmanlike piece of artillery contrasts
~strikingly with the Grifon example. Quite apart from the
gross defect in the alignment of its bore, and the spongy
metal of which it is made, the latter is built to
proportions which experience had already shown to be too
slender for safety and too long for efficient handling at
sea. We cannot, of course, argue from the shortcomings of a
single media culebr1na that the same deficiencies hold true
for every comparable gun in the fleet, but that one so
demonstrably bad was actually passed for service must surely
be significant. ~The Grifon media culebr1na was one of many
similar cast at Lisbon speCifically for the Armada, and its
proportions reflect those favoured by the marqUis of Santa
Cruz, whose influence on Spanish naval affairs from the
1550s to 1588 - a date-bracket within which most of the
Spanish guns carried aboard the Armada will have been
manufactured - was immense. His views doubtless had a
profound effect on the kind Of guns with which ships in the
service Of the crown were equipped.
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Fundamental defects in design and manufacture, such as. , .those evidenced so strikingly in the Grifon example, must
have greatly reduced the effectiveness of these guns in
action, and perhaps in some cases rendered them wholly
unserviceable. In support of this conclusion we have the
corroborative evidence to suggest that ~the Grifon's four
medias culebrinas- the only real ship-killers she
possessed - were, at best, grossly under-used during the
fighting (Figure 49).
viii) sacres !
Apart for a few anomalies, guns of this name listed in
the Armada documents show a shot-weight range of 5-9 ~,
which slightly overlaps with the most lightly shotted medias
culebrinas. Most, however, are 5- or 6-~, thus conforming
closely to Prado y Tovar's prescribed 6 libras for sacre
shot. A serious anomaly, however, is to be found among the
guns of the five Sicilian ships, whose 29 sacres are classed
as 7- to 12-pounders.(78) But, as we have seen, these
weights are expressed in pesos ~ Ita1ia which, if converted
into Castilian weights, gives us the more reasonable figure
of .c.. 5- to 8 1/4-~. A remaining discrepency, and one
less easy to dismiss, is to be found among the 1591 listings
of the armament mounted on the ~.sWan ~ Portugal[2] at
the time of the Armada, in which sacres firing 9- and 10-~
shot are mentioned.(79) If these weights are in full
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Castilian libras (and there is no reason to suppose
otherwise), the guns concerned cannot be true sacres: by
every criterion we can find, they are medias culebrinas.
One of the Italian bronze guns recovered from La
Trinidad Valencera demonstrates the typical characteristics
of a sacre, and must be one of the very guns listed under
that name in Sicilian ship summary noted above (Figure 44).
Its specifications are:
Bore
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation)
Overall length
Muzzle to base ring
Calibre/length
Weight mark (cut on base ring)
Weight by weigh-bridge
Shot/gun-weight
9.5 cm
9.0 cm
6.0
3.45 m
3.27 m
1/34.4
2529
1194 kg
1/433
The casting is a good one, although its surface shows
evidence of a cracked mould which has been replastered in
the way Biringuccio prescribes.(80) A castillated iron
chaplet has been used to hold the core mould in the
breech.(81)
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There are no dolphins, and the cascabel is a simple
turned moulding ending in a button. A motif of swans and
crustacea supporting a vase emitting flames is moulded in
relief on the breech. Towards the muzzle end of the chase
there is a decorated shield, with no internal device, below
which the letters Z A appear within a line of rosettes.
There can be no doubt that these are the initials of Zuanne
Alberghetti, who is known to have founded guns in Venice and
Tuscany during the second half of the sixteenth century.(82)
A remarkably similar gun bearing the initials Z A and the
date 1582 has recently been recovered from a Venetian wreck
off Dalmatia, (83) while another gun of the same Size,
proportions, mouldings and decorative style has been brought
up off Teignmouth, Devon,from what appears to have been the
wreck of a late sixteenth-century galley.(84)
Though the Trinidad Yalencera sacre is technically well
made, it is considerably longer than ballistic efficiency
dictates, and it is certainly too long for comfortable
handling aboard ship. It is, moreover, excessively heavy
for the weight of shot thrown. It would have served, no
doubt, well enough to deter an attack by commerce-raiding
galleys or small craft on the sea lanes of the Adriatic, but
as part of a great-ship's broadside in close action against
Atlantic-built galleons its defects must have appeared only
too obvious.
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We turn now to a very different group of sacres, from
,.El..ar.an Grifon. They are not, strictly speaking, sacres at
all: with a shot weight of~. 4.4 libras they fall just
below the limit we have established for this class of gun,
although they are just above the 4-~ ceiling imposed on
the next class down, the medias sacres. We will therefore
consider them to be light sacres - the distinction is, in
any case, an academic one.
There are four guns in the group. All are of cast iron,
and each has a bore of 8.5 cm. This regularity of bore is
in itself cause for comment, especially since the guns'
overall appearance is one of closely similar proportion and
design. Two, admittedly, have been heavily;reduced by the
effects of abrasion while a third still retains a covering
of concretion which obscures its surface detail. Only the
fourth, the profile of which was recorded in sectional form
within a concreted deposit (Grid 2717 in Figure 25; see also
Figure 26) can be reconstructed in full (Figure 50). Its
specifications are noted below, followed by a discussion on
the similarities between it and the other three pieces.
Bore 8.5 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage) 8.1 cm
Shot weight (by estimation) 4.4 llbras (iron)
Overall length 2.44 m
Muzzle to breech ring 2.20 m
Calibre/length 1/26
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Weight (by estimation)
Shot/gun-weight
1565 libras (720 kg)
1/356
As far as can be ascertained fram measurement over the
concretion, with due allowance made for the thickness of the
crust, the specifications for the gun at Grid 3103 are
essentially the same as those detailed for the first. Of
the two badly abraded guns the trunnion locations on the
example at Grid 2117, indicated by the vestigial bumps,
suggest that it too was of very similar proportions, while
it is a fair guess that the one at Grid 3217, with exactly
the same bore as the other three, was yet another member of
what appears to be a Virtually identical group. This
example was loaded with a 8.1 cm ball when found.
TWo other fragments, at Grids 3705 and 3408, appear to
come from similar guns. We know that when the ship arrived
from the Baltic in 1587 she had on board 27 guns of her own,
all of iron.(85) Eight bronze pieces were added at Lisbon,
and she was credited finally with 38 guns, leaving three for
which we cannot account.(86) But since the four cast iron
4.4-~ are all so clearly of a kind, ~ is likely to be
one of the three missing guns; in consequence all-must have
been part of the ship's own armament as a Rostock-based
hulk. They must therefore be of northern European origin.
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It is unusual, and valuable, to identify examples of
cast iron ordnance from the Baltic region at so early a
date. The guns were probably manufactured in Sweden, a
country well endowed with iron ore and charcoal-producing
forests.(87) Professor Cipolla notes that the production of
cast iron artillery did not start there until the decade
1571-80, when one factory was in operation; by the following
decade (during which, no doubt, our guns were cast), three
foundries were working. (88) Cast iron guns were not
evidently produced in Germany itself until about the turn of
the century.(89)
Let us first examine the ~esign of these guns, and then
consider their technical merits. Their resemblance to later
guns from this region, which was to become the ~ocus o~
northern Europe's armaments industry dur1ng the ~ollowing
two centuries, is striking. The multiple barrel-rings and
fillets are characteristic features of the so-called
·'Finbankers" (a name apparently derived ~rom the ~oundry at
Finspong in Sweden) which were widely exported, particularly
to Holland, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Such guns are common finds on the wrecks o~ East
Indiamen.(90)
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Professor Cipolla has thrown some doubt on the quality
of early Swedish cast-iron guns, citing in particular an
English report of 1623 concerning Swedish ordnance which
claimed that "•••these pieces in the proving brake most of
them".(91) But it would be altogether unwise to condemn an
entire gun-founding industry, the technical excellence of
which at a later date is beyond question, on the evidence of
a single, possibly biased, English critic. It is just as
reasonable to suppose that the product, from the start, was
a sound one, and a close examination of the four Gr1fOn
examples suggest that they, at least, were well designed and
competently manufactured. This conclusion is supported by
the relative dearth of ammunition of the right calibre for
them recovered from the wreck: unlike the under-used medias
culebrinas, a good proportion of the roundshot allocated to
the sacres was evidently fired off in action (see Figure
49).
In terms of design the guns are clean and workmanlike.
Weight has been saved from the chase, where the pressure
stresses were lowest, by stepping down the diameter of the
barrel just forward of the trunnions, while the thickened
base ring reinforced the point at which the main stress
occurs. The barrel length, at 26 calibres, would have
yielded an optimum muzzle velocity, while the piece is short
enough for convenient handling at sea. Its relatively high
shot to gun-weight ratio would have given it the intertia to
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absorb much of the recoil, further enhancing its suitability
for shipboard use. Finally we have the evidence of the
sectioned breech on the gun from Grid 3217 (Figure 51) to
show how smooth and true is the bore, and how sound the
quality of the metal casting. No trace of voids or
irregularities can be detected in the sectioned area, and
there is no sign of pitting in the surface of the bore. All
in all, these early examples of northern European cast-iron
guns appear to be well designed and competently made. There
is every reason to suppose that, at sea, they would have
been effective and easily handled weapons.
That at least four guns from the same ship, moreover,
should be so alike, and of identical bores, suggests an
element of standardisation in the make-up of her armament.
This reflects credit not, of course, upon the Armada
planners, but on the north German merchants who owned and
equipped her. We may perhaps detect here an early glimpse
of the standardised production of cheap cast-iron artillery
which, in the course of the following century, was to
revolutiOnise both naval and merchant ship armament
throughout Europe.(92)
ix) Medias sacres'
The only medias sacres for which shot weights are
recorded in the Armada documents are two on board the
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g~lleasses and 22 distributed among the Andalusian ships
'"mustered at San Lucar on 26 October 1587.(96) All of them
are described as 3- to 4-~ bronze pieces. A good example
'"of such a gun has been recovered from ~~ Grifon (Figure
48). It is one of the four bronze medias sacres from the
Lisbon foundry which we know to have been issued to the
ship, along with four medias culebrinas from the same
source, shortly before she sailed.(93)
The speCifications of this media sacre are: ..
Bore 7.4 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage) 7.0 cm
Shot weight (by estimation) 2.8 Ubras
Overall length 2.43 m
Muzzle to base ring 2.28 m
Calibre/length
Weight (by estimation)
1/31
800 libras (368 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/286
Our calculated shot weight is marginally under the
media sacre's lower limit, but it is close enough; a
Spaniard certainly would have referred to the piece as a
3-,lk, and we need not quibble over the difference here.
This very gun, it should be remembered, was actually listed
in the Spanish documents as a media sacre.
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The piece bears a strong family resemblance to the
"media culebrina from the Grifon, described above. It, too,
carries no royal arms or other markings, while its
mouldings, slab-sided dolphins, and simple button cascabel,
are plain to the point of austerity. It is clearly another
product of Don Juan de Acuna Vela's utility gun-founding
programme which was rushed through at Lisbon in the hectic
weeks before the fleet sailed. Whether it has the same
fundamental flaws as we have detected in the media culebrina
we cannot tell from surface indications alone. Its
specifica td ons, however, show it to have been almost as
lightly metalled as its larger sister although, being
marginally shorter (31 calibres against 33), it would have
been slightly stronger.
A rather similar bronze media sacre has been recovered
by Dr. St~nuit from the Girona wreck, and the specifications
listed below are based on his drawing of the piece: (94)
Bore
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation
Overall length
7.6 cm
7.2 cm
3.1 libras
2.34 m
Muzzle to base ring 2.22 m
Calibre/length
Weight (by estimation)
Shot/gun-weight
1129
800 libras (368 kg)
1/258
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This gun bears a heavily abraded escutcheon on the
breech which cannot be identified with certainty, although
it may perhaps be Philip II's arms.
An Italian bronze gun from La Trinidad Valencera should
also be classified as a media ~acre, though in every respect
except for the bore it is a much more massive piece (Figure
44). It had lain exposed on a rock outcrop, and in
pitting,
consequence has suffered from fairly severe abrasion and
particularly on its left-hand sIde, which faced
uppermost.
Its specIfIcations are:
Bore
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weIght (by estimation)
Overall length
Muzzle to base rIng
CalIbre/length
Weight (by estimation)
Shot/gun-weight
7.6 cm
7.2 cm
3.1 libras
2.92 m
2.77 m
1/36
1900 libras (862 kg)
1/613
The gun is very similar in proportion to the N D C
media canan from the same wreck, and the much abraded traces
of a similar escutcheon on the chase, together with the
letter C, suggest that it may indeed by a smaller version of
that piece, to the same general design and from the same
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foundry.
The final media sacre identified on the wrecks is an
eroded iron gun recorded in a partly sectioned state on the
,
~ Grifon site (Figure 50)•. Because of this gun's
condition its speCifications can only be approximate,
except for the shot diameter, which was obtained by
measuring the well-preserved ball which still lay in its
breech.
Bore (by estimation) 8cm
Shot diameter (actual) 7.6 cm
Shot weight (by estimation) 3.6 libras (iron)
Overall length 2.9 m (approx)
Muzzle to base ring 2.7 m (approx)
Calibre/length 1/34
Weight (by estimation) 2000 libras (920 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/526
This long, heavy, and lightly shotted gun cannot have
been particularly suited to shipboard operation although its
location at the landward end of the wreck site suggests that
,it may have served as one of the Grifoo's bow chasers, where
more roan to work it would have been available. It seems
probable that this gun, like the four short 4.4-~ cast
iron sacres from the same ship, came from a Swedish
foundry. It so, it demonstrates that the Swedish
gunfounders, whatever technical skills they may have
possessed in other directions, were not immune trom the
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sixteenth-century misconception that long guns threw shot
further.
x) Falconetes
In the context of the Armada these guns are rather a
shadowy class of ordnance, and examples attested in the
documents range in weight of shot from 1 1/2- to 4-~.
Medias falconetes are 1- to 2-~.(95) There are versions in
bronze and in iron, and both stone- and iron-throwers are
mentioned. Some appear to have been swivel guns, and some
may have been breech-loaders. I suspect that as a group
they are little more than a rag-bag at the tail end of the
gun lists which the Armada planners did not feel was worth
breaking down into more specific categories. We have no
choice but to follow them.
No examples are known from the wrecks.
xi) Swivel EYna
Breech-loading guns mounted on swivels were the
quick-firers of their time, and Norton claims that one type,
,
the harquebus-a-crock, could be discharged up to 300 times a
day which, assuming a working period of ten hours, gives an
average of once every two minutes. (96) Since he was speaking
of the gun's endurance, and not of its extreme rate of fire,
it is probable that for short periods it could be fired even
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more rapidly. Guns of this kind were common in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and are described
by various contemporary writers. They were mounted, Norton
tells us, "upon a forked prop or pintle upon which the ends
of the trunnions rest," and they were aimed "with a long
stern handle of iron" which extended from the butt-end of
the breech.(97)
The inability of a fixed pintle mounting to absorb
recoil limited the size of such guns, but their quick-firing
capability and the ease with which they could be elevated
and traversed to extreme angles made them especially
valuable for close fighting. They were essentially
anti-personnel pieces, and might equally well have been
found aboard small craft as among the armament of
high-charged warships, with their tactical emphaSis on
close-quarter, man-to-man fight. Swivel guns might be used
in attack for breaking up an enemy's "chiefest fight", or
main troop concentrations on deck, while mounted on the
castleworks fore and aft they coUld be applied in a
defensive role by bringing enfilading fire down on boarders
crowded in the ship's own waist.(9a) The unsuitability of
the new flush-decked galleons of Elizabeth's navy for such
armament, because of their lack of castleworks, was
considered by some to be a major disadvantage. Sir William
Monson, and English officer who had taken part in the Armada
campaign, may have been out of tune with his more
illustrious contemporaries when he wrote:
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"Such a ship that hath neither fore-castle,
copperage head, nor any other manner of defence,
hath no fowlers, which are pieces of great
importance, after a ship is boarded and entered,
or lieth board and board; for the main ordnance
stands her in little stead••• but a murderer or
fowler being shot out of their own ship, laden
with dice shot, will scour the deck of an
enemy•••"
but he was nonetheless expressing a belief still held by
many
until
of the English as well as Spanish naval commanders
beyond the turn of the century.(99) The views of Sir
Richard Hawkins, veteran of a notable close action with two
Spanish ships in 1593, were considerably more conservative
than those of his more famous father who, more than anyone,
had been responsible for creating Elizabeth's flush-decked
warships a generation before: "I hold nothing more
convenient in ships of war," wrote Sir Richard, "than
fowlers and great bases in the cage works and murderers in
the cobridge heads, for that their execution and speedy
charging and discharging is of great moment."(100)
Although breech-loading swivel guns remained in use on
merchant ships long after the Armada period, they largely
disappeared from European warships with the widespread
introduction of flush-decked galleons at the beginning of
the seventeenth century. Their apologist, Richard Hawkins,
ruefully admits their demise along with other obsolesoent
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close-quarter weapons: "many I know have left the use of
them and sundry other preventions as of shear-hooks and
stones in the tops."(101) Norton tells us that by his time
(1628) their use was chiefly restricted to small
vessels.(102)
We cannot estimate with any confidence the total number
of swivel guns with which the Armada was equipped.
Breech-loading itself is not the sole criterion; some types
of pedreros, and apparently some (if not all) of the
falconetes were breech-loaders too, while it must always be
borne in mind that guns suitable for swivel mounting might
equally well have been mounted on light carriages. Only
very rarely, as in the case of the 1 1/2-~ falcon and the
6-~ esmeril on board the Santa Marfa ~ ~~, are
swivels (horquillas) specifically mentioned in association
with the guns(103); while only one of the four guns of this
type recovered from the wrecks - that from La trinidad
Valencera - retains the unequivocal evidence of its intact
swivel mounting. Nonetheless it is reasonable to suppose
that the guns described in the documents as falcones
pedreros, esmeriles, and versos, were almost invariably
mounted on swivels, while some of the lighter falcones and
falconetes might well have been mounted in this way too.
Many such pieces were evidently distributed amongst the
fleet. The four galleasses [123-126], for instance, sported
20 esmeriles apiece(104), while the well-gunned Nuestra
,senora ~ Rosario[43] carried 15 esmeriles de camara dobles
- 301 -
and four falcones pedreros.(105) Five ships of the Levant
squadron mounted between them 31 falcanea pedreroa and 18
~yersos,(106) while 14 falcones pedreros and 10 versos
account for almost half the 50-gun armament of the fleet's
vice-flagship ~Juan~ Portugal[2], a powerful galleon
commanded by the Armada's most experienced and capable
officer, Don Juan Mart!nez de Recalde.(101)
These gun-types crop up in the documents aboard ships
of all Sizes, while more are doubtless lost in the blanket
figures which obscure many of the lighter-shotted
categories. Some of the 251 iron pieces classed Simply as
1- to 6-~ aboard the urcaa were certainly swivel
types (108) - a minimum of three have been identified on the
wreck of their flagship, ~~ GrifCn - while the 61 guns
belonging to the same squadron which threw shot of 4- to
6-oozaa were probably similarly mounted.
In conclusion, we may guess that a gun-weight of about
5 ~ sets a practical upper limit to effective mounting on
a swivel, although most such pieces were probably a good
deal lighter than this.
xii) Falcanes pedreros
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These guns were light stone-throwing breech-loaders,.
usually if not always mounted on swivels. The weigh t of
shot fired ranged typically between 1 1/2- and 4-l1bras,
although a 1-~ piece is recorded aboard the ~ Medel 1
CeledOn[35] (109) while 5- and 6-~ versions are credited
to the Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario[43].(110) Most pieces were
bronze though some, as we shall see, were fitted with an
iron breech construction. '"Only one falcon pedrero recorded
in the documents as issued to the Armada - the Rosario's
5-~ - is specifically described as an all-iron gun,(111)
although another has been identified on the wreck of ~~
"Orifon. The two falcones pedreros listed aboard the Nuestra
Senora ~ Ouadalupe[112] are associated with 4 cun-as
(wedges) /and 4 Camaraa (breech-blocks), thus establishing
the breech-loading character of the group as a whole.(112)
A fine example of a falcon pedrero has been recovered
from the wreck of 1& Trinidad Yalencera (Figure 52). The
barrel is a single bronze casting which bears a weight mark
of 125 on the breech, but all of the gun's other fittings,
including breech stirrup, block, tiller, wedge with
attachment chain, and swivel, are of wrought iron. The iron
is exceptionally well preserved, and most of its surface
remains intact. The whole weapon weighs by estimation
3~, which suggests that the mark on the barrel refers to
the bronze casting only.
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The gun's specifications are:
Bore 8.6 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage) 8.2 cm
Shot weight esp. gr 2.6) 1.7 libras
Overall length (including tiller) 1.73 m
0.88 m~Barrel length (excluding mascolo)
Calibre/length 1110
Weight mark (barrel only)
Weight (by estimation)
125
300 libras (158 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/176
Since this gun must have been part of the ship's
pre-Armada armament of 28 pieces, we can confidently assume
that it is of Italian, and probably Venetian, manufacture.
Close parallels to it have been recovered from the wreck of
a late sixteenth century merchant ship, almost certainly
Venetian, in the Adriatic, and from what appears to be the
wreck of a galley (perhaps Venetian also) off Teignmouth in
Devon.(113) Such guns are described by contemporary Italian
writers, notably Capo Bianco (114) and Moretti.(115) Moretti
calls the piece a petriero 4 braga, and describes it as
follows:
"•••they have their chamber separated, which
is called the Mascolo, Servitore, and Covetta, and
so they are loaded behind; they are servicable
upon galleys,. vessels, towers, and other narrow
- 304 -
places, where the piece cannot reverse; they are
either of beaten iron or brass, as also the
~seryitore or mascolo; the braga is of iron. They
have their chase long from 10 to 12 calibres, and
no more••• betwixt the trunnions and the end•••
there are placed two wings, to fasten the
braga••• the braga is of iron, ordinarily
fastened straight to the wings; it is prolonged
within that it may be capable of the length of the
mascolo, and its coine [wedge] behind, which makes
it firm; and in the end hath a long trail or
train••• [which] serves to manage the petriero:
across the braga underneath, is a place to sustain
~the mascolo. The wedge is of iron... one may
also have more wedges to keep ~the mascolo or
chamber joined to the bore."
Moretti's drawings include names for two more of the
weapon's component parts: the forcone, or swivel, and the
cuneo, or wedge.
This description might be applied, without
,modification, to the falcon pedrero from the Valencera. We
can, however, add some technical details. The braga is a
stout stirrup of wrought iron fixed to the gun by means of
two cheek pieces (Moretti's "wings") which enfold the bronze
barrel on either side and are attached to it over two lugs
cast close to the breech. Hammer marks on the braga suggest
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that this operation had been carried out while the iron was
still in a malleable state, to ensure a tight-shrunk fit.
An iron cradle is welded under the breech end of the braga,
just as Moretti prescribes, /to prevent the mascolo fram
dropping out.
The locking wedge on the Yalencera gun, like Moretti's
cuneo, was secured to the head of the tiller by a short
length of twisted chain, portions of which survive as
concretion casts. It has a V-shaped slot cut in the top for
sighting. The flaring ends which rise on either side of
this cut were intended, no doubt, to shield the gunner's
eyes from blowback caused by the notoriously imperfect seal
at the breech: "•••they will scale extremely••• I have
known divers hurt with shooting them off," wrote an early
seventeenth-century authority on naval warfare. (116) A pad
of folded leather has been inserted behind the wedge of the
Yalencera gun, recalling Cataneo's instruction that "between
the chamber and the wedge should be placed a pad of lead or
a piece of old boot, because this will lessen the shock of
the recoil."(117)
These arrangements imply a well-organized firing drill,
and some features of its procedure can be deduced from the
yalencera example, which survives just as its gun-captain
left it in 1588. It is fully loaded, with a stone ball in
the breech, powder in the chamber, and a twist of hemp in
the touch-hole to keep the priming dry. Marks on the
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left-hand edge of the wedge (as viewed from the breech)
suggest that it was normally struck free after discharge by
the gunner using a hammer held in his left hand (no doubt it
would have been looped with a thong around his wrist). The
gunner's right hand would thus have been free for laying the
piece. But in the aiming position, with the tiller held at
arm's length to put the maximum practicable distance between
the breech seal and his eyes, and with the rising sides of
the wedge blocking his access to the touch-hole, the gunner
would have been unable to ignite the priming. We may
presume therefore that this was done on his word of command
by an assistant facing the gun on its right hand side,
doubtless .by means of a linstock of the kind illustrated in
Figure 77. This assistant would have been well placed to
extract the spent block after the gunner had struck out the
wedge, and inserted a loaded one after a fresh projectile
had been placed in the breech. For rapid fire a third
member would, one imagines, have been needed to sponge out
~and recharge the spent mascolos.
Nine small dots are punched on the top of the Valencera
mascolo at its front end, and nine similar marks are visible
on the side of the braga. These are clearly intended to
match the one to the other, in the same way that a modern
rifle bolt carries the serial number of the weapon for which
it was machined. With so wide a variance between individual
guns and breech blocks such a precaution would have been
essential.
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A wrought iron gun barrel recovered from the wreck of
, ~~ ~ Grifon may also be identified as part of a falcon
pedrero (Figure 53). The barrel is composed of an inner and
an outer sleeve, each of which has been formed by wrapping a
sheet of hammered iron around a mandrel and lap-welding it
along the seam. The outer sleeve has then been passed over
the inner one while the former was still hot, the seams
being positioned opposite one another to ensure maximum
overlap. On cooling, the outer sleeve would have shrunk
tightly onto the inner one to form a strong and serviceable
gun barrel. Reinforcement at the breech and muzzle has been
obtained by adding further short sleeves, while a ring
clamped around the muzzle had secured the trunnions, of
which only vestigial traces now survive. No evidence of the
breech mechanism was found, although a handled breech block
with a chamber bore of 5 cm and a shoulder diameter of
8.3 cm, which was found less than 2 metres away from it,
would have fitted well. The barrel bore is 8.5 em, and its
length 87 cm. If the gun had been an iron-shotted piece it
would have thrown a 4 1/2-~ ball, which is patently too
heavy for so light a weapon. But as a stone-thrower, firing
a ball of~. 1.7 libras, it would closely match the
~Valencera's falcon pedrero of the same calibre, and as such
we will identifY it. This conclusion is given strength by
the discovery, elsewhere on the GrifOn wreck site, of two
abraded stone balls of the appropriate size.
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The gun, we may presume, will have been part of the
ship's original armament, and is therefore probably of north
German or Scandinavian manufacture.
xiii} Esmeriles and versos
If there is a clear distinction to be drawn between
these two names I have been unable to find it. The Armada
documents show that esmeriles, which were normally made of
bronze, threw an iron shot of 6- 30 onzas: the only iron
peices referred to by this name, four guns aboard the patax
,
~ Bernabe[65] which threw 1 1/2-~ stone shot, we will
dismiss as suspected falcones Dedreros.(118} Versos
apparently show a rather wider range of shot weights, from
the 2-~ balls of those on board the ~ Buenayentura[60]
and patax ~AsunciQn[64] (119) to the 3-pdr shot of the
six versos belonging to the five members of the Levant
squadron for which we possess detailed information.(120} But
perhaps these latter guns are incorrectly identified, for it
is difficult to see how 2-~ and 3-pdr shot could possibly
fall within even the most loosely defined single category _
even a sixteenth-century one - and it may be safer to reject
them. The verso appears to be the lightest category of
ship-mounted weapon, and we may guess that it threw an iron
lead bullet from 2-onzas (about the weight of a musketor
ball) up to, say, 1-1ibra. On this assumption the verso
shot-weights overlap the weights we have allocated to the
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esmeriles, and so any distinotion there may be is, from our
point of view, entirely academic. As we already have cause
to suspeot, guns of this kind, whether of bronze of wrought
iron, evidently came in a wide variety of sizes,
proportions, designs and countries of origin.
What undoubtedly is an Armada esmeril was recovered
from the wreck of the galleass Girona[125] by Dr Robert
Stenuit in 1968.(121) isThis Piecelone of the 20 esmeriles,
~each equipped with two mascolos, with which the ship was
credited on 9 July 1587.(122) The ammunition provided for
the 80 esmeriles aboard all four galleasses ranged from 10-
to 30-~ iron balls.(123)
The GirQna esmeril is a single bronze casting, with an
open box-like breech extending rearwards from an octagQnal
,barrel to accommodate a bronze mascolo which could be locked
in position through a pair of wedge slQts at the back. A
further slot was provided in the base for drainage or,
perhaps, ,for knQcking out stubborn mascolos. There is a
hQle in the rear fQr the iron tiller. The surface of the
bronze is much worn, but an escutcheon on tQP of the barrel
is still recognisable as the arms of Philip II.
Several ~ .bronze mascolQs of appropriate size were found
in association with this esmeril. Each was loaded with a
powder charge sealed with a wooden stopper. There were also
~several larger mascQlos or similar pattern, presumably for
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the 30-~ "super" esmeriles which the galleasses carried.
The specifications of,the Girona esmeril are:
Bore 6.4 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage) 6.1 cm
Shot weight 1.9 l1bras
Overall length (excluding tiller) 1.63 m
,Barrel length (excluding mascolo) 1.17 m
Calibre/length 1118
Weight (by estimation) 200 l1bras (92 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/105
In 1905 a similar but rather shorter and lighter bronze
esmeri! was recovered with its mascolo in place from the
wreck of the ~ J~ ~Sici!iar71] in Tobermory Bay
(Figure 55).(124) Its specifications are:
Bore 4.5 cm
Shot diameter (5 percent windage)
Shot weight (by estimation)
Overall length (excluding tiller)
4.3 cm
0.65 libraa
,Barrel length (excluding mascolo)
1.38 m
1.16m
Calibre/length 1/26
Weight (by estimation) 150 libras (69 kg)
Shot/gun-weight 1/230
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The gun has a weight mark of 163 set in a rectangular
cartouche at the breech, while an angular shield in relief
on top of the barrel contains a chiseled device more like a
merchant's mark than a formal escutcheon. The same device,
,without the enclosing shield, appears on the mascolo.
Three wrought iron breech blocks from the wreck of ~
,~ Grifon suggest the presence of at least two more
esmeriles/yersos aboard that ship. They are 37 cm long,
with chamber bores and shoulderings of 4.2 cm and 7.0 cm
respectively, from which we can postulate iron shot of ~.
1 1/2- to 2-1ibras (Figure 53).
xiv) Obsolescent types
Quite a large proportion of the Armada's numerical
gun-strength was made up of light wrought-iron
breechloaders. Little detail of them has survived in the
documents, for they were rarely considered important enough
to merit individual descriptions. A few examples can be
found in the detailed gun lists of the Guipuzcoan squadron.
The Santa Mar!a~~~[55], for instance, carried two
iron lombardas throwing stone shot of 4 1/2- and 7-~
calibre, while ,the Santa Barbara[59] had six iron
passamuros which fired iron shot of 1- or 2-~
calibre.(125) Such guns were typical of merchant vessels of
the time, and were carried as insurance against small-scale
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attack.(126) There were undoubtedly a great many of them
throughout the fleet, particularly aboard the requisitioned
merchantmen and hulks.
Several guns of this kind were found on the wreck of jl
,.nu.n Grifon (Figure 53), whose original armament of 27 guns
was specified only as being of 6-~ calibre or less.(127)
Some of these, as we know from the wreck finds, were high
hammer-welded together over a mandrel to form a cylinder,
quality cast-iron pieces, but others were built-up guns of
wrought iron. In this process bars of hot iron were
which was then reinforced by shrinking on sleeves and hoops
along its length. The open breech was then strengthened,
and lifting rings added. Separate breech-blocks were
constructed on the same principle, and their breech ends
plugged. The gun was mounted on a flatbed timber carriage
to which it was strapped or lashed, and against which the
breech-block could be wedged secure. Sometimes these
flatbed carriages were set on a pair of wheels, as recent
finds from the ~~ have shown,(128) but more often, it
seems, they simply sat level on the deck.
The wrought-iron gun barrel from .El. ~ Grirbo (no. 1
in Figure 53) has a bore of~. 7 cm. which if it threw an
iron projectile, would make it a 2 1/2-~ or thereabouts.
The four breech-blocks (nos. 2-5) are for guns of similar
calibres but, it would appear, of rather different
proportions. Such guns, though certainly obsolescent by
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1588, were still widely used because they were simple and
cheap, and could be turned out by any competent blacksmith.
They were doubtless sufficient to preserve a merchantman
from many of the petty troubles it might encounter on a
voyage, but in a full-blown naval battle, such as that at
Gravelines, they would have been all but useless.
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4. Sh1pboard ~ carriages
No complete gun carriage has been found on any of the
wrecks, but several components from such assemblies have
been identitied on the Trinidad Yalencera site. Many of the
pieces are clearly from carriages intended for use ashore,
and these are discussed below, although field carriages were
quite frequently used by the Spaniards aboard their ships.
The question is considered further in Chapter Nine. Proper
sea carriages (encayalgados de mar) were, however, much
preferred for naval use, and it is clear that when field
carriages were employed at sea it was because better
mountings were not available. But what, precisely, did a
late sixteenth-century Spaniard mean when he spoke of an
encayalgado ~ ~?
The description inevitably conjurs up a picture ot the
tour-wheeled truck carriages which, for more than three
centuries, played a central role in the evolution ot sailing
ship wartare. By the 1540s the English were certainly using
such carriages, and by 1588 they appear to have been
universally employed aboard all the royal galleons and, no
doubt, on many ot the hired merchant ships, too (Figures 56
and 57). But a contemporary Spanish sea carriage appears to
have been something quite different. Two drawings from
Slmancas leave us in no doubt that an encayalaadQ ~~ was
little more than a cut-down version ot a land carriage.(129)
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The first drawing (Figure 58) has composite wheels made up
of four broad spokes into which four felloes are set. A
reinforced axle box surrounds the hub, while the outer
circumference appears to be bound with iron strakes. The
gun itself sits on two cheek-pieces which form a short
trail, and upon which four ornate bolt-heads indicate the
locations of the joining transans. Breech elevation was
controlled by two wooden quoins, and a lashing hook was
provided at the fore end of the carriage. The gun shown
mounted is a 20-~ media canan weighing 40 ~.
A second carriage design from the same source is shown
in Figure 59. Here the wheel is of tripartite construction,
with a reinforced cross-piece which incorporates the hub.
This wheel is considerably larger than the crossed-spoke
type, and its trail (not all of which is shown) appears to
be longer. This carriage, states the caption, was suitable
both for use at sea and for mounting on the walls of a
fortress. Pietro Sardi, in his Art1g11er1a of 1621, shows a
rather Similar design, although the wheel has been
considerably reduced in size and the trail shortened so that
it barely protrudes beyond the breech (Figure 60).(130)
Three dovetailed pieces forming a single tripartite
wheel, and a segment from another of similar type and size,
have been found on the wreck of 1£ Trinidad Valencera
(Figure 61). The wheel is 49 cm in diameter and 7.5 cm
thick, and is secured transversely by two iron bolts which
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pass through all three pieces. There is a 12 cm diameter
axle hole. The rim of the wheel is grooved with aU-shaped
channel, which at first suggested that it might have been a
sheave, but its large size, and particularly the diameter of
the axle hole, precludes this interpretation. The groove
was no doubt for an encircling iron tyre, which would have
clamped the whole wheel together and provided a durable
bearing surface. That the remains of such a tyre were not
found with it suggests that the wheel may have been a
spare.
Close to this wheel was found an axle of appropriate
dimensions to mate with it. The axle is 1.18 m long, with
arms 12 cm in diameter. It is drilled to take simple lynch
pins. With a pair of solid tripartite wheels set on it,
this axle would have provided an undercarriage assembly not
dissimilar to Pietro Sardi's model, and it was upon such
carriages, no doubt, that the Trinidad Valencera's Venetian
guns were mounted.
Not far from the tripartite wheel a ten-spoked wheel
1.15 m .in diameter was found (Figure 61). While this may,
of course, have been intended for a small vehicle, or even a
light field piece, several similar wheels have been found
attached to light flatbed guncarriages on the wreck of the
~~, and the possibility that it, too, may be trom a
naval gun mounting cannot be discounted.(131)
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No evidence has been found either in the documentary
sources or on the wrecks for the use of four-wheeled truck
carriages aboard any of the Armada's ships.
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Chapter Eight: The Army
i. The infantry and their weapons
The basic unit of troops in the Armada was the infantry
company. These were organised into five Spanish regiments,
or terctos, each of 26 companies, together with an~~
contingent of Portuguese levies and pioneers (compan!as
sueltas) 32 companies strong.(1) Altogether the 162
companies contained 18,973 men, an average of 117 each,
although the Lisbon muster shows that actual strengths
varied between 37 and 222. The contemporary English
soldier, Sir Roger Williams, who knew the Spanish army well,
stated that company strengths could be as high as 300,
although 150 was normal.(2) Each company was commanded by a
captain, and acted as an independent tactical unit under the
overall direction of the commander-in-chief. The terato
itself was essentially an administrative grouping and its
commander, the Maestre de CamPo, headed his own regular
company of troops like any other captain. This distinction
between administrative and tactical command is strikingly
similar to the command structure we have postulated for the
Armada as a whole.
The proportion of the various arms within the companies
is not given in the Lisbon muster, and the, figures are
difficult to determine. The fleet carried 7,000 arquebuses,
1,000 muskets, 10,000 pikes, 6,000 half pikes, and 1,000
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partisans and halberds. But regular Spanish troops were
expected to provide their own arms and equipment, and so
while some of the fleet's weapons may have been intended for
new recruits, most were evidently spares, or earmarked for
the ships themselves.(3) The 6,000 half pikes, which made
excellent boarding weapons, were doubtless for this specific
purpose. Nevertheless the additional arms were probably
provided on a scale which broadly reflected the proportion
in which they were normally issued to the fighting
troops.(4)
Remains of many infantry weapons have been identified
among the material recovered from the wrecks. Seven wooden
gunstocks were obtained from the wreck of La Trinidad
Valencera; and the Girona and Santa Marfa J1e. .la .fuuia. have
each provided one. The value of these finds as examples of
ordinary service weapons, rather than the ornate
presentation pieces which more generally have survived into
modern times, is considerable.(S) They are very plain and,
with one exception, wholly undecorated. All are sear
matchlocks of the simplest type, as the recesses and bolt
holes for the lock and sear mechanisms clearly show.
An example of each of the two main types in general
service, the musket and the arquebus, is illustrated in
Figure 62. Both are from .La Trinidad yalencera. They are
typical of the rest, though it should be stressed that no
two are exactly alike; military handguns had not reached any
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standardisation of form by the late sixteenth century,
though they came closer to it than did their idiosyncratic
cousins, the heavy artillery. Within a fairly loose range
of specifications, it seems, there was considerable scope
tor individual preference, as there was with other items of
clothing and equipment.
The smaller ot the two weapons, the arquebus, had a
calibre of about 1.3 cm - a standard which, tor obvious
administrative reasons, was tairly closely adhered to. Its
lead bullet weighed 14 grams. The Yalencera arquebus nicely
demonstrates the droop-curved petronel stock which
characterised the unsatisfactory system of absorbing recoil
on the centre of the tirer's breast rather than in the
tleshy padding ot his shoulder (~. Figure 89). This
piece, like most of the fleet's hand guns, is probably ot
Italian manutacture.(6)
With the introduction of the much heavier musket in the
second halt of the century the chest recoil system became
unworkable and the straight stock, well illustrated by the
Valencera example, came into widespread use. Sir Roger
Williams knew this weapon well, and much admired it: "•••for
the recoiling, there is no hurt, it they be straight stocked
atter the Spanish manner; were they stocked in the French
manner, to be discharged on the breast, few or none could
abide their reCOiling, but being discharged from the
shoulder atter the Spanish manner there is neither danger
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nor hurt."(7) Spanish musket stocks, as this example shows,
were not really straight, since the butt had to drop
slightly to allow the firer's eye to line up comfortably
along the barrel. In this design may be seen the origin of
the modern rifle butt.
The musket had a calibre of~. 1.9 cm, and fired a ball
of 40 grams - nearly three times the weight of the arquebus
projectile. To counter the difficulty of handling this
cumbersome weapon, which would have weighed well over 10 kg,
a wooden rest was provided, and bronze terminals from such
rests have been recovered from the Girona site. The general
method of operation is demonstrated in Figure 63, which
shows a wheel-lock musket of ~. 1600 at the moment of
discharge.
Musketeers and arquebusiers carried their powder in
hopper-shaped wooden flasks, which were inverted to provide
a measured charge by means of a spring-loaded metering
device fitted to the steel loading funnel. Several such
flasks have been found on the wreck of La Trinidad
yalencera, and an example is shown in Figure 64, along with
a smaller flask used to carry the finely ground priming
powder (..c!.. Figure 89).
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Medina Sidonia's orders to the fleet reminded company
officers of their duty to ensure that the soldiers' firearms
were kept servicable, and cleaned twice a week. They were
also enjoined to carry out regular weapon drills, though
whether this involved the use of live ammunition is not made
clear.{S) As far as it went, the performance of the soldiers
in the sea battles was creditable enough, and an instance of
sharp-shooting was recorded when one of Don Francisco de
Toledo's soldiers brought down an Englishman who was calling
from his ship's maintop for the ~ Mateo to surrender.(9)
But such opportunities were rare. The English seldom came
near enough for effective small-arms fire to be employed
and, when they did, there were all too few human targets on
their decks.
The primitive nature of these weapons posed a very real
threat to the users, for the handling of loose gunpowder in
close proximity to a lighted match was a sure recipe for
disaster. That so few accidents in fact occured reflects
well on the standards of discipline and arms drill among the
troops. We do not know for sure how the ~ Salyador[561
blew up, but despite more sensational rumours carelessness
remains by far the most likely explanation. A mishap of
this kind did indeed take place off the Scillies aboard one
of the hulks. In June 1588 the Paloma Blanca[931, blown
thither by the storm which had separated the Armada off
Corunna, broke off a fight with an English merchantman
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because, as Medina Sidonia later reported to the king, "one
of the soldiers' powder flasks caught fire and fell on same
cartridges, which might have resulted in the burning of the
whole ship."(10)
The third infantry weapon was the pike. Used in
defence, it could protect a body of troops against cavalry,
although in attack its great length made it unwieldy, and
for this purpose the shorter half-pike was normally used. A
bundle of the lower ends of ten pikestaves was found on the
wreck of La Trinidad Valencera, the longest surviving length
being 3 metres. The butt ends terminated in simple iron
ferrules. Elsewhere on the site two head-ends have been
found, still retaining the concretion which formed around
their points. From these remains the complete weapon can be
restored as a 6-metre shaft of ash, 3.5 cm thick from its
heel to a point about one-third up its length, after which
it tapers to a diameter at the point of 2.4 cm. The point
was a small conical iron shoe secured to the shaft by iron
side straps 0.8 cm wide and 36 cm long, rivetted through at
six points. The weight of the complete weapon would have
been in the order of 5 kg, and its own inertia was the key
to its effectiveness. If held stationary an advancing foe
would impale himself upon it, while if thrust against an
adversary (the famous "push" of the pike) its momentum would
give formidable penetrating power. These factors explain
the design of its small but extremely well secured point.
The long side straps, moreover, helped to prevent its tip
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from being lopped off by an edged weapon. The Spaniards,
wrote Thomas Digges, held the pike "in so great reputation,
that they seldom commit them but to Gentlemen."(11)
Partisans and halberds were short weapons whose
function was to some extent ceremonial - they were carried
as emblems of office by the company executives - although
their more manageable length of two or three metres gave
them same advantages over the pike, particularly in trench
fighting or boarding. Part of the decorated shaft of such a
weapon was found on the wreck of La Trinidad Valencera. It
was sheathed in red velvet, studded with dome-headed brass
nails.
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ii. Armour and accoutrements
Six complete morions have been recovered in concretion
trom the Trinidad Valencera wreck site, and tragments of
several others have been tound. No complete example has yet
been investigated because ot the ditticulties inherent in
dismantling concretions ot this kind (the object itself
survives only as a void within the matrix ot concretion),
but all the tragments show evidence that the steel helmets
trom which they came carried elaborate surtace decoration
(Figure 65). Even the lowest ranks, it seems, boasted a
measure ot tinery in their military headgear. The helmets
were further decorated with brass rosette-headed rivets
which secured the leather lining band and internal padding,
and a patterned brass plume-holder was fitted at the
rear.(12) Three examples ot plume-holders were tound loose;
they are all identical, which begs the question that the
design may represent some kind of regimental emblem (Figure
66).
These morions, though almost certainly ot Italian
manutacture, are of the parallel-brimmed "Spanish" pattern,
with a pointed tore-and-aft ridge and flat sides designed to
detlect missiles. One ot the concreted helmets retained
traces of its internal padding, which was or coarse cloth
sturted with pine needles. This would have provided
excellent protective shock absorbtlon trom a bullet or
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downward blow, and is similar in concept to the well-padded
German infantry helmet of the First World War - and much
better, as the writer knows to his discomfort, than the
British infantry helmet still in service.(13) The Spanish
morions were clearly designed with the hazards of combat
engineering and trench warfare in mind.
The troops evidently took precautions to protect their
finely decorated helmets from the everyday knocks of service
life, for one concreted fragment bears the impression of an
outer covering of coarse fabric. No doubt this would have
been removed on parade. The discovery probably explains
why, in same contemporary illustrations, Spanish soldiers'
helmets are represented in a variety of colours.(1~)
Two concreted breast-plates, or corseletes, were
recovered from La Trinidad Valencera. These would have
belonged to pikemen, a proportion of whom were equipped with
body armour. The size of this proportion is again open to
question. Professor Parker has shown that of the 3000-odd
Spanish pikemen serving in the Netherlands in May 1571 about
half wore corseletes (15); on the other hand Sir Roger
Williams thought that 20 percent was the ideal figure,(16)
while Santa Cruz's estimates of 1586 envisaged a figure of
only 15 percent.(17) Both the helmets and body armour worn
by pikemen, according to Sir Roger, should be proof against
caliver (i.e. arquebus) shot at 200 paces. Presumably the
armoured pikemen were expected to lead an assault, while
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their nimbler but less well protected comrades followed in
their wake to exploit the initial shock.
No provision was made by the Armada's planners for
supplying the sword and dagger which each soldier carried;
every man, presumably, was expected to furnish his own
sidearms. The wreck of La Trinidad Valencera has yielded a
fine leather sword-belt complete with its hanger, and a
brass suspension buckle.
A collection of well preserved fabrics from the same
site includes the remains of woollen garments and their
elaborate facings and finishings. A find of particular
interest is part of a heraldic surcoat, or repostero, on
which traces of a design can still be discerned.(18) Spanish
soldiers in the late sixteenth century evidently dressed
according to prevailing fashions, without regard to uniform
appearance, and this impression is amply borne out by the
variety of fabrics and design styles noted in the Valencera
collection. Fashion consciousness also extended to
footware, and several contemporary styles are evident in
leather shoe remains from the same site. The most common
form is a lightly constructed slipper-like shoe secured by
two flaps tied with a silk ribbon (Figure 67). Less
suitable footware for an infantry soldier is difficult to
imagine, although the find of a cloth anklet in association
with a shoe of this type suggests that gaiters were worn to
obtain some additional ankle support (Figure 68). In spite
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of the latitude evident in an individual soldier's choice of
footwear it was felt necessary to provide the fleet with
5,000 spare pairs of leather zapatos, to replace those worn
out on campaign. Eight thousand pairs of rope-soled
alpargatas (still a popular form of footwear in Spain) were
also provided, and several examples of these, in a delicate
state of preservation which has so far defied conservation
or detailed inspection, have been recovered from the
Valencera site.(19) These comfortable and durable sandals
would ,have been much more suitable for campaigning than the
fashionable zapatos, although no doubt any Spaniard who
aspired to gentility would have scorned to wear them.
The troops carried their personal gear in cloth
knapsacks, . of which numerous but irrecoverable fragments
were observed during excavation.(20) Each man was also
equipped with a leather bottle for his ration of wine or
water.(21) Several of these have been recovered intact from
the Valencera (Figure 69). They consist of welted goatskin
bags lined with pitch, with a turned wooden funnel bound
into the neck. The funnel was plugged with a tapering
wooden stopper through which a narrow hole was bored to
enable liquid refreshment to be imbibed on the march in the
traditional Spanish manner. The bottles had a capacity of
about one litre, and were fitted with shoulder slings of
woven cord.
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iii. The artillery train
In early February 1588 the Venetian ambassador at
Madrid wrote to his government that "•••on board [the
Armada], besides its own artillery, they have embarked
twelve heavy siege guns and forty-eight smaller ones, with a
double supply of gun carriages and wheels for the field
batteries, and 600 mules•••"(22) The Lisbon muster confirms
the presence of 12 canones de batir (but see pp.l~r-1above
for a suggestion that there may have been more), although it
shows only 21 lighter field pieces.(23) Since many of the
smaller guns could easily have been used on land or sea
without significant modification to their mountings, this
discrepency need not concern us unduly. The Guipuzcoan
squadron, for which we possess good (but by no means
complete) data concerning the mountings of its larger guns,
carried at least 26 sets of field carriages of media
culebrina size and upwards.(24) There can be no doubt,
therefore, that in addition to its twelve or more canones ~
batir, the· Armada possessed a considerable number of
sizeable guns which could have been deployed in the field.
The provision of a double supply of field carriages and
limbers for the four canones de batir shipped on board La
Trinidad yalencera is confirmed in the lading documents,(25)
and ten large spoked wooden wheels together with five
associated axletrees have been located on the wreck site. A
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double set of carriages and limbers for them would account
for 16 axles and 32 wheels, so in terms of identified
components we have located nearly a third.
~ wheels
These fall into two types. The larger is a 12-spoked
wheel with a diameter of 1.5 metres, while the smaller is
1.3 m in diameter and has 10 spokes. It seems likely that
the 12-spoke wheels, of which five have been identified, are
carriage wheels, while the smaller 10-spokers,
number, belong to the limbers.
seven in
A well-preserved 10-spoke wheel from Grid 16.147 has
been raised and examined in detail (Figure 70), while the
two complete but heavily concreted 12-spoke wheels at Grids
22.38 and 74.18 have been recorded in~. Further
constructional details have been obtained from an
examination of the other wheels, from a fractured nave at
Grid 65.51, and from an unused felloe located at Grid
62.48. The drawings presented in Figure 71 are composite
reconstructions, based on these sources, of the two types.
The wheel naves are turned out of elm heartwood. Those
for the carriage wheels are 62 cm in diameter and 55 cm
wide, and are reinforced with iron bands at the hub ends and
at either side of the spokes. A tapered hole accommodates
the axle bearing, which is lined with an iron sleeve. The
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tenoned ends of the spokes are housed in rectangular
mortices.
The naves on the limber wheels are of a rather
different design. They are, in proportion to the diameter of
the wheel, considerably less thick and wide than the
carriage naves (40 cm x 40 cm), and they are not so bulbous
in appearance. They too are reinforced with iron bands.
The tapered bearing sleeve is designed to accommodate much
the same size of axle arm as does the sleeve on the larger
carriage wheel.
On both types of wheel the spokes are of oak. All have
a roughly oval section at the centre, which squares off
towards the extremities. The spokes of the carriage wheels
have a forward curve on their inner faces, which reaches the
vertical as it joins the felloe. The outer spoke face is
straight from the nave to a point just short of the felloe,
where it curves slightly outwards.
forward at an angle of 7 degrees.
curve forward uniformly on both
These spokes are set
The limber wheel spokes
faces from the nave,
squaring as they reach the felloe. Their mean forward set
is 8 degrees.
All the felloes are of ash, and each is mortised to
receive two spokes. Thus a guncarriage wheel has six
felloes, and a limber one five. The butt ends of each
felloe are drilled with holes set tangentially to the wheel
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arc, and fastened to their neighbours with dowels. An
unused felloe blank, in which no mortises or dowel holes
have been cut, was found at Grid 62.48. Unlike the felloes
on the wheels themselves, which in general appear to be
sound and well made, the spare is shoddily cut from wood
derived from a part of the parent tree so close to its outer
surface that a section of its intended inner face actually
extends beyond the bark, and so is missing.
A thick build-up of concretion has obscured details of
the iron-work fitted to the wheels, although it is certain
that they were clamped around the rim with a series of iron
strakes, each starting at the centre of a felloe and ending
at the centre of the next in order to straddle and reinforce
the joints. There would thus have been six strakes on a
carriage wheel and five on a limber wheel. The strakes
would have been bound to the felloes with cross clamps in
the manner illustrated by Pietro Sardi in his work of 1621,
which shows two alternating types of clamp, one for the
felloe joint and one for the strake joint (Figure 72).(26)
Sardi's wheels and axles are so similar to the yalencera
ones that I have used his data as a basis for my
reconstruction of the complete carriage (Figure 73).
The outward angle which the spokes present between the
nave and the felloe gives the wheel a noticable "dish", or
concave appearance. This concavity was set outwards; that
is, the point of the shallow cone thus formed sits on the
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inside of the axle arm. Such an arrangement imparted a more
even stress to the wheel and improved its stability in
rotation. It has been standard practice in European
wheelwrightry since~. 1500, although controversy about its
efficacy still lingered in the late sixteenth century.
Collado still firmly believed
best although, by his own
that an undished wheel was
admission, many of his
contemporaries felt that dishing improved strength and
tractability.(27) They were right•
.Illil axletrees
Of the five heavy axletrees located on the wreck, three
were too severely encrusted with concretion derived from
their iron fittings to allow accurate measurement. One,
however, appeared from its condition to be an unused spare,
without linch-pin holes or evidence of attachments except
for a wrought iron bar running along its lower length.
Another, though partly shrouded in concretion, revealed
enough of its original surfaces to allow an accurate
reconstruction of its form. The two axles differ in their
general dimensions, and it seems likely that one type is for
the carriages, and the other for the limbers.
The unused axletree is smoothly and accurately
fashioned out of ash. Its bed is 80 cm long and 22 cm square
in oross section, save for a 6.5 cm chamfer which has been
removed from its lower corners. The arms extend 60 cm on
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either
13 cm.
side, with a circumference tapering fram 18 cm to
There is a slight shouldering where the arms meet
No hollow (downward inclination) or lead (forwardthe bed.
bend) - stabilising offsets which were to become common in
periods - is apparent in the set of the axle arms.later
The wheels thus ran parallel to one another in both planes.
The iron counter-axle which runs along the underside of
this axletree is especially interesting since Collado
mentions the use of a contraexe in conjunction with wooden
axletrees, though he does not describe it further.(28) Such
an arrangement would greatly have improved an axle's
strength, particularly in its response to shearing loads.
The chamfering of the lower corners of the bed, moreover,
demonstrates a sound technical understanding of the stresses
involved, since the reduction of the whole underside of the
axle to what was in effect a semi-circular cross section
would have increased its upward flexibility, and so helped
to reduce tension stresses between the axle arm and bed.
These arrangements can be seen as a technically
ingenious response to what had undoubtedly been, earlier in
the century, a major fault in the design of heavy vehicle
undercarriages.
square-sectioned
The weakest points on a wooden axle with a
bed are those where the bed meets the
rounded axle-arms, and it was precisely at these points,
upon which the inner edges of the naves rotated, that
stresses and shock loads would have been at their most
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severe. In an attempt to counter this weakness gun
carriages and heavy wagons were often equipped with
elaborate sets of iron linkages which transmitted same of
the shock loads from the axle ends to the main chassis of
the vehicle. But this system was cumbersome, and not very
efficient. By the end of the sixteenth century it had
certainly fallen out of use.
There is no archaeological evidence to suggest that the
Valencera axles were fitted with such linkages, though such
evidence was closely sought, nor are they mentioned by
Collado or .a~ other contemporary authority. Collado's
illustration of the iron fitting (champiron) which provided
both end reinforcement and bearing surfaces for the axle
arms makes it quite clear that only a simple linch pin
fitting was involved at the axle ends.(29) Such a fitting
can be presumed for the Valencera axle arms, together with
an iron washer or rubbing plate at either side of the nave.
These late-sixteenth century wheels and axles are thus
demonstrably superior to their immediate predecessors, and
it can reasonably be argued that the simple innovation of a
counter-axle together with the chamfered axle bed in the
later part of the sixteenth century replaced and greatly
improved upon the old linkage system to provide a better,
more flexible, and cheaper means of undercarriage
suspension. As such, it represents a significant advance in
transport technology.
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The bed width of the unused axletree suggests that it
was meant to be used with a pair of 12-spoked wheels to
provide a mounting for one of the Valencera's canones ~
batir. It is probable that the second axle, the bed and
arms of which are rather longer, was intended for the
smaller diameter 10-spoked wheels of a limber assembly. Its
dimensions are: bed length, 91 cm; bed section, 22 em2; axle
arms, 67.5 em; arm diameter, 21 em tapering to 13 cm. The
greater length of this axle was doubtless to allow for the
swinging of the limber around the pivot on the carriage
trail, upon which the turning circle of the limbered-up gun
assembly depended.
Cheeks ~ transoms
Each carriage would have required two side pieces or
cheeks (caxas), garnished with iron and fitted with hinged
capsquares to lock the gun's trunnions in place. Four
transoms, at the head, bed, quoin, and trail, would have
joined the cheeks together to form a solid, box-like
structure. Into this the undercarriage assembly would have
been securely recessed, bolted, and strapped. No cheek or
transom components have been identified on the Valencera
Site, although many contemporary illustrations and
descriptions are available. Not all of them are reliable
but those ot Pietro Sardi, ot the early seventeenth century,
not only inspire technical confidence but also closely
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parallel, where they can be checked, the archaeological
evidence.(30)
Limber fitt1egs
A heavy oak beam (Figure 74) from Grid 8.141 has been
identified as a swingletree, doubtless from one of the eight
limbers (armQnes) which the ship carried. A shorter
swingletree would have hung from each end to carry the
harness traces to the first pair of draught animals, while a
linked series of draught poles would have transmitted the
whole team's pull via similar (but somewhat lighter)
swingletree assemblies which would have floated between each
pair of animals.
The Valencera swingletree lacks its iron fittings,
although it is drilled for the traces, which suggests that
it is either a spare or that its limber had been dismantled
for stowage. A large curved timber from Grid 3.148 may,
perhaps, be the rear support of a limber, upon which the
pivoted guncarriage trail slid in an arc as it swung with
the articulation of the limber.
Gun-hoists (cabritas)
A heavy hoist was needed to mount and dismount
artillery, and one is recorded among the ordnance stores
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delivered to La Trinidad Valencera.(31) No parts of it have
been identified among the wreck material, although it would
have consisted of a set of iron-reinforced wooden shear legs
with a ratchetted windlass at its base, through which an
upward pull could be exerted from its apex through a hanging
block. Gun-hoists are illustrated, together with limbers,
guncarriages, munition wagons and other artillery gear in
Hans Sebald Beham's woodcut of Charles V's artillery train
on manoeuvres, published in 1530 (Figure 75).{32)
Drauih t an1mals
Although Hieronimo Lippamano, the Venetian ambassador
at Madrid, reported on 6 February 1588 that 600 mules and
horses had been embarked on the Armada,(33) some deserters
from 'the fleet later stated that ·not above 300 horses and
same mules for carriage of their field ordnance· were on
board when they sailed.(34) Four hulks, the ~ Gabriel[100]
of 280 tons, Ll~[98] ot 400 tons, the Dayid[97] of 450
tons, and the Santiago[96] of 600 tons, were earmarked as
horse transports, and it is difficult to see how they could
have carried between them more than 300 animals, especially
as they also had 210 troops aboard. (35) Some 20 horses would
have been required to draw each of the twelve mounted
canQnes .s1e. baUr, and so this task alone would have
accounted for most of the available animals.(36) Many more
would have been required for the smaller field guns, for the
munition and baggage waggons, as officers' mounts (there was
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no cavalry as such), and as reserves - animal mortality on
the voyage and during the campaign was certain to be high.
The main contingent of animals was evidently to come over
with the Army of Flanders, no doubt on the logistically
sound if strategically dangerous reasoning that the
formidable difficulties of foddering and watering over a
long voyage would thereby be eased. Parma had 10
flat-bottomed craft which could carry 30 horses apiece, with
loading ramps for easy embarkation and disembarkation.(31)
In the event the Dayid failed to make the Corunna
rendezvous (her fate is not known), while the remaining
animals on board the Armada were jettisoned at sea prior to
the north-about voyage, to save water. (38)
Ancilliary eguipment
Each gun required a set of implements for its working
and maintenance. These changed little throughout the history
of smooth-bore artillery and normally included the
following:
Ladle: for inserting a loose charge of powder or a prepared
cartridge into the breech (see Figure 45)
Rammer: for ramming home charge, ball, and wadding (see
Figure 45)
SpoDle: for cleaning out the bore and extinguishing any
burning matter
~: a spiral hook for withdrawing wads or charges from the
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barrel
Pricker: a metal skewer for cleaning out the touch-hole and
piercing the cartridge bag before priming
Touch-hole coyer: an apron placed over the priming pan to
keep the powder dry
Linstock: a starf by which a lighted match was applied to
the priming pan
Handspike:
of the gun
Quoin: a wooden wedge, placed under the breech ot the gun,
by which its elevation could be adjusted.
a lever ot wood or metal for shifting the trail
Tampion: a plug inserted into the muzzle when the gun was
not in use.
A number ot finds in this category were recovered from
the Trinidad Valencera wreck site. They include two sheet
copper ladles (cargadores), appropriate to guns of
approximately 18 cm and 7.6 cm calibre. The design, which
is paralleled by rinds trom the &a. ~ (1545) (39) and
the ~ (1628) (40), allowed the charge to be deposited by
twisting the shatt through 180 degrees when the scoop
reached the breech, and it was suitable for loading either
loose powder or cartridges. Sheet copper for manufacturing
new ladles was carried aboard
including La. Trinidad Valencera,
tound on the wreck site.(41)
sane of the Armada ships,
and a piece of it has been
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A pair of tapered cylindrical oak heads, rounded on
their faces and set on shafts, have been identified as
sponge cores (Figure 76). In use they would have been cased
in sheepskin sheaths, with the fleece outside.(42) Close to
the face ends, where the heads are widest, the wool would
have compressed tightly into the barrel sides and so have
served to dislodge the firing residues, while the looser
wool surrounding the taper behind it (which was normally
soaked in urine) would have gathered and held the loosened
dirt. The heads are 27.5 cm and 26.5 cm long respectively,
with maximum diameters of 11.7 cm and 11.0 cm. The bores of
the guns they served would, of course, have been slightly
greater, to allow for the fit of the sheepskin envelopes.
A touch-hole pricker was also recovered from La
Trinidad Yalencera.
and is 22 cm long.
It is made of 3 mm diameter brass wire,
One end is looped into a handle, while
the other is pointed. When the touch-hole had been reamed
and the cartridge bag pierced, the priming powder would have
been poured from the gunner's priming flask into the hole,
guided by a small funnel. The marqUis of Santa Cruz, in his
planning document ot 1586, called tor 4,000 such funnels, ot
tinplate or copper, which were to be obtained from
Seville.(43) Atter priming, the touch-hole was kept dry with
a cover which might either be a hinged flap like those
associated with the Remigy canones de batir (Figure 40), or
a sheet metal apron, usually ot lead, which was shaped to
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fit over the breech mouldings.
Two gunner's linstocks from La Trinidad Valencera are
lively examples of popular art, for their bold but samewhat
unsophisticated .appearance suggests that they were
manufactured by their owners. The designs are closely
paralleled by finds fram the .Mao. ~, and seem to
represent a widely based gunners' tradition.(44) One, which
is complete, is a turned wooden pole 45 cm long with an
elaborately moulded handle and a fuse holder at the other
end carved in the form of a human hand (Figure 77). An iron
spike was set into the handle end so that the linstock might
be stuck vertically into the ground, or a sand bucket, to
keep the burning fuse out of harm's way until it was
needed. The other linstock, of which only the carved fuse
end survives, takes the form of a dragon's head with the
fuse, which is still in~, emerging from its open mouth
(Figure 78).
A well-preserved wooden handspike was also found on the
wreck. It is a 1.69 cm long pole of chestnut, with wedged
faces cut on its lower end to provide a purchase. None of
the Yilencera guns was found with its tampion in place, but
a cork plug was extracted from the broken end of!l~
"Grifon's bronze media culebrina.
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The artillery train required a great deal of specialist
equipment and tools for the farriers, wheelwrights, wagon
masters, smiths and carpenters responsible for operating and
maintaining it. A full break-down of this equipment is
provided in Santa Cruz's 1586 planning document,(45) and
among the recoveries in this category from la Trinidad
Yalencera are two iron hammer heads - a carpenter's and a
blacksmith's - and a pair of bellows (Figures 79 and 80).
Part of a wheel which may be from an ammunition handcart was
also found (Figure 81).
The Armada's 700 eastadores, or pioneers, were equipped
for heavy labouring in support of the artillery. Their main
task was digging, and for this they were provided with
spades, mattocks, piCks, wooden shovels and baskets, three
implements being carried by each man.(46) The pioneers were
responsible for helping to set up gun emplacements and
platforms, and for erecting defensive obstacles around
them. Part or a cylindrical gabion of hurdle construction
was uncovered on the Valencera site (Figure 82); filled with
earth or sand it would have become an element in a
bullet-proof screen to protect the artillery (Figure 83).
The, Yalencera wreck also yielded a number of fir saplings
with their branches trimmed to present a series of short
spikes. These were doubtless intended for the erection of
barricades such as those shown in Ehard Schoen's woodcut of
the siege of Munster (Figure 84). Another kind of defensive
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construction was the cheval ~ frise, and the large number
of olive-wood sticks pointed at each end which were found on
the Yalencera may have been intended for this purpose. An
illustration in Fronsperger's Kriegsbuch of 1573 shows a
wooden cheval ~ frise which utilises stakes of this
kind.(47) Palisade stakes and constructional timbers of
various sizes were also carried by the fleet, and a number
of these have been identified on the wrecks.
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iv. Munitions
Apart from the 50 rounds allocated to each gun in
fleet, including the sea-mounted canones de batir,
the
200
further rounds were provided for the guns earmarked for use
ashore, together with an appropriate quota of gunpowder.
All of the powder carried by the Armada, which amounted to
5,175~, was fine-grained, so that it could be used by the
hand guns and heavy ordnance alike.(48) The gunpowder was
issued in kegs of 1 ~ capacity, and one of these was
discovered, still partly full, on the wreck of 1a Trinidad
Yalencera (Figure 85). The keg is 61 cm tall, with a
maximum width of 35 cm, and was bound with hoops of split
birch. No iron was used in its construction, doubtless to
avoid the risk of sparking. The viscous black sludge which
the keg contained proved on drying to be finely powdered
charcoal, with slight traces of
presumably is the residue ot
sulphur present. This
its original gunpowder
contents, with most of the sulphur and all of the saltpetre
having leached away.
The estimated capacity ot the restored keg (Figure 90)
is 39 litres. Fine-grained gunpowder packed tight has a
weight/volume ratio of about 1.14 g per cc, from which we
may
about
calculate that the keg's full contents would have been
97 Castilian libras or, as near as makes no
difference, one full Castilian Quintal.
The Armada carried a considerable number of incendiary
devices which the soldiers were expected to use in close sea
actions, just before they boarded an adversary. The
operation of these dangerous and unpredictable weapons was
restricted to men well versed in their use, for in untrained
hands they could be more damaging to friend than to foe.(4g)
A well-preserved example of each of the two main types
involved has been recovered from ~ Trinidad Valencera. The
first is an alcanc!a, or fire-pot, of which 250 were issued
for distribution among the Levantine squadron. (50) The
weapon consists of a bottle 11.5 cm tall and 10.5 cm wide,
about half a litre in capacity, made of lightly fired red
earthenware covered externally with a clear glaze (Figure
86). It is of hour-glass shape, with a pinched waist and
narrow neck. A very similar device is illustrated by Lucar,
in a work published in 1588 (Figure 87); it is shown ready
for firing, with several lighted matches tied round its
waist to ignite the charge when the pot shattered on
impact.(51) The neck is sealed with a tightly whipped canvas
patch. Lucar gives several recipes for the content of the
charge; all are based on gunpowder, volatile spirits, and
viscous materials such as pitch or gum, in order to produce
an effect similar to that of modern napalm. He especially
recommends firepots for use in close-quarter fights at sea.
Several other contemporary writers describe these weapons,
and two further examples have recently been recovered from
underwater excavations. (52) The Armada's alcanc!as were
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probably made in Lisbon.(53)
A second type ot incendiary weapon was the bomba, or
trunk, ot which 150 were issued to the Leventine
squadron.(54) .Thewreck ot La Trinidad Valeneera has yielded
a complete example which is, as tar as I know, the only one
ot its kind to have survived into modern times (Figure 88).
Its fragile condition and the problems inherent in
conserving a composite artifact whose internal arrangements
and contents are not known have so far precluded detailed
examination, and only a general description can be given at
the time of writing. Its external case is a hollow cylinder
ot wood 70 cm long and 10 em in diameter, bound along its
length with cord and strips of fabric. One end is tapered,
and has a socket for a shaft. We may surmise that the
interior is filled with a variety of explosive and
combustible materials, together with a number of
shrapnel-like prOjectiles,
discharge lasting several
arranged to give a sequential
seconds. Held on long poles by
the leading troops in an assault, such weapons were designed
to injure, terrify, and contuse the enemy during the
storming ot a breach or the entering of a ship. Various
kinds ot trunk are described and illustrated in the
contemporary technical literature,(55) while troops are
shown carrying them in Hogenberg's woodcut of the arrest of
the duke of Aarschot in 1577 (Figure 89).(56)
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It is appropriate to mention here another type of
close-range weapon particularly suited to the boarding
actions which the Spaniards hoped for. A 38 cm hooked iron
,
blade from ~~ Grifon, with its inner curve edged, has
been identified as a shear hook, intended to tear down an
enemy's rigging when the ships were grappled together.
These hooks might either be attached to the ends of the yard
arms, or they could be mounted on long poles and wielded by
hand.(57)
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v. Provisions
By the standards of its day, the Armada was quite
adequately provided with food and beverages for the journey
to England. The fleet had originally been supplied with six
months' rations for all who sailed with it, and in spite of
heavy spoilage during the early part of the voyage there had
been substantial replenishment at Corunna. Even allowing
for 50 percent wastage there was more than enough to cover
the expected duration of the campaign, especially since the
landings would coincide with the English harvest. It was
the unintended voyage home, without replenishment of water,
that caused the terrible privations which the Spanish were
eventually to endure.
Ration scales were strictly laid down by the duke of
Medina Sidonia in his Instructions to Shipmasters, given out
at Lisbon on 21 April 1588.(58) Their contents may be
summarised thus:
Sundays and
Thursdays:
Mondays and
Wednesdays:
1 1/2 ~ of biscuit or 2 ~ fresh bread
1/3 azumbre of wine (or 1 cuartillQ of
Candia w1ne, which was much stronger)
3 cuartillQs of water (fQr all purposes)
6 ~ of bacon and 2 ~ of r1ce
Daily:
6 ~ of cheese and 3 ~ of beans
or ohick peas
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Fridays and
Saturdays:
6 ~ fish (tunny or cod, failing which
6 ~ of squid or five sardines)
1 1/2 ~ oil and 1/4 cuartillos
of vinegar
Wednesdays:
A considerable quantity of butchered pig bones have
been found on the wreck of 1a Trinidad Valencera. All the
carcasses appear to have been split lengthwise, including
the head. A single tuna vertebra was also identified. In
addition to the official rations a good deal of luxury items
seem to have been carried, as the finds of brazil nuts,
coconut, pine cone, plum and bay-leaf remains indicate.
The fleet's stores of water and wine were accounted for
in pipas,
ascertain.
a measure whose precise value is difficult to
Fortunately the remains of a large barrel were
excavated on the wreck of 1£ Trinidad Valencera, from which
a full reconstruction has been possible (Figure 90). This
is an important discovery in view of the close relationship
between liquid measurement and the calculation of shipping
tonnages. During the sixteenth century the Seville tonelada
(in which there were two pipas) underwent major changes
which are as yet imperfectly understood. Chaunu has
suggested that the tonelada fluctuated from 70 percent to
120 percent of its "classic" standard of 334 gallons (1059
litres), giving a range of 233 gallons (1059 litres) to 400
gallons (1818 litres).(59) The capacity of the restored
Valencera ~ is about 130 gallons (591 litres), and while
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distortion and errors of reconstruction may to same extent
have affected the accuracy of this estimate it falls well
within Chaunu's range and, in default of better evidence,
may be taken to suggest that the Armada's ~ of account
was around this mark. This gives the tonelada a value of
~. 260 gallons (1181 litres).
With two exceptions, the other commodities were
accounted for in Quintales, which suggests that they were
supplied loose, and could be weighed separately from their
containers. The exceptions are oil and vinegar, which are
accounted for in arrobas, and the discovery of two olive
jars on La Trinidad Yalencera each with a capacity of half a
Castilian arroba (6.25 litres) strongly suggests that these
commodities were supplied in these vessels (Figure 91).(60)
Medina Sidonia emphasised in his Instructions that all
ration issues were to be served out strictly in accord with
the certified weights and measures supplied to each ship,
and a number of weighing implements, including two
steelyards,
(Figure 92).
have been recovered from the Yalencera site
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vi. General equipment
In addition to its warlike stores and basic provisions
the Armada brought with it a vast array of domestio
impedimenta. Tentage was provived for the senior officers,
the field hospital, and the storage of munitions and
foodstuff.(61) Tent pegs and mallets have been found on the
Trinidad Yalencera wreck. The rank-and-fUe, however, were
expected to improvise their own temporary shelters, or
barracas, in the field.(62) The basic messing sub-unit in
the Spanish army was the camarada, a group of seven or eight
men who shared a barraca, cooked together, and looked after
each others' interests.(63) At least some of the rations
issued at sea appear to have been cooked centrally and
issued to representatives of the individual camaradas, but
in the field meals were prepared from basic rations within
the camarada itself. This fact probably explains the two
distinct sizes of food containers which have been identified
on the wrecks, of pewter, pottery, and treen: the larger
being for the communally prepared camarada meals, and the
smaller for individual helpings. Examples of these various
utensils in treen are shown in Figure 93.
The marquis of Santa Cruz, in his 1586 planning
document, called for 100,000 pieces of glazed earthenware,
to be supplied in equal proportions by the potteries of
Seville and Lisbon. The vessels specified were "platos,
- 353 -
escudillas, ollas y jarros"; that is, plates, small bowls or
cups, pots and jugs.(64) These pottery forms account for the
bulk of the ceramics recovered from the wrecks, and most can
be shown to be either of Sevillian or Portuguese origin. A
set of Portuguese green-glazed red earthenware vessels from
1£ Trinidad Valencera which conforms closely to Santa Cruz's
specification is shown in Figure 94. Similar forms have
been identified in the distinctive Sevillian tin-glazed
while the Santa Marfa ~ la~ has yielded awares,
ceramic type, not found on any of the other wrecks, which
probably originated at or near her home port of San
Sebastian.
Unglazed Merida-type red earthenware, much of which is
probably Portuguese, is also common on the wrecks. Most of
the forms recorded are lidded jars of many sizes and shapes,
with a lack of uniformity which suggests that they may have
been containers for luxury commodities brought aboard
privately by individuals at Lisbon. The absence of the
,well-known Merida-type costrels is notable, and is perhaps
best explained by the unsuitability of ceramic water
containers for shipboard or campaign use: leather drinking
bottles of the kind found on La Trinidad Valencera would
have provided a more serviceable alternative.
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As a domestic group the Armada wares are remarkable for
their plainness. Comparable groups from contemporary Spanish
and Portuguese contexts include a large proportion of
decorated wares, usually amounting to well over half the
excavated sherds. This reinforces the probability that the
bulk of the Armada's pottery was made to a utility contract
standard, intended solely for issue (doubtless against
stoppage of pay) to the troops.(65)
Some exotic wares have, however, been identified. They
include a small group of Spanish and Italian maiolicas, a
single fragment of Raeren stoneware, and four pieces,
including an intact bowl, of Wan Li porcelain (Figure 95).
Venetian maiolica from ~ Trinidad Valencera reminds us of
the ship's origin, while the German stoneware from the same
wreck emphasises Spain's links with northern Europe. The
Chinese porcelain, which also came from the Valencera, would
have been a rare and valuable commodity in 1588: it is
typical of early export ware, and presumably belonged to one
of the wealthier officers or gentlemen-adventurers on
board. It reached Spain, we may suppose, by way of the
Manila Galleon and the trans-Atlantic flotas.(66)
Pewter was an up-market alternative to pottery or
treen, although the considerable quantity yielded by the
Trinidad Valencera suggests that its possession was not
confined to the higher ranks. Virtually all of it is
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probably of Dutch or English manufacture, for there was no
domestic pewter industry in Spain and kitchen utensils in
this and other materials were frequently imported from these
sources. In 1583-4, for example, the English Privy Council
authorised the dispatch of a consignment of domestic
utensils and musical instruments to no less a customer than
the duke of Medina Sidonia himself.(67)
A curious postscript to this trade is provided by a
pewter plate from La Trinidad Valencera. It bears the
English crowned Tudor rose touch-mark, flanked by the
pewterer's initials W R - perhaps William Reo, who
flourished between 1547 and 1588.(68) On either side of the
touch the customer's initials, I Z have been letter-punched,
suggesting that its original owner was Juan Zapata whose
son, Sebastian, was on board the Valencera (he died, after
capture, at Drogheda).{69) The plate is in perfect
condition, except that the central part of the Tudor arms -
which might understandably have struck its owner as a
thoroughly offensive symbol long before he reached Donegal -
has been neatly excised with a punch!
Items of camp equipment represented by finds from the
wrecks include lanterns (Figure 97; see also Figure 89),
copper buckets, and brushes. More personal objects include
various religious medallions (two from La Trinidad Valencera
are illustrated in Figure 9'), a sweetheart's ring from the
Girona which shows an unclasped girdle with the inscription
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"no tengo mas Que dar te" ("I have nothing more to give
you"),(70) and, from the Valencera, a boxwood comb and a
birdcage. The Valencera has also yielded parts of three
musical instruments - the fingerboard of a cittern, the
wooden end-plates of a small accordion, and a tambourine.
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Part IV: Conclusion
Chapter Nine: The fighting potential of the Spanish Armada
Whatever credibility the Armada may have possessed as a
fighting force does not, of course, alter the historical
outcome of the campaign. From the Spanish point of view it
failed, and failed completely. But, as we established in
the introduction to this thesis, that failure was not
necessarily a foregone conclusion. What, therefore,
prevented the Armada from achieving the objectives for which
it was sent?
It is not my purpose to analyse the weaknesses in the
higher-level strategy and planning behind Philip II's
Enterprise of England. These factors have already been
examined by modern historians and a broad consensus
reached.(l) It is widely accepted that the Flanders
rendezvous proved to be, in the event, the rock upon which
the plan foundered - a danger of which, incidentally, Santa
Cruz, Parma, and later Medina Sidonia, had been only too
aware. Still, it just might have worked. If, after the
fireship attack on 7 August, the rest of the Spanish fleet
had stood firm with Medina Sidonia and his close supports,
it is difficult to see how the English could have dislodged
them. The deep-water port of Calais was only two days'
march from Dunkirk, and for months Parma had been courting
the goodwill and tacit support of the French, no doubt with
- 358 -
this very contingency in mind.(2) The Seigneur de Gourdan,
Governor of Calais, might well have been prevailed upon to
allow the embarkation of troops. Then again, Justin of
Nassau's blockading Dutch flyboats only reached their
crucial station off the Banks of Flanders in the nick of
time, and had the wind during the first few days of August
kept in the westerly quarter they might never have left the
ScheIdt. If they had remained in port, the Spanish link-up
off Flanders could have been achieved without effective
opposition.
After Calais the fleets were, in a naval sense,
stalemated. For reasons we have already touched upon, and
will develop further below, neither side proved able to
inflict outright defeat upon the other. This was an outcome
for which Philip had not provided. He had accepted that the
Spaniards might lose a battle at sea, before Flanders was
reached, but he had assumed that the Armada, if it reached
the rendezvous at all, would have defeated the English fleet
as a ~ ~~ of getting there. That both fleets might
arrive at this point more or less unscathed had not occurred
to him. Underlying the detailed instructions he sent to his
commanders (none were delivered or discussed in person) is a
clear recognition that, unless the mere presence of the
Armada off the English coast proved enough to bring
Elizabeth to the negotiating table, a sea battle to win
supremacy for the cross-Channel jump was inevitable.
Perhaps Medina Sidonia's cardinal error was that he did not
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fully grasp this essential point. He saw his duty simply as
one of bringing the Armada intact to Parma. To him, the
fleet was an armed convoy concerned solely with getting one
component of a combined invasion force from A to B. Seen in
these terms, his command of it was almost flawless. But to
the king - who must surely carry the blame for failing to
convey this crucial information unequivocally to the man he
chose as its commander - the Armada was to be a task force,
capable not only of playing its role in the invasion but
also of clearing any opposition which might prevent that
invasion from taking place.
But, had it come to an all-out battle to determine the
issue before Flanders was reached, how would the Armada have
fared as a naval force? To same extent this question is
answered by the outcome of the final engagement off
Gravelines when, for the first time, the two fleets came to
close quarters. Before we consider this matter, however, we
must first demolish once and for all two misconceptions upon
which most modern interpretations of the fighting have been
based.
Both relate to artillery. The first is the assumption,
which we have shown to be incorrect, that long light-shot ted
culverin-type guns threw their projectiles further than did
the short and heavy-shotted cannon-types.(3) The Spaniards,
so this argument runs, wanted to close and board, and so
opted for short-range heavies with which to immobilise an
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adversary before launching a final boarding assault.
Conversely the English, who wished to avoid just such an
eventuality, went for culverin-types so that they could
exploit their better sailing qualities to stay just out of
range of the Spanish cannons but within range of their own
long guns. This supposed difference in armament policy has
been held to explain why the English consistently refused to
close the range until Gravelines, and then only closed it
because (so it was believed) the Spaniards had run out of
shot. But, as we have seen, this assumption is based on an
entirely false technical premise, and may therefore be
discounted without further argument.
A consideration of the guns on both sides, moreover,
suggests that the Spaniards had no real supremacy in
cannon-types, and that the English did not possess the
greater number of culverins.(4) The only true cannons
carried by either side in the campaign were the dozen or so
canones ~ batir of the invasion force's siege train which,
although they were speCially mounted for temporary service
at sea, were probably too heavy and unwieldy for effective
shipboard operation. This argument 1s developed further
below, and gains support from the fact that, alone of all
the guns recovered from the wrecks, the two canones ~ batir
from La Trinidad Yalencera were not loaded when found. The
apparent Spanish superiority in this respect is therefore
an illusory one.
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In fact the heavy naval guns on both sides appear to
have been remarkably similar. Modern confusion in
interpreting Armada-period artillery is rooted not in the
guns themselves but in the names given to them by their
users. An attempt to provide a working vocabulary of
Spanish and English gun-names is set out in Appendix 3.
From this it appears that a contemporary Englishman would
call any gun of around the 18-pounder mark, irrespective of
its length, a culverin. A Spaniard, on the other hand,
would only label such a gun a culebrina if it possessed true
long-gun proportions; otherwise, to him, it would be a mediQ
,canon. But an English dem1-cannon would be different again;
a short 30-pounder or thereabouts which a Spaniard would
call a canOn. I believe that there were very few true full
culverins on either side, whatever the misconceptions of the
time, since they would simply have been too long to handle
aboard ship. Thus the apparent Spanish preponderance of
canones and medios canones is balanced almost exactly by the
greater number, on paper, of English demi-cannons and
culverins. From this it appears that ~e mdn
"ship-killers" in the conflict were short- or medium-length
15- to 30-pounders, and in this category the two sides were
fairly evenly matched.
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The second modern misconception is that the Spaniards
ran out of shot at Gravelines, so rendering impotent their
supposed preponderance of short-range ship-killers. This,
it is argued, allowed the English to close the range and,
for the first time, inflict real hull damage on their
adversaries.(5) But, as we have seen, our wrecks have
produced large quantities of ammunition,
larger calibres. All of these ships,
front-line 'trouble-shooting' units,
been heavily involved in the fighting.
especially of the
moreover, were
and all of them had
Medina Sidonia, it
is true, blamed the lack of projectiles as a reason for the
Armada's failure at Gravelines, and some of the principal
ships may indeed have exhausted their shot lockers in this
final fight.(6) It is worth noting, however, that when the
duke had earlier complained of a shortage of ammunition, and
had sent an urgent request to Parma for fresh supplies, he
had specified that the calibres required were 4-, 6-, and
10-~.(7) Why, it might be asked, had he exhausted his
stocks of light anti-personnel ammunition, but presumably
still had plenty of the heavier ship-killing shot left?
We can only conclude that, contrary to modern opinion,
both sides possessed substantial ammunition stocks for their
main battery guns when the Gravelines engagement began, and
that the Spaniards, if anything, were better supplied than
the English. By the end of that fight - an ending brought
about prematurely because the English themselves ran out of
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ammunition - considerable punishment had been inflicted on
the Armada, which had been able to mete out almost none in
return. Why then, if the range was right and the stocks of
ammunition not exhausted, did the Spanish gunners fail in
the moment of crisis?
It is in the operation and handling of the guns and not
in their relative sizes or supplies of ammunition that the
answers must be sought. Very little is known of gunnery
procedures in the sixteenth century, particularly at sea,
and neither the documentary nor the archaeological sources
are of much direct help in this respect. Both, however,
provide a number of circumstantial clues. On the Spanish
side these combine to suggest that the operation of heavy
guns at sea had been so little considered or practised as to
reduce any attempt to deploy them in battle to
irreconCilable chaos. On the other hand, evidence from the
English side hints that gunnery procedures aboard ship -
though no doubt abysmally sloppy and inefficient if set
against the highly disciplined routines of Nelson's day -
were in comparison markedly less chaotic. In a battle such
as Gravelines, the like of which had never been fought
before, quite a modest difference in the degree of chaos
upon the gun decks of the contending fleets would provide
ample explanation of the final result.
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We know more about the composition of the Spanish gun
crews than we do of the Engl1shones, and it is therefore
convenient to consider them first. Captain Alonso Vanegas,
an officer aboard the ~ Mart!n, states that each gun on
the flagship was manned by a gun-captain (ayudante) and six
soldiers, under the overall supervision of a master-gunner
(condestable) and six artillery officers.(8) This command
structure is confirmed by the duke of Medina Sidonia's
battle orders for the flagship, which allocate two artillery
officers to each side of the two gun decks, eight in all.(9)
There is no further information on how the gun crews were
organised, how they operated, or what (if any) training they
received.
What is clear, however, is that the crews were composed
of soldiers and not seamen. The ~ Martin's 177 mariners
would in any case have been fully occupied in working the
ship. But if six soldiers were permanently assigned to each
of the flagship's 48 guns, 288 out of the 302 troops she
carried would have been thus employed. True, her smaller
pieces and swivel guns may have required fewer men to work
them, but against this must be set the probability that the
bigger guns demanded more - in Nelson's day a 32-pounder,
"roughly equivalent to a sixteenth century Spanish canQn,
needed a crew of twelve. Medina Sidonia's battle orders,
however, make it plain that when at action stations the
mOSQueteros and arcabuzeros were deployed as infantry, not
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as gunners.(10) This apparent anomaly is best resolved by
assuming that working the ship's guns was only a secondary
duty of the soldiers, for which they might, as required, be
withdrawn from their allotted firing stations.
Such an arrangement, if I have interpreted it
correctly, can scarcely have been a satisfactory one. A
Spanish infantryman, with his firearm, lighted slow match,
powder and shot, morion, jerkin, side-arms, hose, and shoes
would have been ill suited to a task for which bare feet,
breeches, and headscarf were the traditional attire. Nor
was the management of big guns at sea something to be
tackled on the spur of the moment by an untrained landsman,
however brave and well disciplined he might have been. And
finally, to make matters worse, the mountings and equipment
with which the Spanish guns were provided appear to have
been of entirely the wrong kind for efficient use at sea.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
naval gunnery was an evolving and far from perfected art in
which the Spaniards, relative to the English, lagged far
behind. We have already seen that many of the Armada's guns
were mounted on field carriages, and we have reason to
believe that those carriages which the Spaniards called
encayalgados ~ ~ in the documents were, in fact, little
more then cut-down versions of the basic field carriage
design: that is, they had a pair of large-diameter wheels
and a sliding trail which extended well beyond the' breech.
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This suspicion is confirmed by Mainwaring and Monson in the
early seventeenth century, both of whom blame poor Spanish
sea gunnery on a still widespread use of field carriages on
board ship.{ll)
The technical difficulties of working muzzle-loading
guns at sea were formidable. They had to be kept well
secured - several tons of bronze or iron mounted on an
ungainly chassis might easily, if control of it were lost,
sink a ship - but at the same time it was necessary to
absorb the considerable recoil and to allow the operations
ot scouring, sponging, charging and priming to be carried
out.(12) Some means had to be provided for elevating and
traversing the pieces if targets beyond point-blank range
were to be engaged, and for etfective tac~cal deployment in
battle a ship's guns had to be responsive to a measure of
overall direction and fire control.
Efticient mountings for the guns were therefore of
crucial importance. At sea two-wheeled carriages with
trails, whether full land carriages or versions cut-down for
naval use, possessed fundamental detects. Because ot the
rearward extension of the trail, weapons thus mounted
occupied as much as twice the length ot the guns
themselves. The forward edges of the carriage wheels,
moreover, extended well beyond the guns' centres ot gravity
(which naturally lay behind the carriage axles), so limiting
the amount of muzzle which could protrude through the
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gunports. Virtually the full length of the guns and their
unwieldy carriages therefore had to lie inboard, so taking
up much of the severely limited deck space and, in all
probability, encroaching upon the line of similarly mounted
pieces along the opposite broadside.
A further problem in using such carriages at sea must
be considered. The large-diameter wheels and deep cheek
pieces would have raised the centre-line of the gun barrels,
along the axes of which the whole assemblies recoiled, to a
point high above the deck. If allowed an unrestrained
recoil the piece would have jumped violently upwards as well
as backwards, a potentially dangerous and damaging procedure
which could only have been held in check by lashing gun and
carriage firmly to the ship's side. But this would have had
a less obvious though progressively more damaging effect on
the vessel's structure. An incident in the fighting seems
to illustrate, in a most graphic way, the cumulative effect
such stresses might have on a vessel's hull. It concerns
the gallant and much engaged Portuguese galleon ~ Mateo[61
off the Banks of Flanders which, after heavy fighting, was
seen to have been "opened up by her own artillery".(13) This
curious phrase can only mean, I think, that the recoil of
the ~ Mateo's guns had begun to pull her structure apart.
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In the light of these observations, how did the
Spaniards actually operate their artillery during the Armada
campaign? The guns were, as we know from Medina Sidonia's
instructions to the fleet and from our own discoveries on
the wrecks, always kept loaded, so that when battle was
joined one salvo was available for immediate use.(14) An
operator holding a lighted linstock beside each gun was
therefore
discharge.
the only requirement for
This is exactly how a galley
this preliminary
was expected to
in the brief momentloose off its close-range cannonade
before it rammed its foe; there would be no opportunity or
need for reloading, and so no procedure existed for
reloading as a battle-drill. Spanish sailing ship tactics
also envisaged the broadside as a device for crippling and
confusing an adversary as an immediate prelude to boarding.
"The aim of our men," Philip had instructed Medina Sidonia
shortly before the Armada sailed, "must be to bring the
enemy to close quarters and grapple with him."(15) But the
kind of fighting the English had developed, and imposed so
successfully on the Spaniards at Gravelines, involved a
continuous close-range bombardment intended to destroy an
enemy by the attrition of gunfire alone. Given that their
inferior sailing qualities prevented the Spaniards from
closing and boarding as they would have liked, their only
counter to such tactics was to attempt to reply in kind. To
do this, however, they would have had to reload their guns
time and again during the course of an engagement. Not only
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was this practice outside the tactical experience of the
Spanish commanders and their crews, but it was also one for
which their gunnery equipment was fundamentally unsuited.
There are two ways in which muzzle-loading guns can be
reloaded at sea. They can either be brought inboard so that
access to the muzzle is made available within the ship, or
they can be left in the fully run-out position and loaded
outboard. As I will discuss further with reference to
English gun-drills, the later practice of allowing a gun's
own recoil to bring it inboard under the restraint of a
breeching rope appears to have been unknown in the sixteenth
century, although it was obviously possible, after firing,
to unhitch the piece and haul it back manually. This
process would be laborious but reasonably efficient, and
during the course of it the crew would be covered from the
view, and to some extent from the fire, of the enemy.
Outboard loading was far more awkward and dangerous, though
it required a much smaller crew, and involved straddling the
gun outside the port and carrying out the clearing and
charging operations from this exposed and difficult
position. In spite of its obvious disadvantages this method
was still occasionally used in the seventeenth century, and
two examples may be cited by way of illustration. The first
involved an Icelandic gunner serving aboard the Danish
frigate Christianshayn in 1622. His ship, he tells us in
his Memoirs, had been cleared for action against a suspected
corsair off Gibraltar, and he had been ordered to load his
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guns outboard. He went on: "When I had loaded the first gun
and was lying outside the gunwale on the next, a heavy wave
struck the port side three times, whereupon the ship rolled
all the starboard guns over, and me on my gun with them. I
swallowed much water, and was nearly carried away•••"(16)
The second incident took place off the Cape Verde Islands in
1686, .when an English merchantman was attacked by five
pirate ships. An officer on board described the resulting
action. The merchantman was able to beat off the attack, he
explained, because "their men [the pirates] loading their
great guns without board (as is the custom of these West
India gunner pirates) were cut off as fast as they appeared
to do their duty, and this was the reason they fired but few
great guns when they bore down upon us, for which we are
beholden unto our small arms•••"(17)
Which of these procedures the Spanish gunners used in
1588 we cannot know for certain, but the design of their
guncarriages suggests that it would have been impractical,
because of the lack of working space on the gundecks, for
the pieces to have been loaded inboard while a ship was
closely engaged. At the same time it would have been little
short of suicidal to attempt outboard loading within
small-arms range of an enemy. The probability is,
therefore, that once close action was joined most Spanish
ships only managed to get off their previously prepared
salvo, after which sustained gunfire ceased. This does not
necessarily mean that no further firing was possible.
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Outboard loading might sometimes have been carried out in
comparative safety on the disengaged side, while no doubt
the smaller pieces, being shorter and more easily managed,
were often hauled in and reloaded. But it seems certain
that the big ship-killing guns were never able to apply a
continuous close-range cannonade against the enemy, although
this was the only way in which they might have achieved
success.
This hypothesis explains why the ~ Mart!n ran out of
light but not heavy shot well before Gravelines, and why so
many of the front-line trouble-shooters, as evidenced by the
wrecks, still possessed plenty of ship-killing ammunition
after the battle was over. It also explains why so much of
El ~ GrifOn's heaviest shot - that intended for her four
medias culebrinas - remained unused. Further indication of
the extremely limited rate of fire achieved by the Spanish
gunners comes from the records of a number of the hired
ships, which were expected to produce a detailed account of
each royal projectile expended. The 22-gun Levanter
Trinidad ~ Escala[77] fired thirty-five shots on 2 August
(1.6 rounds per gun), twenty-one shots on 4 August (0.96
rounds per gun), and thirty-eight shots on 8 August (1.7
rounds per gun).(18) The Gulpuzcoan Santa Barbara[59], which
appears to have had twenty guns instead of the twelve
credited to her in the Lisbon muster, fired twenty-two shots
on 31 July (1.1 rounds per gun), twenty-eight on 1 August
(1.4 rounds per gun), forty-seven on 2 August (2.35 rounds
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per gun), and 167 on 8 August (8.35 rounds per gun).(19)
Over the full period of fighting the Andalusian almiranta
~ Francisco[44] fired 241 rounds from her twenty-one guns,
an average of 11.5 per gun.(20) Her two heaviest pieces,
full canones of 75- and 60-Atx, discharged ten and twelve
balls respectively. These figures come nowhere near to
acoounting for the fifty rounds with which, according to the
Lisbon muster, each gun had been provided.
The conclusion is inescapable that, when it came to the
test, Spanish sea-gunnery failed almost completely, and that
the larger the calibre of gun the less likely it was to be
fired. Confusion on the gun-decks was no doubt exacerbated
by the almost total lack of weapon standardisation or of an
overall system of weights and measures, by a oorresponding
weakness in numeracy on the part of the gunners, and by
sub-standard and often dangerous guns like the off-centre
media culebrina from El~ GrifOn. A telling and almost
contemporary parallel to this lamentable state of affairs
can be drawn from the observations of the Dutch traveller
van Linschoten, who in 1589 experienced a minor action with
some small English privateers while he was a passenger
aboard the 1600-ton Portuguese carrack Santa~. WWhen we
shot off a piece," he wrote, "we had at least an hour's work
to lade it in again, whereby we had so great a noise and cry
in the ship as if we had all been cast away."(21)
- 373 -
A heavy price was paid by the Spaniards at Gravelines
for approaching artillery-based sea warfare in logistical
rather than in technical and human terms. No matter what
guns were carried, how many artillery "experts" employed, or
how lavish the provision of powder and shot, little could be
achieved unless the weapons-system as a whole could be
deployed effectively in battle. Just how ineffective that
deployment turned out to be off Gravelines is reflected by
the low casualties and minimal ship damage actually suffered
by the English fleet. ,
What, then, of the other side? Without question the
English artillery was used to good effect at Gravelines, and
although few Spanish ships were actually sunk or crippled at
the time the damage many sustained during this action was
later to be their undoing off the Atlantic coasts of
Scotland and Ireland. Much of the damage was low down in
the hull, confirming Philip II's earlier appraisal of
English gunnery tactics.(22) Some of the battle damage
suffered by the Spaniards has already been considered, and
four out of our five wrecks evidently received severe injury
to their hulls. The Santa Marfa .4e. l..a ~ had been,
according to her only survivor, "shot through four times,
and one of the shots was between the wind and the water,
whereof they thought she would have sunk."(23) Both La
Trinidad ,Valencera and El ~ Grifon sustained hull damage
so severe that their crews were forced eventually to run
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them ashore, while a Ragusan survivor from the ~ .s!Y.a..n ~
Sicilia later reported that at Gravelines a group of
English ships had battered the ship "so heavily from their
guns that they completely shattered her... [we had to]
repair the damage from the many shots which the ship had
received alow and aloft and from the prow to the stern, and
below the waterline in places difficult to repair... The
ship remained so damaged and battered by cannon balls that
she could move forward only with great difficulty".(24)
But, in spite of these evident successes, the
achievements of the English gunners at Gravelines were not
without their critics. William Thomas, an English
master-gunner stationed at Flushing at the time of the
campaign, was one of them. On 30 September 1588 he wrote to
Lord Burghley: "•••if it had pleased God that her Majesty's
ships had been manned with a full supply of good gunners
according to the forces they carry... it would have been
the woefullest time or enterprise that ever the Spaniards
took in hand... What can be said but our sins was the cause
that so much powder and shot spent, and so long time in
fight, and, in comparison thereof, so little harm?"(25)
One shortcoming was certainly in the provision of shot.
But while we know that the Spaniards carried, on paper at
least, fifty rounds per gun, we do not know the
corresponding English figure. There are, indeed, no grounds
for supposing that any standard quota existed, for the
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response to the Armada had been an essentially ~~
business throughout. The ships simply had to make do with
what they could get, and royal supplies of ammunition were
chronically short and jealously husbanded. Professor Lewis
has considered the question in detail, and concluded that
the average figure per gun probably fell somewhere between
twenty and thirty - that is, almost exactly half the Spanish
one.(26) This shortfall was to some extent made good by a
trickle
crisis
of fresh
developed,
supplies
and by
from the royal arsenals as the
a hurried distribution of
ammunition from the captured ~ Salvador and Nuestra Senora
~ Rosario. Even so, a considerable proportion of the
limited stock available was expended to little effect during
the long-range engagements in the Channel, and after only a
few hours at Gravelines all that remained had been used up.
Had replenishment been possible at this point the outcome
would no doubt have been much more decisive.
And yet, as we have seen, it was decisive enough. If
the Spaniards' failure at Gravelines was due to their almost
total inability to work ship-killing guns in a close
engagement, England's limited successes in the same fight
must imply at least some measure of competence upon the gun
decks. Several reasons may be adduced. First, the English
gunners were seamen, and were therefore presumably familiar
both with the particular guns carried aboard their own
vessels and with the tasks of handling them on shipboard.
Men detailed to work the guns were not expected, as were the
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Spaniards, to double as soldiers, and in consequence they
military clothing andwould have been unencumbered with
accoutrements. At least some of them, moreover, had
undergone training with the precious live ammunition, though
apparently such prodigality met with official disapproval.
Overall, considered the contemporary English artillery
theorist William Bourne, his practical counterparts made
good gunners because they were "hardy and without fear of
their ordnance", and they were "handsome about their
ordnance in ships, on the sea•••".(27)
Bourne unwittingly touches upon yet another probable
cause of the English superiority in gunnery. He possessed,
as he explained in his Introduction to the Arte of Shooting
in Great Ordnaunce, no personal experience as an
artilleryman, but he had read all the continental books on
the subject and could therefore justify his presumption in
attempting to distil their joint wisdom in English by
pointing out that, unlike the Italians, French and
Spaniards, Englishmen had no ready access to the theoretical
basis of the subject, excellent though they were as working
gunners. His book was intended to make good that
deficiency. Most of this theoretical knowledge, however, we
now know to have been unnecessarily complicated, usually
inaccurate, often spurious, and generally of little
practical help. KQ1 to have easy access to or interest in
such information may have been one of the English gunners'
greatest strengths. Early modern gunnery was a dangerous
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and haphazard business, but it was not essentially a complex
one, and the real requirement for it was not booklearning
but common sense, familiarity, and a good measure of brawn.
The possession by the English of a single standard of
weights and measures must have been another practical
advantage of inestimable value.
What techniques, then, did the English use to work
their guns at Gravelines?
That the use of the four-wheeled truck carriage was in
widespread service aboard English ships well before the end
of the sixteenth century has long been known from
documentary and iconographic sources, and the date of its
introduction has now been pushed back at least as far as the
1540s by the recent discovery of several intact examples on
the wreck of the ~ ~.(28) The design of such a
carriage was much better suited to shipboard use than the
two-wheeled trail carriages with which the Spaniards were
evidently equipped (Figure 56). It was very simple. TWo
short wooden cheek pieces were fastened to a base-board to
which were fixed axletrees fore and aft, upon each of which
was set a pair of small wooden wheels or trucks. The front
trucks were rather larger than the rear ones, partly to
accommodate deck camber and partly because they took the
main weight of the whole assembly. The gun sat on its
trunnions close to the fore part of the carriage so that its
centre of gravity lay just to the rear of the front trucks.
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Because of the small wheel diameter almost the whole of the
gun's chase could be thrust through the gunport, while the
rear of the carriage did not extend beyond the breech. A
gun mounted on such a carriage would therefore protrude
further through its port than one mounted on the two-wheeled
type, and it had no awkward trail or wide wheels to obstruct
its sides and rear. Adequate working space for the crew was
therefore available beside and behind it.
Although a number of structural refinements were added
to this design over the succeeding two centuries, its
general appearance remained substantially unchanged until
well after Nelson's day. At some time during the first half
of the seventeenth century - probably around 1625 - the
practice of allowing the whole assembly to recoil inboard
for reloading was introduced, a procedure for which the
compact design of the truck carriage was particularly well
suited.(29) Such a practice was not, however, current in
1588. William Bourne implied as much when he instructed how
a ship's ordnance should be "fast breeched" when run out for
aotion, while a detail on the Smerwiok map of 1580 oonfirms
that truck-mounted guns were always made seoure before
firing.(30) The detail (Figure 57) shows two ship's guns
which have been brought ashore from the English fleet to
invest the Papal force's position from the landward side.
Both are emplaoed behind a gabion-built rampart and ditch,
in front of whioh substantial anchor holdfasts have been
rigged. Such an arrangement would only have been necessary
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if it had been intended to hold the guns' recoil fully in
check.
It does not follow, however, that if the guns were not
allowed to recoil inboard they had to be reloaded outboard.
With truck mountings there would have been ample space on
the decks to haul them in manually after firing and this, I
suggest, was the procedure adopted by the English in 1588.
An inventory of gunnery eqUipment issued to the Queen's
ships Elizabeth Bonayenture and Aid in 1585 includes bowsing
tackles (for running guns out), talling or tailing tackles
(for pulling them inboard), and double and single blocks for
providing the necessary mechanical advantages.(31)
Breechings and lashers were provided for securing the guns
inboard when not in use. That provision was also made for
traversing and elevating the gun assemblies is indicated by
the issue of crows, sledges and quoins. Bourne stressed the
importance of elevation and timing in shooting the roll,
with the enemy rising from a trough to present his
vulnerable lower hull.(32) Gunner and steersman, he
emphasised, must work in the closest co-operation. The
application of such principles at Gravelines must surely
explain the hull damage meted out to the Spaniards,
confirming Philip II's fears that the dastardly English
would indeed fire low.
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Guns, however, are only part of a naval weapons system.
The platforms upon which they are carried, and the capacity
of those platforms to be placed where the weapons may best
be deployed, must also be taken into account. It takes two
sides to fight a battle, and any such assessment can only be
approached in relative terms. A review of the performance
achieved by the Armada's ships must therefore be preceded by
a consideration of the vessels which opposed them.
Contemporary opinion was in little doubt as the the
merits of Queen Elizabeth's front-line navy. It was
generally agreed that the new breed of race-decked galleons
which had been built under John Hawkins's inspired
supervision were superb warships. "I protest before God,"
enthused Charles Howard, "•••that I think there were never
in any place in the world nobler ships than these were."(33)
And again, after an inspection of the royal galleons in
February 1587 (in his zeal the Lord Admiral had visited
"every place where any man may creep"), he wrote to Burghley
that there was not one but he "durst go to the Rio de la
Plata in her".(34) Other letters confirm both the sound
build and sprightly performance of his ships. In March 1587
the 600-ton Elizabeth Bonayenture grounded at the entrance
to Flushing harbour and endured the stresses of two complete
tidal cycles before she could be refloated. "In all this
time," wrote the Lord Admiral later, "there never came a
spoonful of water into her well. My Lord, except a ship had
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been made of iron, it were to be thought impossible to do as
she had done; and it may be well and truly said that there
never was nor is in the world a stronger ship•••"(35) Of his
newly-built flagship the ~ he wrote to Burghley: "I think
her the odd ship in the world for all conditions ••• We can
see no sail, great or small, but how far soever they be off
we fetch them and speak with them."(36)
These were not the prejudiced views of an uncritical
sycophant. Howard was an able and perspicacious commander
who was not afraid to speak his mind, and his confidence in
his own ships is confirmed by an observation made during the
battles by his opposite number on the Spanish side. "The
English ships," wrote Medina Sidonia after his first
encounter with them, "were very swift and well handled, so
that they could do as they liked with them."(37)
Although the English galleons were fast and agile they
were evidently able to carry a formidable armament. Little
detail is available on the actual gun strengths of
individual English ships during the Armada campaign, but the
armament issued to two of the Queen's galleons three years
earlier is probably typical.(38) They were the 600-ton
Elizabeth Bonayenture and the 250-ton~, both of which
were to serve with distinction in 1588. The information may
be broken down thus:
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Elizabeth Bonayenture
Gun Type Number Average Weight
demi cannon 4 4532 pounds
cannon perrier 4 2737 pounds
culverin 8 3761 pounds
demi culverin 12 2895 pounds
sacre 6 1839 pounds
minion 1 1400 pounds
falcon 3 840 pounds
port piece (with chamber) 4 1288 pounds
fowler (with chamber) 2 759 pounds
.AJJ1
Gun Type Number Average Weight·
culverin 4 3965 pounds
demi cufverin 4 2680 pounds
sacre 10 1708 pounds
minion 4 1273 pounds
falcon 4 882 pounds
fowler 4 743 pounds
base 2
The point to be made is not the heavy firepower of
these two English front-line armaments - though that is
remarkable enough - but their physical weights. In gun
barrels alone the Elizabeth Bonayenture carried 51.5 tons of
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ordnance, amounting to 8.6 percent of her rated tonnage,
while the ~'s twenty-seven tons of weaponry gives her the
even highter figure of 10.8 percent. To these figures
should be added the weight of the guns' mountings, crews,
and ready-use ammunition. The ability to carry loads of
this magnitude on the decks above the waterline indicates
that the ships were exceptionally strong and stable, and the
fact that these characteristics were obtained without
apparently sacrificing an edge of sailing performance over
the best of their rivals further emphasises
revolutionary design of these late sixteenth century English
warships.
The Castilian galleons were, no doubt, superficially
rather similar in design but, as earlier suggested, their
single high-placed gundecks limited the weight of ordnance
they could carry. We can estimate that the thirty-six guns
aboard the squadron's 700-ton capitana ~ Cristobal[27]
weighed about twenty tons, or rather less than three percent
of her rated tonnage, while the other ships in the squadron
carried, if anything, even lower percentages.(39} In spite
of this their performance still evidently fell below that of
front-line Elizabethan warships carrying up to three times
their firepower. In a straight tail-chase, lamented Purser
~Calderon, the two fastest galleons in the Armada appeared,
in comparison with their English quarry, to be standing
still.(40}
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In contrast, the Portuguese royal galleons were heavier
in terms both of displacement and in weight of armament.
The only one for which we possess a detailed break-down of
guns, the 1050-ton almiranta ~ ~[2], carried an
armament amounting to about 4.5 percent of her rated
tonnage. These ships were evidently able to take a good
deal of punishment in battle, though the curious case of the
~ Mateo[6] suggests that they may have been prone to
internal stresses from the prolonged recoiling of their own
guns. But they were not particularly manoeuvreable ships
nor were they, in the strict sense of the word, galleons.
They were high-charged, strongly built battleships of
carrack design which could carry plenty of troops stationed
in their towering castleworks and fighting tops. The guns
they carried were intended to be fired as a preliminary to
close-quarter boarding action. During the campaign the
English wisely denied them the opportunity of putting their
undoubted capabilities in this respect to the test.
Although many ships on both sides were requisitioned
merchant vessels the English rarely, if ever, employed these
as front-line units. A number of the biggest fighting ships
in the Spanish fleet, however, were vessels of this kind.
Martin de Bertendona believed that the large and capacious
Mediterranean-built merchantmen of his Levantine squadron
would, because of their overbearing grandeza, prove to be
formidable fighting ships, while one contemporary Spanish
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opinion went even further, and suggested that in a fight
each Levanter would be worth ten or twelve English ships.
Certainly the four or five principal ships of Bertendona's
squadron were armed as front-line troubleshooters, and were
to playa central role in much of the fighting. But they
were not a success, and the extent of their ultimate failure
may be gauged from the fact that, by the time the campaign
was over, eighty percent of them had been lost.
This exceptionally high casualty rate, though sustained
through subsequent wrecking and not in the course of the
battles themselves, requires explanation. The Portuguese
galleons had been even more hotly engaged, and yet most of
them got home. Perhaps this was because they had been built
as warships, and were designed to receive punishment as well
as to mete it out. Bulk cargo carriers like the Levanters,
on the other hand, were conceived on strictly economic
grounds, and their design criteria did not include possible
involvement in a close range artillery battle. It may be
that Bertendona's optimistic assessment was based on their
suitability for boarding action, and in this he was probably
justified. Had it come to clapping sides with a smaller
adversary the grandeza, backed by aggressively handled
Spanish steel, might well have proved a winning.
combination. In such an encounter height and troop capacity
were the main considerations. Structural strength beyond
the minimum necessary to ensure seaworthiness was of little
consequence, since a conventional boarding assault placed
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few abnormal stresses on a ship's hull.
The same could not be said of sustained artillery
action, in which the extra stresses to which a hull might be
subjected included not only the obvious one of enemy
bombardment but also the strains imposed by the working of
its own guns. These were not stresses which the hull of a
merchant ship was ordinarily designed to bear. The
harmonisation of hull design, constructional techniques,
cargo behaviour, safety margins and economic operation
involved a set of complex equations which were not always
easy to balance, but certain broad generalisations can be
expressed. A merchant hull had to be light but strong, so
as to minimise the cost of materials used in its
construction and maximise its load-carrying capabilities.
Where possible it made use of small and simply-shaped
components because these were cheaper and more readily
obtainable than large or complex ones. In consequence its
designers sought to achieve an overall structural integrity
based on a large number of small and closely fitting parts
which, though individually slight, locked together to form a
light self-stressing structure. Like an egg-shell, it was
external shape rather than a massive internal skeleton which
provided its ultimate strength.
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The stuctural remains discovered on the wreck site of
La Trinidad Valencera show clearly that this ship had been
built according to such principles, and to a high degree of
standardisation and perhaps prefabrication. No doubt she
was quite strong enough for her normal commercial tasks in
the Mediterranean. But such a hull would have been highly
susceptible to the effects of localised damage because, to
continue the simile of the egg-shell, a self-stressing
structure of this kind is prone, if only slightly cracked in
one part, to overall collapse. In modern parlance it has no
structural 'redundancy' to back up partial failure because
partial failure was not, from the point of view of the
designers, a likely contingency. Naturally enough, they had
not anticipated Gravelines.
Yet another factor should be borne in mind. Quite apart
from the stresses of bombardment and recoil ships like La
Trinidad Valencera may have been subject to what might best
be termed negative stresses when not employed in the
capacity for which they were built - the bulk transport of
grain. Stored grain exerts a very considerable sideways
pressure, which is why granaries require strong external
butressing to counter its thrust. We do not know what
structural arrangements were made in grain ships of the
early modern period to stand up to this pressure but,
whatever they were, they are likely to have diminished
rather than strengthened a hull's capaCity to resist
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external forces when it was not carrying the load for which
it was designed. An empty granary will collapse more
readily than a full one because its conflicting stresses are
out of balance, and for the same reason a modern supertanker
is at its most vulnerable when sailing in ballast.
,The squadrons of Biscay and Guipuzcoa, which consisted
of merchant shipping drawn from the Atlantic coast of
northern Spain, suffered lower casualty rates than the
Levanters, at twenty and forty percent respectively. While
this may in some measure reflect their more limited
employment as front-line ships it is unlikely to be the only
reason, since many of them were quite heavily engaged.
Further explanation must be sought. Their better rate of
survival may perhaps have been due to the more resiliant
"Atlantic-type" build which the wreck of one of their
number, the Santa Marfa ~ .la. ~, has demonstrated
archaeologically. Even so, the Basque ships were built for
commercial operation and not war, and like the Levanters
they were almost certainly ill-suited to give or receive
heavy gunfire. The same judgement may be passed on the
Andalusian squadron, whose vessels came from Spain's
southern ports and Mediterranean seaboard. In short, the
converted merchantmen which made up four of the Armada's
territorial squadrons were probably adequate as armed
transports but altogether unsuitable as gun platforms in a
close artillery engagement.
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The hulks need not detain us. They were not meant to
take part in the fighting at all, although their capitana El
,~ Grifon, does seem to have operated as a front-line
troubleshooter. This is to be explained not by her
suitability for such a role but by the status of her
commander and senior officers. As a group, the function of
the hulks was simply to provide cargo support, and in the
event their contribution to the campaign was a negative one,
in that their abysmal sailing performance acted as a
continual impediment to the Armada's rate of progress.
More surprising is the almost total failure of the
galleasses, with their apparently formidable capacity to
combine mobility with heavy firepower. But, as we have
seen, the source of that mobility was itself vulnerable to
gunfire, while the need to concentrate armament in cramped
fore and aft castleworks must have imposed even greater
restrictions on working space than we have postulated for
the galleons. No doubt the galleasses would have been
superb weapons in a ramming and boarding fight, as they had
been at Lepanto, but, denied such an opportunity, they
proved clumsy and all but ineffective. Their hybrid design,
moreover, made them unsuited to oceanic sailing, and their
awkwardly hung steering gear was particularly prone to
disastrous injury.
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Poor sea-keeping abilities and difficulties with
steering also dogged the four galleys, and indeed prevented
them from taking part in the campaign. An assessment of
their likely performance in the battles is therefore
entirely academic. But the failure of Pedro de Acuna's
squadron against Drake at Cadiz in 1587, where conditions
for galley operation were theoretically ideal, gives no
grounds for supposing they would have done any better in the
Channel engagements. In fairness it should be remembered
that sea fighting was not the role for which they had been
intended,
been put
and no doubt their unique capabilities would have
to good use had they been present at either the
Flanders link-up or off the invasion beaches.
Hurtado de Mendoza's communications squadron of zabras
and pataches deserves greater recognition than it has
hitherto been given. Physical communication within the
fleet, and
excellent,
between the fleet and Parma,
thanks to these bustling and
was at all times
sprightly small
craft which closely attended Medina Sidonia's flagship.
They were central to the Armada's closely ordered command
structure and, had the link-up and cross-Channel jump come
about, they would have been vital to the control and
smooth-running of the whole complex operation.
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A final matter which must be considered before we
conclude our assessment of the fleet's fighting capacity is
that of the men. How good were they, and under what system
of command did they work?
Let us take the seamen first. The skill in ship
management which the Armada's formation-keeping demonstrated
is all the more remarkable when the clumsy, and variable,
performance of its 120-odd floating units is taken into
account. Individual examples of fine seamanship are
numerous. One of the most revealing is Juan Mart!nez de
Recalde's performance off the south-west coast of Ireland
during the voyage home. Not only did the lion-hearted old
admiral, who by this time was quite literally dying on his
feet, display almost unbelievable seamanship in gaining the
shelter of Great Blasket Island but, in the thirteen days he
remained there, he acted with unflagging skill, forethought,
and resolve to ensure the survival of his own ship and those
in his company. During the day of high crisis on 21
September, after the Santa Mar!a .de. .la .RQ.a.a. had gone down,
he made strenuous and partly successful efforts, in spite of
the appaling weather, the state of near exhaustion to which
he and his men had been reduced, and what must by then have
seemed the total futility of the five painful months they
had been at sea, to transfer heavy guns from another ship
which was about to sink so that they could be brought back
to Spain and used to fight another day.(42) This implies
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seamanship, leadership, and morale of the very highest
order, and also reflects and explains the performance of the
seamen under Recalde's command.
The Basque mariners who manned the squadrons of Biscay
and Guipuzcoa were judged to be Spain's finest seafarers.
Nearly half a century later that old veteran of the 1588
campaign, Sir William Monson, wrote that were it not for the
Biscay sailors the Armadas of Spain could not have been
maintained. Their skill, Monson pointed out, was in large
measure derived from their experiences in Newfoundland
waters, where hardy Basque seafarers vigorously exploited
the vast stocks of cod and whales. (43) By implication Monson
suggests that, in comparison, the other mariners in Spanish
service were not up to much. But this is not entirely
fair. The trade routes of the Mediterranean and Atlantic,
the long and exposed coast of Portugal, the North Sea and
the Baltic, make stern demands on those who navigate them,
and the hard realities of conditions afloat leaves little
room for fair-weather sailors. Most of the Armada's seamen
were professionals in that they were, in the main, the
original crews of the ships allocated or requisitioned for
the campaign. There is nothing whatever to suggest that as
a group they were inexperienced or below normal standard.
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But the complement of a merchant ship is far smaller
than that of a warship, and the Armada crews undoubtedly
suffered from a lack of skilled seamen to fight their
ships. On average there was only one seaman for every 7 1/2
tons of shipping, while the corresponding English figure was
less than two tons per man: To some extent this deficiency
was made good by the employment of soldiers on general
duties about the ships and, as we have seen, the bulk of the
gun-crews was drawn from this source. Nevertheless, the
fact that less than a third of the manpower carried by the
Armada consisted of trained seamen must have been a severe
impediment to its efficient handling,
labour-intensive business of battle.
especially in the
The presence of so many soldiers aboard the ships,
moreover, created severe difficulties of co-operation and
command. Spanish soldiers considered themselves more than a
cut above their seafaring comrades, and would not have taken
kindly to working with them as equals, let alone taking
orders from them. Medina Sidonia anticipated this problem
in his General Orders, which sternly enjoined the soldiers
not to interfere with the running of the ships or to "pull
rank" on the crews over rations and other privileges.(44) He
could not, however, alter the heirarchal and divisive
command structure which lay at the root of these traditional
antipathies. William Monson, no doubt drawing upon the
experiences of his youth, has provided a graphic critique on
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the shortcomings of Spanish naval command. They had, he
said, "more officers in their ships than we: they have a
captain for their ship, a captain for their gunners, and as
many captains as there are companies of soldiers; and, above
all, they have a commander in the nature of a colonel above
the rest. This breeds a great confusion, and is many times
the cause of mutinie among them. They brawl and fight,
commonly, aboard their ships as if they were ashore."(45)
Here we see the reason for Medina Sidonia's directive that
for the duration of the campaign no man should bear a feud
or carry a dagger, and that "perfect good feeling" should
prevail among the soldiers and sailors of his command.(46)
A similar structure had once governed the command of
English ships, but the naval reorganisations of Elizabeth's
reign, and especially the highly individual genius of
Francis Drake, had replaced it with the more logical if
socially revolutionary system of unified command under a
single captain: a ship's complement, said Drake, must "all
be of a company."(47) His celebrated dictum that the
gentlemen should "hale and draw" with the mariners was
evidently normal practice aboard English ships in 1588, and
even so illustrious an officer as Lord Henry Seymour,
commander of the eastern squadron and a cousin of the Lord
Admiral, was not above lending a hand on deck when it was
needed. On 23 June 1588 he dispatched a report to
Walsingham from his blockading station aboard the Rainbow
off Dunkirk, with a postscripted apology that it was not
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written in his own hand, which he had strained "with hauling
of a rope".(48) No Spanish gentleman, however modest his
rank, could have countenanced so menial a task.
We turn now to a consideration of the 19,925 troops
which the fleet carried. Not all were veterans; about half
were recently trained conscripts, but they were well
equipped and disciplined, and a good proportion of them were
experienced and battle-hardened men.(49) So too, in the
main, were their officers, although there was always a
tendency for supernumerary officers and
gentlemen-adventurers to seek commands for which they were
not necessarily well qualified. Recalde warned of the
dangers of this practice in a letter to the king from
Corunna on 11 July 1588.(50) Nevertheless, the overall
quality of the troops was high and Medina Sidonia, though he
would have liked more of them, was not prepared to lower
standards. When 400 hurridly gathered replacements were
sent to join the fleet at Corunna he judged them to be
unsuitable for employment even as pioneers, and sent them
home.(S1)
Medina Sidonia had good reason for this concern, for he
knew that upon its soldiers depended the Armada's hoped-for
superiority in a boarding fight. When the ships went into
action their decks would be crowded wi th fully equipped
troops whose duty it was to bring down a hail of small-arms
fire as the range closed, to wield the pre-boarding weapons
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of grapnel, shear-hook, missile, and incendiary device, and
finally to enter and overwhelm the adversary. But although
the Spaniards were denied the opportunity of putting these
tactics into effect their soldiers remained a vital part of
the Armada's own defences, for while they remained at their
stations there was no way short of physical annihilation or
surrender in which the English could actually defeat a
Spanish vessel. At Gravelines this resolved itself into a
strange stalemate. The Spaniards could not defeat their
enemies because they could not catch them or seriously
damage them with gunfire, while on the other hand the
English, though they could batter the Spaniards to the
extent that their limited stocks of ammunition allowed, were
able neither to sink nor to capture them.
The fact that a Spanish ship deprived of its soldiers
was virtually defenceless explains Medina Sidonia's
reluctance to detach troops from the fleet to reinforce
Parma's army on the beaches. After much haggling it was
agreed that the Armada should disembark 6,000 of its best
troops for the invasion, though at the last minute this
figure was raised to 10,000 to cover a shortfall in the
contingent which the Army of Flanders was able to
provide.(52) This in itself represents another serious
weakness in the overall plan, for after the landings the
Armada'S presence and close support would still have been
required, yet stripped of more than half its troops - and
most of its best ones - its own security against the English
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fleet would have been dangerously compromised.
We are now in a position to consider in general terms
what actually happened while the fleets were in contact,
from the first skirmishes off Plymouth on 31 July to the
disengagement after Gravelines on 8 August, and why it
happened as it did. In approaching this question it is
important to bear in mind that before the fighting began
there were no guiding precedents; neither side had any
experience of the kind of action which was to follow, nor
did it possess reliable knowledge of the strengths or
shortcomings of its rival. But one fact is clear. From its
conception and throughout the traumas of its birth the
Armada had been intended, whatever its other capabilities
might have been, to impress and overawe. Philip never lost
sight of the possibility, to him a most attractive one, that
his aims might be achieved simply by parading the Armada in
the Channel. Negotiations with Elizabeth were already in
hand, and in his sealed instructions to 'Parma,which Medina
Sidonia was to deliver the moment the Army of Flanders
landed on English soil, the king made it clear that, once
this stage tn the campaign had been reached, the threat of
further force might be used as a bargaining counter to reach
a negotiated settlement. In such negotiations, Philip
,directed, the "reputacion" of the Armada should be exploited
to the full: the fleet's grandeza, real or imagined, was
therefore an important element in its make-up.(53)
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At first the English were wholly taken in. "We never
thought," wrote a contemporary observer, "that they could
ever have found, gathered and joined so great a force of
puissant ships together and so well appointed them with
their cannon, culverin, and other great pieces of brass
ordnance."(54) The deep sense of awe which the appearance of
the Armada evoked is echoed by Lord Admiral Howard's early
reaction to it: ."We durst not adventure to put in amongst
them, their fleet being so strong."(55) Other reports stress
the "majesty" of the Armada, and comment especially on the
good order with which its progress was managed. The initial
English naval reactions to it were extremely cautious, often
experimental, and sometimes even half-hearted. WWe pluck
their feathers little by little," wrote the Lord Admiral,
but apart for the fortuitous capture of the ~ Salvador and
Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario his feather-plucking was largely
ineffectual, for it was conducted in the main at excessively
long ranges, and at the expense of a "terrible value" of
precious round-shot.(56) Nothing, it seemed, could prevent
the Armada's orderly progress up the Channel.
But, after the fireship episode off Calais, an entirely
new approach was adopted by the English. In the wake of the
dislocation which that attack brought upon the Armada's
hitherto tight and steadfastly maintained defensive
formation, Howard's galleons, now reinforced by Seymour's
eastern squadron, launched an aggressive close-range gunnery
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assault on the retreating but reforming Spanish fleet,
anticipating by more than two centuries the tactics which
were to win Trafalgar. But, as the English must have known
then and we have discovered again, the Spaniards had not run
out of large-calibre ammunition and were theoretically as
capable of delivering ship-smashing broadsides as they had
been at the start of the campaign. What, therefore, changed
the caution which the English had displayed in the Channel
skirmishes to the vigorously confident close-action shown at
Gravelines?
The answer must surely be that, at last, the bubble of
the Armada's invincibility had been pricked, and in
particular its shortcomings in gunnery clearly identified.
This realisation must have dawned upon the English some time
before Gravelines, and explanatory clues are therefore to be
sought in accounts of the earlier fighting. One key fact
stands out. After the battles off the Isle of Wight on 3/4
August all fighting ceased for three days, while the Armada
progressed to Calais. This suggests that on or before 4
August the English had made a firm decision to reserve their
ammunition for an all-out attack on the Armada when it
reached its vulnerable and uncertain station off Flanders.
ship-smashing broadsides
they knew they could come olose
to deliver really effective
without risking serious
By this time, it follows,
enough to the Spaniards
retaliation, so long as they used their deoisive sailing
advantage to avoid being grappled and boarded. Who first
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made this momentous discovery, and when, we may never know
for sure. Perhaps it was a gradual realisation in the minds
of many men. But one mind we can single out as a
particularly likely candidate is that of Francis Drake, and
we can point to a number of incidents which may have helped
him towards this vital conclusion.
The first was the capture, on the morning of 2 August,
of Pedro de Valdez's Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario, one of the
Armada's most heavily gunned ships. The reasons behind Don
Pedro'S ready surrender need not concern us here; what
matters is that Drake had ample opportunity to inspect every
detail of the ship and her equipment and to extract, with
his ready wit, infectious charm, and lavish hospitality, as
much as he wanted to know from her haughty and disillusioned
commander. He would have seen for himself the unsuitable
gun-mountings and scratch crews
clumsy and divisive structure of
of soldiers,
command, and
noted the
doubtless
observed that the ship's biggest guns had scarcely been
fired. No one was better qualified to make assessments such
as these, and it may well be that Drake's capture of the
Rosario, though bitterly criticised by some of his
contemporaries,
the campaign.
was one of the most significant actions of
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It is tempting to link the dawn attack on the
/straggling ~ capitana Ll~ Grifon, which took place
off the Solent on 3 August, with the discoveries Drake had
made aboard the Rosario the day before. Here, for the first
time, we hear of a really close single-ship action in which
mobility and firepower were skilfully deployed, and it
cannot be coincidence that the aggressor was almost
certainly the Reyenge. Was Drake perhaps testing a
developing theory about the Spaniards' inability to tight a
mobile artillery action, and wisely choosing one of the less
well-armed troubleshooters for his experiment? If so, he
must have found the results profoundly encouraging, for he
struck his target forty times and killed many soldiers on
~her decks, while the Grifon's bronze medias culebrinas - the
biggest guns she carried - remained virtually silent
throughout.
A day later, if my interpretation of the second phase
ot the Isle of Wight battles is correct, Drake repeated his
experiment in full squadron strength, breaking the Armada's
right wing and so forcing it past Selsey Bill and away from
the Solent. The English now had all the information they
needed to identify the Armada's fundamental weaknesses, and
it was precisely at this point that a decision was made to
conserve ammunition for the final battle.
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Where, then, does this leave our final assessment of
the Armada's potential as a fighting force? As we have now
seen, it could not under any foreseeable circumstances have
defeated the English in naval terms, but at the same time -
and this is important - the English did not possess the
means of
stalemate,
destroying or capturing it. This caused a
and in the end both fleets could only disengage
and make for home. That the Spanish route home was longer
and much more hazardous than the English one, and that many
of the ships were damaged and the weather unusually severe,
accounts for the magnitude of the Armada'S final losses. It
was a failure, and a catastrophic one at that, but it was
not an outright defeat.
There were important elements in the Armada which, seen
retrospectively, may be counted successful. Its performance
as an armed convoy was exemplary, and there is little doubt
that it could have entered the Thames estuary on its own and
landed troops and equipment on the Kent beaches. There
would doubtless have been a Gravelines-type attempt on the
part of the English to counter this, but the kind of damage
which was later to precipitate such disaster off the coasts
of Scotland and Ireland would have been of little
consequence in the sheltered waters of the Thames. And by
this time, in any case, the English would have run out of
ammunition.
- 403 -
Why did the Armada not press its advantage at this
pOint? At the Council of War aboard the ~ Martin on 9
August the option was not even considered. Unless the
weather allowed a return to the Channel, and then only if
Parma's barges came out to meet the fleet, it was decided
unanimously to return home by the north-about route.(57)
There were, I think, a number of reasons which precluded the
Armada from acting without Parma's support. First, such an
attempt would have been in total contradiction to the king's
orders. More compellingly, perhaps, the fleet did not
possess on its own all the elements necessary to mount even
a scaled-down invasion of England. Most obviously, it did
not have enough troops. Even if 10,000 veterans had been
put ashore they would scarcely have constituted an adequate
force for the task of securing London, especially since they
would have been in far from peak condition after more than
three months living in the cramped and unhealthy conditions
aboard the ships. Then again, if stripped of its soldiers,
the fleet would have had no adequate defence itself, so
compromising the close support which the Armada was expected
to give the advancing land forces. Finally, there was a
serious shortage of the draught and pack animals which would
have provided the mobility upon which the campaign depended,
especially in respect of the artillery train. Only four
hulks were fitted out as horse transports. Most of the
animals were to come over with Parma, no doubt to ease the
problems of foddering and water supply which a long voyage
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would have entailed. Thus an army landed by the Armada on
its own would have been small, lacking in mobility and heavy
transport, and inadequately supported by the fleet. Without
the Army of Flanders there was nothing the Armada could do
except go home, and none of its officers seriously thought
otherwise~
It remains to pass final judgement on the Armada as a
fighting force. There can be no doubt that Santa Cruz's
proposals of 1586, had they been put into effect, would have
stood an excellent chance of success. If a self-contained
invasion fleet had entered the Channel in 1588 with orders
simply to sail to Margate and land
difficult to see what could have
troops there it is
stopped it. Even an
operation less ambitious than the 1586 scheme might well
have worked. With a few thousand extra troops, and perhaps
a dozen horse transports, the Armada on its own would have
constituted a formidable self-contained force.
The failure of the Armada is not to be blamed on any
single inadequacy in its composition or performance. True,
its achievements in heavy gunnery were poor to the point of
uselessness, and in the event the space and load capacity
taken up by its bigger guns would have been better occupied
by extra troops. The heavy siege guns, though vital for the
campaign ashore, had no place on the decks, and should have
been stowed in the holds.(59) But the Armada did not fail
because its gunnery was bad. Its lighter anti-personnel
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pieces together with the small-arms fire of the troops were
more than enough to guard against a boarding assault. Nor
did the structural weaknesses displayed by the requisitioned
merchant shipping, particularly the big Levanters, cause the
fleet's downfall. Despite the damage they had suffered most
would still have been able to land their massive cargoes of
troops and invasion stores, and this of course was their
primary function. Those that were eventually lost only fell
apart when, on top of their battle damage, they were
subjected to the stresses of the return voyage: the English
on their own were not able to knock them out. And the
overall lack of manoeuvreability displayed by the Spanish
ships was more than compensated by the rigid discipline with
which their defensive formation was maintained. Even when
broken and severely attacked, as at Calais and Gravelines,
the Armada demonstrated a quite remarkable ability to
regroup and fight on.
These, shortcomings, although serious enough in
themselves, do not therefore explain the Armada's ultimate
failure. The underlying cause of that failure lies, beyond
any doubt, in Philip II's inability to recognise what his
Armada, as it was actually composed in 1588, could and could
not do.
virtually
seaborne
It could advance where it willed in a defensive and
impregnable formation, but it could not defeat a
enemy in open battle. Any plan which utilised its
capacity of defensive mobility, as Santa Cruz's did, was
therefore likely to achieve success, while on the other hand
- 406 -
a strategy which required it first to win naval supremacy
was doomed to failure. That it was expected to carry out
the latter must be blamed on the king, upon whose insistence
Santa Cruz's original plan had been modified. Once the
link-up with Parma became an integral part of the overall
strategy the Armada's role changed from that of an armed
convoy to that of a naval task force. What did not change,
however, was its fundamental inability to substitute a
wholly defensive capability for one which, at sea, was
primarily offensive. In 1588 nothing could have been done
by the Spaniards, whether or not they recognised their
shortcomings in sailing performance and gunnery tactics, to
challenge the English fleet on its own terms. Yet without
first winning a naval battle there was no realistic hope of
achieving a rendezvous with the Army of Flanders.
While the king did not appreciate the significance of
these unpalatable facts, and countered all criticism by
invoking his confidence in divine guidance and support, his
/loyal servant Alvaro de Bazan, Captain-General of the Ocean
Sea, hero of Lepanto, Portugal and the Azores, most
certainly did. Here, perhaps, we come close to the root of
the old marquis' uncharacteristic reluctance to press
forward with the Enterprise, once the king's decision to
rely on a link-up with Parma had been taken. The s~e
reasoning might well have lain behind the self-denigration
with which his successor sought to refuse his apPointment to
the command. The marquis of Santa Cruz had known only too
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well why the Armada as it had evolved by early 1588 was not
likely to succeed. When the fleet sailed in May the duke of
Medina Sidonia knew why too, and so did his understandably
lukewarm comrade-in-arms, the duke of Parma.
But the king did not know why, and no one was able to
tell him.
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Appendix ~
Spanish and English tonnage measurements in 1588
Evidence of the method whereby the Spaniards calculated
ship tonnage, and the relationship of this figure to the
overall dimensions of the hull, is provided by a document
dated at Lisbon on 30 April 1588 which lists the principal
dimensions and tonnages of six large Mediterranean ships
requisitioned or hired for the campaign.(1) They are: La
~~ Marino Prodanela (San Nicolas [74]); La Naye de Stefano
Deoliste (Anunc1ada [73]); Santa Maria de VisCO [76]; ~
,Galeoo del DUQue (Florencia [8]); La Regazooa
Beneziaoa [68]; and La Nave Layia Benez1ana [69]. The first
three ships were probably Ragusan, the last two Venetian,
while the fourth belonged to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. All
sailed with the Levant Squadron, except the Florencia, which
was attached to the Squadron of Portugal.
It was necessary for requisitioned vessels to be rated
for tonnage so that the amount to be paid by the Crown for
their charter, or compensation in the event of loss, could
be calculated. As elsewhere, the calculations were based on
established formulae which were intended to safeguard the
interests of both owner and hirer. Such formulae were not,
it should be stressed, intended to give exact load
capacities or displacements in a scientific sense: they were
no more than rules-of-thumb by which dues or hire charges
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could be worked out simply and without argument.
In 1590 reforms were introduced by the Casa de la
/Contratacion at Seville which laid down, among other things,
that tonnages were in future to be rated according to the
formula:
8
where manga = beam taken internally at midships,
puntal = depth from.beneath the main deck at midships to the
bottom of the hold, and eslorfa = length of main deck from
stem to sternpost, exclusive of the thickness of head and
stern timbers.(2) The 1/20th, or 5 percent, was subtracted
from the solid number - which assumed a constant
cross-section - to allow for the entry and run of the hull.
The dimensions were expressed in codos, or Castilian cubits,
which according to Veitia Linage were 33/48ths of a
Castilian ~ (835.9 mm), giving the ~ a value of
547.7 mm.(3) This calculation gave the ship's capacity, or
burden, in toneles machos; her war-rating, in toneladas, was
obtained by adding an arbitrary fifth.
Although the formula used in the 1588 calculations is
not specified in so many words (the form in current use was
presumably taken for granted), figures are given, in codos,
for the puntal, manga and eSlor!a measurements of each of
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the six ships, together with the resultant toneles macbos
and toneladas ratings. It is also implied that a
subtraction of three percent has been made at some stage in
reaching the toneles machos figure, and that one-fifth has
been added to that result in order to obtain the toneladas.
It seems likely that the 1590 formula was a simple
revision of an earlier and similar one, the only apparent
difference being the substitution of five percent for the
three percent deducted to allow for the entry and run of the
hull. Such an alteration would no doubt reflect the
increasing fineness of underwater lines towards the end of
the sixteenth century. Unfortunately this neat conclusion
is only partly borne out by the arithmetic, although it
should be remembered that sixteenth century numeracy,
especially in Spain, was abysmally bad, a fact which has
been amply demonstrated in our examination of the
artillery.
calculaUoM,
because of
There is no reason to suppose that the tonnage
despite their awkward fractions (or perhaps
them) were not worked out by an equally
rough-and-ready process of "guesstimation".
The figures for the six ships, together with the
results of my calculations based on the postulated "three
percent" formula (in brackets, rounded to the nearest tun),
may be found in the following table (overleaf).
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Though the results are admittedly not consistent, they
are close enough to be reasonably convincing. The figures
for the Annunciada and Lavia match to the tun, while those
for the Santa Marfa de Yison and Florencia agree within
three and four percent respectively. Only in the case of
the San Nicolas and the Regazona, with differences of ten
and sixteen percent, may we suspect more fundamental errors
than can be blamed on sloppy arithmetic. This suspicion is
reinforced by the obvious mistake of 100 toneladas in the
case of the Santa Marfa de Yis6n.
Caution must be exercised in drawing comparisons
between English and Spanish tonnage calculations, since the
formulae employed were quite different and the respective
units involved impossible to quantifY with any certainty.
However, since we possess the actual dimensions of these
ships it is worth considering how their tonnages might
compare with a contemporary Englishman's rating. English
tonnages of this period were obtained, it is generally
agreed, by dividing keel length x beam x depth (all in feet)
by 100, although a divisor of 97 was sometimes used.(4) This
gave the vessel's burden, to which one-third was added to
obtain the "tun and tunnage" figure.
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Applying this formula to the Layia by assuming a keel
length of 41.58 codos and converting her dimensions to feet,
we obtain a burden of 546 tuns and a tunnage of 728.(5) The
first figure is 61 tuns, or ten percent, short of the
Spanish toneles machos, while the second - surely
cOincidentally -
figure. Not
is exactly
withstanding
the
the
same as the toneladas
obvious differences of
approach in Spanish and English methods of tonnage
calculation, this admittedly inconclusive sample does tend
to suggest that the relative size of the ships of these two
countries at the time of the Armada may have been clo'serto
that suggested by their rated tonnages than has often been
supposed.(6)
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Appendix 2
Bore and shot measurement in practice: the gunner's rule and
shot gauges from La Trinidad Valencera (Figures 98 and 99).
Our investigations into bore and shot sizes have shown
that it was no easy matter for a sixteenth-century gunner to
find exactly the right diameter of ball for his piece, and
that the difficulty doubtless was immeasurably greater when
each ship in a heterogeneous fleet such as the Armada had to
be issued with a quota of ammunition matched to its
particular set of guns. Not all of the gun-weights and
calibres were expressed in constant units and, even when
they were, variations in the specific gravity of shot might
be sufficient to upset what were, by Sixteenth-century
standards, quite small tolerances. Evidence recovered from
the wreck of La Trinidad Valencera shows how some of these
difficulties were overcome, but at the same time indicates
previously unsuspected factors which might, particularly in
the heat of battle, have caused yet more inaccuracy,
confusion, and ultimately chaos.
The evidence consists of a wooden scale, identified as
a gunner's rule, and four circular wooden shot gauges.
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The sunner's rule
This instrument (Figure 98) was recovered in three
pieces of boxwood which can be restored to a length of 22.2
cm, though a small decorative finial, of no significance to
the interpretation of the object,
1.05 cm wide and 0.65 cm thick.
is missing. The rule is
A scale of horizontal
lines, each associated with a number, appears on both sides
of the instrument. The graduations, which are irregularly
spaced and so do not represent a linear measure, are
numbered 1, 3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 90, 100,
and 120. The sequence and proportions of the graduations
are the same on both Sides, but one set is laid out to a
larger scale than the other. The relationship between the
two scales is not immediately apparent.
The instrument is a gunner's rule, intended to convert
the linear measurement of bore (represented by the
horizontal lines) into weight of roundshot (represented by
the figures). Such instruments are described in several
late sixteenth-century published works, while a number of
examples survive in the form of the (usetto ~ bonbardiere,
or gunner's stiletto, on whose steel blades similar scales
are engraved.(1) These daggers are invariably Italian and of
seventeenth or eighteenth century date, and served as a
gunner's symbol of office. In 1661, for example, a corporal
in the Venetian Compasnia A1 Bombardieri was given authority
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by the Council of Ten to carry the stillo sagomoto, and all
scolari bombardieri were enjoined to obey him. Regulations
connected with the wearing of the st1llo sagomato were still
in force at Verona in 1770 but by that date, and probably
long before, gunners' stilettos were entirely ceremonial in
purpose and not in any sense working instruments.(2)
The yalencera rule, on the other hand, was almost
certainly intended for operational use, since a short wooden
stick can hardly have possessed the symbolism of an ornate
ceremonial dagger. It is, to my knowledge, the earliest
surviving example of a gunner's rule, though a drawing of
one was published by Girolamo Cataneo in his Tratto degli
Essami ~ Bombardieri of 1571.(3) Cataneo's scale is
similar, though not identical, to the larger of the two
scales on the Yalencera rule, and the sequence of numbers is
the same except for the addition, in Cataneo's version, of
the figure 9. Comparable scales were also published by
Eugenio Gentilini(4) and Alesandro Capo Bianco,(5) both in
1598. Three published scales, and the Yalencera instrument,
are shown in Figure 98.
When one tries to make sense of these scales, however,
unexpected complications arise. The first modern attempt to
do so was by J.G. Mann, in an article published in 1931.(6)
Mann, followed by M. Terenzi in 1962 and H.L. Blackmore in
1976, noted that calculations aimed at resolving the
relationship between the linear and volumetric figures on
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the scales consistently failed to produce satisfactory
results.(7) Exasperated, the modern authors sought to blame
the wide variations in the weight of pound units in
contemporary use, and further suggested that some of the
figures on the scales related to lead, some to stone, and
some to iron projectiles. Such assumptions do not, however,
lead to workable solutions, and it is therefore necessary to
approach the problem from its roots.
The first graduation on the larger of the two Yalencera
scales is located 4.4 cm from the top of the rule, and the
figure shown above it is 1. This means, according to the
sixteenth-century theorists, that a 4.4 cm diameter sphere
of the material for which the scale was intended will weigh
one pound. We can calculate that the volume of such a ball
would be 45 cc, and if we assume that the material of which
it was made is iron, and take an average specific gravity
for the metal of 7.26, we find that it would weigh 327
grams - quite a convincing figure, for it falls within the
range of the most common Italian pounds in use during the
sixteenth century (the light Milanese pound, with a value of
326.75, is the closest).(8) It is not unreasonable to
conclude that the scale is indeed for iron shot, and that an
Italian weight unit 1s probably involved.
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This being so, it is a simple matter to work out all
the values on the scale, reducing each to a unit value in
grams. The results are as follows:
Figure in Length (mm) Spherical Shot weight
scale of graduation volume in grams
Unit value
(grams)
from zero (cc) (sp. gr. 7.26)
1 44 45 327 327
3 63 131 951 317
6 72.5 199 1445 241
12 91.5 400 2904 242
14 108 660 4792 342
16 115.5 807 5859 366
20 123.5 987 7166 358
30 138 1376 9990 333
40 150 1767 12828 321
50 169 2527 18346 367
60 176.5 2882 20923 349
90 191 3648 26484 294
100 205 4511 32750 327
120 215 5204 37784 315
Note: "subtile" pound of Venice = 301 g
"light" pound of Genoa = 317 g
"light" pound of Milan = 326.75 g Lewis, 1961,
"heavy" pound of Genoa = 348 g p. 218.
Florentine pound = 378 g
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These results are clearly not consistent with the
regular progression of a single weight unit. What formula
was used to calculate the scale I do not know, except that
it was erroneous; it would be tedious, and almost certainly
fruitless, to investigate the possible sources of error.
However, with three exceptions (those for the figures 6, 12,
and gO) all the unit values fall within the range of the
five most common Italian pounds and so we shall follow the
example of the Spanish inventorists (with increased sympathy
for their predicament) in describing the rule as being
marked, more or less, in pesos ~ Italia. Further than this
we cannot go.
Next, let us apply the same calculations to one of the
published scales. I have chosen Gentilini's partly because
his lower figures are somewhat at variance with the other
scales (and might therefore produce interesting
divergencies), and partly because his higher ones-
particularly those between 40 and 100, where they are
identical - coincide with the Valencera's "iron" scale.
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His figures work out thus:
Figure in Length (mm) Spherical Shot weight
scale volume in grams
Unit value
(grams)
(cc) (sp. gr. 7.26)
1 42.5 40 290 290
2 61 119 834 417
4 72.5 199 1445 361
6 80 268 1946 324
8 89 369 2679 335
14 106.5 634 4603 329
16 114 776 5634 352
20 123 974 7071 354
30 137.5 1365 9910 330
40 150 1767 12828 321
50 169 2527 18346 367
60 176.5 2882 20923 349
90 191 3648 26484 294
100 205 4511 32750 327
120 214 5132 37258 310
Again, with three exceptions, the results indicate a
pretty rough-and-ready ~~ Italia, so remarkably similar
(though incorrect) in some cases to the Valencera's scale as
to suggest a common source. The other scales I have
reproduced look as if they would give broadly similar
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results although further detailed arithmetic is, I think,
unnecessary to make the pOint.
But before we leave these calculations we must tackle
the problem of the smaller of the two scales on the
Yalencera's rule. If we accept that the larger one relates
to iron, then the smaller must have been calibrated against
a material of greater mass, for which lead is the only
practical candidate. But when we apply the specific gravity
of lead (11.37) to the spherical volumes indicated by the
scale we do not, as I had imagined we would, obtain a
broadly similar unit value. Far from it, as the figures
show:
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Figure in Length (mm) Spherical Shot weight Unit value
scale of graduation volume (cc) in grams (grams)
from zero (sp. gr.
11.37)
1 27 10 114 114
3 38 29 330 110
6 44.5 46 523 87
12 55 87 989 82
14 65 144 1637 117
16 70.5 184 2093 131
20 75 221 2513 126
30 84 310 3525 117
40 90.5 389 4423 111
50 101.5 548 6231 125
60 106 624 7095 118
90 114 775 8812 98
100 124 998 11347 113
120 130 1150 13075 109
There is no conceivable weight unit which falls within
the range of 82 to 131 grams, and the figures therefore seem
entirely spurious. However, the linear ratios between the
larger and smaller scales show, for the figure 1, that the
smaller is 62 percent of the larger, while for the figure
120, it is 60.5 percent. Now if we compare the weights of
iron and lead (assuming specific gravities of 7.26 and
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11.37) we find that the former is 64 percent of the latter,
a figure close enough to the linear proportions of the
scales to raise more than a suspicion that the instrument,
maker (or, more probably, the theorist whose manual he
consulted) succumbed to the fundamental arithmetical error
of supposing that an adjustment of the linear proportions
according to the relative weights of iron and lead would
result in a proportional adjustment to their spherical
masses. In this case the error is so great as to render the
figures meaningless.
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~~ gauges
The four Italian iron-calibrated gunners' rules we have
examined underline the general lack of standardisation and
agreed forms of measurement which prevailed in
sixteenth-century gunnery. But these four scales, or a
combination of similar diversity, might well have been in
the possession of gunners aboard a single Armada ship
together with, perhaps, scales graduated (or allegedly so)
according to Castilian, Portuguese, French, German, Flemish,
or other systems of measurement. Even superficially similar
gunners' rules, like the four we have analysed, show
sufficient variation to have ~aused considerable errors in
practice. If, say, the owner of a Cataneo rule, who had
just measured a gun's bore and found it to be of 20-pounder
calibre (11.95 cm) by his scale, called to the owner of the
Yalencera rule for a 20-pounder shot to put in it, the
latter would assume from his scale that the bore concerned
was 12.35 cm which, even if he allowed the correct five
percent windage for the ball (0.6 cm), would have resulted
in a dangerously tight fit.
to attempt to select a
And had anyone been so naive as
ball on the basis of the actual
weight indicated by the rule, he would almost certainly have
come to grief. It must follow, therefore, that neither of
these systems was actually used in practice.
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How gunners overcame this problem is indicated by the
discovery, in the same deposit within which the gunner's
rule was found, of four circular wooden templates clearly
intended to gauge roundshot (Figure 99). The smallest of
these has an internal ,diameter of 4.4 em - exactly the
measurement of the 1-pounder graduation on the Valencera
gunner's rule. The next size, represented by one complete
gauge and a segment of another, is 9.15 em in diameter -
precisely equivalent to the 12-pounder graduation on the
scale. The largest gauge found, with a diameter of 11.75
cm, is 2 mm larger than the 16-pounder mark on the rule
which, in view of the absolute correlation of the smaller
gauges, suggests that it may have been part of a different
set. This gauge is the only one which carries recognisable
markings: the Roman figure XII, cut crudely across its
handle, and a series of twelve small notches roughly nicked
at its outer edge. These marks, the possible significance
of which is discussed below, are so out of keeping with the
neat appearance of the gauge itself as to suggest that they
were casually added at same stage after manufacture. We may
therefore suppose that it,
originally identified by
and the unmarked gauges, were
painted or inked numerals which
related each gauge to the corresponding graduation on a
gunner's rule.
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The implication is clear: a gunner's rule was only part
of the equipment used for equating calibre to shot size.
Each rule was supplied with a matched set of shot gauges,
one for each of the fourteen or fifteen graduations on its
scale. With such equipment it would be a straightforward
procedure to measure the bore with the rule, select the
gauge which represented the calibre shown, and pass it over
likely-looking pieces of roundshot until the right one was
found, windage presumably being judged by eye. That many of
the figures were spurious in terms of the actual weight
marked did not really matter: in practice the system relied
on simple linear measurement and not on volumetric
calculation, despite the illusion to the contrary that the
instruments themselves give.
Such a system no doubt served the individual land-based
gunner well enough, steeped as he was in the pseudo-science
and mystique of his calling. The fiddling about with rules
and gauges, combined with the adjustment of complicated
instruments (themselves of questionable relevance and
precision) designed to compute traverse and elevation, was
all part of. an elaborate conjurer's trick consciously
intended to awe and mystifY, in which the careful selection
of the "right" projectile was one of the highlights. But on
the heaving deck of a ship at sea, with many weapons being
worked in close confinement under the bombardment of a
skilful and aggressive enemy, such niceties would hardly
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have been practicable. Under such circumstances the
individual rule-and-gauge system would surely have been
unworkable: the picture of a dozen powder-monkeys, each
clutching his wooden shot-gauge as he scrabbled in a dark
shot-locker for a ball to fit the gun he served, is scarcely
a credible one.
In the face of such predictable confusion an attempt
must have been made to impose some kind of regularity in the
allocation of shot to guns aboard each ship, and in the
overall issue of ammunition to the fleet. The duke of
Medina Sidonia's instructions to the Armada concerning the
operation of its guns imply as much: "near each piece," he
stipulated, "must be placed its magazines with
ammunition."(9) Nine years later, in his fleet orders of
1597, Martin de Padilla ordained that "•••numbers must be
set down upon every cartridge, according to the piece."(10)
What applied to cartridges must also have applied to shot
and, if so, a common standard of measurement must have been
employed. There is evidence from the Trinidad Valencera to
suggest that an overriding Castilian standard was indeed
imposed over the mainly Italian guns and artillery
instruments aboard this ship - and, by implication, over
those carried by the rest of the fleet. The evidence comes
from the largest of the four shot-gauges which, as we have
seen, carries the inscribed numeral XII and twelve edge
nicks, these marks almost certainly having been added after
manufacture. We have also postulated that it, and the other
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gauges, were originally identified by painted or inked
numerals which related them to individual Italian gunner's
rules, on which criterion this gauge would represent a ball
of 16-pounder calibre. The added marks, both of which
indicate the figure twelve, must therefore relate to
another, heavier, weight unit. The obvious candidate is the
Castilian libra Qf 460 grams, and indeed the 12-~ ball
illustrated in Acuna Vela's diagram of Spanish'shot sizes
(Figure 39) would fit it very closely (ball diameter 11.4
cm; gauge diameter 11.75 cm).
It thus seems likely that the Armada's gunners,
whatever their nationalities or those of their guns and
instruments of measurement, were expected to conform to a
common Castilian standard. How well this worked in practice
is beyond the scope of our evidence to determine, but we
have already seen enough of sixteenth-century arithmetic for
us to suspect that errors will have been common and often of
considerable magnitude. And there is another factor to take
into account. Shot could only be matched with the guns
aboard an individual ship if the ammunition issued in the
first place included projectiles of the right calibres and
in the right proportions. How this infinitely more complex
logistcal exercise was accomplished is nowhere made clear,
although the detailed ammunition figures available for the
four Neapolitan galleasses and two ships of the Levant
squadron (Anunciada[73] and Santa Marfa ~ Vison[76]) show
that twenty-one distinct sizes of iron shot were needed to
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serve the 183 iron-throwing guns aboard them, while their
forty-one pedreros will have required a further undefined
but presumably substantial variety of stone shot.(11} Nor
was this an isolated case. The iron shot sample recovered
,from the wreck of El~ Grifon has yielded forty-five
sizes of roundshot, as measured in arbitrary differentials
of 0.1 cm (see Figure 49).
Bearing in mind the general inefficiency of
manufacturing processes and distributive services of
sixteenth-century Europe, the chronic muddle of weights and
measures, and the demonstrable fact that sixteenth-century
sums are almost never right, it is reasonable to conclude
that the equation between calibres and shot sizes often fell
short of its theoretical solution. The neat allocation of
fifty rounds per gun throughout the fleet, recorded in the
Lisbon muster, should not therefore blind us to the
probability that much of this·shot was unsatisfactory or
even useless for the guns it was intended to serve.
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Appendix 3
A comparison of Spanish and English gun-type nomenclature:
the inventories of the NUestra Senora del Rosario [43] and
the San Salvador [56] (1)
Only two Spanish ships were captured by the English
during the Armada battles. The first was the Guipuzcoan~
Salvador, which was seriously damaged by an explosion early
in the fighting. The duke of Medina Sidonia made a valiant
attempt in adverse weather to tow her into the main body of
the fleet, but during the confusion the Andalusian cap1tana,
the Nuestra Senora ~ RosariO, which had broken her.
bowsprit in an earlier collision, was taken aback and lost
her foremast. After further attempts to rescue the two
crippled ships Medina Sidonia decided to abandon them both
to the enemy rather than imperil his primary objective. In
due course the ~ Salvador's burnt-out hull was towed into
Weymouth, while the Rosario, having been captured by Drake
and relieved of her commander, Pedro de Valdes, and a
considerable quantity of treasure, was taken to Dartmouth
under escort by Captain Jacob Whiddon of the Roebuck.
The English authorities later took detailed inventories
of the contents of both ships, with particular emphasis on
their artillery. By good fortune, these two vessels are
among the few for which we possess full armament lists from
Spanish sources. It is possible therefore to match one list
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against the other and so obtain a Spanish-English
"dictionary" of gun-names in which the meanings are defined
by the weapons themselves. Naturally, there are
difficulties. The Spanish gun-lists do not necessarily
reflect the exact armament with which each ship actually
sdl~, since additions or subtractions, or both, may
subsequently have been made by the Spaniards. Then again,
some illicit subtractions certdnly took place between the
capture of the ships and the time their official English
inventories were taken. Another problem arises in the
different criteria used in describing the pieces. In
general, the Spaniards gave the name of each gun and the
weight of shot it threw, but not the weight of the gun
itself. The English, on the other hand, omitted the weight
of shot but recorded the weight number marked on each piece,
together with their version of its name.
I have therefore attempted, somewhat arbitrarily, to
reconcile the lists by first arranging the Spanish-named
pieces in a logical progression of types, starting with the
largest, and then by setting the guns in the English column,
which is incomplete, against the Spanish master column in a
way which seems to me (on the baSiS, where no better
evidence is available, of common sense) to provide the best
set of equations between them. The result is, I think,
reasonably convincing. Not every gun, I am sure, is placed
correctly against its mirror in the opposite list, but I
believe that the reconciliation is close enough for us to
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extract a working vocabulary from the two languages.
Nuestra Senora ~ Rosario
GUDS listed by the Spaniards
-"canon 35-lbr
-/canon 28-lbr
medio canon 21-lbr
medio canon 20-lbr
medio canon 20-1br
medio canon 16-1br
medio can6n 16-lbr
medio can6n 15-1br
culebrina 18-lbr
culebrina 17-lbr
tercio can6n (iron) 10-lbr
media culebrina 8-lbr
sacre s-as-
sacre 7-lbr
sacre 6-lbr
sacra 6-lbr
sacra 6-1br (iron)
sacra 5-lbr
Guns listed by the English
demi cannon
demi cannon, 6-inch
bore, no mark
dem! cannon, 6-inch
bore, no mark
culverin
culverin
culverin
culverin
basilico
dem! culverin
(iron)
cannon padro
cannon padro
5230
4736
4728
4589
3200
4840
2300
3032
3021
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falcon pedrero 6-lbr
falc6n pedrero 6-lbr
cannon pedro 2934
cannon pedro 2894
cannon pedro 2639
cannon pedro 2566
great base 779
great base 775
great base 753
great base 708
minion 1100
great base 675
base
base
base
base
fowler
,falcon pedrero 5-lbr
falc6n pedrero (iron) 5-1br
falconete (iron) 4-lbr
falconete 3 1/2-lbr
falconete 3 1/2-1br
falconete 3 1/2-lbr
falconete 3-lbr
falconete 3-lbr
falconete 3-lbr
falconete 3-lbr
falconete 3-lbr
15 esmeriles de camaras dobles
Total: 46 guns 26 guns
~ Salvador
Guns listed by the Spaniards Guns listed by the English
,.., Spanish founding 5329canon 50-lbr, cannon
,. , Spanish founding 5222canon 50-lbr, cannon
medio -, Gregorio Lefer culverincanon za-n»,
..., Gregorio Lefer culverinmedio canon za-n»,
,.,,. pedrero, I cannon pedro 2572canon nueva fundicion
- 434 -
N, ,canon pedrero, nueva fundicion cannon pedro .. 2318
~, /canon pedrero, nueva fundicion cannon pedro 2077
-, ,canon pedrero, nueva fundicion cannon pedro 2019
canoncete 10-lbr, Juan Manrique culverin
media culebrina reforzada 8-lbr culverin
media culebrina reforzada 8-lbr culverin 2866
media culebrina, nueva fundicibn demi culverin 2866
, 14 iron guns, 1- 2 1/2-lbr 4 iron minions
1 old fowler and
a bad sling
Total: 26 guns 18 guns
These comparisons reveal a number of significant
points. First, it appears that to an Englishman only the
larger canones ~ batir qualified as full cannons. The two
50-~ canones from ~ Salvador are so listed in the
English inventory. But lighter guns like the 28- and
35-~ aboard the Rosario, which the Spaniards called
canones, appeared in English eyes to be demi cannons, used
as they were to a shot-weight of around 30 pounds for this
class of weapon. Spanish medios canones were clearly much
lighter pieces altogether. Four of the Rosario's six appear
to square with four culverins bearing weight marks between
3200 and 4736 in the English inventory: the shot-weight
range of these pieces, from the Spanish source, was 15- to
20-libras. /One medio canon appears to be missing from the
English list while a sixth, . the 21-~, may just have
scraped into the English demi cannon category if my
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interpretation, based on an estimate of its bore, is
correct. Then again, the two 22-~ medias canones from the
~ Salvador pair convincingly with two of the culverins,
whose weight marks are not recorded, from the English
list. Even by English criteria a heavy culverin and a light
demi cannon might easily overlap their bore dimensions.
Any attempt to compare the gun strength of the two
sides must therefore take into account the fact that a
Spanish ~, unless it is suffixed by "~batir", will
almost certainly equate with an English demi cannon. It
should also be appreciated that Spanish medias canones were,
for all practical purposes, synonymous with English
culverins. This suggests, in turn, that by 1588 an 18-~
(or thereabouts) with a barrel length of 25 calibres or
less, which a Spaniard would instinctively have called a
media ,canon, would in England have been classed as a
culverin. From this we may suspect that the true culverin,
with its length of 30 calibres or more, was falling out of
use in England, and perhaps, a~ the rarity of the type
aboard the Armada ships suggests, to a lesser extent in
Spain too. Thus when a Spanish culebrina (which we know
must have been a true long culverin, otherwise it would have
been classed as a media canan) like the Rosario's 18-~,
was inventoried by an Englishman, he listed it - assuming my
equation to be correct - not as a culverin but as a
basilica, a comparatively rare type of gun characterised by
its unusual length.
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Much the same conclusion can be drawn from the equation
between the Rosario's iron 10-~ tercio ,canon and the
2300-pound iron demi culverin of the English list. Here the
pairing is virtually certain, because this is the only iron
gun among the higher calibres in both lists. A Spanish
,
tercio canon was, presumably, distinguishable from a media
,culebrioa by its canon proportions of 25 calibres or less: a
length which evidently appeared, to a contemporary
Englishman, perfectly appropriate for a demi-culverin. The
implication once again is that the English culverin family,
by the 1580s if not before, had lost it length attribute.
William Bourne's remarks, published in 1587 and already
touched upon, deserve to be quoted again:
"•••and furthermore, upon good consideration,
for divers causes, and especially for the Queen's
navy, they have decided to make their ordnance
shorter than the accustomed manner, and so by that
means they are lighter than the pieces before time
made, and yet as servicable as the longer in some
points, shooting that weight in powder and in shot
that the heavier doth, in all points as the other;
for that metal is taken from the length of the
piece hurteth not the fortifYing of the piece. "(2)
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Most of the other "translations" demonstrated by the
lists are straightforward enough. Canones pedreros and
cannons pedro are one and the same, while the breech-loading
falcooes pedreros match the English great bases, with their
chambers and halls. Falconetes were bases or fowlers and
one suspects, on both sides, considerable diversities of
form among these smaller pieces. One obvious omission in
the English sources is that of the Rosario's fifteen
esmeriles ~ Cameras dobIes, whose usefulness and
portability doubtless ensured their disappearance long
before the English inventorists arrived at Dartmouth.
The anomaly presented by the six sacres which are
included in the Spanish list of the Rosario's armament but
which are not identifiable in the English inventory, and the
six cannons pedro which are listed in the latter but not in
the former, is easily resolved. In March 1588, Pedro de
Valdes asked that some of his squadron's guns might be
exchanged for heavier pieces, and the king approved his
request. The replacements Don Pedro had his eye on were
guns "which had been cast in that city" - that is, at
Lisbon.(3) Much of Acuna Vela's last-minute output of
artillery consisted of canones pedrero, and it is this type
of gun that the Rosario apparently now received. We do not
know the weight of shot thrown by these guns, but to judge
from their weight marks as recorded in
inventory, which range from 2566 to 3020,
the English
the pieces will
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have been 15- to 20-~, giving the Rosario a formidable if
extremely short-range total firepower in excess of 100
libras (stone) in exchange for the 38 libras of rather
longer-range iron firepower provided by the six sacres. We
must suppose that Don Pedro saw in the exchange a gain in
the fighting efficiency of his ship, which indicates that
he, like most of his compatriots, subscribed to the "close
and board" school of tactical thought.
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Appendix 4
The Order of Battle of the Spanish Armada
As far as can be ascertained, no manuscript copy of the fleet
muster held on 9 May 1588 has survived. A version of it was however
published at Lisbon within a matter of days, and numerous editions
subsequently appeared throughout Europe. The edition I have
consulted is the one published by Pedro de Paz Salas at Lisbon in
1588, of which there is a copy in the British Librar,y (192 f. 11.
(1», annotated in the hands of Lord Burghley and others.
The following tables are based on the Paz Salas edition, and
on the summary relaci6n issued by the duke of Medina Sidonia on
14 May 1588 (see p. 54 above). I have also incorporated information
contained in the two undated lists (see p. 109 above), which record
ships lost in the campaign, and those which returned to Spain.
These lists are not entirely consistent or correct. When a ship
appears on both, it is reasonable to assume that she returned
safely. Some of the ships listed as missing, moreover, m~ simply
have made for other ports, some of the hulks; and manY of the
smaller craft, almost certainly did so, while the galleass Zuniga
reached Le Havre, where she remained disabled for almost a year.
Most of the ships which carried 60 gUintales or more of
gunpowder were, I suggest, front-line "troubleshooters".
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MEN
General Staff
The duke of Medina Sidonia, capitan general
23 members of his personal staff, with 50 retainers
Alonso Mart~nez de Leyva, capit(n general of r~ilanese cavalr,r
vJuan Mart~nez de Recalde, general of the Biscayan squadron and
almirante of the Armada
Diego Flores de Valdes, general of the Castilian squadron
(and Medina Sidonia's semi-official Chief of Staff)
Pedro de Valdes, general of the Andalusian squadron
Miguel de Oquendo, general of the Guipuzcoan squadron
Mart!n de Bertendona, general of the Levant squadron
Hugo de Moncada, commanding the four Neapolitan galleasses
Diego de Medrano, commanding the four Portugese galleys
Juan Gomez de Medina, commanding the hulks
Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza, commanding the pataches and zabras
Jorge Manrique, vee dar general (inspector-general), with
50 members of his staff
~Bernabe de Pedroso, proveedqr (purveyor)
Mart!n de Aranda, auditor general (judge-general), with
19 members of his staff
Tom~s del Monte, alguacil real (royal constable)
Alonso de Alameda, contador (accountant)
Pedro Coco Calderon, contador
Juan de Huerta, pagador (p~aster)
Felipe de Porras, veedor of the galleasses
~Bernabe de Aliva, contador of Guipuzcoa
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Pedro de 19ueldo, contador of Biso~
Juan de los Rios, comisario de muestras (commissary for
muster-rolls)
Ochoa de Anuncibay, comisario
Pedro de Arbisua, comisario
Agustin de la Guerra, comisario
Diego Infante del Aguila, comisario
Juan Mart{nez de GUilistequi, comisario
Melchor Perez, veedor of the Sicilian tercio
Andres Roseto, escribano de raciones (ration clerk)
Francisco Ltpez de Espino, tenedor de bastimentos
(supply officer)
Fr~ Diego Calohorrano, canell!n general (chaplain-general)
Gentlemen-adventurers
122 aventureros (gentlemen-adventurers), all named in the original
460 criados (retainers)
Unattached officers
214 entretenidos (unattached officers)
146 criados
ArtillerY personnel
Alonso de C~spedes, teniente de capitan general (lieutenant to the
captain-general, i.e. to Juan de Acu~ Vela, who did not sail with
the fleet)
Capel1{n mayor (vicar-general)
Gentile hombre (gentleman)
2 ingenieros (engineers)
M ordomo de artillerfa con su a dante (superintendant of artillery
with his aide-de-camp
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,
Medico (doctor)
Cirujano (surgeon)
Boticario (apothecary)
Alguacil (provost)
Maestro mayor de carpenter!a (master carpenter)
Maestro mayor de herrer!a (master blacksmith)
9 herreros y carpinteros (blacksmiths and carpenters)
95 artilleros (artiller,ymen)
23 comisario de mulas y sus mozos (commissar of mules and his
stable lads)
8 criados de los oficiales
Hospital service
., .,
Mart1n de Alarcon, administrador general
Teniente (his lieutenant)
,
5 medicos
Ciru,jano mayor
4 cirujanos
5 ayudantes (assistants)
4 curas (priests)
Veedor (inspector)
Mayordomo (steward)
62 oficiales y mozos de servicio (officials and servants)
Chaplaincy
180 religiosos of various orders (listed by numbers of each
order in the original)
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Infantry
(names of company captains, and their company strengths,
are given in the original)
Francisco de Bobadilla, maestre de campo general
Tercio of Sicily, maestre de campo Diego Pimentel
26 companies totalling
Tercio of maestre de campo Francisco de Toledo
26 companies totalling
Tercio of Naples, maestre de campo Alonso de Luzon
26 companies totalling
Tercio of Nicolas de Isla
26 companies totalling
Tercio of Agustin Mexia
26 companies totalling
Comp~n!as sueltas (irregular companies)
32 companies totalling
Portugese troops under Gaspar de Sosa
and Antonio Pereira
2493
2694
2889
2439
2670
3589
2000
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EQUIPMENT
Field artillery
12 canones de batir with field carriages
21 other field pieces
40 mules
Artillery carts
Tackles, shear-legs, and beams
Hand Weapons
1000 arquebuses
1000 muskets
10,000 pikes
1000 partisans and halberds
6000 half-pikes
Munitions
(for fleet and army combined)
12),790 pieces of roundshot, of all calibres
5175 guintales of powder, all of fine-grained arquebus grade
1238 guintales of lead for small shot
1151 guintales of match
Pioneers' tools
(for 100 men)
Spades
Mattocks
Picks
Wooden shovels
Earth baskets
Knapsacks
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General equipment
Plates, cups, and bowls of wood and earthenware
Buckets of all kinds
Lanterns of various sizes
Sheet lead
Cowhides
Calfskin bags for gunpowder
Tapers and candles for the lanterns
Bags and knapsacks
Scales
Wooden barrel hoops
8000 leather bottles for wine and water
5000 pairs of zapatos (shoes)
11,000 pairs of alpargatas (rope-soled shoes)
Rigging tackle, sailcloth, oakum and iron
Banners of Christ, Our Lady, and the Royal Arms
PRO V I S ION S
(estimated to supply the Armada for six months)
110,000 guintales of biscuit
11,117 pipas of wine
6000 guintales of bacon
3000 guintales of cheese
6000 quintales of fish of various kinds
4000 quint ales of rice
6000 fanegas of beans and chick-peas
10,000 arrobas of oil
21,000 arrobas of vinegar
11,000 pipas of water
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I.A.A. Thompson's estimate of the Armada's total gun-strength,
which he published in his Spanish Armada guns, appears below, with
comparative information for the English fleet derived from Michael
Lewis's Armada guns. Because of the various anomalies which existed
between Spanish and English gun-type nomenclature, as discussed in
Appendix 3, these lists should not be treated as strictly
synorzymous.
Armada English fleet
Canones (28-50 l£!) 31 1
Medios canones (15-27 Ibr) 81 54
Canoncetes (9-14 lbr) 24
Pedreros (4-12 Ibr) 231 43
Culebrinas (16-21 Ibr) 21 153
Medias culebrinas (7~14 Ibr) 151 344
Sacres (5-8 Ibr) 244 662
Medias sacres (3-4 Ibr) 70 715
Larger iron guns 264
Miscellaneous small pieces 1291
2394 1912
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5. I have assessed the Lavia's keel length as 53/65ths of
her eslor!a figure - this being the ratio cited by Veitia
Linage (op. cit., XIV: 14, p. 172) in his specification of
a 700-ton iale6n.
6. Although the six Armada ships in the document under
discussion were rated according to the "three percent"
formula, some of the others may have been assessed by the
later "five percent" method. Such seems to have been the
case with the Andalusian ~ ~ ~ Gargar!n [46], whose
eslor!a (47 3/4 codas), mania (14 codas), and puntal (14 1/3
codos) dimensions only square with the resultant figure of
569 toneladas if the later formula is used (AGS CMC
2a/1012).
- 507 -
Appendix Z
1. There are three in the Tower of London collections; see
Blackmore, The Armouries of the Tower of London, nos. 295,
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squadron, 31 October 1587 (AGS GA 221/41) and the additions
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2. Bourne, Arte of Shooting in Great Ordnaunce, p. 13.
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